




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FILE: [Redacted]
MSC 01 331 62105

Office: LOS ANGELES

Date: SEP 22

IN RE: Applicant: [Redacted]

APPLICATION: Application for Status as a Permanent Resident pursuant to Section 1104 of the Legal Immigration Family Equity (LIFE) Act of 2000, Pub. L. 106-553, 114 Stat. 2762 (2000), amended by LIFE Act Amendments, Pub. L. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

SELF-REPRESENTED

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. If your appeal was sustained, or if the matter was remanded for further action, you will be contacted. If your appeal was dismissed, you no longer have a case pending before this office, and you are not entitled to file a motion to reopen or reconsider your case.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "R. Wiemann".

Robert P. Wiemann, Chief
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The application for permanent resident status under the Legal Immigration Family Equity (LIFE) Act was denied by the District Director, Los Angeles, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The director denied the application because the applicant had not demonstrated that she had continuously resided in the United States in an unlawful status from before January 1, 1982 through May 4, 1988.

An applicant for permanent resident status must establish entry into the United States before January 1, 1982 and continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since such date and through May 4, 1988. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.11(b).

An applicant for permanent resident status under section 1104 of the LIFE Act has the burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she has resided in the United States for the requisite periods, is admissible to the United States and is otherwise eligible for adjustment of status under this section. The inference to be drawn from the documentation provided shall depend on the extent of the documentation, its credibility and amenability to verification. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.12(e).

The “preponderance of the evidence” standard requires that the evidence demonstrate that the applicant's claim is “probably true,” where the determination of “truth” is made based on the factual circumstances of each individual case. *Matter of E-M-*, 20 I&N Dec. 77, 79-80 (Comm. 1989). In evaluating the evidence, *Matter of E-M-* also stated that “[t]ruth is to be determined not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality.” *Id.* Thus, in adjudicating the application pursuant to the preponderance of the evidence standard, the director must examine each piece of evidence for relevance, probative value, and credibility, both individually and within the context of the totality of the evidence, to determine whether the fact to be proven is probably true.

Even if the director has some doubt as to the truth, if the petitioner submits relevant, probative, and credible evidence that leads the director to believe that the claim is “probably true” or “more likely than not,” the applicant or petitioner has satisfied the standard of proof. *See U.S. v. Cardozo-Fonseca*, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (defining “more likely than not” as a greater than 50 percent probability of something occurring). If the director can articulate a material doubt, it is appropriate for the director to either request additional evidence or, if that doubt leads the director to believe that the claim is probably not true, deny the application or petition.

Here, the submitted evidence is not relevant, probative, and credible.

In the Notice of Intent to Deny (NOID), the director observed that, at an interview on May 18, 1992, the applicant testified and signed a written statement indicating that she departed from the United States in April 1981 and did not return until December 1983. In response to the NOID, the applicant submitted a statement denying that she ever gave such testimony or submitted such a written statement. The applicant also submitted receipts dated during this period from the [REDACTED] made to a [REDACTED] apparently for expenses related to the care of the applicant's children. In denying the applicant's application, the director stated that the information submitted by the applicant failed to overcome the grounds for denial stated in the NOID. On appeal, the applicant states only that she believes the evidence she submitted previously is sufficient to establish her eligibility.

Doubt cast on any aspect of the applicant's proof may lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in support of the application. It is incumbent upon the applicant to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence, and attempts to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies, absent competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth, in fact, lies, will not suffice. *Matter of Ho*, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591-92 (BIA 1988).

The record contains a written statement from the applicant and notes of the applicant's oral testimony consistent with the director's decision. The applicant has failed to present competent objective evidence to explain the inconsistency between this evidence and the applicant's claim to have continuously resided in the United States in an unlawful status from before January 1, 1982 through May 4, 1988.

As stated in 8 C.F.R. § 103.3(a)(3)(iv), any appeal which is filed that fails to state the reason for appeal, or is patently frivolous, will be summarily dismissed. The applicant has failed to address the reasons stated for denial and have not provided any additional evidence on appeal. The appeal must therefore be summarily dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. This decision constitutes a final notice of ineligibility.

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