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
Office: LOS ANGELES

Date: **APR 01 2008**

IN RE: Applicant: [REDACTED]

APPLICATION: Application for Status as a Permanent Resident pursuant to Section 1104 of the Legal Immigration Family Equity (LIFE) Act of 2000, Pub. L. 106-553, 114 Stat. 2762 (2000), *amended by* LIFE Act Amendments, Pub. L. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:



INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. If your appeal was dismissed or rejected, all documents have been returned to the National Benefits [or Records] Center. You no longer have a case pending before this office, and you are not entitled to file a motion to reopen or reconsider your case. If your appeal was sustained or remanded for further action, you will be contacted.

Robert P. Wiemann, Chief  
Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The application for permanent resident status under the Legal Immigration Family Equity (LIFE) Act was denied by the District Director, Los Angeles, California, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The district director denied the application because the applicant had not demonstrated that she had continuously resided in the United States in an unlawful status from before January 1, 1982 through May 4, 1988.

On appeal, counsel for the applicant submits a brief and resubmits documentation previously provided.

Section 1104(c)(2)(B) of the LIFE Act states:

(i) In General – The alien must establish that the alien entered the United States before January 1, 1982, and that he or she has resided continuously in the United States in an unlawful status since such date and through May 4, 1988. In determining whether an alien maintained continuous unlawful residence in the United States for purposes of this subparagraph, the regulations prescribed by the Attorney General under section 245A(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) that were most recently in effect before the date of the enactment of this Act shall apply.

An applicant for permanent resident status under section 1104 of the LIFE Act has the burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she has resided in the United States for the requisite periods, is admissible to the United States and is otherwise eligible for adjustment of status under this section. The inference to be drawn from the documentation provided shall depend on the extent of the documentation, its credibility and amenability to verification. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.12(e).

The “preponderance of the evidence” standard requires that the evidence demonstrate that the applicant's claim is “probably true,” where the determination of “truth” is made based on the factual circumstances of each individual case. *Matter of E-M-*, 20 I&N Dec. 77, 79-80 (Comm. 1989). In evaluating the evidence, *Matter of E-M-* also stated that “[t]ruth is to be determined not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality.” *Id.* Thus, in adjudicating the application pursuant to the preponderance of the evidence standard, the director must examine each piece of evidence for relevance, probative value, and credibility, both individually and within the context of the totality of the evidence, to determine whether the fact to be proven is probably true.

Even if the district director has some doubt as to the truth, if the applicant submits relevant, probative, and credible evidence that leads the director to believe that the claim is “probably true” or “more likely than not,” the applicant has satisfied the standard of proof. See *U.S. v. Cardozo-Fonseca*, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (defining “more likely than not” as a greater than 50 percent probability of something occurring). If the director can articulate a material doubt, it is appropriate

for the director to either request additional evidence or, if that doubt leads the director to believe that the claim is probably not true, deny the application.

Although the regulations provide an illustrative list of contemporaneous documents that an applicant may submit, the list also permits the submission of affidavits and any other relevant document. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(vi)(L).

While there is no specific regulation that governs what third party individual affidavits should contain to be of sufficient probative value, the regulations do set forth the elements that affidavits are to include. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3). These guidelines provide a basis for a flexible standard of the information that an affidavit should contain in order to render it probative for the purpose of comparison with the other evidence of record.

According to the guidelines set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3), a signed attestation should contain (1) an identification of the applicant by name; (2) the dates of the applicant's continuous residence to which the affiant can personally attest; (3) the address(es) where the applicant resided throughout the period which the affiant has known the applicant; (4) the basis for the affiant's acquaintance with the applicant; (5) the means by which the affiant may be contacted; and, (6) the origin of the information being attested to. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(v).

Nevertheless, an affidavit not meeting all the foregoing requirements may still merit consideration as "any other relevant document" pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(vi)(L).

On October 25, 2005, the district director issued a Notice of Intent to Deny (NOID) the applicant's Form I-485, Application to Register Permanent Residence or Adjust Status (under the LIFE ACT), advising the applicant that there were inconsistencies between her application, oral testimony, and evidence provided that called into question the credibility of her case. The district director specifically noted that during the applicant's deportation proceeding in 1998, she stated that she came to the United States for the first time in or about July 1989; however, during an interview on March 18, 1992, she stated under oath (and provided a written sworn statement) that she came to the United States for the first time in June 1987. The director further noted that the applicant had failed to submit evidence to establish that her initial entrance into the United States took place prior to January 1, 1982. The district director granted the applicant 30 days to submit additional evidence.

In response, counsel for the applicant submitted a letter stating that the applicant first came to the United States in January 1981 and that her only departure was for 2 weeks in June 1989. Counsel asserted that the applicant had been misguided and confused by a dishonest attorney and that the date the applicant gave in her deportation hearing was her most recent date of entry - not the first entry date - because her attorney at that time needed to establish eligibility for suspension of deportation and did not need to reveal or argue her 1981 entry date because it would not have mattered. Counsel further asserted that "...for the purpose of applications for relief involving entry dates, attorneys routinely report the oldest entry date that can be proven with documents, as long as overall eligibility can be established ...." In support of the appeal, counsel submitted declarations from the applicant,

several of the applicant's relatives (including her spouse, son, daughter, and sister-in-law), a friend and a co-worker.

In a decision to deny the application, dated November 28, 2005, the district director noted that there was no evidence on file that the applicant ever had an attorney representing her and that the applicant could not use this as a reason for providing inconsistent testimony.

On appeal, counsel submits a brief. Counsel asserts that the declarations provided by the applicant are sufficient to establish her eligibility for adjustment of status to permanent resident under the LIFE Act. Counsel reiterates that the misunderstandings regarding the applicant's dates of entry were the result of "ineffective assistance of counsel" and "ordinary attorney custom for suspension of deportation relief." In support of the appeal, counsel resubmits photocopies of the declarations provided in response to the NOID. No new evidence or argument has been submitted by counsel on appeal.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.12(e) provides that "[a]n alien applying for adjustment of status under [section 1104 of the LIFE Act] has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she has resided in the United States for the requisite periods." Preponderance of the evidence is defined as "evidence which as a whole shows that the fact sought to be proved is more probable than not." Black's Law Dictionary 1064 (5<sup>th</sup> ed. 1979). *See Matter of Lemhammad*, 20 I&N Dec. 316, 320, Note 5 (BIA 1991).

Given the insufficiencies and discrepancies in the evidence submitted, the AAO determines that the applicant has not met her burden of proof. The applicant has not established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that she entered the United States before January 1, 1982 and resided in this country in an unlawful status continuously since that time through May 4, 1988, as required under 1104(c)(2)(B)(i) of the LIFE Act and 8 C.F.R. § 245a.11(b).

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed. This decision constitutes a final notice of ineligibility.