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[REDACTED]

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FILE: [REDACTED]  
MSC 02 240 63443

Office: GARDEN CITY

Date: **AUG 29 2008**

IN RE: Applicant: [REDACTED]

APPLICATION: Application for Status as a Permanent Resident pursuant to Section 1104 of the Legal Immigration Family Equity (LIFE) Act of 2000, Pub. L. 106-553, 114 Stat. 2762 (2000), *amended by* LIFE Act Amendments, Pub. L. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000).

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

[REDACTED]

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. If your appeal was sustained, or if your case was remanded for further action, you will be contacted. If your appeal was dismissed, you no longer have a case pending before this office, and you are not entitled to file a motion to reopen or reconsider your case.

Robert P. Wiemann, Chief  
Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The application for permanent resident status under the Legal Immigration Family Equity (LIFE) Act was denied by the District Director, New York, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The district director denied the application because the applicant failed to demonstrate that he entered the United States before January 1, 1982, and continuously resided in the United States in an unlawful status since such date through May 4, 1988, as required by section 1104(c)(2)(B) of the LIFE Act.

On appeal, counsel asserts that the director failed to give proper consideration to the evidence/documents submitted by the applicant in support of his claim. Counsel contends that the applicant has met his burden of proof to establish his claim.

Section 1104(c)(2)(B) of the LIFE Act states:

(i) In General – The alien must establish that the alien entered the United States before January 1, 1982, and that he or she has resided continuously in the United States in an unlawful status since such date and through May 4, 1988. In determining whether an alien maintained continuous unlawful residence in the United States for purposes of this subparagraph, the regulations prescribed by the Attorney General under section 245A(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) that were most recently in effect before the date of the enactment of this Act shall apply.

An applicant for permanent resident status under section 1104 of the LIFE Act must establish entry into the United States before January 1, 1982, and continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since such date through May 4, 1988. *See* § 1104(c)(2)(B) of the LIFE Act and 8 C.F.R. § 245a.11(b). The applicant has the burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she has resided in the United States for the requisite periods, is admissible to the United States and is otherwise eligible for adjustment of status under section 1104 of the LIFE Act. The inference to be drawn from the documentation provided shall depend on the extent of the documentation, its credibility and amenability to verification. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.12(e).

The “preponderance of the evidence” standard requires that the evidence demonstrate that the applicant's claim is “probably true,” where the determination of “truth” is made based on the factual circumstances of each individual case. *Matter of E-M-*, 20 I&N Dec. 77, 79-80 (Comm. 1989). In evaluating the evidence, *Matter of E-M-* also stated that “[t]ruth is to be determined not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality.” *Id.* at 80. Thus, in adjudicating the application pursuant to the preponderance of the evidence standard, the director must examine each piece of evidence for relevance, probative value, and credibility, both individually and within the context of the totality of the evidence, to determine whether the fact to be proven is probably true.

Even if the director has some doubt as to the truth, if the applicant submits relevant, probative, and credible evidence that leads the director to believe that the claim is “probably true” or “more likely than not,” the applicant or applicant has satisfied the standard of proof. *See U.S. v. Cardozo-Fonseca*, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (defining “more likely than not” as a greater than 50 percent probability of something occurring). If the director can articulate a material doubt, it is appropriate for the director to either request additional evidence or, if that doubt leads the director to believe that the claim is probably not true, deny the application.

Although the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3) provides an illustrative list of contemporaneous documents that an applicant may submit in support of his or her claim of continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since prior to January 1, 1982, the submission of any other relevant document is permitted pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(vi)(L). To meet his or her burden of proof, an applicant must provide evidence of eligibility apart from the applicant’s own testimony. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.13(f).

At issue in this proceeding is whether the applicant has submitted sufficient credible evidence to meet the burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the applicant’s claim of continuous unlawful residence in the United States during the requisite period is probably true. Upon an examination of each piece of evidence for relevance, probative value, and credibility, both individually and within the context of the totality of the evidence, the AAO finds that the applicant has failed to meet this burden.

In a March 29, 2004, interview the applicant asserted that he first arrived in the United States in October 1981 on a B2 visitor visa entering at JFK airport in New York. The applicant failed to submit any evidence of this entry.

In support of his continuous residence in the United States during the requisite period, the record contains two declarations of employment in support of the applicant’s claim. The first declaration is from [REDACTED] owner of [REDACTED]. He stated that the applicant worked for the company from November 1981 to June 1987 as a stock boy and was paid in cash. The second declaration is from [REDACTED] owner of ATA Construction. The declarant stated that the applicant worked for the company from July 20, 1987, to January 30, 1992, as an occasional helper, painter and wood worker, and he was paid in cash. By regulation, letters from employers should be on employer letterhead stationery if available and must include the applicant’s address at the time of employment, exact period of employment and layoffs, duties with the company; whether the information was taken from official company records; and where records are located and whether CIS may have access to the records; if records are unavailable, an affidavit explaining this shall also state the employer’s willingness to come forward and give testimony if requested. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(i). Neither affidavit meets these regulatory standards. They do not provide the applicant’s address at the time of employment and the affiants do not offer to either produce official company records or to testify regarding unavailable records. These letters can be accorded only minimal weight as evidence of residence during the requisite period.

It is also noted that during his interview, the applicant stated that he worked in construction from 1981 to 1991 and at a fruit store from 1981 to 1982. The applicant's statements are inconsistent with the above affidavits, as well as his Form I-687, Application for Status as a Temporary Resident, signed by the applicant on December 31, 1992. It is incumbent upon the applicant to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence. Any attempt to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies will not suffice unless the applicant submits competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. *Matter of Ho*, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591-92 (BIA 1988). The record contains no independent objective evidence to explain the above inconsistency.

A few errors or minor discrepancies are not reason to question the credibility of an alien or an employer seeking immigration benefits. *See, e.g., Spencer Enterprises Inc. v. U.S.*, 345 F.3d 683, 694 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir., 2003). However, anytime an application includes errors and discrepancies, and the applicant fails to resolve those errors and discrepancies after provided an opportunity to do so, those inconsistencies will raise serious concerns about the veracity of the applicant's assertions. The applicant was given an opportunity to resolve the above inconsistencies, but failed to do so on appeal. These inconsistencies seriously detract from the credibility of the applicant's claim.

The record also includes an affidavit, dated December 31, 1992, from [REDACTED]. The affiant stated that to his personal knowledge the applicant resided in the United States at [REDACTED] New York, from November 1981 to May 1992. The affiant also stated that he met the applicant at a religious gathering in Brooklyn in 1981. While this affidavit is consistent with the applicant's Form I-687, the affiant failed to provide details regarding his claimed friendship with the applicant or to provide any information that would indicate personal knowledge of the applicant's places of residence or the circumstances of his residence over the prior ten or eleven years of his claimed relationship. Lacking relevant details, the affidavit has minimal probative value.

The AAO finds that, upon an examination of each piece of evidence for relevance, probative value, and credibility, both individually and within the context of the totality of the evidence, the applicant has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that he resided in the United States for the requisite period.

Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 245a.12(e), the inference to be drawn from the documentation provided shall depend on the extent of the documentation, its credibility and amenability to verification. Given the lack of credible supporting documentation and the inconsistencies noted in the record, it is concluded that the applicant has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he entered the United States before January 1, 1982 and maintained continuous, unlawful residence from such date through May 4, 1988, as required for eligibility for adjustment to permanent resident status under section 1104(c)(2)(B)(i) of the LIFE Act. The applicant is, therefore, ineligible for permanent resident status under section 1104 of the LIFE Act.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed. This decision constitutes a final notice of ineligibility.