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U.S. Department of Homeland Security
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U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services

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FILE: [Redacted]
MSC 02 254 62364

Office: Chicago

Date: FEB 04 2008

IN RE: Applicant:



APPLICATION: Application for Status as a Permanent Resident pursuant to Section 1104 of the Legal Immigration Family Equity (LIFE) Act of 2000, Pub. L. 106-553, 114 Stat. 2762 (2000), *amended by* LIFE Act Amendments, Pub. L. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000).

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:



INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. If your appeal was sustained, or if the matter was remanded for further action, you will be contacted. If your appeal was dismissed, you no longer have a case pending before this office, and you are not entitled to file a motion to reopen or reconsider your case.

Robert P. Wiemann, Chief
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The application for permanent resident status under the Legal Immigration Family Equity (LIFE) Act was denied by the District Director, Chicago, Illinois, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be sustained.

The district director denied the application based upon the determination that the applicant had not established that she resided in the United States in a continuous unlawful status from before January 1, 1982 through May 4, 1988, as required by section 1104(c)(2)(B) of the LIFE Act.

On appeal, the applicant's representative objects to the fact that application was denied less than thirty days after the notice of intent to deny had been issued. The applicant's representative also objects to the fact that the applicant was asked to provide documentation relating to her marital history as it was not relevant to the applicant eligibility for permanent residence under section 1104 of the LIFE Act.

An applicant for permanent resident status must establish entry into the United States before January 1, 1982 and continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since such date and through May 4, 1988. Section 1104(c)(2)(B) of the LIFE Act and 8 C.F.R. § 245a.11(b).

An applicant for permanent resident status under section 1104 of the LIFE Act has the burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she has resided in the United States for the requisite periods, is admissible to the United States and is otherwise eligible for adjustment of status under this section. The inference to be drawn from the documentation provided shall depend on the extent of the documentation, its credibility and amenability to verification. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.12(e).

The "preponderance of the evidence" standard requires that the evidence demonstrate that the applicant's claim is "probably true," where the determination of "truth" is made based on the factual circumstances of each individual case. *Matter of E-M-*, 20 I&N Dec. 77, 79-80 (Comm. 1989). In evaluating the evidence, *Matter of E-M-* also stated that "[t]ruth is to be determined not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality." *Id.* Thus, in adjudicating the application pursuant to the preponderance of the evidence standard, the director must examine each piece of evidence for relevance, probative value, and credibility, both individually and within the context of the totality of the evidence, to determine whether the fact to be proven is probably true.

Even if the director has some doubt as to the truth, if the petitioner submits relevant, probative, and credible evidence that leads the director to believe that the claim is "probably true" or "more likely than not," the applicant or petitioner has satisfied the standard of proof. *See U.S. v. Cardozo-Fonseca*, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (defining "more likely than not" as a greater than 50 percent probability of something occurring). If the director can articulate a material doubt, it is appropriate for the director to either request additional evidence or, if that doubt leads the director to believe that the claim is probably not true, deny the application or petition.

Although the regulations provide an illustrative list of contemporaneous documents that an applicant may submit, the list also permits the submission of affidavits and any other relevant document. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(vi)(L).

At issue in this proceeding is whether the applicant has submitted sufficient credible evidence to establish entry into the United States before January 1, 1982 and continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since such date and through May 4, 1988. Here, the submitted evidence is relevant, probative, and credible.

The applicant made a claim to class membership in a legalization class-action lawsuit and as such, was permitted to previously file a Form I-687, Application for Temporary Resident Status Pursuant to Section 245A of the Immigration and Nationality Act (Act), on September 14, 1990. A review of the Form I-687 application reveals that this document was prepared by an individual other than the applicant. This individual noted that the applicant had used the name [REDACTED] during the requisite period at part #4 of the Form I-687 application.

The record shows that the applicant subsequently filed her Form I-485 LIFE Act application on June 11, 2002.

In cases where an applicant claims to have met any of the eligibility criteria under an assumed name, the applicant has the burden of proving that he or she was in fact the person who used that name. 8 C.F.R. § 245.2(d)(2)(i).

The most persuasive evidence of common identity is a document issued in the assumed name which identifies the applicant by photograph, fingerprint or detailed physical description. Other evidence which will be considered are affidavit(s) by a person or persons other than the applicant, made under oath, which identify the affiant by name and address and state the affiant's relationship to the applicant and the basis of the affiant's knowledge of the applicant's use of the assumed name. Affidavits accompanied by a photograph which has been identified by the affiant as the individual known to the affiant under the assumed name in question will carry greater weight. Other documents showing the assumed name may serve to establish the common identity when substantiated by corroborating detail. 8 C.F.R. § 245.2(d)(2)(ii).

The record does not contain any evidence or testimony other than the applicant's own in support of her claim to have used another name during a portion of the requisite period. However, the record contains sufficient evidence including contemporaneous documentation in the applicant's given name for that same period. Consequently, there need not be any determination as to whether the applicant has met her burden of proving that she had in fact used a different name pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 245.2(d)(2)(ii).

In support of her claim of continuous residence in this country since prior to January 1, 1982, the applicant submitted two birth certificates reflecting that she bore two children in the United States during the requisite period, two employment letters, six affidavits of residence, six letters,

two affidavits attesting to the applicant's brief absence from this country during the requisite period, immunization records, two original Form W-2, Wage and Tax Statements, a paycheck stub, a letter from the Internal Revenue Service, and baptismal certificates.

In the notice of intent to deny issued on June 15, 2004, the district director questioned the veracity of the applicant's claimed residence in the United States for the requisite period. Although the director incorrectly applied the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b) to the instant application, it is harmless error because the AAO conducts a de novo review, evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence in the record according to its probative value and credibility as required by the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.12(f).

The statements of the applicant's representative on appeal have been considered. In this instance, the applicant submitted evidence, including affidavits, letters, and contemporaneous documents, which tends to corroborate her claim of residence in the United States during the requisite period. The district director has not sufficiently established that the information in this evidence was inconsistent with the claims made on the application, or that it was false information. As stated in *Matter of E-M*, when something is to be established by a preponderance of evidence, the proof submitted by the applicant has to establish only that the assertion or asserted claim is probably true. *Id.* That decision also points out that, under the preponderance of evidence standard, an application may be granted even though some doubt remains regarding the evidence. The documents that have been furnished may be accorded substantial evidentiary weight and are sufficient to meet the applicant's burden of proof of residence in the United States for the requisite period.

The documentation provided by the applicant establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that she satisfies the statutory and regulatory criteria of entry into the United States before January 1, 1982, as well as continuous unlawful residence in the country during the ensuing time frame of January 1, 1982 through May 4, 1988, as required for eligibility for legalization under section 1104(c)(2)(B)(i) of the LIFE Act. Consequently, the applicant has overcome the basis of denial cited by the district director.

Accordingly, the applicant's appeal will be sustained. The district director shall continue the adjudication of the application for permanent resident status.

ORDER: The appeal is sustained.