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U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services

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[Redacted]

FILE:

MSC 02 143 64146

Office: NEW YORK

Date:

NOV 25 2008

IN RE:

Applicant:

[Redacted]

APPLICATION:

Application for Status as a Permanent Resident pursuant to Section 1104 of the Legal Immigration Family Equity (LIFE) Act of 2000, Pub. L. 106-553, 114 Stat. 2762 (2000), *amended by* LIFE Act Amendments, Pub. L. 106-554. 114 Stat. 2763 (2000).

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

[Redacted]

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. If your appeal was dismissed or rejected, all documents have been returned to the National Benefits Center. You no longer have a case pending before this office, and you are not entitled to file a motion to reopen or reconsider your case. If your appeal was sustained or remanded for further action, you will be contacted.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "John F. Grissom".

John F. Grissom, Acting Chief
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The application for permanent resident status under the Legal Immigration Family Equity (LIFE) Act was denied by the Director, New York, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The director denied the application because the applicant failed to demonstrate that she resided in the United States in a continuous, unlawful status from before January 1, 1982, through May 4, 1988, as required by section 1104(c)(2)(B) of the LIFE Act.

On appeal, counsel for the applicant contends that the applicant responded to the director's Notice of Intent to Deny. However, counsel asserts that the documents were returned for failure to include correct information. Counsel requests that the AAO accept the documents and reverse the director's decision.

Section 1104(c)(2)(B) of the LIFE Act states:

(i) In General – The alien must establish that the alien entered the United States before January 1, 1982, and that he or she has resided continuously in the United States in an unlawful status since such date and through May 4, 1988. In determining whether an alien maintained continuous unlawful residence in the United States for purposes of this subparagraph, the regulations prescribed by the Attorney General under section 245A(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) that were most recently in effect before the date of the enactment of this Act shall apply.

An applicant for permanent resident status under section 1104 of the LIFE Act must establish entry into the United States before January 1, 1982, and continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since such date through May 4, 1988. See § 1104(c)(2)(B) of the LIFE Act and 8 C.F.R. § 245a.11(b). The applicant has the burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she has resided in the United States for the requisite periods, is admissible to the United States and is otherwise eligible for adjustment of status under section 1104 of the LIFE Act. The inference to be drawn from the documentation provided shall depend on the extent of the documentation, its credibility and amenability to verification. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.12(e). To meet his or her burden of proof, an applicant must provide evidence of eligibility apart from the applicant's own testimony, and the sufficiency of all evidence produced by the applicant will be judged according to its probative value and credibility. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.12(f).

The "preponderance of the evidence" standard requires that the evidence demonstrate that the applicant's claim is "probably true," where the determination of "truth" is made based on the factual circumstances of each individual case. *Matter of E-M-*, 20 I&N Dec. 77, 79-80 (Comm. 1989). In evaluating the evidence, *Matter of E-M-* also stated that "[t]ruth is to be determined not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality." *Id.* at 80. Thus, in adjudicating the application pursuant to the preponderance of the evidence standard, the director must examine each piece of evidence for relevance, probative value, and credibility, both individually and

within the context of the totality of the evidence, to determine whether the fact to be proven is probably true.

Even if the director has some doubt as to the truth, if the applicant submits relevant, probative, and credible evidence that leads the director to believe that the claim is “probably true” or “more likely than not,” the applicant or petitioner has satisfied the standard of proof. *See U.S. v. Cardozo-Fonseca*, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (defining “more likely than not” as a greater than 50 percent probability of something occurring). If the director can articulate a material doubt, it is appropriate for the director to either request additional evidence or, if that doubt leads the director to believe that the claim is probably not true, deny the application.

Although the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3) provides an illustrative list of contemporaneous documents that an applicant may submit in support of his or her claim of continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since prior to January 1, 1982, the submission of any other relevant document is permitted pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(vi)(L).

The issue in this proceeding is whether the applicant (1) entered the United States before January 1, 1982, and (2) has continuously resided in the United States in an unlawful status for the requisite period of time. The documentation that the applicant submits in support of her claim to have arrived in the United States before January 1982 and resided in an unlawful status during the requisite period consists of attestations from individuals claiming to know the applicant, an employment letter, a church letter, and several postmarked envelopes. Some of the evidence submitted indicates that the applicant resided in the United States after May 4, 1988; however, because evidence of residence after May 4, 1988 is not probative of residence during the requisite time period, it shall not be discussed. The AAO has reviewed each document in its entirety to determine the applicant’s eligibility; however, the AAO will not quote each witness statement in this decision.

The affidavits from [REDACTED] all contain statements that the affiants have known the applicant since 1981 and that they attest to the applicant being physically present in the United States during the required period. These affidavits fail, however, to establish the applicant’s continuous unlawful residence in the United States for the duration of the requisite period. As stated previously, the evidence must be evaluated not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality; an applicant must provide evidence of eligibility apart from his or her own testimony; and the sufficiency of all evidence produced by the applicant will be judged according to its probative value and credibility.

None of the witness statements provide concrete information, specific to the applicant and generated by the asserted associations with her, which would reflect and corroborate the extent of those associations and demonstrate that they were a sufficient basis for reliable knowledge about the applicant’s residence during the time addressed in the affidavits. To be considered probative and credible, witness affidavits must do more than simply state that an affiant knows

an applicant and that the applicant has lived in the United States for a specific time period. Their content must include sufficient detail from a claimed relationship to indicate that the relationship probably did exist and that the witness does, by virtue of that relationship, have knowledge of the facts alleged. Upon review, the AAO finds that, individually and together, the witness statements do not indicate that their assertions are probably true. Therefore, they have little probative value.

In addition, the affidavits from [REDACTED] contain contradictory information. Both affiants assert that they have personal knowledge that the applicant resided in the United States since January 1981 to present. However, both affiants state that they met the applicant several months later in 1981. These inconsistencies detract from the credibility of the affiants. Given these inconsistencies, the affidavits are deemed not credible and shall be afforded little weight.

The affidavit from [REDACTED] indicates that the applicant has resided in the United States since January 1981 to November 1987, worked as a housekeeper, and traveled to Mexico in November 1987 for a few days. The affidavit lacks details regarding his claimed friendship with the applicant or any information that would indicate personal knowledge of the applicant's 1981 entry into the United States. Although he claims to have known the applicant since 1981, he fails to note how or where he met her. Lacking relevant details, this evidence has minimal probative value.

The employment affidavit from [REDACTED] is also of little value because it fails to conform to the regulatory standards at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(i). The affiant failed to provide the applicant's address at the time of employment, to declare whether the information was taken from company records, and to identify the location of such company records and state whether such records are accessible or in the alternative state the reason why such records are unavailable.

The church letter from [REDACTED] parochial vicar as well as counsel for the applicant, also fails to conform to the regulatory standards at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(v). The letter failed to state the address where the applicant resided during the membership period, establish how the author knows the applicant, and establish the origin of the information being attested to. The letter will be given little weight as evidence of the applicant's residence in the United States during the requisite period.

The record also contains four envelopes addressed to the applicant from Peru. These envelopes are postmarked in 1981, December 14, 1982, March 24, 1983, and December 29, 1984. While these envelopes will be given some weight as evidence of the applicant's presence in the United States, they do not establish the applicant's continuous residence during those years.

Therefore, based upon the foregoing, the applicant has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he entered the United States before January 1, 1982 and maintained continuous, unlawful residence from such date through May 4, 1988, as required for eligibility for adjustment to

permanent resident status under section 1104(c)(2)(B)(i) of the LIFE Act. The applicant is, therefore, ineligible for permanent resident status under section 1104 of the LIFE Act.

Beyond the decision of the director, the record indicates that on January 19, 1999, the applicant was arrested and charged with *disorderly conduct*, in violation of section 240.20 of the New York Penal Code (Certificate of Disposition Number [REDACTED]). On January 20, 1999, the applicant was convicted of *disorderly conduct*, a violation. The applicant was sentenced to community service. This single violation conviction does not render the applicant ineligible pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 245a.11(d)(1) and 8 C.F.R. § 245a.18(a).

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. This decision constitutes a final notice of ineligibility.