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
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
20 Mass. Ave., N.W., Rm. 3000
Washington, DC 20529



U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services

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FILE:



Office: LOS ANGELES

Date: SEP 24 2008

MSC 02 243 60380

IN RE: Applicant:



APPLICATION: Application for Status as a Permanent Resident pursuant to Section 1104 of the Legal Immigration Family Equity (LIFE) Act of 2000, Pub. L. 106-553, 114 Stat. 2762 (2000), amended by Life Act Amendments, Pub. L. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000).

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:



INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. The file has been returned to the National Benefits Center. If your appeal was sustained, or if the matter was remanded for further action, you will be contacted. If your appeal was dismissed, you no longer have a case pending before this office, and you are not entitled to file a motion to reopen or reconsider your case.

Robert P. Wiemann, Chief
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The application for permanent resident status under the Legal Immigration Family Equity (LIFE) Act was denied by the District Director, Los Angeles, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The district director denied the application because the applicant had not demonstrated that he had continuously resided in the United States in an unlawful status since before January 1, 1982 through May 4, 1988.

On appeal counsel for the applicant asserts that the applicant has established his continuous residence and physical presence during the required period, and that the applicant was denied his due process rights by not having his attorney present during an interview.

An applicant for permanent resident status must establish entry into the United States before January 1, 1982 and continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since such date and through May 4, 1988. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.11(b).

An applicant for permanent resident status under section 1104 of the LIFE Act has the burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she has resided in the United States for the requisite periods, is admissible to the United States and is otherwise eligible for adjustment of status under this section. The inference to be drawn from the documentation provided shall depend on the extent of the documentation, its credibility and amenability to verification. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.12(e).

An applicant must establish eligibility by a preponderance of the evidence. The "preponderance of the evidence" standard requires that the evidence demonstrate that the applicant's claim is "probably true," where the determination of "truth" is made based on the factual circumstances of each individual case. *Matter of E-M-*, 20 I&N Dec. 77, 79-80 (Comm. 1989). In evaluating the evidence, *Matter of E-M-* also stated that "[t]ruth is to be determined not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality." *Id.* Thus, in adjudicating the application pursuant to the preponderance of the evidence standard, the director must examine each piece of evidence for relevance, probative value, and credibility, both individually and within the context of the totality of the evidence, to determine whether the fact to be proven is probably true.

Even if the director has some doubt as to the truth, if the petitioner submits relevant, probative, and credible evidence that leads the director to believe that the claim is "probably true" or "more likely than not," the applicant or petitioner has satisfied the standard of proof. *See U.S. v. Cardozo-Fonseca*, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (defining "more likely than not" as a greater than 50 percent probability of something occurring). If the director can articulate a material doubt, it is appropriate for the director to either request additional evidence or, if that doubt leads the director to believe that the claim is probably not true, deny the application or petition.

Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) regulations provide an illustrative list of contemporaneous documents that an applicant may submit to establish presence during the required period. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.15(b)(1); *see also* 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(vi)(L). Such evidence may include employment records, tax records, utility bills, school records, hospital or medical

records, or attestations by churches, unions, or other organizations so long as certain information is included. The regulations also permit the submission of affidavits and any other relevant document, but applications submitted with unverifiable documentation may be denied. Documentation that does not cover the required period is not relevant to a determination of the alien's presence during the required period and will not be considered or accorded any evidentiary weight in these proceedings.

On September 20, 2006, the director sent the applicant a Notice of Intent to Deny (NOID), which stated that the evidence submitted by the applicant was insufficiently probative of continuous unlawful residence in the U.S. from prior to January 1, 1982 through May 4, 1988, and continuous physical presence in the U.S. from November 6, 1986 through May 4, 1988. In addition the director cited the applicant's failure to provide the final disposition for charges listed on his criminal record.

In response the applicant provided documentation regarding the final disposition of his DWI charge in Florida.

On May 9, 2007, the director denied the application because the applicant had failed to establish his continuous unlawful presence during the required period.

On appeal the applicant asks that CIS reconsider his application.

Upon examination of the record the applicant has submitted sufficient evidence to support that he was probably resident in the United States from May 1984, and continuously present from the period after July 1985. The period in question is the applicant's arrival prior to January 1, 1982, and continuous residence and presence through July 1985.

Relevant to the period in question the record contains the following evidence:

1. A document signed by _____ asserting generically that he has known the applicant since March, 1983.
2. A copy of a document labeled as a lease for the year 1983 with an income certification.
3. A copy of a document labeled "quotation", dated September 16, 1982, and bearing a letterhead of the Carricarte Corporation "The Insurance People."

As stated above, the inference to be drawn from the documentation provided shall depend on the *extent* of the documentation. The minimal evidence furnished cannot be considered extensive, and in such cases a negative inference regarding the claim may be made as stated in 8 C.F.R. § 245a.12(e).

Documents which generically assert an affiant has known an applicant since a particular year are not sufficiently probative to support assertions of eligibility. In this case the document at No. 1 above is simply not sufficiently probative to add significant weight to the applicant's assertions of residence and continuous presence.

The document at No. 2 above would normally be considered probative evidence, however in this case the AAO would note an inconsistency in the dates applied to the document raising suspicions that it is either not authentic or was fabricated in 1990, the date of the signatory attestation on the Income Certification. For this reason the document is not sufficiently credible to support the applicant's assertions.

In addition, the document labeled as an insurance quote is not signed, and the AAO would note that the business name does not appear to comply with industry norms by indicating it is an actual corporation. While the document is not clearly lacking in credibility, it does not add significant weight to the applicant's assertions.

Even in a light most favorable to the applicant, the evidence does not cover the entire required period. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). An aggregate analysis of the evidence of record does not establish that the applicant entered the United States prior to January 1, 1982, and resided continuously through May 4, 1988. For this reason the director's decision will be upheld and the appeal dismissed.

An alien applying for LIFE Act legalization has the burden of proving that he or she meets the requirements enumerated above and is otherwise eligible under the provisions of section 245a of the Act. The applicant has failed to meet this burden.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. This decision constitutes a final notice of ineligibility.