


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U.S. Citizenship
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FILE:

Office: VERMONT SERVICE CENTER

Date: **APR 28 2008**

[EAC 07 266 52344, motion]

[EAC 01 177 50558]

IN RE:


Applicant:



APPLICATION:

Application for Temporary Protected Status under Section 244 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.c. § 1254

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:



INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

for Robert P. Wiemann, Chief
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The application was denied by the Director, Vermont Service Center. The matter is now before the AAO on a motion to reopen. The motion to reopen will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of El Salvador who is seeking Temporary Protected Status (TPS) under section 244 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1254.

The record reveals that the applicant filed a TPS application during the initial registration period on May 15, 2001, under Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) receipt number EAC 01 177 50558. The Director, Vermont Service Center, denied that application on July 22, 2004, because the applicant had been convicted of two misdemeanors in the United States. On August 12, 2004, the applicant filed an appeal from the denial decision. The Director (now Chief), AAO, dismissed that appeal on July 19, 2007.

On motion to reopen, counsel for the applicant states that the applicant had not been convicted of two misdemeanor offenses. According to counsel, CIS is cataloguing offenses based on the number of days a person may be sentenced to and is not distinguishing between mere traffic violations and actual criminal offenses.

Contrary to counsel's contention, Federal immigration laws should be applied uniformly, without regard to the nuances of state law. See *Ye v. INS*, 214 F.3d 1128, 1132 (9th Cir. 2000); *Burr v. INS*, 350 F.2d 87, 90 (9th Cir. 1965). Thus, whether a particular offense under state law constitutes a "misdemeanor" for immigration purposes is strictly a matter of federal law. See *Franklin v. INS*, 72 F.3d 571 (8th Cir. 1995); *Cabral v. INS*, 15 F.3d 193, 196 n.5 (1st Cir. 1994). While we must look to relevant state law in order to determine whether the statutory elements of a specific offense satisfy the regulatory definition of "misdemeanor," the legal nomenclature employed by a particular state to classify an offense or the consequences a state chooses to place on an offense in its own courts under its own laws does not control the consequences given to the offense in a federal immigration proceeding. See *Yazdchi v. INS*, 878 F.2d 166, 167 (5th Cir. 1989); *Babouris v. Esperdy*, 269 F.2d 621, 623 (2d Cir. 1959); *United States v. Flores-Rodriguez*, 237 F.2d 405, 409 (2d Cir. 1956).

The fact that New York's legal taxonomy classifies the applicant's offense as a "violation" rather than a "crime," and precludes the offense from giving rise to any criminal disabilities in New York, is simply not relevant to the question of whether the offense qualifies as a "misdemeanor" for immigration purposes. For immigration purposes, a misdemeanor is any offense that is punishable by imprisonment for a term of one year or less, regardless of the term such alien actually served, if any. It is also noted that offenses that are punishable by imprisonment for a maximum term of five days or less shall not be considered a misdemeanor. In this case, New York law provides, and counsel concedes, that a violation of VTL 509 and VTL 1193.1 are punishable by up to fifteen days incarceration. Therefore, we conclude that the applicant's convictions qualify as "misdemeanors" as defined for immigration purposes in 8 C.F.R. § 244.1.

The applicant is ineligible for TPS due to his record of at least two misdemeanor convictions, detailed above. Section 244(c)(2)(B)(i) of the Act and 8 C.F.R. § 244.4(a). Consequently, the director's decision to deny the application for this reason will be affirmed.

The burden of proof in these proceedings rests solely with the applicant. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.c. § 1361. That burden has not been met since the applicant has not provided any new facts or additional evidence to overcome the previous decision of the AAO. Accordingly, the motion to reopen will be dismissed and the previous decision of the AAO will not be disturbed.

ORDER: The motion to reopen is dismissed. The previous decision of the AAO dated July 19, 2007, is affirmed.