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U.S. Department of Homeland Security
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Washington, DC 20536

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services

[redacted]

FILE: [redacted] Office: TEXAS SERVICE CENTER Date: MAY 28 2004
SRC 03 151 50529

IN RE: Petitioner: [redacted]
Beneficiary:

PETITION: Petition for Alien Fiancé(e) Pursuant to Section 101(a)(15)(K) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(K)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: SELF-REPRESENTED

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

Robert P. Wiemann, Director
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The nonimmigrant visa petition was denied by the Director, Texas Service Center, and is now on appeal before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO). The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner is a naturalized citizen of the United States who seeks to classify the beneficiary, a native and citizen of Ghana, as the fiancée of a United States citizen pursuant to section 101(a)(15)(K) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(K).

The director denied the petition after determining that the petitioner had not offered documentation evidencing that he and the beneficiary had personally met within two years before the date of filing the petition, as required by section 214(d) of the Act. *See* Notice of Decision to Deny, dated November 10, 2003.

Section 101(a)(15)(K) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(K), provides nonimmigrant classification to an alien who:

> (i) is the fiancé(e) of a U.S. citizen and who seeks to enter the United States solely to conclude a valid marriage with that citizen within 90 days after admission;
>
> (ii) has concluded a valid marriage with a citizen of the United States who is the petitioner, is the beneficiary of a petition to accord a status under section 201(b)(2)(A)(i) that was filed under section 204 by the petitioner, and seeks to enter the United States to await the approval of such petition and the availability to the alien of an immigrant visa; or
>
> (iii) is the minor child of an alien described in clause (i) or (ii) and is accompanying, or following to join, the alien.

Section 214(d) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1184(d), states, in pertinent part, that a fiancé(e) petition:

> . . . shall be approved only after satisfactory evidence is submitted by the petitioner to establish that the parties have previously met in person within two years before the date of filing the petition, have a bona fide intention to marry, and are legally able and actually willing to conclude a valid marriage in the United States within a period of ninety days after the alien's arrival. . . .

Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(k)(2), the petitioner may be exempted from this requirement for a meeting if it is established that compliance would:

> (1) result in extreme hardship to the petitioner; or
> (2) that compliance would violate strict and long-established customs of the beneficiary's foreign culture or social practice, as where marriages are traditionally arranged by the parents of the contracting parties and the prospective bride and groom are prohibited from meeting subsequent to the arrangement and prior to the wedding day. In addition to establishing that the required meeting would be a violation of custom or practice, the petitioner must also establish that any and all other aspects of the traditional arrangements have been or will be met in accordance with the custom or practice.

The regulation at section 214.2 does not define what may constitute extreme hardship to the petitioner. Therefore, each claim of extreme hardship must be judged on a case-by-case basis taking into account the

totality of the petitioner's circumstances. Generally, a director looks at whether the petitioner can demonstrate the existence of circumstances that are (1) not within the power of the petitioner to control or change, and (2) likely to last for a considerable duration or the duration cannot be determined with any degree of certainty.

The petitioner filed the Petition for Alien Fiancé(e) (Form I-129F) with the Immigration and Naturalization Service [now Citizenship and Immigration Services] on May 6, 2003. Therefore, the petitioner and the beneficiary were required to have met during the period that began on May 6, 2001 and ended on May 6, 2003.

In response to the director's request for additional evidence, the petitioner submitted a letter stating that he and the beneficiary had not met within the two-year period prior to filing the Form I-129F petition because of his hectic employment schedule with the United States military.

On appeal, the petitioner states that he seeks a waiver based on his profession. The petitioner asks that his situation be considered extreme hardship and submits a Statement of Service from the United States Army, dated June 16, 2003, and a letter from his chaplain in the United States Army, dated December 10, 2003.

The AAO notes that while the petitioner and the beneficiary are required to meet under section 214(d) of the Act, the statute does not require the petitioner to travel to the beneficiary's home country. The record does not demonstrate that the petitioner and the beneficiary explored options for a meeting beyond the petitioner traveling to Ghana, including, but not limited to the beneficiary traveling to meet the petitioner in the United States or a bordering country. The inability of the petitioner to travel to the home country of the beneficiary standing alone does not warrant a finding of extreme hardship. Furthermore, the petitioner's lack of time to travel to Ghana does not constitute extreme hardship to the petitioner pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(k)(2). The time commitment required for travel to a foreign destination is a common requirement to those filing a Form I-129F petition. The AAO notes that the petitioner entered active duty in the United States armed forces on August 20, 2002. If the petitioner had traveled to Ghana to meet the beneficiary anytime between May 6, 2001 and the date of his entrance into the United States Army, the meeting would have fulfilled the requirement of section 214(d) of the Act.

The evidence of record does not establish that the petitioner and the beneficiary met as required. Taking into account the totality of the circumstances as the petitioner has presented them, the AAO does not find that compliance with the meeting requirement would result in extreme hardship to the petitioner or would violate strict and long-established customs of the beneficiary's foreign culture or social practice. Therefore, the appeal will be dismissed.

Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(k)(2), the denial of the petition is without prejudice. The petitioner may file a new Form I-129F petition on the beneficiary's behalf when sufficient evidence is available.

The burden of proof in these proceedings rests solely with the petitioner. *See* Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The petitioner has not met that burden. Therefore, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.