


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
Office: TEXAS SERVICE CENTER

Date: **MAY 12 2008**

IN RE: Petitioner: [redacted]  
Beneficiary: [redacted]

PETITION: Immigrant petition for Alien Worker as a Skilled Worker or Professional pursuant to section 203(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:



**INSTRUCTIONS:**

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

*Robert P. Wiemann for*  
Robert P. Wiemann, Chief  
Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The preference visa petition was denied by the Director, Texas Service Center, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal.<sup>1</sup> The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner is a nursing care facility. It seeks to employ the beneficiary permanently in the United States as a registered nurse. The petitioner asserts that the beneficiary qualifies for blanket labor certification pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 656.10, Schedule A, Group I. As required by statute, a Form ETA 9089, Application for Permanent Employment Certification (Form ETA 9089 or labor certification) accompanied the petition. The director determined that the petitioner had failed to establish its ability to pay the proffered wage. The director denied the petition accordingly.

The record shows that the appeal is properly filed, timely and makes a specific allegation of error in law or fact. The procedural history in this case is documented by the record and incorporated into the decision. Further elaboration of the procedural history will be made only as necessary.

As set forth in the director's October 25, 2006 denial, the primary issue in this case is whether or not the petitioner has the ability to pay the proffered wage as of the priority date and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence.

Section 203(b)(3)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(i), provides for the granting of preference classification to qualified immigrants who are capable, at the time of petitioning for classification under this paragraph, of performing skilled labor (requiring at least two years training or experience), not of a temporary nature, for which qualified workers are not available in the United States.

The regulation 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states in pertinent part:

*Ability of prospective employer to pay wage.* Any petition filed by or for an employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements. In a case where the prospective United States employer employs 100 or more workers, the director may accept a statement from a financial officer of the organization which establishes the prospective employer's ability to pay the proffered wage. In appropriate cases, additional evidence, such as profit/loss statements, bank account records, or personnel records, may be submitted by the petitioner or requested by [Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS)].

The priority date for the instant petition is the date the ETA Form 9089 was properly filed with Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS), or September 15, 2006. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(d). The proffered wage as stated on the ETA Form 9089 is \$40,310.40 per year. On the petition, the petitioner claimed to have been

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<sup>1</sup> The instant petitioner filed another immigrant petition (LIN-06-075-51746) on behalf of the instant beneficiary with the Nebraska Service Center on January 12, 2006 while the instant appeal was pending with the AAO. On December 7, 2006, the Nebraska Service Center denied the petition because the petition did not include a prevailing wage determination in accordance with 20 C.F.R. § 656.40(c). No further action was taken on that petition.

established in 1981, to have a gross annual income of \$3,854,154, and to currently employ eighty-seven (87) workers. On the ETA Form 9089, the beneficiary did not claim to have worked for the petitioner.

The petitioner must establish that its job offer was realistic as of the priority date and that the offer remained realistic for each year thereafter, until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. The petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is an essential element in evaluating whether a job offer is realistic. *See Matter of Great Wall*, 16 I&N Dec. 142 (Acting Reg. Comm. 1977). *See also* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2).

The AAO maintains plenary power to review each appeal on a de novo basis. 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) ("On appeal from or review of the initial decision, the agency has all the powers which it would have in making the initial decision except as it may limit the issues on notice or by rule."); *see also, Janka v. U.S. Dept. of Transp.*, NTSB, 925 F.2d 1147, 1149 (9th Cir. 1991). The AAO's de novo authority has been long recognized by the federal courts. *See, e.g. Dor v. INS*, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989). The AAO considers all pertinent evidence in the record, including new evidence properly submitted upon appeal.<sup>2</sup> On appeal, counsel submits a brief and copies of invoices the petitioner issued for the contract nursing in 2005. Other relevant evidence in the record includes the petitioner's corporate federal income tax return for 2005, financial statements for 2005, Form 941, Employer's Quarterly Tax Return, for the first and second quarters of 2006, bank statements for months from March 2006 to August 2006, W-2 forms issued to its employees in 2005 and a staffing agreement between the petitioner and a staffing company. The record does not contain any other evidence relevant to the petitioner's ability to pay the wage.

On appeal, counsel asserts that the petitioner paid \$176,996 for contract nursing in 2005, which could be used to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage in 2005. Counsel also argues that the submitted bank statements reflect the petitioner's finances at the end of each month in 2006, and therefore, they do in fact show a sustained ability to pay the proffered wage.

In determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage during a given period, CIS will first examine whether the petitioner employed and paid the beneficiary during that period. If the petitioner establishes by documentary evidence that it employed the beneficiary at a salary equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the evidence will be considered *prima facie* proof of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. In the instant case, the beneficiary did not claim to have worked for the petitioner and the petitioner did not submit any evidence to show that the petitioner paid the beneficiary any amount of compensation in the relevant years. It is noted that the petitioner submitted all W-2 forms issued to its employees in 2005 and the petitioner's Forms 941 for the first and second quarters of 2006 show that the petitioner paid salaries to its employees during the two quarters. However, these documents do not list the beneficiary as one of the paid employees. In general, wages already paid to others are not available to prove the ability to pay the wage proffered to the beneficiary at the priority date of the petition and continuing to the present. Thus, the petitioner failed to establish its ability to pay the proffered wage through wages paid to the beneficiary.

If the petitioner does not establish that it employed and paid the beneficiary an amount at least equal to the proffered wage during that period, CIS will next examine the net income figure reflected on the petitioner's federal income tax return, without consideration of depreciation or other expenses. Reliance on federal income tax returns as a basis for determining a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is well

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<sup>2</sup> The submission of additional evidence on appeal is allowed by the instructions to the Form I-290B, which are incorporated into the regulations by the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(1) and the record in the instant case provides no reason to preclude consideration of any of the documents newly submitted on appeal, *See Matter of Soriano*, 19 I&N Dec. 764 (BIA 1988).

established by judicial precedent. *Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava*, 632 F. Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (citing *Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman*, 736 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1984)); see also *Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh*, 719 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Texas 1989); *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), *aff'd*, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983). Reliance on the petitioner's gross income and gross profit is misplaced. Showing that the petitioner's total income exceeded the proffered wage is insufficient. Similarly, showing that the petitioner paid wages in excess of the proffered wage is insufficient.

In *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. at 1084, the court held that the Immigration and Naturalization Service, now CIS, had properly relied on the petitioner's net income figure, as stated on the petitioner's corporate income tax returns, rather than the petitioner's gross income. Reliance on the petitioner's depreciation in determining its ability to pay the proffered wage is misplaced. The court in *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava* specifically rejected the argument that the Service should have considered income before expenses were paid rather than net income. The court in *Chi-Feng Chang* further noted:

Plaintiffs also contend the depreciation amounts on the 1985 and 1986 returns are non-cash deductions. Plaintiffs thus request that the court *sua sponte* add back to net cash the depreciation expense charged for the year. Plaintiffs cite no legal authority for this proposition. This argument has likewise been presented before and rejected. See *Elatos*, 632 F. Supp. at 1054. [CIS] and judicial precedent support the use of tax returns and the *net income figures* in determining petitioner's ability to pay. Plaintiffs' argument that these figures should be revised by the court by adding back depreciation is without support.

(Emphasis in original.) *Chi-Feng Chang* at 537.

The petitioner submitted its Form 1120S U.S. Income Tax Return for an S Corporation for 2005 as evidence of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. According to the tax return in the record, the petitioner is structured as an S corporation, and its fiscal year is based on a calendar year. This office notes that the priority date in the instant case is September 15, 2006, therefore, the petitioner is responsible to establish its ability to pay the proffered wage from 2006, the year of the priority date. However, the record before the director closed on October 23, 2006 with the receipt by the director of the petitioner's submissions in response to the director's request for evidence (RFE). As of that date the petitioner's federal tax return, annual report or audited financial statement for 2006 was not yet available. Therefore, the AAO will examine the petitioner's 2005 tax return as primary evidence in determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage.

The petitioner's tax return for 2005 stated that the petitioner had a net income<sup>3</sup> of \$8,709.<sup>4</sup> Therefore, for the year 2005, the petitioner did not have sufficient net income to pay the proffered wage.

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<sup>3</sup> Where an S corporation's income is exclusively from a trade or business, CIS considers net income to be the figure for ordinary income, shown on line 21 of page one of the petitioner's Form 1120S. The instructions on the Form 1120S U.S. Income Tax Return for an S Corporation state on page one, "Caution: Include only trade or business income and expenses on lines 1a through 21."

Where an S corporation has income from sources other than from a trade or business, net income is found on Schedule K. The Schedule K form related to the Form 1120S states that an S corporation's total income from its various sources are to be shown not on page one of the Form 1120S, but on line 23 or line 17e of the Schedule K, Shareholders' Shares of Income, Credits, Deductions, etc. See Internal Revenue Service, Instructions for Form 1120S (2003), available at <http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/i1120s--2003.pdf>; Instructions for Form 1120S (2002), available at <http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/i1120s--2002.pdf>.

If the net income the petitioner demonstrates it had available during that period, if any, added to the wages paid to the beneficiary during the period, if any, do not equal the amount of the proffered wage or more, CIS will review the petitioner's assets. We reject, however, the idea the petitioner's total assets should have been considered in the determination of the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner's total assets include depreciable assets that the petitioner uses in its business. Those depreciable assets will not be converted to cash during the ordinary course of business and will not, therefore, become funds available to pay the proffered wage. Further, the petitioner's total assets must be balanced by the petitioner's liabilities. Otherwise, they cannot properly be considered in the determination of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. Rather, CIS will consider net current assets as an alternative method of demonstrating the ability to pay the proffered wage. Counsel urges that the petitioner's cash on hand should be added to its net profits in calculating the funds available to the petitioner to pay the proffered wage. That calculation would be inappropriate. Some portion of the petitioner's revenue during a given year is paid in expenses and the balance is the petitioner's net income. Of its net income, some is retained as cash. Adding the petitioner's Schedule L Cash to its net income would likely be duplicative, at least in part. The petitioner's Schedule L Cash is included in the calculation of the petitioner's net current assets, which are considered separately from its net income.

Net current assets are the difference between the petitioner's current assets and current liabilities.<sup>5</sup> A corporation's year-end current assets are shown on Schedule L, lines 1 through 6. Its year-end current liabilities are shown on lines 16 through 18. If the total of a corporation's end-of-year net current assets and the wages paid to the beneficiary (if any) are equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the petitioner is expected to be able to pay the proffered wage using those net current assets.

The petitioner's net current assets during 2005 were \$(122,202). Therefore, for the year 2005, the petitioner did not have sufficient net current assets to pay the proffered wage.

The record contains the petitioner's financial statements for 2005. The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) makes clear that where a petitioner relies on financial statements to demonstrate its ability to pay the proffered wage, those financial statements must be audited. The accountants make clear in their compilation report that accompanied those financial statements that they have not audited or reviewed the accompanying financial statements and supplementary schedules. An audit is conducted in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards to obtain a reasonable assurance that the financial statements of the business are free of material misstatements.<sup>6</sup> The unaudited financial statements that counsel submitted with the petition are not persuasive evidence. The accountant's report that accompanied those financial statements makes clear that

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<sup>4</sup> The director erred in taking the figure reposted on line 21 and stating that the petitioner's net income was \$18,164.00 in 2005; however, this error does not alter the ultimate outcome of the appeal.

<sup>5</sup> According to *Barron's Dictionary of Accounting Terms* 117 (3<sup>rd</sup> ed. 2000), "current assets" consist of items having (in most cases) a life of one year or less, such as cash, marketable securities, inventory and prepaid expenses. "Current liabilities" are obligations payable (in most cases) within one year, such as accounts payable, short-term notes payable, and accrued expenses (such as taxes and salaries). *Id.* at 118.

<sup>6</sup> However, the accountant's compilation report dated February 16, 2006 indicates a departure from general accepted accounting principles.

they were produced pursuant to a compilation rather than an audit. As the accountant's report also makes clear, financial statements produced pursuant to a compilation are the representations of management compiled into standard form. The unsupported representations of management are not reliable evidence and are insufficient to demonstrate the ability to pay the proffered wage.

Counsel also submitted bank statements for the petitioner's checking account for the six months from March 2006 to August 2006. Although the bank statements are for 2006, the year of the priority date in the instant case, counsel's reliance on the balance in the petitioner's bank account is misplaced. First, bank statements are not among the three types of evidence, enumerated in 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2), required to illustrate a petitioner's ability to pay a proffered wage. While this regulation allows additional material "in appropriate cases," the petitioner in this case has not demonstrated why the documentation specified at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) is inapplicable. Second, bank statements show the amount in an account on a given date, and cannot show the sustainable ability to pay a proffered wage. Counsel argues these bank statements reflect the petitioner's finances at the end of each month in 2006, and therefore, they do in fact show a sustained ability to pay the proffered wage for 2006. However, counsel did not submit the bank statements for September 2006, the month of the priority date, and nor did counsel submit the petitioner's bank statements for January and February 2006 preventing any meaningful analysis of 2006 ability to pay.

Counsel claims on appeal that the petitioner paid \$176,996 for contract nursing and submits copies of invoices showing that the petitioner paid total of \$168,976.75 in 2005 to contract nurses due to lack of employed nurses. Counsel advises that this compensation was for services that would, in part, be provided by the beneficiary upon approval of the petitioner's offer of full time employment for the beneficiary. The petitioner did not, however, document that it had replaced or would replace the contract nurses with the beneficiary. The assertions of counsel do not constitute evidence. *Matter of Obaigbena*, 19 I&N Dec. 533, 534 (BIA 1988); *Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez*, 17 I&N Dec. 503, 506 (BIA 1980). In addition, the amount of compensation paid to contract nurses alleged by counsel from the unaudited financial statements and shown on the invoices is not supported by the petitioner's tax return or other regulatory-prescribed evidence. The petitioner's 2005 tax return did not show that the petitioner reported any cost of labor or other costs on the schedule A, line 3 or 5 of the 1120S form except for salaries and wages of \$1,970,987 paid to its 87 employees reported on line 8 of the 1120S form (proximately at the level of \$22,655 annually per person). Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). It is also noted that some invoices submitted as evidence of compensation payments to contractors are not for registered nurses. Therefore, counsel's request for replacement would be given less weight in the proceeding. The replacement argument cannot establish the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the proffered wage in the instant case.

If the instant petition were the only petition filed by the petitioner, the petitioner would be required to produce evidence of its ability to pay the proffered wage to the single beneficiary of the instant petition. However, where a petitioner has filed multiple petitions for multiple beneficiaries which have been pending simultaneously, the petitioner must produce evidence that its job offers to each beneficiary are realistic, and therefore, that it has the ability to pay the proffered wages to each of the beneficiaries of its pending petitions, as of the priority date of each petition and continuing until the beneficiary of each petition obtains lawful permanent residence. See *Matter of Great Wall*, 16 I&N Dec. 142, 144-145 (Acting Reg. Comm. 1977) (petitioner must establish ability to pay as of the date of the Form MA 7-50B job offer, the predecessor to the Form ETA 750 and ETA Form 9089). See also 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2). CIS records show that the petitioner

had at least two petitions filed and approved in 2005 and 2006 respectively.<sup>7</sup> Therefore, the petitioner must establish that it had sufficient net income or net current assets to pay all multiple beneficiaries of the approved or pending petitions. However, the record does not contain any evidence showing that the petitioner had such ability in either 2005 or 2006.

Therefore, the petitioner had not established that it had continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage through an examination of wages paid to the beneficiary, its net income or net current assets. Counsel's assertions on appeal cannot be concluded to outweigh the evidence presented in the tax returns as submitted by the petitioner that demonstrates that the petitioner could not pay the proffered wage from the day the ETA Form 9089 accepted for processing by the Department of Labor. The decision of the director must be affirmed.

Beyond the director's decision and counsel's assertions on appeal, the AAO has identified an additional ground of ineligibility and will discuss whether the petitioner submitted evidence that notice was posted in accordance with 20 C.F.R. § 656.10(d). An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. *See Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States*, 299 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), *aff'd*, 345 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2003); *see also Dor v. INS*, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989)(noting that the AAO reviews appeals on a de novo basis).

The regulatory scheme governing the alien labor certification process contains certain safeguards to assure that petitioning employers do not treat alien workers more favorably than U.S. workers. New DOL regulations concerning labor certifications went into effect on March 28, 2005. The new regulations are referred to by DOL by the acronym PERM. *See* 69 Fed. Reg. 77325, 77326 (Dec. 27, 2004). The PERM regulation was effective as of March 28, 2005, and applies to labor certification applications for the permanent employment of aliens filed on or after that date. Therefore, PERM applies to the instant case.

The regulation at 20 C.F.R. § 656.15 states in pertinent part:

- (a) *Filing application.* An employer must apply for a labor certification for a *Schedule A* occupation by filing an application in duplicate with the appropriate DHS office, and not with an ETA application processing center.
- (b) *General documentation requirements.* A *Schedule A* application must include:
  - (1) An *Application for Permanent Employment Certification* form, which includes a prevailing wage determination in accordance with § 656.40 and § 656.41.
  - (2) Evidence that notice of filing the Application for Permanent Employment Certification was provided to the bargaining representative or the employer's employees as proscribed in § 656.10(d).

The regulation at 20 C.F.R. § 656.10(d) states in pertinent part:

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<sup>7</sup> The two approved petitions are as follows:

LIN-05-276-51601 filed on September 30, 2005 and approved on October 26, 2005;

SRC-07-054-52186 filed on December 18, 2006 and approved on December 28, 2006.

CIS records also show that the petitioner filed other immigrant petitions but they were denied.

- (1) In applications filed under Section 656.15 (Schedule A), 656.16 (Shepherders), 656.17 (Basic Process), 656.18 (College and University Teachers), and 656.21 (Supervised Recruitment), the employer must give notice of the filing of the Application for Permanent Employment Certification and be able to document that notice was provided, if requested by the Certifying Officer, as follows:
  - (i) To the bargaining representative(s) (if any) of the employer's employees in the occupational classification for which certification of the job opportunity is sought in the employer's location(s) in the area of intended employment. Documentation may consist of a copy of the letter and a copy of the Application for Permanent Employment Certification form that was sent to the bargaining representative.
  - (ii) If there is no such bargaining representative, by posted notice to the employer's employees at the facility or location of the employment. The notice shall be posted for at least 10 consecutive business days. The notice must be clearly visible and unobstructed while posted and must be posted in conspicuous places where the employer's U.S. workers can readily read the posted notice on their way to or from their place of employment. Appropriate locations for posting notices of the job opportunity include locations in the immediate vicinity of the wage and hour notices required by 29 CFR 516.4 or occupational safety and health notices required by 29 CFR 1903.2(a). In addition, the employer must publish the notice in any and all in-house media, whether electronic or printed, in accordance with the normal procedures used for the recruitment of similar positions in the employer's organization. The documentation requirement may be satisfied by providing a copy of the posted notice and stating where it was posted, and by providing copies of all the in-house media, whether electronic or print, that were used to distribute notice of the application in accordance with the procedures used for similar positions within the employer's organization.
- (3) The notice of the filing of an Application for Alien Employment Certification must:
  - (i) State the notice is being provided as a result of the filing of an application for permanent alien labor certification for the relevant job opportunity;
  - (ii) State any person may provide documentary evidence bearing on the application to the Certifying Officer of the Department of Labor;
  - (iii) Provide the address of the appropriate Certifying Officer; and
  - (iv) Be provided between 30 and 180 days before filing the application.

The regulation at 20 C.F.R. § 656.10(d)(3) requires the notice of the filing must state that any person may provide documentary evidence bearing on the application to the Certifying Office and provide the address of the appropriate Certifying Officer. The notice of job opportunity in the record contains an address for Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of Labor, Nebraska Service Center at 850 S. Street, Lincoln, NE 68508 as the appropriate Certifying Officer's address. While the address lists U.S. Department of Labor, it is not an address for the Department of Labor, nor is it an address for the appropriate certifying officer under the PERM regulation. The petitioner failed to post the notice of filing in compliance with the requirements of the regulations because it failed to provide the correct address of the appropriate certifying officer.

The regulations also require that the employer must publish the notice in any and all in-house media, whether electronic or printed, in accordance with the normal procedures used for the recruitment of similar positions in the employer's organization. The documentation requirement may be satisfied by providing a copy of the posted notice and stating where it was posted, and by providing copies of all the in-house media, whether electronic or print, that were used to distribute notice of the application in accordance with the procedures used for similar positions within the employer's organization. However, the record does not contain any evidence showing that the job opportunity was published in any and all in-house media, whether electronic or printed. Therefore, the AAO finds that the petitioner failed to provide evidence showing that the petitioner had posted and published in its in-house media a notice of filing in compliance with 20 C.F.R. § 656.10(d)(3).

The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and alternative basis for denial. In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, that burden has not been met.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed.