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
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
20 Mass. Ave., N.W., Rm. 3000
Washington, DC 20529



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


FILE: [Redacted] Office: NEBRASKA SERVICE CENTER Date: **SEP 16 2008**
LIN 07 024 52336

IN RE: Petitioner: [Redacted]
Beneficiary: [Redacted]

PETITION: Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as a Skilled Worker or Professional pursuant to section 203(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:



INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "R. Wiemann".

Robert P. Wiemann, Chief
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The director, Nebraska Service Center, denied the preference visa petition. The matter is presently before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner is a sign and display manufacturing company. It seeks to employ the beneficiary permanently in the United States as an inventory manager.¹ As required by statute, the petition is accompanied by a Form ETA 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification, approved by the Department of Labor. The director determined that the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage beginning on the 2003 priority date of the visa petition. The director denied the petition accordingly.

The record shows that the appeal is properly filed, timely and makes a specific allegation of error in law or fact. The procedural history in this case is documented by the record and incorporated into the decision. Further elaboration of the procedural history will be made only as necessary.

As set forth in the director's December 20, 2006 denial, the single issue in this case is whether or not the petitioner has the ability to pay the proffered wage as of the priority date and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence.

Section 203(b)(3)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(i), provides for the granting of preference classification to qualified immigrants who are capable, at the time of petitioning for classification under this paragraph, of performing skilled labor (requiring at least two years training or experience), not of a temporary nature, for which qualified workers are not available in the United States.

The regulation 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states in pertinent part:

Ability of prospective employer to pay wage. Any petition filed by or for an employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements. . . . In appropriate cases, additional evidence, such as profit/loss statements, bank account records, or personnel records, may be submitted by the petitioner or requested by the [Citizenship and Immigration Service].

The petitioner must demonstrate the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, which is the date the Form ETA 750 Application for Alien Employment Certification, was accepted for processing by any office within the employment system of the U.S. Department of Labor. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(d). The petitioner must also demonstrate that, on the priority date, the beneficiary had the qualifications stated on its Form ETA 750 Application for Alien Employment Certification as certified by the U.S. Department of Labor and submitted with the instant petition. *Matter of Wing's Tea House*, 16 I&N Dec. 158 (Act. Reg. Comm. 1977).

¹ The record reflects that a subsequent I-140 petition filed by the beneficiary by a new petitioner under the professional with an advanced degree classification was approved on December 1, 2007.

In the instant matter, the Form ETA 750 was accepted on March 23, 2003. The proffered wage as stated on the Form ETA 750 is \$29.37 an hour or \$61,089.60 per year. The Form ETA 750 states that the position requires two years of experience in the proffered job.

The AAO maintains plenary power to review each appeal on a de novo basis. 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) ("On appeal from or review of the initial decision, the agency has all the powers which it would have in making the initial decision except as it may limit the issues on notice or by rule."); *see also, Janka v. U.S. Dept. of Transp., NTSB*, 925 F.2d 1147, 1149 (9th Cir. 1991). The AAO's de novo authority has been long recognized by the federal courts. *See, e.g. Dor v. INS*, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989). The AAO considers all relevant evidence in the record, including new evidence properly submitted on appeal.²

Relevant evidence submitted on appeal includes counsel's brief. Counsel submits no further evidence. The record also contains the petitioner's Forms 1120S, U.S. Income Tax Return for an S Corporation, for tax years 2003 to 2005, W-2 Wage and Tax Statements for the beneficiary for tax years 2003 to 2005; bank statements for the petitioner's business checking account with Fleet Bank from January 1, 2004 to December 31, 2004; the first page of the petitioner's monthly checking account bank statements from Bank of America from January 2005 to July 2005; and two bank statements from Commerce Bank, Cherry Hill, New Jersey for a different account (Account Number [REDACTED]) dated January 6, 2006 and February 3, 2006. In the petitioner's response to the director's request for further evidence (RFE) dated November 8, 2006, counsel noted that if the petitioner's cash on hand figures contained in the petitioner's Schedules L in its tax return or as documented in the petitioner's bank statements were considered in combination with the beneficiary's actual wages paid by the petitioner, the petitioner had established its ability to pay the proffered wage in tax years 2003 to 2005. The record contains no further evidence of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage.

The evidence in the record of proceeding indicates that the petitioner is structured as a S corporation. On the petition, the petitioner claimed to have been established in February 1997, did not indicate its gross or annual net income, and stated that it currently employed 25 workers. On the Form ETA 750, signed by the beneficiary on May 19, 2003, the beneficiary claimed to have worked for the petitioner since April 2001.

The petitioner must establish that its job offer to the beneficiary is a realistic one. Because the filing of an ETA 750 labor certification application establishes a priority date for any immigrant petition later based on the ETA 750, the petitioner must establish that the job offer was realistic as of the priority date and that the offer remained realistic for each year thereafter, until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. The petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is an essential element in evaluating whether a job offer is realistic. *See Matter of Great Wall*, 16 I&N Dec. 142 (Acting Reg. Comm. 1977). *See also* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2). In evaluating whether a job offer is realistic, Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) requires the petitioner to demonstrate financial resources sufficient to pay the beneficiary's proffered wages, although the totality of the circumstances affecting the petitioning business will be considered if the evidence warrants such consideration. *See Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (Reg. Comm. 1967).

² The submission of additional evidence on appeal is allowed by the instructions to the Form I-290B, which are incorporated into the regulations by the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(1). The record in the instant case provides no reason to preclude consideration of any of the documents newly submitted on appeal. *See Matter of Soriano*, 19 I&N Dec. 764 (BIA 1988).

With the initial I-140 petition and in its response to the director's RFE, the petitioner submitted its bank checking account statements for two checking accounts to the record.³ Counsel's reliance on the balances in the petitioner's bank accounts is misplaced. First, bank statements are not among the three types of evidence, enumerated in 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2), required to illustrate a petitioner's ability to pay a proffered wage. While this regulation allows additional material "in appropriate cases," the petitioner in this case has not demonstrated why the documentation specified at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) is inapplicable or otherwise paints an inaccurate financial picture of the petitioner. Second, bank statements show the amount in an account on a given date, and cannot show the sustainable ability to pay a proffered wage. Third, no evidence was submitted to demonstrate that the funds reported on the petitioner's bank statements somehow reflect additional available funds that were not reflected on its tax return, such as the petitioner's taxable income (income minus deductions) or the cash specified on Schedule L that will be considered below in determining the petitioner's net current assets.

Counsel's assertion that the petitioner's cash on hand and the beneficiary's actual wages can be combined to establish the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is also misplaced. The AAO will discuss the role of cash on hand when it analyzes the petitioner's net current assets.

In determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage during a given period, CIS will first examine whether the petitioner employed and paid the beneficiary during that period. If the petitioner establishes by documentary evidence that it employed the beneficiary at a salary equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the evidence will be considered *prima facie* proof of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner submitted the beneficiary's W-2 Forms for tax years 2003, 2004 and 2005 to the record. These documents indicate the petitioner paid the beneficiary \$31,683.64 in tax year 2003, \$35,0847.96 in tax year 2004, and \$9,847.07 in tax year 2005. Thus the petitioner cannot establish it had the ability to pay the proffered wage through the wages it paid to the beneficiary as of the 2003 priority date based on the beneficiary's wages. Thus, the petitioner has to establish its ability to pay the difference between the beneficiary's actual wages and the proffered wage of \$61,089.60 from either its net income or net current assets.

If the petitioner does not establish that it employed and paid the beneficiary an amount at least equal to the proffered wage during that period, CIS will next examine the net income figure reflected on the petitioner's federal income tax return, without consideration of depreciation or other expenses. Reliance on federal income tax returns as a basis for determining a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is well established by judicial precedent. *Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava*, 632 F. Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (citing *Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman*, 736 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1984)); see also *Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh*, 719 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Texas 1989); *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), *aff'd*, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983). Reliance on the petitioner's gross receipts and wage expense is misplaced. Showing that the petitioner's gross receipts exceeded the proffered wage is insufficient. Similarly, showing that the petitioner paid wages in excess of the proffered wage is insufficient.

In *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. at 1084, the court held that the Immigration and Naturalization Service, now CIS, had properly relied on the petitioner's net income figure, as stated on the petitioner's corporate income tax returns, rather than the petitioner's gross income. The court specifically rejected the argument that the Service should have considered income before expenses were paid rather than net income. The court in *Chi-Feng Chang* further noted:

³ The petitioner's bank statements for Fleet Bank and Bank of America have the same account number.

Plaintiffs also contend the depreciation amounts on the 1985 and 1986 returns are non-cash deductions. Plaintiffs thus request that the court *sua sponte* add back to net cash the depreciation expense charged for the year. Plaintiffs cite no legal authority for this proposition. This argument has likewise been presented before and rejected. *See Elatos*, 632 F. Supp. at 1054. [CIS] and judicial precedent support the use of tax returns and the *net income figures* in determining petitioner's ability to pay. Plaintiffs' argument that these figures should be revised by the court by adding back depreciation is without support.

(Emphasis in original.) *Chi-Feng Fang* 719 F. Supp. at 537.

The tax returns demonstrate the following financial information concerning the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage of \$61,089.60 per year from the priority date based on its net income:

- In 2003, the Form 1120S stated a net income⁴ of -\$704,195.
- In 2004, the Form 1120S stated a net income of -\$950,214.
- In 2005, the Form 1120S stated a net income of -\$621,870.

Therefore, for the years 2003 to 2005, the petitioner did not have sufficient net income to pay the proffered wage.

If the net income the petitioner demonstrates it had available during that period, if any, added to the wages paid to the beneficiary during the period, if any, do not equal the amount of the proffered wage or more, CIS will review the petitioner's assets. The petitioner's total assets include depreciable assets that the petitioner uses in its business, including real property. Those depreciable assets will not be converted to cash during the ordinary course of business and will not, therefore, become funds available to pay the proffered wage. Further, the petitioner's total assets must be balanced by the petitioner's liabilities. Otherwise, they cannot properly be considered in the determination of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. Rather, CIS will consider net current assets as an alternative method of demonstrating the ability to pay the proffered wage.

⁴Where an S corporation's income is exclusively from a trade or business, CIS considers net income to be the figure for ordinary income, shown on line 21 of page one of the petitioner's IRS Form 1120S. However, where an S corporation has income, credits, deductions or other adjustments from sources other than a trade or business, they are reported on Schedule K. If the Schedule K has relevant entries for additional income, credits, deductions or other adjustments, net income is found on line 23 (1997-2003), line 17e (2004-2005) and line 18 (2006) of Schedule K. *See* Instructions for Form 1120S, 2006, at <http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i1120s.pdf> (accessed March 22, 2007) (indicating that Schedule K is a summary schedule of all shareholder's shares of the corporation's income, deductions, credits, etc.). Because the petitioner had additional income or deductions shown on its Schedule K for tax years 2003 and 2005, the petitioner's net income is found on Schedule K, line 23 for tax year 2003 and Line 17e for tax year 2005. With regard to tax year 2004, the petitioner did not have any additional income, deductions, credits or other adjustments, therefore, the petitioner's net income is found on line 21, of the Form 1120S.

Net current assets are the difference between the petitioner's current assets and current liabilities.⁵ A corporation's year-end current assets are shown on Schedule L, lines 1 through 6. Its year-end current liabilities are shown on lines 16 through 18. Although counsel on appeal asserts that the petitioner's cash on hand alone can be used to establish the petitioner's ability to pay the difference between the beneficiary's actual wages and the proffered wage, counsel is not correct. Rather the petitioner's cash in hand is one line item to be considered in calculating the petitioner's net assets. These net assets in turn have to be examined with the petitioner's net liabilities to arrive at the petitioner's net current assets. If the total of a corporation's end-of-year net current assets and the wages paid to the beneficiary (if any) are equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the petitioner is expected to be able to pay the proffered wage using those net current assets.

- The petitioner's net current assets during 2003 were -\$683,946.
- The petitioner's net current assets during 2004 were -\$1,031,247.
- The petitioner's net current assets during 2005 were -\$1,372,275.

Therefore, for the years 2003 to 2005, the petitioner did not have sufficient net current assets to pay the proffered wage, and from the date the Form ETA 750, was filed with the Department of Labor, the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage as of the priority date through an examination of wages paid to the beneficiary, or its net income or net current assets.

Counsel's assertion on appeal that the beneficiary's actual wages and the petitioner's cash on hand can be used to determine the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is without merit. As previously stated, the AAO does not consider the petitioner's cash on hand as identified on its Schedules L, combined with the beneficiary's actual wages, as determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. The AAO examines lines one through six of Schedule L, which includes the petitioner's end of year cash on hand, in determining the petitioner's net assets. The AAO then compares these current assets with the petitioner's current liabilities to calculate the petitioner's net current assets. Counsel's assertion cannot be concluded to outweigh the evidence presented in the tax returns as submitted by the petitioner that demonstrates that the petitioner could not pay the proffered wage from the day the Form ETA 750 was accepted for processing by the Department of Labor.

The evidence submitted does not establish that the petitioner had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date. The burden of proof in these proceedings rests solely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The petitioner has not met that burden.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.

⁵According to *Barron's Dictionary of Accounting Terms* 117 (3rd ed. 2000), "current assets" consist of items having (in most cases) a life of one year or less, such as cash, marketable securities, inventory and prepaid expenses. "Current liabilities" are obligations payable (in most cases) within one year, such as accounts payable, short-term notes payable, and accrued expenses (such as taxes and salaries). *Id.* at 118.