




U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services

~~Identifying data deleted to~~
prevent clearly unwarranted
invasion of personal
privacy

~~Identifying data deleted to~~
prevent clearly unwarranted
invasion of personal
privacy

PUBLIC COPY

B6



FILE: [REDACTED]
LIN 07 124 52087

Office: NEBRASKA SERVICE CENTER

Date: JAN 14 2009

IN RE: Petitioner: [REDACTED]
Beneficiary: [REDACTED]

PETITION: Immigrant petition for Alien Worker as a Skilled Worker or Professional pursuant to Section 203(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:



INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. Please refer to 8 C.F.R. § 103.5 for the specific requirements. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$585. Any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider, as required by 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i).

John F. Grissom, Acting Chief
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The preference visa petition was denied by the Director, Nebraska Service Center, and the director dismissed a subsequent motion to reconsider. The matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner is a cleaning service. It seeks to employ the beneficiary permanently in the United States as a cleaner, housekeeping. As required by statute, the petition is accompanied by a Form ETA 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification, approved by the United States Department of Labor (DOL).¹ The director determined that the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage beginning on the priority date of the visa petition and that the petitioner had not established that the petition requires at least two years of training or experience and, therefore, that the beneficiary cannot be found qualified for classification as a skilled worker. The director denied the petition accordingly.

The record shows that the appeal is properly filed, timely and makes a specific allegation of error in law or fact. The procedural history in this case is documented by the record and incorporated into the decision. Further elaboration of the procedural history will be made only as necessary.

As set forth in the director's July 21, 2007 denial, the issues in this case are whether or not the petitioner has the ability to pay the proffered wage as of the priority date and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence, and whether or not the petitioner has established that the petition requires at least two years of training or experience such that the beneficiary may be found qualified for classification as a skilled worker.

Section 203(b)(3)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(i), provides for the granting of preference classification to qualified immigrants who are capable, at the time of petitioning for classification under this paragraph, of performing skilled labor (requiring at least two years training or experience), not of a temporary nature, for which qualified workers are not available in the United States. Section 203(b)(3)(A)(iii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(iii), provides for the granting of preference classification to other qualified immigrants who are capable, at the time of petitioning for classification under this paragraph, of performing unskilled labor, not of a temporary or seasonal nature, for which qualified workers are not available in the United States.

¹ The instant petition is for a substituted beneficiary. An I-140 petition for a substituted beneficiary filed prior to July 16, 2007 retains the same priority date as the original ETA 750. Memo. From [REDACTED] Acting Associate Director, Domestic Operations, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), to Regional Directors, *et al.*, *Interim Guidance Regarding the Impact of the [DOL's] final rule, Labor Certification for Permanent Employment of Aliens in the United States; Reducing the Incentives and Opportunities for Fraud and Abuse and Enhancing Program Integrity, on Determining Labor Certification Validity and the Prohibition of Labor Certification Substitution Requests*, <http://www.uscis.gov/files/pressrelease/DOLPermRule060107.pdf> (accessed December 8, 2008).

The regulation 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states in pertinent part:

Ability of prospective employer to pay wage. Any petition filed by or for an employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be either in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements.

The petitioner must demonstrate the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, which is the date the Form ETA 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification, was accepted for processing by any office within the employment system of the DOL. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(d). The petitioner must also demonstrate that, on the priority date, the beneficiary had the qualifications stated on its Form ETA 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification, as certified by the DOL and submitted with the instant petition. *Matter of Wing's Tea House*, 16 I&N Dec. 158 (Act. Reg. Comm. 1977).

Here, the Form ETA 750 was accepted on March 13, 2003. The proffered wage as stated on the Form ETA 750 is \$6.50 per hour (\$13,520.00 per year). The Form ETA 750 states that the position requires no education, training or experience.

The AAO maintains plenary power to review each appeal on a de novo basis. 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) ("On appeal from or review of the initial decision, the agency has all the powers which it would have in making the initial decision except as it may limit the issues on notice or by rule."); see also, *Janka v. U.S. Dept. of Transp., NTSB*, 925 F.2d 1147, 1149 (9th Cir. 1991). The AAO's de novo authority has been long recognized by the federal courts. See, e.g. *Dor v. INS*, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989). The AAO considers all pertinent evidence in the record, including new evidence properly submitted upon appeal.² On appeal, counsel submits a brief; the petitioner's compiled financial statements for 2007;³ the petitioner's monthly bank statements for 2003, 2004, 2005 and

² The submission of additional evidence on appeal is allowed by the instructions to the Form I-290B, which are incorporated into the regulations by the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(1). The record in the instant case provides no reason to preclude consideration of any of the documents newly submitted on appeal. See *Matter of Soriano*, 19 I&N Dec. 764 (BIA 1988).

³ The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) makes clear that where a petitioner relies on financial statements to demonstrate its ability to pay the proffered wage, those financial statements must be audited. An audit is conducted in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards to obtain a reasonable assurance that the financial statements of the business are free of material misstatements. The unaudited financial statements that counsel submitted with the petition are not persuasive evidence. The accountant's report that accompanied those financial statements makes clear that they were produced pursuant to a compilation rather than an audit. As the accountant's report also makes clear, financial statements produced pursuant to a compilation are the representations of

2006; a declaration of [REDACTED]; and the petitioner's bank statements for February through December 2007. Relevant evidence in the record includes the petitioner's IRS Forms 1120, U.S. Corporation Income Tax Returns, for 2001,⁴ 2003, 2004 and 2005, and a list of its bids for public cleaning contracts. The record does not contain any other evidence relevant to the petitioner's ability to pay the wage.

The evidence in the record of proceeding shows that the petitioner is structured as a C corporation. On the petition, the petitioner claimed to have been established on January 1, 1990, to have a gross annual income of \$1,838,122.00, to have a net annual income of \$174,241.00, and to currently employ 300 workers.⁵ According to the tax returns in the record, the petitioner's fiscal year is based on a calendar year. On the Form ETA 750B, signed by the beneficiary in February 2007, the beneficiary did not claim to have worked for the petitioner.

On appeal, counsel asserts that the petitioner's business "would grow by more than 25 percent were it able to bring on board the approximately fifty additional cleaners for which it has filed petitions." Counsel asserts that the petitioner's business is substantial and that the petitioner could easily accommodate fifty additional employees. Counsel notes the petitioner's substantial labor costs and indicates that the petitioner hopes to employ its workers directly rather than through contractors. Counsel indicates that the petitioner's contract with Baltimore City is approximately \$850,000, which counsel asserts would exceed the entire gross salary figure of all of its potential employees.⁶ Counsel states that it had over 500 workers at a proffered wage of \$16,640 in 2007. Counsel states that the petitioner's "average balance" in its bank account exceeds \$56,333 and that the petitioner has always had cash on hand to pay more than 50 additional entry-level workers. Finally, counsel cites *Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (BIA 1967), and additional cases for the proposition that USCIS may consider the overall magnitude of the petitioner's business activities in its determination of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage.

management compiled into standard form. The unsupported representations of management are not reliable evidence and are insufficient to demonstrate the ability to pay the proffered wage.

⁴ Evidence preceding the priority date in 2003 is not necessarily dispositive of the petitioner's continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date.

⁵ In general, 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) requires annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements as evidence of a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. That regulation further provides: "In a case where the prospective United States employer employs 100 or more workers, the director may accept a statement from a financial officer of the organization which establishes the prospective employer's ability to pay the proffered wage." The petitioner did not submit a letter from a financial officer of the organization which establishes its ability to pay the proffered wage. Counsel notes in his brief that such a letter was not provided because the workers were not "directly employed."

⁶ The petitioner did not submit a copy of this contract, or of any of its other contracts, to the record. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)).

The petitioner must establish that its job offer to the beneficiary is a realistic one. Because the filing of an ETA 750 labor certification application establishes a priority date for any immigrant petition later based on the ETA 750, the petitioner must establish that the job offer was realistic as of the priority date and that the offer remained realistic for each year thereafter, until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. The petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is an essential element in evaluating whether a job offer is realistic. *See Matter of Great Wall*, 16 I&N Dec. 142 (Acting Reg. Comm. 1977). *See also* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2). In evaluating whether a job offer is realistic, USCIS requires the petitioner to demonstrate financial resources sufficient to pay the beneficiary's proffered wages, although the totality of the circumstances affecting the petitioning business will be considered if the evidence warrants such consideration. *See Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (Reg. Comm. 1967).

In determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage during a given period, USCIS will first examine whether the petitioner employed and paid the beneficiary during that period. If the petitioner establishes by documentary evidence that it employed the beneficiary at a salary equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the evidence will be considered *prima facie* proof of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. In the instant case, the petitioner has not established that it employed and paid the beneficiary the full proffered wage from the priority date or subsequently.

If the petitioner does not establish that it employed and paid the beneficiary an amount at least equal to the proffered wage during that period, USCIS will next examine the net income figure reflected on the petitioner's federal income tax return, without consideration of depreciation or other expenses. Reliance on federal income tax returns as a basis for determining a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is well established by judicial precedent. *Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava*, 632 F. Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (*citing Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman*, 736 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1984)); *see also Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh*, 719 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Texas 1989); *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), *aff'd*, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983). Reliance on the petitioner's gross sales and profits and wage expense is misplaced. Showing that the petitioner's gross sales and profits exceeded the proffered wage is insufficient. Similarly, showing that the petitioner paid wages in excess of the proffered wage is insufficient.

In *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. at 1084, the court held that the Immigration and Naturalization Service, now USCIS, had properly relied on the petitioner's net income figure, as stated on the petitioner's corporate income tax returns, rather than the petitioner's gross income. The court specifically rejected the argument that the Service should have considered income before expenses were paid rather than net income. The court in *Chi-Feng Chang* further noted:

Plaintiffs also contend the depreciation amounts on the 1985 and 1986 returns are non-cash deductions. Plaintiffs thus request that the court *sua sponte* add back to net cash the depreciation expense charged for the year. Plaintiffs cite no legal authority for this proposition. This argument has likewise been presented before and rejected. *See Elatos*, 632 F. Supp. at 1054. [USCIS] and judicial precedent support the use of

tax returns and the *net income figures* in determining petitioner's ability to pay. Plaintiffs' argument that these figures should be revised by the court by adding back depreciation is without support.

(Emphasis in original.) *Chi-Feng Chang* at 537.

For a C corporation, USCIS considers net income to be the figure shown on Line 28 of the Form 1120, U.S. Corporation Income Tax Return. The record before the director closed on March 23, 2007. As of that date, the petitioner's 2006 federal income tax return was not yet due. Therefore, the petitioner's income tax return for 2005 is the most recent return available. The petitioner's tax returns demonstrate its net income for 2003, 2004 and 2005, as shown in the table below.

- In 2003, the Form 1120 stated net income of \$115,717.00.
- In 2004, the Form 1120 stated net income of \$135,930.00.
- In 2005, the Form 1120 stated net income of \$174,241.00.

Therefore, for the years 2003, 2004, and 2005, the petitioner had sufficient net income to pay the proffered wage. However, USCIS electronic records show that the petitioner filed at least 77 other I-140 petitions which have been pending during the time period relevant to the instant petition. If the instant petition were the only petition filed by the petitioner, the petitioner would be required to produce evidence of its ability to pay the proffered wage to the single beneficiary of the instant petition. However, where a petitioner has filed multiple petitions for multiple beneficiaries which have been pending simultaneously, the petitioner must produce evidence that its job offers to each beneficiary are realistic, and therefore that it has the ability to pay the proffered wages to each of the beneficiaries of its pending petitions, as of the priority date of each petition and continuing until the beneficiary of each petition obtains lawful permanent residence. *See Matter of Great Wall*, 16 I&N Dec. 142, 144-145 (Acting Reg. Comm. 1977) (petitioner must establish ability to pay as of the date of the Form MA 7-50B job offer, the predecessor to the Form ETA 750 and Form ETA 9089). *See also* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2). The record in the instant case contains no information about the proffered wage for the beneficiaries of those petitions, about the current immigration status of the beneficiaries, whether the beneficiaries have withdrawn from the visa petition process, or whether the petitioner has withdrawn its job offers to the beneficiaries. Furthermore, no information is provided about the current employment status of the beneficiaries, the date of any hiring and any current wages of the beneficiaries. The evidence does not establish the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage to the beneficiaries of the other petitions filed by the petitioner.

If the net income the petitioner demonstrates it had available during that period, if any, added to the wages paid to the beneficiary during the period, if any, do not equal the amount of the proffered wage or more, USCIS will review the petitioner's net current assets. Net current assets are the difference between the petitioner's current assets and current liabilities.⁷ A corporation's year-end

⁷According to *Barron's Dictionary of Accounting Terms* 117 (3rd ed. 2000), "current assets" consist of items having (in most cases) a life of one year or less, such as cash, marketable securities, inventory and prepaid expenses. "Current liabilities" are obligations payable (in most cases) within

current assets are shown on Schedule L, lines 1 through 6 and include cash-on-hand. Its year-end current liabilities are shown on lines 16 through 18. If the total of a corporation's end-of-year net current assets and the wages paid to the beneficiary (if any) are equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the petitioner is expected to be able to pay the proffered wage using those net current assets. The petitioner's tax returns demonstrate its end-of-year net current assets for 2003, 2004 and 2005, as shown in the table below.

- In 2003, the Form 1120 stated net current assets of \$85,769.00.
- In 2004, the Form 1120 stated net current assets of -\$23,377.00.
- In 2005, the Form 1120 stated net current assets of \$4,176.00.

Therefore, for the year 2003, the petitioner had sufficient net current assets to pay the proffered wage but did not establish sufficient net current assets to pay the proffered wage to the beneficiaries of its 77 other petitions. For the years 2004 and 2005, the petitioner did not have sufficient net current assets to pay the proffered wage.

Therefore, from the date the Form ETA 750 was accepted for processing by the DOL, the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiaries of its multiple petitions the proffered wages as of the priority date through an examination of wages paid to the beneficiary, or its net income or net current assets.

On appeal, counsel asserts that the petitioner's business "would grow by more than 25 percent were it able to bring on board the approximately fifty additional cleaners for which it has filed petitions." Against the projection of future earnings, *Matter of Great Wall*, 16 I&N Dec. 142, 144-145 (Acting Reg. Comm. 1977) states:

I do not feel, nor do I believe the Congress intended, that the petitioner, who admittedly could not pay the offered wage at the time the petition was filed, should subsequently become eligible to have the petition approved under a new set of facts hinged upon probability and projections, even beyond the information presented on appeal.

Further, on appeal, counsel submits the petitioner's monthly bank statements for 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006. Counsel states that the proffered wage totals \$1,127 per month and that if the monthly wage is multiplied by 50, the petitioner's monthly payroll would total \$56,333. Counsel's reliance on the balances in the petitioner's bank account is misplaced. First, bank statements are not among the three types of evidence, enumerated in 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2), required to illustrate a petitioner's ability to pay a proffered wage. While this regulation allows additional material "in appropriate cases," the petitioner in this case has not demonstrated why the documentation specified at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) is inapplicable or otherwise paints an inaccurate financial picture of the petitioner. Second, bank statements show the amount in an account on a given date, and cannot show the sustainable ability

one year, such accounts payable, short-term notes payable, and accrued expenses (such as taxes and salaries). *Id.* at 118.

to pay a proffered wage. Third, no evidence was submitted to demonstrate that the funds reported on the petitioner's bank statements somehow reflect additional available funds that were not reflected on its tax returns, such as the petitioner's taxable income (income minus deductions) or the cash specified on Schedule L that was considered in determining the petitioner's net current assets. Finally, although counsel suggests that the proffered wage for 50 of its outstanding petitions equals the proffered wage in the instant case, the record in the instant case contains no information about the proffered wage for the beneficiaries of the petitioner's 77 other immigrant petitions. The assertions of counsel do not constitute evidence. *Matter of Obaigbena*, 19 I&N Dec. 533, 534 (BIA 1988); *Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez*, 17 I&N Dec. 503, 506 (BIA 1980). Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)).

USCIS may consider the overall magnitude of the petitioner's business activities in its determination of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. See *Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (BIA 1967). The petitioning entity in *Sonogawa* had been in business for over 11 years and routinely earned a gross annual income of about \$100,000. During the year in which the petition was filed in that case, the petitioner changed business locations and paid rent on both the old and new locations for five months. There were large moving costs and also a period of time when the petitioner was unable to do regular business. The Regional Commissioner determined that the petitioner's prospects for a resumption of successful business operations were well established. The petitioner was a fashion designer whose work had been featured in *Time* and *Look* magazines. Her clients included Miss Universe, movie actresses, and society matrons. The petitioner's clients had been included in the lists of the best-dressed California women. The petitioner lectured on fashion design at design and fashion shows throughout the United States and at colleges and universities in California. The Regional Commissioner's determination in *Sonogawa* was based in part on the petitioner's sound business reputation and outstanding reputation as a couturiere. As in *Sonogawa*, USCIS may, at its discretion, consider evidence relevant to the petitioner's financial ability that falls outside of a petitioner's net income and net current assets. USCIS may consider such factors as the number of years the petitioner has been doing business, the established historical growth of the petitioner's business, the overall number of employees, the occurrence of any uncharacteristic business expenditures or losses, the petitioner's reputation within its industry, whether the beneficiary is replacing a former employee or an outsourced service, or any other evidence that USCIS deems relevant to the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage.

In the instant case, the petitioner's tax returns indicate that it was established on January 1, 1990. The petitioner has not established the occurrence of any uncharacteristic business expenditures or losses or the petitioner's reputation within its industry. The petitioner's gross receipts were \$7,677,588, \$11,024,712, \$10,177,135 and \$10,080,510 in 2001, 2003, 2004 and 2005, respectively. The petitioner did not submit documentation to establish its growth since its incorporation in 1990, and based on its declining gross receipts from 2003 and 2005, the petitioner failed to establish its historical growth. While the petitioner stated that it employs 300 employees on Form I-140, the petitioner did not submit evidence of its actual number of employees. The petitioner paid salaries and wages of \$673,442, \$1,810,068, \$1,198,147 and \$842,772 and substantial costs of labor of

\$6,151,912, \$7,791,664, \$7,729,506 and \$7,746,655 in 2001, 2003, 2004 and 2005, respectively. While these figures are substantial, the petitioner has provided no information about the proffered wage for the beneficiaries of its 77 other immigrant petitions, about the current immigration status of the beneficiaries, whether the beneficiaries have withdrawn from the visa petition process, or whether the petitioner has withdrawn its job offers to the beneficiaries. Furthermore, no information is provided about the current employment status of the beneficiaries, the date of any hiring and any current wages of the beneficiaries. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). In addition, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary will be replacing a current employee or contract worker. Thus, assessing the totality of the circumstances, the evidence does not establish the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage to the beneficiaries of all of the petitions filed by the petitioner.

Counsel's assertions on appeal cannot be concluded to outweigh the evidence presented in the tax returns as submitted by the petitioner that demonstrates that the petitioner could not pay the proffered wage from the day the Form ETA 750 was accepted for processing by the DOL.

The evidence submitted does not establish that the petitioner had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date.

The director also determined that the petitioner had not established that the petition requires at least two years of training or experience and, therefore, that the beneficiary cannot be found qualified for classification as a skilled worker. Here, the Form I-140 was filed on May 30, 2006. On Part 2.e. of the Form I-140, the petitioner indicated that it was filing the petition for a professional or a skilled worker.

On appeal, counsel and the petitioner assert that the petitioner made a typographical error on Form I-140 and that the petitioner intended to check Part 2.g. indicating that it was filing the petition for an unskilled worker.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 204.5(i) provides in pertinent part:

(4) Differentiating between skilled and other workers. The determination of whether a worker is a skilled or other worker will be based on the requirements of training and/or experience placed on the job by the prospective employer, as certified by the Department of Labor.

In this case, the ETA Form 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification, indicates that there are no education, training or experience requirements for the proffered position. However, the petitioner requested the skilled worker classification on the Form I-140. There is no provision in statute or regulation that compels USCIS to readjudicate a petition under a different visa classification in response to a petitioner's request to change it, once the decision has been rendered. A petitioner may not make material changes to a petition in an effort to make a deficient petition

conform to USCIS requirements. *See Matter of Izummi*, 22 I&N Dec. 169, 176 (Assoc. Comm. 1988). In this matter, the appropriate remedy would be to file another petition with the proper fee and required documentation.

The evidence submitted does not establish that the petition requires at least two years of training or experience such that the petition or the beneficiary may be found qualified for classification as a skilled worker.

The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and alternative basis for denial. The burden of proof in these proceedings rests solely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The petitioner has not met that burden.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.