


identifying data deleted to
prevent clearly unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy




U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services

PUBLIC COPY

B6



FILE:



Office: TEXAS SERVICE CENTER

Date:

MAR 03 2009

SRC 08 059 52164

IN RE:


Petitioner:

Beneficiary:



PETITION: Immigrant petition for Alien Worker as a Skilled Worker or Professional pursuant to section 203(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:



INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. Please refer to 8 C.F.R. § 103.5 for the specific requirements. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$585. Any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen, as required by 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i).

John F. Grissom, Acting Chief
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The Director, Texas Service Center, denied the preference visa petition on August 12, 2008, and a subsequent Motion to Reopen and Reconsider was denied on December 29, 2006. The director certified his decision to the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO). The director's decision will be affirmed. The petition will remain denied.

The petitioner is a software development company. It seeks to employ the beneficiary permanently in the United States as a computer systems analyst. As required by statute, the petition is accompanied by ETA Form 9089, Application for Permanent Employment Certification, approved by the United States Department of Labor (DOL). As set forth in the director's decision, the petition was denied pursuant to a May 27, 2008, [REDACTED] listing the petitioner as a debarred entity. Pursuant to the [REDACTED] Memo, petitions filed by the petitioner may not be approved for a period of one year commencing on June 1, 2008, and ending on May 31, 2009.¹

The AAO reviewed the record of proceeding under its *de novo* review authority. The authority to adjudicate appeals is delegated to the AAO by the Secretary of Homeland Security pursuant to the authority vested in him through the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-296.

Section 203(b)(3)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(i), provides for the granting of preference classification to qualified immigrants who are capable, at the time of petitioning for classification under this paragraph, of performing skilled labor (requiring at least two years training or experience), not of a temporary nature, for which qualified workers are not available in the United States. Section 203(b)(3)(A)(ii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(ii), also provides for the granting of preference classification to qualified immigrants who hold baccalaureate degrees and are members of the professions.

On motion, counsel contends that the [REDACTED] only authorizes United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) to "deny approval of petitions filed by [the petitioner]" during the one year debarment period. Since the petitioner filed the instant petition on December 13, 2007, counsel asserts that USCIS should approve the petition. Counsel states that any other interpretation of the [REDACTED] "would penalize the petitioner for processing delays at the Service Center in regard to petitions filed well before the start of the debarment period."

In the case at hand, the petitioner filed the ETA Form 9089, Application for Permanent Employment Certification, on October 12, 2007. The petitioner then filed the Form I-140 petition on the beneficiary's behalf on December 13, 2007. The DOL advised USCIS on March 25, 2008 that an Administrator's determination finding a violation under the INA had become a final agency action. The [REDACTED] was issued on May 27, 2008. The director adjudicated the I-140 petition and denied it on August 12, 2008.

The petitioner in this case was the subject of an investigation by the Department of Labor in accordance with the H-1B provisions of the Act. *See generally* 20 C.F.R. § 655 related to

¹ As noted by counsel, the [REDACTED] inadvertently stated that the debarment was for two years.

Temporary Employment of Aliens in the United States; and 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h) provisions related to H-1B nonimmigrants. If DOL determines that there has been a violation of 20 C.F.R. § 655, then under 20 C.F.R. § 655.855(c), USCIS shall not approve a petition during the debarment period: USCIS “shall not approve petitions filed with respect to that employer under sections 204 or 214(c) of the INA (8 U.S.C. 1154 and 1184(c)) for the period of time provided by the Act and described in Sec. 655.810(f).”² Therefore, despite counsel’s assertion, USCIS may not approve a nonimmigrant or immigrant petition during the debarment period, regardless of when it was filed.

Upon notice that the petitioner was in violation of 20 C.F.R. § 655, USCIS then issued a letter dated May 27, 2008 to the petitioner, which provides that USCIS “has invoked the provisions of section 212(n)(2)(C)(i) of the INA. As a result, the USCIS will not approve any petitions filed by [the petitioner], under section 204 or 214(c) of the INA for a period of one year commencing on June 1, 2008 and ending on May 31, 2009.” As noted by the director in his decision, the [REDACTED] properly states that petitions filed by the petitioner may not be approved during the debarment period.

The petitioner violated provisions related to H-1B nonimmigrant petitions.³ As a result, USCIS is barred from approving petitions during the debarment period. The [REDACTED] provides that nonimmigrant or immigrant petitions may not be approved for the time period indicated.

² We note that certain statutes that preclude USCIS from approving applications effectively require that USCIS deny the application. For instance, the language of Sections 204(c), (d), and (g) of the Act all similarly provide that “notwithstanding [the relevant applicable subsections] . . . no petition shall be approved if [the following facts are present].” Further, on October 21, 1998, President Clinton signed into law the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1999, which incorporated several immigration-related provisions, including the American Competitiveness and Workforce Improvement Act of 1998 (ACWIA). ACWIA mandated new requirements for petitioners filing for H-1B beneficiaries. Pursuant to ACWIA, penalties were established for H-1B violations on a three tier system: (1) the first tier would encompass non-willful conduct, or less substantial violations such as failure to meet strike, lockout or layoff attestations; failure to meet notice or recruitment attestations; or misrepresentation of a material fact on a labor condition application, and would result in fines of not more than \$1,000 per violation and result in the mandatory debarment of at least one year. *See* ACWIA § 413(a) incorporated at 212(n)(2)(C)(i) of the Act; (2) willful violations, such as willful failure to meet any attestation condition; willful misrepresentation; or actions taken in retaliation against whistleblowers, which would result in a fine of not more than \$5,000 per violation, and mandatory debarment of two years. *See* ACWIA § 413(a) incorporated at 212(n)(2)(C)(ii) of the Act; and (3) willful violations that result in layoffs, such as a violation of the attestation, or misrepresentation of a material fact in the course where an employer displaces a U.S. worker, which would result in a fine not to exceed \$35,000 per violation, and mandatory debarment of at least three years. *See* ACWIA § 413(a) incorporated at 212(n)(2)(C)(iii) of the Act.

³ Nothing indicates that the petitioner failed to pay the present beneficiary the prevailing or proffered wage, or that the labor condition application related to any H-1B filing for the beneficiary was subject to DOL investigation, which, if were the case, might impact adjudication of the petition.

Accordingly, the instant petition was properly denied as the petition became ready for adjudication during the period of debarment.

Beyond the decision of the director,⁴ the petitioner has not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date. The regulation 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states in pertinent part:

Ability of prospective employer to pay wage. Any petition filed by or for an employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be either in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements.

The petitioner must demonstrate the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, which is the date the ETA Form 9089, Application for Permanent Employment Certification, was accepted for processing by any office within the employment system of the DOL. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(d).

Here, the Form ETA 9089 was accepted on October 12, 2007. The proffered wage as stated on the Form ETA 9089 is \$47,100.00 per year. Relevant evidence in the record includes the beneficiary's paystubs issued by the petitioner for the months of July through October 2007, and a letter from [REDACTED] of the petitioner, dated December 10, 2007, indicating that in 2006, the petitioner employed almost 200 people. The record does not contain any other evidence relevant to the petitioner's ability to pay the wage.

On the petition, the petitioner claimed to have been established in 1995, to have a gross annual income of \$32,000,000.00, and to currently employ 300 workers. On the Form ETA 9089, the beneficiary claimed to have worked for the petitioner since March 25, 2006.⁵

The petitioner must establish that its job offer to the beneficiary is a realistic one. Because the filing of an ETA 9089 labor certification application establishes a priority date for any immigrant petition later based on the ETA 9089, the petitioner must establish that the job offer was realistic as of the priority date and that the offer remained realistic for each year thereafter, until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. The petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is an essential element in evaluating whether a job offer is realistic. *See Matter of Great Wall*, 16 I&N Dec. 142 (Acting Reg.

⁴ An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. *See Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States*, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), *aff'd*, 345 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2003); *see also Dor v. INS*, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989)(noting that the AAO reviews appeals on a de novo basis).

⁵ We note that the beneficiary's paystubs indicate that his date of hire was July 2, 2007.

Comm. 1977). *See also* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2). In evaluating whether a job offer is realistic, USCIS requires the petitioner to demonstrate financial resources sufficient to pay the beneficiary's proffered wages, although the totality of the circumstances affecting the petitioning business will be considered if the evidence warrants such consideration. *See Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (Reg. Comm. 1967).

In determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage during a given period, USCIS will first examine whether the petitioner employed and paid the beneficiary during that period. If the petitioner establishes by documentary evidence that it employed the beneficiary at a salary equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the evidence will be considered *prima facie* proof of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. In the instant case, the beneficiary's paystubs show compensation received from the petitioner in 2007 of \$38,463.99. Therefore, for the year 2007, the petitioner has not established that it employed and paid the beneficiary the full proffered wage, but it did establish that it paid partial wages that year. Since the proffered wage is \$47,100.00 per year, the petitioner must establish that it can pay the difference between the wages actually paid to the beneficiary and the proffered wage, which is \$8,636.01 in 2007.

If the petitioner does not establish that it employed and paid the beneficiary an amount at least equal to the proffered wage during that period, USCIS will next examine the net income figure reflected on the petitioner's federal income tax return, without consideration of depreciation or other expenses. Reliance on federal income tax returns as a basis for determining a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is well established by judicial precedent. *Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava*, 632 F. Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (citing *Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman*, 736 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1984)); *see also Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh*, 719 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Texas 1989); *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), *aff'd*, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983). Reliance on the petitioner's gross sales and profits and wage expense is misplaced. Showing that the petitioner's gross sales and profits exceeded the proffered wage is insufficient. Similarly, showing that the petitioner paid wages in excess of the proffered wage is insufficient.

In *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. at 1084, the court held that the Immigration and Naturalization Service, now CIS, had properly relied on the petitioner's net income figure, as stated on the petitioner's corporate income tax returns, rather than the petitioner's gross income. The court specifically rejected the argument that the Service should have considered income before expenses were paid rather than net income. The court in *Chi-Feng Chang* further noted:

Plaintiffs also contend the depreciation amounts on the 1985 and 1986 returns are non-cash deductions. Plaintiffs thus request that the court *sua sponte* add back to net cash the depreciation expense charged for the year. Plaintiffs cite no legal authority for this proposition. This argument has likewise been presented before and rejected. *See Elatos*, 632 F. Supp. at 1054. [USCIS] and judicial precedent support the use of tax returns and the *net income figures* in determining petitioner's ability to pay. Plaintiffs' argument that these figures should be revised by the court by adding back depreciation is without support.

(Emphasis in original.) *Chi-Feng Chang* at 537

If the net income the petitioner demonstrates it had available during that period, if any, added to the wages paid to the beneficiary during the period, if any, do not equal the amount of the proffered wage or more, USCIS will review the petitioner's net current assets. Net current assets are the difference between the petitioner's current assets and current liabilities.⁶ The petitioner did not submit its annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements as required by 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2). Therefore, we are unable to determine if the petitioner's net income or net current assets are sufficient to pay the difference between the wages actually paid to the beneficiary and the proffered wage.

Further, USCIS electronic records show that the petitioner filed multiple I-140 petitions which have been pending during the time period relevant to the instant petition. If the instant petition were the only petition filed by the petitioner, the petitioner would be required to produce evidence of its ability to pay the proffered wage to the single beneficiary of the instant petition. However, where a petitioner has filed multiple petitions for multiple beneficiaries which have been pending simultaneously, the petitioner must produce evidence that its job offers to each beneficiary are realistic, and therefore that it has the ability to pay the proffered wages to each of the beneficiaries of its pending petitions, as of the priority date of each petition and continuing until the beneficiary of each petition obtains lawful permanent residence. *See Matter of Great Wall*, 16 I&N Dec. 142, 144-145 (Acting Reg. Comm. 1977) (petitioner must establish ability to pay as of the date of the Form MA 7-50B job offer, the predecessor to the Form ETA 750 and Form ETA 9089). *See also* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2). The record in the instant case contains no information about the proffered wage for the beneficiaries of those petitions, about the current immigration status of the beneficiaries, whether the beneficiaries have withdrawn from the visa petition process, or whether the petitioner has withdrawn its job offers to the beneficiaries. Furthermore, no information is provided about the current employment status of the beneficiaries, the date of any hiring and any current wages of the beneficiaries. Since the record in the instant petition fails to establish the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage to the single beneficiary of the instant petition, it is not necessary to consider further whether the evidence also establishes the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage to the beneficiaries of the other petitions filed by the petitioner, or to other beneficiaries for whom the petitioner might wish to submit I-140 petitions based on the same approved labor certification applications.⁷

⁶According to *Barron's Dictionary of Accounting Terms* 117 (3rd ed. 2000), "current assets" consist of items having (in most cases) a life of one year or less, such as cash, marketable securities, inventory and prepaid expenses. "Current liabilities" are obligations payable (in most cases) within one year, such accounts payable, short-term notes payable, and accrued expenses (such as taxes and salaries). *Id.* at 118.

⁷ We note that the record contains a letter from [REDACTED] of the petitioner, dated December 10, 2007, indicating that in 2006, the petitioner employed almost 200 people. In general, 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) requires annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements as evidence of a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. That regulation further provides: "In a

Therefore, from the date the Form ETA 9089 was accepted for processing by the DOL, the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage as of the priority date through an examination of wages paid to the beneficiary, or its net income or net current assets.

The DOL has informed USCIS that the prohibition of the approval of petitions from the petitioner will last from June 1, 2008 until May 31, 2009. Therefore, USCIS is statutorily precluded from approving the instant petition. Further, the evidence submitted does not establish that the petitioner had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date. The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and alternative basis for denial. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361.

ORDER: The director's decision on August 12, 2008 is affirmed. The petition remains denied.

case where the prospective United States employer employs 100 or more workers, the director may accept a statement from a financial officer of the organization which establishes the prospective employer's ability to pay the proffered wage." The record does not establish that [REDACTED] is a financial officer of the petitioner, and the letter does not reference the petitioner's number of employees in 2007, the year of the priority date. Evidence preceding the priority date is not necessarily dispositive of the petitioner's continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date. Additionally, given the record as a whole and the petitioner's history of filing petitions, we find that USCIS need not exercise its discretion to accept the letter from [REDACTED]