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
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U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U. S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Office of Administrative Appeals MS 2090
Washington, DC 20529-2090




**U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services**

B6



FILE:



Office: TEXAS SERVICE CENTER

Date: APR 20 2010

SRC 07 178 51420

IN RE:

Petitioner:

Beneficiary:



PETITION: Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as a Skilled Worker or Professional pursuant to Section 203(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:



INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. Please refer to 8 C.F.R. § 103.5 for the specific requirements. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$585. Any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider, as required by 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i).

Perry Rhew
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The preference visa petition was denied by the Director, Texas Service Center, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner is a fast food store. It seeks to employ the beneficiary permanently in the United States as an assistant manager. As required by statute, the petition is accompanied by a Form ETA 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification, approved by the United States Department of Labor (DOL). The director determined that the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage beginning on the priority date of the visa petition. The director denied the petition accordingly.

The record shows that the appeal is properly filed, timely and makes a specific allegation of error in law or fact. The procedural history in this case is documented by the record and incorporated into the decision. Further elaboration of the procedural history will be made only as necessary.

As set forth in the director's December 11, 2007 denial, the issue in this case is whether or not the petitioner has the ability to pay the proffered wage as of the priority date and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence.

Section 203(b)(3)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(i), provides for the granting of preference classification to qualified immigrants who are capable, at the time of petitioning for classification under this paragraph, of performing skilled labor (requiring at least two years training or experience), not of a temporary nature, for which qualified workers are not available in the United States.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states in pertinent part:

Ability of prospective employer to pay wage. Any petition filed by or for an employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be either in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements.

The petitioner must demonstrate the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, which is the date the Form ETA 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification, was accepted for processing by any office within the employment system of the DOL. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(d). The petitioner must also demonstrate that, on the priority date, the beneficiary had the qualifications stated on its Form ETA 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification, as certified by the DOL and submitted with the instant petition. *Matter of Wing's Tea House*, 16 I&N Dec. 158 (Act. Reg. Comm. 1977).

Here, the Form ETA 750 was accepted on March 26, 2001.^{1,2} The proffered wage as stated on the Form ETA 750 is \$17.07 per hour (\$35,505.60 per year). The Form ETA 750 states that the position requires two years of experience in the position offered as an assistant manager.

The AAO maintains plenary power to review each appeal on a *de novo* basis. 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) ("On appeal from or review of the initial decision, the agency has all the powers which it would have in making the initial decision except as it may limit the issues on notice or by rule."); *see also, Janka*

¹ We note that the case involves the substitution of a beneficiary on the labor certification. Substitution of beneficiaries was formerly permitted by the DOL. DOL had published an interim final rule, which limited the validity of an approved labor certification to the specific alien named on the labor certification application. *See* 56 Fed. Reg. 54925, 54930 (October 23, 1991). The interim final rule eliminated the practice of substitution. On December 1, 1994, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, acting under the mandate of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in *Kooritzky v. Reich*, 17 F.3d 1509 (D.C. Cir. 1994), issued an order invalidating the portion of the interim final rule, which eliminated substitution of labor certification beneficiaries. The *Kooritzky* decision effectively led 20 C.F.R. §§ 656.30(c)(1) and (2) to read the same as the regulations had read before November 22, 1991, and allow the substitution of a beneficiary. Following the *Kooritzky* decision, DOL processed substitution requests pursuant to a May 4, 1995 DOL Field Memorandum, which reinstated procedures in existence prior to the implementation of the Immigration Act of 1990 (IMMACT 90). DOL delegated responsibility for substituting labor certification beneficiaries to United States Citizenship and Immigration Services ("USCIS") based on a Memorandum of Understanding, which was recently rescinded. *See* 72 Fed. Reg. 27904 (May 17, 2007) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. § 656). DOL's final rule became effective July 16, 2007 and prohibits the substitution of alien beneficiaries on permanent labor certification applications and resulting certifications. As the filing of the instant case predates the rule, substitution will be allowed for the present petition.

² We note that the 100% shareholder of the petitioner shares part of the beneficiary's surname.

An occupational preference petition may be filed on behalf of a prospective employee who is related to a shareholder in the corporation. The prospective employee's relationship to the shareholder, however, is a material fact to be considered in determining whether the job being offered was really open to all qualified applicants. A shareholder's concealment, in labor certification proceedings, of his or her familial relationship may constitute willful misrepresentation of a material fact and is a ground for invalidation of an approved labor certification under 20 CFR § 656.30(d). *See Matter of Silver Dragon Chinese Restaurant*, 19 I&N Dec. 401, 406 (Comm. 1986).

Under 20 C.F.R. §§ 626.20(c)(8) and 656.3, the petitioner has the burden when asked to show that a valid employment relationship exists, that a *bona fide* job opportunity is available to U.S. workers. *See Matter of Amger Corp.*, 87-INA-545 (BALCA 1987). A relationship invalidating a *bona fide* job offer may arise where the beneficiary is related to the petitioner by "blood" or it may "be financial, by marriage, or through friendship." *See Matter of Summart* 374, 00-INA-93 (BALCA May 15, 2000). However, an affidavit submitted with the beneficiary's adjustment of status application states that they are not related.

v. U.S. Dept. of Transp., NTSB, 925 F.2d 1147, 1149 (9th Cir. 1991). The AAO's *de novo* authority has been long recognized by the federal courts. *See, e.g. Dor v. INS*, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989). The AAO considers all pertinent evidence in the record, including new evidence properly submitted upon appeal.³

The evidence in the record of proceeding shows that the petitioner is structured as a C corporation. On the petition, the petitioner claimed to have been established in December 2000 and to currently employ six workers. According to the tax returns in the record, the petitioner's fiscal year is the same as the calendar year. On the Form ETA 750B, signed by the beneficiary on March 19, 2001, the beneficiary stated that she had not worked for the petitioner.

The petitioner must establish that its job offer to the beneficiary is a realistic one. Because the filing of an ETA 750 labor certification application establishes a priority date for any immigrant petition later based on the ETA 750, the petitioner must establish that the job offer was realistic as of the priority date and that the offer remained realistic for each year thereafter, until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. The petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is an essential element in evaluating whether a job offer is realistic. *See Matter of Great Wall*, 16 I&N Dec. 142 (Acting Reg. Comm. 1977); *see also* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2). In evaluating whether a job offer is realistic, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) requires the petitioner to demonstrate financial resources sufficient to pay the beneficiary's proffered wages, although the totality of the circumstances affecting the petitioning business will be considered if the evidence warrants such consideration. *See Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (Reg. Comm. 1967).

In determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage during a given period, USCIS will first examine whether the petitioner employed and paid the beneficiary during that period. If the petitioner establishes by documentary evidence that it employed the beneficiary at a salary equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the evidence will be considered *prima facie* proof of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner submitted no evidence that it ever employed the beneficiary.

If the petitioner does not establish that it employed and paid the beneficiary an amount at least equal to the proffered wage during that period, USCIS will next examine the net income figure reflected on the petitioner's federal income tax return, without consideration of depreciation or other expenses. *River Street Donuts, LLC v. Napolitano*, 558 F.3d 111 (1st Cir. 2009). Reliance on federal income tax returns as a basis for determining a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is well established by judicial precedent. *Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava*, 632 F. Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (*citing Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman*, 736 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1984)); *see also Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh*, 719 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Texas 1989); *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill.

³ The submission of additional evidence on appeal is allowed by the instructions to the Form I-290B, which are incorporated into the regulations by the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(1). The record in the instant case provides no reason to preclude consideration of any of the documents newly submitted on appeal. *See Matter of Soriano*, 19 I&N Dec. 764 (BIA 1988).

1982), *aff'd*, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983). Reliance on the petitioner's gross sales and profits and wage expense is misplaced. Showing that the petitioner's gross sales and profits exceeded the proffered wage is insufficient. Similarly, showing that the petitioner paid wages in excess of the proffered wage is insufficient.

In *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. at 1084, the court held that the Immigration and Naturalization Service, now USCIS, had properly relied on the petitioner's net income figure, as stated on the petitioner's corporate income tax returns, rather than the petitioner's gross income. The court specifically rejected the argument that the Service should have considered income before expenses were paid rather than net income.

With respect to depreciation, the court in *River Street Donuts* noted:

The AAO recognized that a depreciation deduction is a systematic allocation of the cost of a tangible long-term asset and does not represent a specific cash expenditure during the year claimed. Furthermore, the AAO indicated that the allocation of the depreciation of a long-term asset could be spread out over the years or concentrated into a few depending on the petitioner's choice of accounting and depreciation methods. Nonetheless, the AAO explained that depreciation represents an actual cost of doing business, which could represent either the diminution in value of buildings and equipment or the accumulation of funds necessary to replace perishable equipment and buildings. Accordingly, the AAO stressed that even though amounts deducted for depreciation do not represent current use of cash, neither does it represent amounts available to pay wages.

We find that the AAO has a rational explanation for its policy of not adding depreciation back to net income. Namely, that the amount spent on a long term tangible asset is a "real" expense.

River Street Donuts, 558 F.3d at 116. “[USCIS] and judicial precedent support the use of tax returns and the *net income figures* in determining petitioner's ability to pay. Plaintiffs' argument that these figures should be revised by the court by adding back depreciation is without support.” *Chi-Feng Chang*, 719 F.Supp. at 537 (emphasis added). Therefore, the petitioner's assertion that depreciation should be considered fails.

For a C corporation, USCIS considers net income to be the figure shown on Line 28 of the Form 1120, U.S. Corporation Income Tax Return. The record before the director closed on December 6, 2007 with the receipt by the director of the petitioner's submissions in response to the director's request for evidence (RFE). As of that date, the petitioner's 2007 federal income tax return was not yet due. Therefore, the petitioner's income tax return for 2006 is the most recent return available. The petitioner's tax returns demonstrate its net income for 2001 through 2006, as shown in the table below.

- In 2001, the Form 1120 stated net income of -\$52,164.
- In 2002, the Form 1120 stated net income of \$56,954.
- In 2003, the Form 1120 stated net income of \$65,877.
- In 2004, the Form 1120 stated net income of \$47,900.
- In 2005, the Form 1120 stated net income of \$48,578.
- In 2006, the Form 1120 stated net income of \$8,035

Therefore, for the years 2001 and 2006, the petitioner's tax returns demonstrated insufficient net income to establish an ability to pay the wage. The petitioner's net income in 2002, 2003, 2004, and 2005 is sufficient to establish an ability to pay the proffered wage in those years.

If the net income the petitioner demonstrates it had available during that period, if any, added to the wages paid to the beneficiary during the period, if any, do not equal the amount of the proffered wage or more, USCIS will review the petitioner's assets. Net current assets are the difference between the petitioner's current assets and current liabilities.⁴ A corporation's year-end current assets are shown on Schedule L, lines 1 through 6 and include cash-on-hand. Its year-end current liabilities are shown on lines 16 through 18. If the total of a corporation's end-of-year net current assets and the wages paid to the beneficiary (if any) are equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the petitioner is expected to be able to pay the proffered wage using those net current assets. The petitioner's tax returns demonstrate its end-of-year net current assets for 2001 and 2006, as shown in the table below.

- In 2001, the Form 1120 stated net current assets of \$24,142.
- In 2006, the Form 1120 stated net current assets of \$59,305.

Therefore, for the year 2001, the petitioner did not have sufficient net current assets to pay the difference between the actual wage paid and the proffered wage. The petitioner demonstrated net current assets to pay the difference between the actual wage paid and the proffered wage in 2006.

Therefore, while the petitioner has established its ability to pay in some years, the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage as of the priority date onward through an examination of wages paid to the beneficiary, or its net income or net current assets.

⁴According to *Barron's Dictionary of Accounting Terms* 117 (3rd ed. 2000), "current assets" consist of items having (in most cases) a life of one year or less, such as cash, marketable securities, inventory and prepaid expenses. "Current liabilities" are obligations payable (in most cases) within one year, such accounts payable, short-term notes payable, and accrued expenses (such as taxes and salaries). *Id.* at 118.

On appeal, counsel argues that the director erred in refusing to consider the petitioner's bank statements and cites an Interoffice Memo from William Yates dated May 4, 2004.⁵ We first note that this memo was rescinded by a memo dated May 14, 2005 from William Yates. Secondly, it is noted that by its own terms, this document is not intended to create any right or benefit or constitute a legally binding precedent within the regulation(s) at 8 C.F.R. § 103.3(c) and 8 C.F.R. § 103.9(a), but merely is offered as guidance. Where the documentation submitted pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) is sufficient to render a decision, the director need not consider additional information. Lastly, the AAO's analysis complied with policy set forth by William R. Yates, Associate Director of Operations of USCIS, whose internal memorandum dated May 14, 2005 offering guidance on adjudications of petitioning entities' continuing ability to pay the proffered wage through the following three-tiered analysis:

Adjudicators should make a positive ability to pay determination on an I-140 under the following circumstances:

- The petitioner's net income is equal to or greater than the proffered wage;
- The petitioner's net current assets are equal to or greater than the proffered wage; or
- The employer submits credible, verifiable evidence that the petitioner is both employing the beneficiary and has paid or is currently paying the proffered wage.

The memorandum then states the acceptance of any other type of financial information is discretionary on the part of the adjudicator. The burden is on the petitioner to show that the financial information pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) is insufficient to demonstrate the petitioner's true financial situation. The petitioner presented no such evidence here and following the above analysis, failed to demonstrate that it had sufficient net income, net current assets, or paid the beneficiary the proffered wage.

On appeal, counsel argues that under the reasoning of *Elatos Restaurant*, 632 F.Supp. 1049, the petitioner's bank statements should be accepted as evidence of its financial ability. The petitioner also submitted its bank statements from March 2001, May 2001, July 2001, August 2001, September 2001, October 2001, November 2001, and December 2001. As stated by counsel on appeal, the court in that case stated that *Elatos Restaurant* should have been able to "submit more conclusive evidence such as cash flow data or certified financial statements." However, bank statements are not among the three types of evidence, enumerated in 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) or specified by the court in the *Elatos Restaurant* case to illustrate a petitioner's ability to pay a proffered wage. While this regulation allows additional material "in appropriate cases," the petitioner in this case has not demonstrated why the documentation specified at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) is inapplicable or otherwise paints an inaccurate financial picture of the petitioner. Second, bank statements show the amount in an account on a given date, and cannot show the sustainable ability to pay a proffered wage. Third, no evidence was submitted to demonstrate that the funds reported on the petitioner's bank statements

⁵ The May 4, 2004 memo concerns requests for evidence.

somehow reflect additional available funds that were not reflected on its tax return, such as the petitioner's taxable income (income minus deductions) or the cash specified on Schedule L that will be considered below in determining the petitioner's net current assets.

Counsel argues that the petitioner was not adequately notified by the director's RFE that it failed to demonstrate the ability to pay the proffered wage and that the RFE impermissibly requested only its tax returns as opposed to any of the evidence enumerated in 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2). Counsel stated that with proper notice, the petitioner "could have established more substantially its financial viability by providing additional evidence." As the petitioner failed to submit any of the evidence enumerated under 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) on appeal even after having been notified of its deficiencies in demonstrating its ability to pay the proffered wage by the director's decision, we fail to note any prejudice suffered by the petitioner through the wording of the director's RFE.

USCIS may consider the overall magnitude of the petitioner's business activities in its determination of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. *See Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (BIA 1967). The petitioning entity in *Sonogawa* had been in business for over 11 years and routinely earned a gross annual income of about \$100,000. During the year in which the petition was filed in that case, the petitioner changed business locations and paid rent on both the old and new locations for five months. There were large moving costs and also a period of time when the petitioner was unable to do regular business. The Regional Commissioner determined that the petitioner's prospects for a resumption of successful business operations were well established. The petitioner was a fashion designer whose work had been featured in *Time* and *Look* magazines. Her clients included Miss Universe, movie actresses, and society matrons. The petitioner's clients had been included in the lists of the best-dressed California women. The petitioner lectured on fashion design at design and fashion shows throughout the United States and at colleges and universities in California. The Regional Commissioner's determination in *Sonogawa* was based in part on the petitioner's sound business reputation and outstanding reputation as a couturiere. As in *Sonogawa*, USCIS may, at its discretion, consider evidence relevant to the petitioner's financial ability that falls outside of a petitioner's net income and net current assets. USCIS may consider such factors as the number of years the petitioner has been doing business, the established historical growth of the petitioner's business, the overall number of employees, the occurrence of any uncharacteristic business expenditures or losses, the petitioner's reputation within its industry, whether the beneficiary is replacing a former employee or an outsourced service, or any other evidence that USCIS deems relevant to the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage.

The tax returns reflect that the petitioner's gross receipts declined to \$379,282 in 2005 from \$482,534 in 2002. On appeal, counsel argues that the petitioner's "reasonable expectation of future revenue and profits" should be considered. Counsel cites to the net income and net asset figures shown on the petitioner's tax returns, however, those figures do not show an overall increase in either net income or net assets. Instead, the tax returns show varying income and net asset amounts as well as varying payments to officers from no officer compensation to \$15,000, and significant variation in salary amounts paid from \$102,451 in 2001 to \$25,585 in 2003 to \$82,373 in 2006. In addition, counsel stated that certain extenuating circumstances colored the net income and net assets of the petitioner in 2001. Counsel states that the petitioner took a particularly large depreciation and

otherwise incurred uncharacteristic costs since the petitioner was formed in 2000 and 2001 was its first full year in operation. The petitioner submitted no evidence to support counsel's statements. The assertions of counsel do not constitute evidence. *Matter of Obaigbena*, 19 I&N Dec. 533, 534 (BIA 1988); *Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez*, 17 I&N Dec. 503, 506 (BIA 1980). Additionally, the petitioner's gross receipts were lower in 2005 than 2001, so that the tax returns do not demonstrate that 2001 was an uncharacteristically bad year. Further, nothing in the record documents the petitioner's reputation in the industry similar to the situation presented in *Sonegawa*.

Thus, assessing the totality of the circumstances in this individual case, it is concluded that the petitioner has not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage.

Additionally, the petitioner failed to adequately document that the beneficiary has the required experience for the position offered. An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. *See Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States*, 299 F.Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), *aff'd*, 345 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2003); *see also Dor v. INS*, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989) (noting that the AAO reviews appeals on a de novo basis). The petitioner must also demonstrate that, on the priority date, the beneficiary had the qualifications stated on its Form ETA 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification, as certified by the DOL and submitted with the instant petition. *Matter of Wing's Tea House*, 16 I&N Dec. 158 (Act. Reg. Comm. 1977). The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(l)(3)(ii) specifies for the classification of a skilled worker that:

(A) *General*. Any requirements of training or experience for skilled workers, professionals, or other workers must be supported by letters from trainers or employers giving the name, address, and title of the trainer or employer, and a description of the training received.

(B) *Skilled workers*. If the petition is for a skilled worker, the petition must be accompanied by evidence that the alien meets the educational, training or experience, and any other requirements of the individual labor certification, meets the requirements for Schedule A designation, or meets the requirements for the Labor Market Information Pilot Program occupation designation. The minimum requirements for this classification are at least two years of training or experience.

On the ETA Form 750, the petitioner listed that the position required two years of experience in the position offered as an assistant manager. On Form ETA 750B, the beneficiary represented that she worked for [REDACTED] from February 5, 1994 to January 20, 1998 as an assistant manager. The petitioner submitted a letter from [REDACTED] stating that the beneficiary worked for the company from February 5, 1994 to January 20, 1998. This letter does not indicate the business's address as required by 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(l)(3)(ii). Additionally, the letter does not state whether the employment was on a full-time or part-time basis. As a result, we are unable to conclude that the beneficiary possesses the requisite two full years of

experience in the position offered so as to be eligible for the employment offered under the terms of the Form ETA 750.

The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and alternative basis for denial. The burden of proof in these proceedings rests solely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The petitioner has not met that burden.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.