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


**U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services**

B6



FILE:



Office: TEXAS SERVICE CENTER

Date: **JAN 21 2010**

SRC 07 210 52138

IN RE:

Petitioner:



Beneficiary:

PETITION: Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as a Skilled Worker or Professional pursuant to Section 203(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:

SELF-REPRESENTED

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. Please refer to 8 C.F.R. § 103.5 for the specific requirements. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$585. Any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider, as required by 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i).

Darin D'haan

Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The preference visa petition was denied by the Director, Texas Service Center, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner is a construction company. It seeks to employ the beneficiary permanently in the United States as a cement mason. As required by statute, the petition is accompanied by a Form ETA 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification, approved by the United States Department of Labor (DOL). The director determined that the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage beginning on the priority date of the visa petition. The director denied the petition accordingly.

The record shows that the appeal is properly filed, timely and makes a specific allegation of error in law or fact. The procedural history in this case is documented by the record and incorporated into the decision. Further elaboration of the procedural history will be made only as necessary.

As set forth in the director's October 30, 2007 denial, the single issue in this case is whether or not the petitioner has the ability to pay the proffered wage as of the priority date and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence.

Section 203(b)(3)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(i), provides for the granting of preference classification to qualified immigrants who are capable, at the time of petitioning for classification under this paragraph, of performing skilled labor (requiring at least two years training or experience), not of a temporary nature, for which qualified workers are not available in the United States.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states in pertinent part:

Ability of prospective employer to pay wage. Any petition filed by or for an employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be either in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements.

The petitioner must demonstrate the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, which is the date the Form ETA 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification, was accepted for processing by any office within the employment system of the DOL. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(d). The petitioner must also demonstrate that, on the priority date, the beneficiary had the qualifications stated on its Form ETA 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification, as certified by the DOL and submitted with the instant petition. *Matter of Wing's Tea House*, 16 I&N Dec. 158 (Act. Reg. Comm. 1977).

Here, the Form ETA 750 was accepted on April 30, 2001. The proffered wage as stated on the Form ETA 750 is \$19.16 per hour (\$39,852 per year). The Form ETA 750 states that the position requires

two years of experience in the offered position or two years in a related occupation of cement patcher.

The AAO maintains plenary power to review each appeal on a *de novo* basis. 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) ("On appeal from or review of the initial decision, the agency has all the powers which it would have in making the initial decision except as it may limit the issues on notice or by rule."); *see also*, *Janka v. U.S. Dept. of Transp., NTSB*, 925 F.2d 1147, 1149 (9th Cir. 1991). The AAO's *de novo* authority has been long recognized by the federal courts. *See, e.g. Dor v. INS*, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989). The AAO considers all pertinent evidence in the record, including new evidence properly submitted upon appeal.¹

The evidence in the record of proceeding shows that the petitioner is structured as a C corporation. On the petition, the petitioner claimed to have been established in 1999. The petitioner failed to list the number of its employees on the Form I-140 as required. According to the tax returns in the record, the petitioner's fiscal year runs from April 1 to March 31. On the Form ETA 750B, signed by the beneficiary on April 26, 2001, the beneficiary stated that he began working for the petitioner in March 1998.

On appeal, the petitioner states that it is submitting additional evidence regarding its financial position that was not available earlier and requests reconsideration of the case in light of the new evidence.

The petitioner must establish that its job offer to the beneficiary is a realistic one. Because the filing of an ETA 750 labor certification application establishes a priority date for any immigrant petition later based on the ETA 750, the petitioner must establish that the job offer was realistic as of the priority date and that the offer remained realistic for each year thereafter, until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. The petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is an essential element in evaluating whether a job offer is realistic. *See Matter of Great Wall*, 16 I&N Dec. 142 (Acting Reg. Comm. 1977); *see also* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2). In evaluating whether a job offer is realistic, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) requires the petitioner to demonstrate financial resources sufficient to pay the beneficiary's proffered wages, although the totality of the circumstances affecting the petitioning business will be considered if the evidence warrants such consideration. *See Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (Reg. Comm. 1967).

In determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage during a given period, USCIS will first examine whether the petitioner employed and paid the beneficiary during that period. If the petitioner establishes by documentary evidence that it employed the beneficiary at a salary equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the evidence will be considered *prima facie* proof of the

¹ The submission of additional evidence on appeal is allowed by the instructions to the Form I-290B, which are incorporated into the regulations by the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(1). The record in the instant case provides no reason to preclude consideration of any of the documents newly submitted on appeal. *See Matter of Soriano*, 19 I&N Dec. 764 (BIA 1988).

petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner submitted the following W-2 forms for the beneficiary:

- In 2001, the W-2 stated that the petitioner paid the beneficiary \$19,858.96.
- In 2002, the W-2 stated that the petitioner paid the beneficiary \$17,336.18.
- In 2003, the tax summary stated that the petitioner paid the beneficiary \$20,219.²
- In 2004, the W-2 stated that the petitioner paid the beneficiary \$5,616.
- In 2005, the W-2 stated that the petitioner paid the beneficiary \$10,970.
- In 2006, the W-2 stated that the petitioner paid the beneficiary \$14,255.

The W-2 statements and tax summary fail to demonstrate that the petitioner paid the beneficiary the proffered wage during the relevant time. As such, the petitioner must demonstrate that it had the ability to pay the difference between the actual wages paid and the proffered wage, which in 2001 was \$19,994; in 2002, was \$22,516; in 2003 was \$19,633; in 2004 was \$34,236; in 2005 was \$28,882; and in 2006 was \$25,597.

If the petitioner does not establish that it employed and paid the beneficiary an amount at least equal to the proffered wage during that period, USCIS will next examine the net income figure reflected on the petitioner's federal income tax return, without consideration of depreciation or other expenses. *River Street Donuts, LLC v. Napolitano*, 558 F.3d 111 (1st Cir. 2009). Reliance on federal income tax returns as a basis for determining a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is well established by judicial precedent. *Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava*, 632 F. Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (citing *Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman*, 736 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1984)); see also *Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh*, 719 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Texas 1989); *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), *aff'd*, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983). Reliance on the petitioner's gross sales and profits and wage expense is misplaced. Showing that the petitioner's gross sales and profits exceeded the proffered wage is insufficient. Similarly, showing that the petitioner paid wages in excess of the proffered wage is insufficient.

In *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. at 1084, the court held that the Immigration and Naturalization Service, now USCIS, had properly relied on the petitioner's net income figure, as stated on the petitioner's corporate income tax returns, rather than the petitioner's gross income. The court specifically rejected the argument that the Service should have considered income before expenses were paid rather than net income.

With respect to depreciation, the court in *River Street Donuts* noted:

The AAO recognized that a depreciation deduction is a systematic allocation of the cost of a tangible long-term asset and does not represent a specific cash

² The petitioner did not submit a W-2 for this year and provided no explanation as to why one was not available.

expenditure during the year claimed. Furthermore, the AAO indicated that the allocation of the depreciation of a long-term asset could be spread out over the years or concentrated into a few depending on the petitioner's choice of accounting and depreciation methods. Nonetheless, the AAO explained that depreciation represents an actual cost of doing business, which could represent either the diminution in value of buildings and equipment or the accumulation of funds necessary to replace perishable equipment and buildings. Accordingly, the AAO stressed that even though amounts deducted for depreciation do not represent current use of cash, neither does it represent amounts available to pay wages.

We find that the AAO has a rational explanation for its policy of not adding depreciation back to net income. Namely, that the amount spent on a long term tangible asset is a "real" expense.

River Street Donuts, 558 F.3d at 116. “[USCIS] and judicial precedent support the use of tax returns and the *net income figures* in determining petitioner’s ability to pay. Plaintiffs’ argument that these figures should be revised by the court by adding back depreciation is without support.” *Chi-Feng Chang*, 719 F.Supp. at 537 (emphasis added).

For a C corporation, USCIS considers net income to be the figure shown on Line 28 of the Form 1120, U.S. Corporation Income Tax Return. The record before the director closed on September 28, 2007 with the receipt by the director of the petitioner’s submissions in response to the director’s notice of intent to deny. As of that date, the petitioner’s 2007 federal income tax return was not yet due. Therefore, the petitioner’s income tax return for 2006 is the most recent return available. The petitioner’s tax returns demonstrate its net income for tax years 2001 through 2006, as shown in the table below.

- The 2001 Form 1120 stated net income of \$11,235.³
 - The 2002 Form 1120 stated net income of \$7,527.
 - The 2003 Form 1120 stated net income (loss) of -\$3,495.
 - The 2004 Form 1120 stated net income of \$1,265.
 - The 2005 Form 1120 stated net income of \$3,005.
- The 2006 Form 1120 stated net income of \$34,984.

Therefore, for the tax years 2001 through 2005, the petitioner did not have sufficient net income to pay the difference between the actual wage paid and the proffered wage. The petitioner established its ability to pay the proffered wage in 2006.

If the net income the petitioner demonstrates it had available during that period, if any, added to the wages paid to the beneficiary during the period, if any, do not equal the amount of the proffered

³ The petitioner’s 2001 tax return represents the time period April 1, 2001 to March 31, 2002.

wage or more, USCIS will review the petitioner's assets. Net current assets are the difference between the petitioner's current assets and current liabilities.⁴ A corporation's year-end current assets are shown on Schedule L, lines 1 through 6 and include cash-on-hand. Its year-end current liabilities are shown on lines 16 through 18. If the total of a corporation's end-of-year net current assets and the wages paid to the beneficiary (if any) are equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the petitioner is expected to be able to pay the proffered wage using those net current assets. The petitioner's tax returns demonstrate its end-of-year net current assets for 2001 through 2006, as shown in the table below.

- In 2001, the Form 1120 stated net current assets (liabilities) of -\$16,904.
 - In 2002, the Form 1120 stated net current assets (liabilities) of \$6,074.
 - In 2003, the Form 1120 stated net current assets of \$3,440.
 - In 2004, the Form 1120 stated net current assets of \$5,249.
- In 2005, the Form 1120 stated net current assets of \$10,900.

Therefore, for the years 2001 through 2005, the petitioner did not have sufficient net current assets to pay the difference between the actual wage and the proffered wage.

Therefore, from the date the Form ETA 750 was accepted for processing by the DOL, the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage as of the priority date through an examination of wages paid to the beneficiary, or its net income or net current assets except for 2006.

On appeal, the petitioner states that the wages reflected on the W-2 forms do not reflect that the beneficiary received the prevailing wage because the beneficiary was employed as a cement patcher during those years.⁵ The position and accompanying wage received is irrelevant to this discussion: our concern is not whether the beneficiary *did* receive the prevailing wage, but whether the petitioner

⁴According to *Barron's Dictionary of Accounting Terms* 117 (3rd ed. 2000), "current assets" consist of items having (in most cases) a life of one year or less, such as cash, marketable securities, inventory and prepaid expenses. "Current liabilities" are obligations payable (in most cases) within one year, such accounts payable, short-term notes payable, and accrued expenses (such as taxes and salaries). *Id.* at 118.

⁵ The petitioner submitted a signed statement to DOL, dated October 25, 2006 that stated that since February 2002, the beneficiary was employed in the position offered as a cement mason. *Matter of Ho*, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591-592 (BIA 1988) states:

It is incumbent on the petitioner to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence, and attempts to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies, absent competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth, in fact, lies, will not suffice.

can pay the prevailing wage.⁶ In our analysis above, the amount on the W-2 forms was used to determine the petitioner's capacity to pay the prevailing wage either individually based on wages paid or in combination with net income or net current assets. The petitioner did not demonstrate available funds between the amount actually paid to the beneficiary and its net assets or net income for any given year, save 2006.

On appeal, the petitioner submitted a letter dated November 19, 2007 from [REDACTED], which states that wages paid to employees are reflected on the petitioner's tax returns on the "cost of labor" line found on Schedule A. Wages paid to other employees do not evidence the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage to this beneficiary. The wages actually paid to the beneficiary have already been considered above.

USCIS may consider the overall magnitude of the petitioner's business activities in its determination of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. *See Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (BIA 1967). The petitioning entity in *Sonogawa* had been in business for over 11 years and routinely earned a gross annual income of about \$100,000. During the year in which the petition was filed in that case, the petitioner changed business locations and paid rent on both the old and new locations for five months. There were large moving costs and also a period of time when the petitioner was unable to do regular business. The Regional Commissioner determined that the petitioner's prospects for a resumption of successful business operations were well established. The petitioner was a fashion designer whose work had been featured in *Time* and *Look* magazines. Her clients included Miss Universe, movie actresses, and society matrons. The petitioner's clients had been included in the lists of the best-dressed California women. The petitioner lectured on fashion design at design and fashion shows throughout the United States and at colleges and universities in California. The Regional Commissioner's determination in *Sonogawa* was based in part on the petitioner's sound business reputation and outstanding reputation as a couturiere. As in *Sonogawa*, USCIS may, at its discretion, consider evidence relevant to the petitioner's financial ability that falls outside of a petitioner's net income and net current assets. USCIS may consider such factors as the number of years the petitioner has been doing business, the established historical growth of the petitioner's business, the overall number of employees, the occurrence of any uncharacteristic business expenditures or losses, the petitioner's reputation within its industry, whether the beneficiary is replacing a former employee or an outsourced service, or any other evidence that USCIS deems relevant to the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage.

In the instant case, the tax returns show that the petitioner did not have one "off" year like in *Sonogawa*, but instead the tax returns reflect consistent low or negative net income instead of positive income and the net current assets are also consistent and much lower than the proffered wage. The tax returns reflect a substantial decline in gross receipts between 2001 and 2006. Nothing in the record documents the petitioner's reputation in the industry similar to the situation presented in *Sonogawa*. Thus, assessing the totality of the circumstances in this individual case, it is

⁶ We note that a petitioner must establish eligibility at the time of filing; a petition cannot be approved at a future date after the petitioner becomes eligible under a new set of facts. *See Matter of Katigbak*, 14 I&N Dec. 45, 49 (Comm. 1971).

concluded that the petitioner has not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage.

The evidence submitted does not establish that the petitioner had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date. The burden of proof in these proceedings rests solely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The petitioner has not met that burden.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.