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U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services  
Administrative Appeals Office (AAO)  
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., MS 2090  
Washington, DC 20529-2090



U.S. Citizenship  
and Immigration  
Services

**PUBLIC COPY**

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FILE:



Office: NEBRASKA SERVICE CENTER

Date:

MAR 11 2011

IN RE: Petitioner:

Beneficiary:



PETITION: Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as an Other, Unskilled Worker Pursuant to § 203(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:



INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied by us in reaching our decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. The specific requirements for filing such a request can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$630. Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires that any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,

Perry Rhew  
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The preference visa petition was denied by the Director, Nebraska Service Center, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner is a ballet academy. It seeks to employ the beneficiary permanently in the United States as a ballet master. As required by statute, the petition is accompanied by a Form ETA 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification, approved by the United States Department of Labor (DOL). The director determined that the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage beginning on the priority date of the visa petition. The director denied the petition accordingly.

The record shows that the appeal is properly filed, timely and makes a specific allegation of error in law or fact. The procedural history in this case is documented by the record and incorporated into the decision. Further elaboration of the procedural history will be made only as necessary.

As set forth in the director's April 15, 2010 denial, the issue in this case is whether or not the petitioner has the ability to pay the proffered wage as of the priority date and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence.

Section 203(b)(3)(A)(iii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(iii), provides for the granting of preference classification to other qualified immigrants who are capable, at the time of petitioning for classification under this paragraph, of performing unskilled labor, not of a temporary or seasonal nature, for which qualified workers are not available in the United States.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states in pertinent part:

*Ability of prospective employer to pay wage.* Any petition filed by or for an employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be either in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements.

The petitioner must demonstrate the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, which is the date the Form ETA 750 was accepted for processing by any office within the employment system of the DOL. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(d). The petitioner must also demonstrate that, on the priority date, the beneficiary had the qualifications stated on its Form ETA 750 as certified by the DOL and submitted with the instant petition. *Matter of Wing's Tea House*, 16 I&N Dec. 158 (Act. Reg. Comm. 1977).

Here, the Form ETA 750 was accepted on April 10, 2002. The proffered wage as stated on the Form ETA 750 is \$15.00 per hour (\$27,300.00 per year). The Form ETA 750 states that the position requires a high school diploma and one year training in ballet and character.

The AAO conducts appellate review on a *de novo* basis. *See Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004). The AAO considers all pertinent evidence in the record, including new evidence properly submitted upon appeal.<sup>1</sup>

The evidence in the record of proceeding shows that the petitioner is structured as an S corporation. On the petition, the petitioner claims to have been established on July 17, 1990, and to currently employ 13 workers. According to the tax returns in the record, the petitioner's fiscal year is based on a calendar year. On the Form ETA 750B, signed by the beneficiary on April 1, 2002, the beneficiary does not claim to have been employed by the petitioner. However, on the Form G-325A, Biographic Information, submitted by the beneficiary and dated August 15, 2007, he indicated that he has been employed by the petitioner since September 1998.

The petitioner must establish that its job offer to the beneficiary is a realistic one. Because the filing of a Form ETA 750 labor certification application establishes a priority date for any immigrant petition later based on the Form ETA 750, the petitioner must establish that the job offer was realistic as of the priority date and that the offer remained realistic for each year thereafter, until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. The petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is an essential element in evaluating whether a job offer is realistic. *See Matter of Great Wall*, 16 I&N Dec. 142 (Acting Reg. Comm. 1977); *see also* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2). In evaluating whether a job offer is realistic, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) requires the petitioner to demonstrate financial resources sufficient to pay the beneficiary's proffered wages, although the totality of the circumstances affecting the petitioning business will be considered if the evidence warrants such consideration. *See Matter of Sonegawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (Reg. Comm. 1967).

In determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage during a given period, USCIS will first examine whether the petitioner employed and paid the beneficiary during that period. If the petitioner establishes by documentary evidence that it employed the beneficiary at a salary equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the evidence will be considered *prima facie* proof of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage.

The petitioner has submitted a number of Forms W-2 as evidence of wages paid to the beneficiary by the petitioner. However, these Forms W-2 are not persuasive evidence of any wages having been paid to the beneficiary because information contained in these forms are inconsistent with claims made by the petitioner and the beneficiary in the Form I-140 and Form I-485 under penalty of perjury. The Forms W-2 state that the wages were paid to a person having social security number [REDACTED]. The petitioner responded "N/A," or not applicable,

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<sup>1</sup> The submission of additional evidence on appeal is allowed by the instructions to the Form I-290B, which are incorporated into the regulations at 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(1).

to the query in the Form I-140 asking for the beneficiary's social security number, even though this information was clearly available to it if, in fact, [REDACTED] is the beneficiary's social security number. The beneficiary also claims that she does not have a social security number in the Form I-485 and Form G-325A. It is incumbent upon the petitioner to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence. Any attempt to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies will not suffice unless the petitioner submits competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. *Matter of Ho*, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591-92 (BIA 1988).

Absent clarification of these inconsistencies in the record, the AAO will not accept the Forms W-2 as persuasive evidence of wages paid to the beneficiary. Although this is not the basis for the AAO's decision in the instant case, it is noted that certain unlawful uses of social security numbers are criminal offenses involving moral turpitude and can lead in certain circumstances to removal from the United States. *See Lateef v. Dept. of Homeland Security*, 592 F.3d 926 (8<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2010).

However, assuming the Forms W-2 are persuasive evidence, the record of proceeding contains copies of Forms W-2 that were allegedly issued by the petitioner to the beneficiary as shown in the table below. The petitioner is obligated to show that it can pay the difference between the proffered wage (\$27,300.00) and wages already paid in each year.<sup>2</sup>

- In 2002, the Form W-2 stated total wages of \$25,752.96, a difference of \$1,547.04.
- In 2003, the Form W-2 stated total wages of \$4,292.16, a difference of \$23,007.84.
- In 2006, the Form W-2 stated total wages of \$6,200.00, a difference of \$21,100.00.
- In 2007, the Form W-2 stated total wages of \$12,000.00, a difference of \$15,300.00.
- In 2008, the Form W-2 stated total wages of \$13,166.67, a difference of \$14,133.33.
- In 2009, the Form W-2 stated total wages of \$26,000.00, a difference of \$1,300.00.

The petitioner submitted a copy of IRS Forms 1099-MISC issued by [REDACTED] to the beneficiary for 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2009. The AAO however will not take this evidence into consideration in determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. Although Masterworks, Inc. has the same address as the petitioner, it appears to be a different corporate entity. Because a corporation is a separate and distinct legal entity from its owners and shareholders, the assets of its shareholders or of other enterprises or corporations cannot be considered in determining the petitioning corporation's ability to pay the proffered wage. *See Matter of Aphrodite Investments, Ltd.*, 17 I&N Dec. 530 (Comm. 1980). The court in *Sitar v. Ashcroft*, 2003 WL 22203713 (D.Mass. Sept. 18, 2003) stated, "nothing in the governing regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 204.5, permits [USCIS] to consider the financial resources of individuals or entities who have no legal obligation to pay the wage." Even if the AAO were to consider the salary amounts from the Forms 1099-MISC, there still would not be a sufficient amount equal to or in excess of the proffered wage. Therefore, the petitioner has not established that it paid the beneficiary the full proffered wage from the priority date and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence.

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<sup>2</sup> The petitioner did not provide evidence of wages paid to the beneficiary in 2004 and 2005.

If, as in this case, the petitioner does not establish that it employed and paid the beneficiary an amount at least equal to the proffered wage during that period, USCIS will next examine the net income figure reflected on the petitioner's federal income tax return, without consideration of depreciation or other expenses. *River Street Donuts, LLC v. Napolitano*, 558 F.3d 111 (1<sup>st</sup> Cir. 2009); *Taco Especial v. Napolitano*, 696 F. Supp. 2d 873 (E.D. Mich. 2010). Reliance on federal income tax returns as a basis for determining a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is well established by judicial precedent. *Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava*, 632 F. Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (citing *Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman*, 736 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1984)); see also *Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh*, 719 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Texas 1989); *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), *aff'd*, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983). Reliance on the petitioner's gross receipts and wage expense is misplaced. Showing that the petitioner's gross receipts exceeded the proffered wage is insufficient. Similarly, a showing by the petitioner that it paid wages in excess of the proffered wage is insufficient.

In *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. at 1084, the court held that the Immigration and Naturalization Service, now USCIS, had properly relied on the petitioner's net income figure, as stated on the petitioner's corporate income tax returns, rather than the petitioner's gross income. The court specifically rejected the argument that USCIS should have considered income before expenses were paid rather than net income. See *Taco Especial v. Napolitano*, 696 F. Supp. 2d at 881 (gross profits overstate an employer's ability to pay because it ignores other necessary expenses).

With respect to depreciation, the court in *River Street Donuts* noted:

The AAO recognized that a depreciation deduction is a systematic allocation of the cost of a tangible long-term asset and does not represent a specific cash expenditure during the year claimed. Furthermore, the AAO indicated that the allocation of the depreciation of a long-term asset could be spread out over the years or concentrated into a few depending on the petitioner's choice of accounting and depreciation methods. Nonetheless, the AAO explained that depreciation represents an actual cost of doing business, which could represent either the diminution in value of buildings and equipment or the accumulation of funds necessary to replace perishable equipment and buildings. Accordingly, the AAO stressed that even though amounts deducted for depreciation do not represent current use of cash, neither does it represent amounts available to pay wages.

We find that the AAO has a rational explanation for its policy of not adding depreciation back to net income. Namely, that the amount spent on a long term tangible asset is a "real" expense.

*River Street Donuts* at 118. "[USCIS] and judicial precedent support the use of tax returns and the *net income figures* in determining petitioner's ability to pay. Plaintiffs' argument that these

figures should be revised by the court by adding back depreciation is without support.” *Chi-Feng Chang* at 537 (emphasis added).

The record before the director closed on April 22, 2009, with the receipt by the director of the petitioner’s submissions in response to the director’s request for evidence. As of that date, the petitioner’s 2009 federal income tax return was not yet due. Therefore, the petitioner’s income tax return for 2008 is the most recent return available for review by the director. However, as the petitioner submitted its 2009 tax return on appeal, it will be considered by the AAO. The petitioner’s IRS Form 1120S tax returns<sup>3</sup> demonstrate its net income as shown in the table below.

- In 2002, the Form 1120S stated net income of (\$12,202.00).
- In 2003, the Form 1120S stated net income of (\$1,353.00).
- In 2004, the Form 1120S stated net income of \$461.00.
- In 2005, the Form 1120S stated net income of (\$27,075.00).
- In 2006, the Form 1120S stated net income of \$2,844.00.
- In 2007, the Form 1120S stated net income of \$25,872.00.
- In 2008, the Form 1120S stated net income of \$17,502.00.
- In 2009, the Form 1120S stated net income of \$2,095.00.

Therefore, for all the relevant years, the petitioner did not have sufficient net income to pay the proffered wage, given that the Forms W-2 were unpersuasive. Even accepting the Forms W-2, the petitioner did not establish an ability to pay the proffered wage through a combination of wages paid and net income in 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006.

As an alternate means of determining the petitioner’s ability to pay the proffered wage, USCIS may review the petitioner’s net current assets. Net current assets are the difference between the petitioner’s current assets and current liabilities.<sup>4</sup> A corporation’s year-end current assets are

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<sup>3</sup> Where an S corporation’s income is exclusively from a trade or business, USCIS considers net income to be the figure for ordinary income, shown on line 21 of page one of the petitioner’s IRS Form 1120S. However, where an S corporation has income, credits, deductions or other adjustments from sources other than a trade or business, they are reported on Schedule K. If the Schedule K has relevant entries for additional income, credits, deductions or other adjustments, net income is found on line 23 (1997-2003); line 17e (2004-2005); and line 18 (2006-2009) of Schedule K. *See* Instructions for Form 1120S, 2006, at <http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i1120s.pdf> (indicating that Schedule K is a summary schedule of all shareholder’s shares of the corporation’s income, deductions, credits, etc.). Although the director figured the net income of the petitioner using the amounts listed on page one of the tax returns rather than from Schedule K, on appeal, the petitioner’s income was taken from Schedule K.

<sup>4</sup>According to *Barron’s Dictionary of Accounting Terms* 117 (3<sup>rd</sup> ed. 2000), “current assets” consist of items having (in most cases) a life of one year or less, such as cash, marketable securities, inventory and prepaid expenses. “Current liabilities” are obligations payable (in most cases) within one year, such accounts payable, short-term notes payable, and accrued expenses (such as taxes and salaries). *Id.* at 118.

shown on Schedule L, lines 1 through 6. Its year-end current liabilities are shown on lines 16 through 18. If the total of a corporation's end-of-year net current assets and the wages paid to the beneficiary (if any) are equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the petitioner is expected to be able to pay the proffered wage using those net current assets. The petitioner's tax returns demonstrate its end-of-year net current assets as shown in the table below.

- In 2002, the Form 1120S stated net current assets of \$5,440.00.
- In 2003, the Form 1120S stated net current assets of (\$11,425.00).
- In 2004, the Form 1120S stated net current assets of (\$24,555.00).
- In 2005, the Form 1120S stated net current assets of (\$21,339.00).
- In 2006, the Form 1120S stated net current assets of (\$74,397.00).
- In 2007, the Form 1120S stated net current assets of (\$66,067.00).
- In 2008, the Form 1120S stated net current assets of (\$47,701.00).
- In 2009, the Form 1120S stated net current assets of (\$51,808.00).<sup>5</sup>

Therefore, for all relevant years, the petitioner did not have sufficient net current assets to pay the proffered wage, given that the Forms W-2 were unpersuasive. Even accepting the Forms W-2, the petitioner did not establish an ability to pay the proffered wage in 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009 through net current assets and wages paid to the beneficiary.

Therefore, from the date the Form ETA 750 was accepted for processing by the DOL, the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage as of the priority date.

On appeal, counsel asserts that the director's conclusion that the petitioner has failed to establish that it has the ability to pay the offered wage at the time of filing is inaccurate. Counsel further asserts that when taken into consideration, other sources of income such as the personal assets and other income of the employer are sufficient to demonstrate its continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wages. Counsel also asserts that the petitioner has expectations of continued business growth and increased profits. The petitioner submits as evidence a statement by the petitioner owner, a CPA compilation report, unaudited financial statements, and a letter from the facility manager of [REDACTED]

Contrary to counsel's claim, the AAO rejects any suggestion that the petitioner's total assets should have been considered in the determination of the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner's total assets include depreciable assets that the petitioner uses in its business. Those depreciable assets will not be converted to cash during the ordinary course of business and will not, therefore, become funds available to pay the proffered wage. Further, the petitioner's total assets must be balanced by the petitioner's liabilities. Otherwise, they cannot properly be considered in the determination of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. Rather,

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<sup>5</sup> As noted above, the 1120S for 2009 will be considered in evaluating the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage.

USCIS will consider net current assets as an alternative method of demonstrating the ability to pay the proffered wage.

On appeal, counsel submitted the petitioner's financial statements for 2007, 2008, and 2009. The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) makes clear that where a petitioner relies on financial statements to demonstrate its ability to pay the proffered wage, those financial statements must be audited. An audit is conducted in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards to obtain a reasonable assurance that the financial statements of the business are free of material misstatements. The unaudited financial statements that counsel submitted with the petition are not persuasive evidence. The accountant's report that accompanied those financial statements makes clear that they were produced pursuant to a compilation rather than an audit. As the accountant's report also makes clear, financial statements produced pursuant to a compilation are the representations of management compiled into standard form. The unsupported representations of management are not reliable evidence and are insufficient to demonstrate the ability to pay the proffered wage.

Counsel asserts on appeal that the beneficiary's wife's Form I-140 petition has been approved and that her petition was also initiated by the petitioner, and therefore contained the same financial documents. Contrary to counsel's claim, USCIS, through the AAO, is not bound to follow the contradictory decision of a service center. *Louisiana Philharmonic Orchestra v. INS*, 44 F. Supp.2d 800, 803 (E.D. La. 2000), *affd*, 248 F.3rd 1139 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2001), *cert. denied*, 122 S.Ct. 51 (2001). Furthermore, although counsel refers to a decision issued by USCIS concerning the beneficiary's wife, counsel does not provide its published citation. While 8 C.F.R. § 103.3(c) provides that precedent decisions of USCIS are binding on all its employees in the administration of the Act, unpublished decisions are not similarly binding. Precedent decisions must be designated and published in bound volumes or as interim decisions. 8 C.F.R. § 103.9(a). In addition, it appears from counsel's statement that the petitioner has filed multiple immigrant petitions subsequent to the priority date of the instant petition; and therefore, the petitioner must establish that it had sufficient funds to pay all the wages from the priority date and continuing to the present. If the instant petition were the only petition filed by the petitioner, the petitioner would be required to produce evidence of its ability to pay the proffered wage to the single beneficiary of the instant petition. However, where a petitioner has filed multiple petitions for multiple beneficiaries which have been pending simultaneously, the petitioner must produce evidence that its job offers to each beneficiary are realistic, and therefore, that it has the ability to pay the proffered wages to each of the beneficiaries of its pending petitions, as of the priority date of each petition and continuing until the beneficiary of each petition obtains lawful permanent residence. *See Matter of Great Wall*, 16 I&N Dec. 142, 144-145 (Acting Reg. Comm. 1977) (petitioner must establish ability to pay as of the date of the Form MA 7-50B job offer, the predecessor to the Form ETA 750 and ETA Form 9089). *See also* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2). Accordingly, even if the instant record established the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage for the instant beneficiary, which it does not, the fact that there are multiple petitions would further call into question the petitioner's eligibility for the benefit sought.

Counsel's assertions on appeal cannot be concluded to outweigh the evidence presented in the tax returns and other evidence, as submitted by the petitioner that demonstrates that the petitioner could not pay the proffered wage from the day the Form ETA 750 was accepted for processing by the DOL.

USCIS may consider the overall magnitude of the petitioner's business activities in its determination of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. *See Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612. The petitioning entity in *Sonogawa* had been in business for over 11 years and routinely earned a gross annual income of about \$100,000. During the year in which the petition was filed in that case, the petitioner changed business locations and paid rent on both the old and new locations for five months. There were large moving costs and also a period of time when the petitioner was unable to do regular business. The Regional Commissioner determined that the petitioner's prospects for a resumption of successful business operations were well established. The petitioner was a fashion designer whose work had been featured in *Time* and *Look* magazines. Her clients included Miss Universe, movie actresses, and society matrons. The petitioner's clients had been included in the lists of the best-dressed California women. The petitioner lectured on fashion design at design and fashion shows throughout the United States and at colleges and universities in California. The Regional Commissioner's determination in *Sonogawa* was based in part on the petitioner's sound business reputation and outstanding reputation as a couturiere. As in *Sonogawa*, USCIS may, at its discretion, consider evidence relevant to the petitioner's financial ability that falls outside of a petitioner's net income and net current assets. USCIS may consider such factors as the number of years the petitioner has been doing business, the established historical growth of the petitioner's business, the overall number of employees, the occurrence of any uncharacteristic business expenditures or losses, the petitioner's reputation within its industry, whether the beneficiary is replacing a former employee or an outsourced service, or any other evidence that USCIS deems relevant to the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage.

In assessing the totality of the circumstances in this case, it is concluded that the petitioner has not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage. There are no facts paralleling those in *Sonogawa* that are present in the instant matter to a degree sufficient to establish that the petitioner had the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner has not demonstrated the occurrence of any uncharacteristic business expenditures or losses in any of the relevant years which would circumvent its inability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner has not submitted evidence to establish that the beneficiary is replacing a former employee whose primary duties were described in the Form ETA 750. Counsel suggests that despite the petitioner's inadequate net income, USCIS should consider the petitioner's anticipated business growth and increased profits in the future. While the petitioner may anticipate business growth and increased profits in the future, it still must show that it had such capacity beginning on the priority date, April 10, 2002. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). Finally, the unresolved inconsistency in the record pertaining to the

beneficiary's social security number and the wages claimed to have been paid to him further undermine the credibility of the evidence as a whole.

Accordingly, the evidence submitted does not establish that the petitioner had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date.

The burden of proof in these proceedings rests solely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The petitioner has not met that burden.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed.