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U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Administrative Appeals Office (AAO)
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., MS 2090
Washington, DC 20529-2090
**U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services**



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Date:

MAY 03 2011

Office: NEBRASKA SERVICE CENTER

FILE:



IN RE:

Petitioner:

Beneficiary:



PETITION: Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as a Skilled Worker or Professional pursuant to Section 203(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:



INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied by us in reaching our decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. The specific requirements for filing such a request can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$630. Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires that any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,

Perry Rhew
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The Director, Nebraska Service Center, denied the employment-based immigrant visa petition, which is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner is a commercial litigation company. It seeks to employ the beneficiary permanently in the United States as an accountant, management pursuant to section 203(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3). As required by statute, an ETA Form 9089 Application for Alien Employment Certification approved by the Department of Labor (DOL), accompanied the petition. Upon reviewing the petition, the director determined that the beneficiary did not satisfy the minimum level of education stated on the labor certification.

The record shows that the appeal is properly filed and timely and makes a specific allegation of error in law or fact. The procedural history in this case is documented by the record and incorporated into the decision. Further elaboration of the procedural history will be made only as necessary.

As set forth in the director's August 6, 2008 denial, the issue in this case is whether the beneficiary possessed the requisite education at the time of the labor certification's priority date. We note additional issues of whether the beneficiary may be found qualified for classification as a professional or skilled worker when the terms of the labor certification require a Master's degree and whether the petitioner had the ability to pay the proffered wage from the priority date onwards.

The AAO conducts appellate review on a *de novo* basis. *See Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004). The AAO considers all pertinent evidence in the record, including new evidence properly submitted upon appeal.¹

An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. *See Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States*, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), *aff'd*, 345 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2003); *see also Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004) (noting that the AAO conducts appellate review on a *de novo* basis). Here, the petition was filed for under Section 203(b)(A)(i) or (ii), as a professional or skilled worker, yet ETA Form 9089 requires a Master's degree for the position and does not state an alternate educational requirement of a bachelor's degree for consideration as a professional.

Section 203(b) of the Act states in pertinent part that:

- (2) Aliens who are members of the professions holding advanced degrees or aliens of exceptional ability. --

¹ The submission of additional evidence on appeal is allowed by the instructions to the Form I-290B, which are incorporated into the regulations by the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(1). The record in the instant case provides no reason to preclude consideration of any of the documents newly submitted on appeal. *See Matter of Soriano*, 19 I&N Dec. 764 (BIA 1988).

(A) In general. -- Visas shall be made available . . . to qualified immigrants who are members of the professions holding advanced degrees or their equivalent or who because of their exceptional ability in the sciences, arts, or business, will substantially benefit prospectively the national economy, cultural or educational interests, or welfare of the United States, and whose services in the sciences, arts, professions, or business are sought by an employer in the United States.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(4) provides the following:

(i) General. Every petition under this classification must be accompanied by an individual labor certification from the Department of Labor, by an application for Schedule A designation (if applicable), or by documentation to establish that the alien qualifies for one of the shortage occupations in the Department of Labor's Labor Market Information Pilot Program. To apply for Schedule A designation or to establish that the alien's occupation is within the Labor Market Information Program, a fully executed uncertified Form ETA-750 in duplicate must accompany the petition. The job offer portion of the individual labor certification, Schedule A application, or Pilot Program application must demonstrate that the job requires a professional holding an advanced degree or the equivalent or an alien of exceptional ability.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(2) defines an advanced degree as follows:

[A]ny United States academic or professional degree or a foreign equivalent degree above that of baccalaureate. A United States baccalaureate degree or a foreign equivalent degree followed by at least five years of progressive experience in the specialty shall be considered the equivalent of a master's degree. If a doctoral degree is customarily required by the specialty, the alien must have a United States doctorate degree or a foreign equivalent degree.

Section 203(b)(3)(A)(ii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(ii), provides for the granting of preference classification to qualified immigrants who hold baccalaureate degrees and are members of the professions. Section 203(b)(3)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(i), provides for the granting of preference classification to qualified immigrants who are capable, at the time of petitioning for classification under this paragraph, of performing skilled labor (requiring at least two years training or experience), not of a temporary nature, for which qualified workers are not available in the United States.

In this matter, Part H, line 4 of the labor certification reflects that a Master's degree in Accounting is the minimum level of education required and line 6 reflects that 36 months of experience are also required. The labor certification does not allow for any other combination of education and experience in Section H.8. As a result, the terms of the labor certification provide for a worker with an advanced degree, not a professional or skilled worker. Here, however, the petitioner filed the petition for a professional or skilled worker despite the required education of a Master's degree.

Additionally, based on the advanced degree requirement and three years of experience, the higher required qualifications would preclude consideration as a skilled worker.

There is no provision in statute or regulation that compels United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) to readjudicate a petition under a different visa classification in response to a petitioner's request to change it, once the decision has been rendered. A petitioner may not make material changes to a petition in an effort to make a deficient petition conform to USCIS requirements. *See Matter of Izummi*, 22 I&N Dec. 169, 176 (Assoc. Comm. 1988). The labor certification submitted does not support the category requested.

Even if the petition had been filed under the correct category, the petitioner did not submit evidence that the beneficiary has the education required by the terms of the labor certification. The petitioner submitted evidence that the beneficiary possesses a "Diploma in Basic Bookkeeping" from The Financial Management Institute of South Africa and a "Diploma in Business Management" from the Academy of Advanced Training also in South Africa.

As noted above, the ETA Form 9089 in this matter is certified by DOL. Here, the ETA Form 9089 was filed on June 19, 2007. To be eligible for approval, a beneficiary must have the education and experience specified on the labor certification as of the petition's filing date. *See Matter of Wing's Tea House*, 16 I&N Dec. 158 (Act. Reg. Comm. 1977).

To determine whether a beneficiary is eligible for a preference immigrant visa, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) must ascertain whether the alien is, in fact, qualified for the certified job. USCIS will not accept a degree equivalency or an unrelated degree when a labor certification plainly and expressly requires a candidate with a specific degree. In evaluating the beneficiary's qualifications, USCIS must look to the job offer portion of the labor certification to determine the required qualifications for the position. USCIS may not ignore a term of the labor certification, nor may it impose additional requirements. *See Matter of Silver Dragon Chinese Restaurant*, 19 I&N Dec. 401, 406 (Comm. 1986). *See also Madany*, 696 F.2d at 1008; *K.R.K. Irvine, Inc.*, 699 F.2d at 1006; *Stewart Infra-Red Commissary of Massachusetts, Inc. v. Coomey*, 661 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1981).

In this matter, Part H, line 4 reflects that the minimum level of education is a Master's degree in Accounting, line 6 reflects that 36 months of experience is required in the position offered, and line 8 reflects that no alternate combination of education and experience would be acceptable. Line 9 reflects that a foreign educational equivalent is acceptable.

DOL assigned the code of 013-2011.00, accountant, management, to the proffered position. According to DOL's public online database at <http://online.onetcenter.org/link/summary/13-2011.01> (accessed February 2, 2011) and its description of the position and requirements for the position most analogous to the petitioner's proffered position, the position falls within Job Zone Four requiring "considerable preparation" for the occupation type closest to the proffered position.

DOL assigns a standard vocational preparation (SVP) range of 7.0-<8.0 to the occupation, which means that “Most of these occupations require a four-year bachelor's degree, but some do not.” Additionally, DOL states the following concerning the training and overall experience required for these occupations:

A considerable amount of work-related skill, knowledge, or experience is needed for these occupations. For example, an accountant must complete four years of college and work for several years in accounting to be considered qualified.

Employees in these occupations usually need several years of work-related experience, on-the-job training, and/or vocational training.

See id. Because of the requirements of the proffered position and DOL’s standard occupational requirements, the proffered position is for a professional.²

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(l)(3)(ii)(C) states the following:

If the petition is for a professional, the petition must be accompanied by evidence that the alien holds a United States baccalaureate degree or a foreign equivalent degree and by evidence that the alien is a member of the professions. Evidence of a baccalaureate degree shall be in the form of an official college or university record showing the date the baccalaureate degree was awarded and the area of concentration of study. To show that the alien is a member of the professions, the petitioner must submit evidence that the minimum of a baccalaureate degree is required for entry into the occupation.

The above regulation uses a singular description of foreign equivalent degree. Thus, the plain meaning of the regulatory language concerning the professional classification sets forth the requirement that a beneficiary must produce one degree that is determined to be the foreign equivalent of a U.S. baccalaureate degree in order to be qualified as a professional for third preference visa category purposes. Based on the specific requirements of the labor certification, the beneficiary would then need to produce a second degree that is determined to be the foreign equivalent of a U.S. Master’s degree.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 204(5)(l)(3)(ii)(B) states the following:

If the petition is for a skilled worker, the petition must be accompanied by evidence that the alien meets the educational, training or experience, and any other requirements of the individual labor certification, meets the requirements for

² While an accountant position might otherwise be considered as a skilled worker in some cases depending on the position description and stated requirements, here, as noted above, the petitioner’s requirements of a Master’s degree plus three years of experience precludes consideration as a skilled worker based on the advanced education and experience requirements set forth.

Schedule A designation, or meets the requirements for the Labor Market Information Pilot Program occupation designation. The minimum requirements for this classification are at least two years of training or experience.

The above regulation requires that the alien meet the requirements of the labor certification.

Initially, we will provide an explanation of the general process of procuring an employment-based immigrant visa and the roles and respective authority of both agencies involved.

As noted above, the ETA Form 9089 in this matter is certified by DOL. Thus, at the outset, it is useful to discuss DOL's role in this process. Section 212(a)(5)(A)(i) of the Act provides:

In general.-Any alien who seeks to enter the United States for the purpose of performing skilled or unskilled labor is inadmissible, unless the Secretary of Labor has determined and certified to the Secretary of State and the Attorney General that-

(I) there are not sufficient workers who are able, willing, qualified (or equally qualified in the case of an alien described in clause (ii)) and available at the time of application for a visa and admission to the United States and at the place where the alien is to perform such skilled or unskilled labor, and

(II) the employment of such alien will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of workers in the United States similarly employed.

It is significant that none of the above inquiries assigned to DOL, or the remaining regulations implementing these duties under 20 C.F.R. § 656, involve a determination as to whether the position and the alien are qualified for a specific immigrant classification. This fact has not gone unnoticed by Federal Circuit Courts.

There is no doubt that the authority to make preference classification decisions rests with INS. The language of section 204 cannot be read otherwise. *See Castaneda-Gonzalez v. INS*, 564 F.2d 417, 429 (D.C. Cir. 1977). In turn, DOL has the authority to make the two determinations listed in section 212(a)(14).³ *Id.* at 423. The necessary result of these two grants of authority is that section 212(a)(14) determinations are not subject to review by INS absent fraud or willful misrepresentation, but all matters relating to preference classification eligibility not expressly delegated to DOL remain within INS' authority.

* * *

Given the language of the Act, the totality of the legislative history, and the agencies' own interpretations of their duties under the Act, we must conclude that Congress did

³ Based on revisions to the Act, the current citation is section 212(a)(5)(A) as set forth above.

not intend DOL to have primary authority to make any determinations other than the two stated in section 212(a)(14). If DOL is to analyze alien qualifications, it is for the purpose of “matching” them with those of corresponding United States workers so that it will then be “in a position to meet the requirement of the law,” namely the section 212(a)(14) determinations.

Madany v. Smith, 696 F.2d 1008, 1012-1013 (D.C. Cir. 1983).

Relying in part on *Madany*, 696 F.2d at 1008, the Ninth Circuit stated:

[I]t appears that the DOL is responsible only for determining the availability of suitable American workers for a job and the impact of alien employment upon the domestic labor market. It does not appear that the DOL’s role extends to determining if the alien is qualified for the job for which he seeks sixth preference status. That determination appears to be delegated to the INS under section 204(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1154(b), as one of the determinations incident to the INS’s decision whether the alien is entitled to sixth preference status.

K.R.K. Irvine, Inc. v. Landon, 699 F.2d 1006, 1008 (9th Cir. 1983). The court relied on an amicus brief from DOL that stated the following:

The labor certification made by the Secretary of Labor ... pursuant to section 212(a)(14) of the ... [Act] ... is binding as to the findings of whether there are able, willing, qualified, and available United States workers for the job offered to the alien, and whether employment of the alien under the terms set by the employer would adversely affect the wages and working conditions of similarly employed United States workers. *The labor certification in no way indicates that the alien offered the certified job opportunity is qualified (or not qualified) to perform the duties of that job.*

(Emphasis added.) *Id.* at 1009. The Ninth Circuit, citing *K.R.K. Irvine, Inc.*, 699 F.2d at 1006, revisited this issue, stating:

The Department of Labor (“DOL”) must certify that insufficient domestic workers are available to perform the job and that the alien’s performance of the job will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of similarly employed domestic workers. *Id.* § 212(a)(14), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(14). The INS then makes its own determination of the alien’s entitlement to sixth preference status. *Id.* § 204(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1154(b). *See generally K.R.K. Irvine, Inc. v. Landon*, 699 F.2d 1006, 1008 9th Cir.1983).

The INS, therefore, may make a de novo determination of whether the alien is in fact qualified to fill the certified job offer.

Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman, 736 F. 2d 1305, 1309 (9th Cir. 1984).

Therefore, it is DOL's responsibility to certify the terms of the labor certification, but it is the responsibility of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) to determine if the petition and the alien beneficiary are eligible for the classification sought. For classification as a member of the professions, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(l)(3)(ii)(C) requires that the alien had a U.S. baccalaureate degree or a foreign equivalent degree and be a member of the professions. Additionally, the regulation requires the submission of "an official *college or university* record showing the date the baccalaureate degree was awarded and the area of concentration of study." (Emphasis added.)

In 1991, when the final rule for 8 C.F.R. § 204.5 was published in the Federal Register, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (the Service), responded to criticism that the regulation required an alien to have a bachelor's degree as a minimum and that the regulation did not allow for the substitution of experience for education. After reviewing section 121 of the Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-649 (1990), and the Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference, the Service specifically noted that both the Act and the legislative history indicate that an alien must have at least a bachelor's degree: "[B]oth the Act and its legislative history make clear that, in order to qualify as a professional under the third classification or to have experience equating to an advanced degree under the second, *an alien must have at least a bachelor's degree.*" 56 Fed. Reg. 60897, 60900 (November 29, 1991)(emphasis added).

Moreover, it is significant that both the statute, section 203(b)(3)(A)(ii) of the Act, and relevant regulations use the word "degree" in relation to professionals. A statute should be construed under the assumption that Congress intended it to have purpose and meaningful effect. *Mountain States Tel. & Tel. v. Pueblo of Santa Ana*, 472 U.S. 237, 249 (1985); *Sutton v. United States*, 819 F.2d. 1289m 1295 (5th Cir. 1987). It can be presumed that Congress' narrow requirement in of a "degree" for members of the professions is deliberate. Significantly, in another context, Congress has broadly referenced "the possession of a degree, diploma, certificate, or similar award from a college, university, school, or other institution of learning." Section 203(b)(2)(C) (relating to aliens of exceptional ability). Thus, the requirement at section 203(b)(3)(A)(ii) that an eligible alien both have a baccalaureate "degree" and be a member of the professions reveals that a member of the professions must have a *degree* and that a diploma or certificate from an institution of learning other than a college or university is a potentially similar but distinct type of credential. Thus, even if we did not require "a" degree that is the foreign equivalent of a U.S. baccalaureate degree, we would not consider education earned at an institution other than a college or university.

There is no provision in the statute or the regulations that would allow a beneficiary to qualify under section 203(b)(3)(A)(ii) of the Act with anything less than a full baccalaureate degree.⁴ Where the analysis of the beneficiary's credentials relies on work experience alone or a combination of multiple

⁴ A bachelor degree is generally found to require four years of education. *Matter of Shah*, 17 I&N Dec. 244, 245 (Comm. 1977).

lesser degrees, the result is the “equivalent” of a bachelor’s degree rather than a single-source “foreign equivalent degree.” In order to have experience and education equating to a bachelor’s degree under section 203(b)(3)(A)(ii) of the Act, the beneficiary must have a single degree that is the “foreign equivalent degree” to a United States baccalaureate degree.⁵

Because the beneficiary does not have a “United States baccalaureate degree or a foreign equivalent degree,” from a college or university in the required field of study listed on the certified labor certification, the beneficiary does not qualify for preference visa classification under section 203(b)(3)(A)(ii) of the Act as a professional as he does not have the minimum level of education required for the foreign equivalent of a bachelor’s degree.

We are cognizant of the recent decision in *Grace Korean United Methodist Church v. Michael Chertoff*, 437 F. Supp. 2d 1174 (D. Or. 2005), which finds that U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) “does not have the authority or expertise to impose its strained definition of ‘B.A. or equivalent’ on that term as set forth in the labor certification.” In contrast to the broad precedential authority of the case law of a United States circuit court, the AAO is not bound to follow the published decision of a United States district court except in matters arising within the same district. *See Matter of K-S-*, 20 I&N Dec. 715 (BIA 1993). Although the reasoning underlying a district judge’s decision will be given due consideration when it is properly before the AAO, the analysis does not have to be followed as a matter of law. *Id.* at 719. The court in *Grace Korean* makes no attempt to distinguish its holding from the Circuit Court decisions cited above. Instead, as legal support for its determination, the court cited to a case holding that the United States Postal Service has no expertise or special competence in immigration matters. *Grace Korean United Methodist Church*, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 1179 (citing *Tovar v. U.S. Postal Service*, 3 F.3d 1271, 1276 (9th Cir. 1993)). On its face, *Tovar* is easily distinguishable from the present matter since USCIS, through the authority delegated by the Secretary of Homeland Security, is charged by statute with the enforcement of the United States immigration laws and not with the delivery of mail. *See* section 103(a) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a).

Additionally, we also note the recent decision in *Snapnames.com, Inc. v. Michael Chertoff*, 2006 WL 3491005 (D. Or. Nov. 30, 2006). In that case, the labor certification application specified an educational requirement of four years of college and a ‘B.S. or foreign equivalent.’ The district court determined that ‘B.S. or foreign equivalent’ relates solely to the alien’s educational background, precluding consideration of the alien’s combined education and work experience. *Snapnames.com, Inc.* at *11-13. Additionally, the court determined that the word ‘equivalent’ in the employer’s educational requirements was ambiguous and that in the context of skilled worker petitions (where there is no statutory educational requirement), deference must be given to the employer’s intent. *Snapnames.com, Inc.* at *14. However, in professional and advanced degree professional cases, where the beneficiary is statutorily required to hold a baccalaureate degree, the

⁵ Here, again, we note that the specific terms of the labor certification require a Master’s degree. The record does not establish that the beneficiary has a four-year baccalaureate, and more specifically, that the beneficiary does not have a Master’s degree to meet the specific terms of the labor certification.

USCIS properly concluded that a single foreign degree or its equivalent is required. *Snapnames.com, Inc.* at *17, 19. As discussed herein, the beneficiary does not have a single foreign degree to meet the requirements of either the category selected or the terms of the labor certification.

The court in *Snapnames.com, Inc.* recognized that even though the labor certification may be prepared with the alien in mind, USCIS has an independent role in determining whether the alien meets the labor certification requirements. *Id.* at *7. Thus, the court concluded that where the plain language of those requirements does not support the petitioner's asserted intent, USCIS "does not err in applying the requirements as written." *Id.* See also *Maramjaya v. USCIS*, Civ. Act No. 06-2158 (RCL) (D.C. Cir. March 26, 2008) (upholding an interpretation that a "bachelor's or equivalent" requirement necessitated a single four-year degree). Here, the plain language of the labor certification states that a Master's degree is required. The petitioner does not state any alternate education such as a bachelor's degree or define any acceptable educational equivalency.

The petitioner here relies upon the conclusion of one credential evaluation from [REDACTED] of International Evaluation Services which concludes that the beneficiary has the *equivalent* of a Bachelor of Science and Master of Science degree in Accounting and Business Management and not the foreign equivalent of a U.S. Master's degree. He reaches this determination by combining the beneficiary's education and experience. [REDACTED] notes that the beneficiary is a member of the South African Institute of Management but concludes that it amounts to a "professional rather than an academic qualification." Specifically, [REDACTED] states that the beneficiary's Diploma in Basic Bookkeeping is the equivalent of two years of undergraduate studies in bookkeeping, the beneficiary's Diploma from the Academy of Advanced Training amounts to one year of undergraduate study in Business Management, and the beneficiary's experience from November 1991 to December 2004 amounts to the equivalent of the other years of education using a formula of three years of experience to one year of schooling ratio for the Bachelor's degree and five years of experience to one year of schooling ratio for the Master's degree. The three to one experience to education ratio applies to non-immigrant H-1B petitions, not to immigrant petitions. See 8 CFR § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(D)(5).⁶ In addition, if the evaluation uses the beneficiary's experience from November 1991 to December 2004 to count towards the education requirement, it is unclear that the beneficiary would have enough other experience to meet the three years of experience required by the terms of the labor certification. No letter or other evidence of the beneficiary's experience after 2004 appears in the record. The evaluation does not state that the beneficiary has the foreign equivalent of an advanced degree as required by the terms of the labor certification.⁷

⁶ On appeal, counsel states that 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(D)(5) "expressly sets forth the formula for determining equivalency requirements and does not preclude the use of the formula for purposes of employment based immigrant petitions." On the contrary, 8 C.F.R. § 214.2 explicitly states that its provisions are for use in "nonimmigrant classes," which includes, in subsection (h), "temporary employees." No similar provision appears in the regulation providing for the ratio to be used for immigrant classes including employment based immigrant petitions.

⁷ Additionally, the petitioner failed to state that it would accept any alternate combination of education and experience or qualify anywhere on ETA Form 9089 that it would accept the

We have reviewed the Electronic Database for Global Education (EDGE) created by the American Association of Collegiate Registrars and Admissions Officers (AACRAO).⁸ According to its website, www.aacrao.org, is “a nonprofit, voluntary, professional association of more than 10,000 higher education admissions and registration professionals who represent approximately 2,500 institutions in more than 30 countries.” Its mission “is to provide professional development, guidelines and voluntary standards to be used by higher education officials regarding the best practices in records management, admissions, enrollment management, administrative information technology and student services.” According to the registration page for EDGE, <http://aacraoedge.aacrao.org/register/index/php>, EDGE is “a web-based resource for the evaluation of foreign educational credentials.” Authors for EDGE work with a publication consultant and a Council Liaison with AACRAO’s National Council on the Evaluation of Foreign Educational Credentials. “An Author’s Guide to Creating AACRAO International Publications” 5-6 (First ed. 2005), available for download at [www.aacrao.org/publications/guide to creating international publications.pdf](http://www.aacrao.org/publications/guide%20to%20creating%20international%20publications.pdf). If placement recommendations are included, the Council Liaison works with the author to give feedback and the publication is subject to final review by the entire Council. *Id.* at 11-12.

EDGE’s credential advice provides that a South African National Diploma is “awarded after completion of 2-3 years of study at a technikon or private higher education institution” and amounts to “attainment of a level of education comparable to 2-3 years of university study in the United States.” The petitioner did not submit the beneficiary’s transcripts or other evidence of the duration of the beneficiary’s educational programs so that we are unable to ascertain how many years of schooling he attained. Additionally, based on the dates the program of study was completed, it is unclear that the beneficiary’s “Diplomas” (both obtained in 1986) are the same as a “National Diploma” based on changes to the South African educational system in the 1990s.⁹

The petitioner presented no evidence to show that the beneficiary holds an actual Master’s degree or its foreign equivalent as required by the terms of the labor certification. The labor certification

equivalent of a Bachelor’s degree. Instead, the labor certification clearly states the only allowed qualifying education as a Master’s degree. Further, the evaluator does not find that the beneficiary’s education is the single-source foreign equivalent of a U.S. four-year bachelor’s degree to meet the standard for professional classification, even if the petitioner had stated a bachelor’s degree as the allowed alternate education.

⁸ In *Confluence Intern., Inc. v. Holder*, 2009 WL 825793 (D.Minn. March 27, 2009), the District Court in Minnesota determined that the AAO provided a rational explanation for its reliance on information provided by the American Association of Collegiate Registrar and Admissions Officers to support its decision. *See also Tisco Group v. Napolitano*, 2010 WL 3464314, No. 09-10072 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 30, 2010) (holding that the AAO’s reliance upon EDGE was appropriate).

⁹ Additionally, the evaluator assesses the Diploma in Business Management as equal to only one year of study. The record does not contain transcripts or any information regarding the accreditation of the “Academy of Advanced Training” to assess the academic value of this program, if any.

requires that the beneficiary holds a Master's degree in Accounting to be eligible for the position. Neither the immigrant category for a professional nor the terms of the labor certification allow for any equivalency using combined education and/or experience to meet the requirement that the beneficiary hold a Master's degree.¹⁰ As the beneficiary has not been shown to have such a Master's degree in Accounting, he does not meet the education requirements of the labor certification and this petition may not be approved.

As the beneficiary does not meet the terms of the labor certification, the petition cannot be approved. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(l)(3)(ii)(B) (requiring evidence that the alien meets the educational, training or experience, and any other requirements of the individual labor certification). Specifically, the labor certification requires a Master's degree in Accounting plus three years of experience. The beneficiary's coursework has not been shown to be a degree that is the foreign equivalent to a U.S. Master's degree. The petitioner did not allow for any alternate education on the labor certification. Additionally, as noted above, if all of the beneficiary's experience is attributed to the educational equivalency, then it is not clear that the petitioner can establish that the beneficiary has the required three years of experience in the position offered.

Additionally, the petitioner failed to establish its ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage. An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. See *Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States*, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), *aff'd*, 345 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2003); see also *Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004) (noting that the AAO conducts appellate review on a *de novo* basis). The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states in pertinent part:

¹⁰ On appeal, counsel states that the labor certification "require[s] a Master's degree or equivalent." The equivalent of an advanced degree by regulation for a filing under the advanced degree category is a Bachelor's degree plus five years of progressive experience. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(2). The labor certification states that a Master's degree plus three years of experience is required for the position (part H, lines 4 and 6) and that no alternate combination of education and experience would be acceptable (part H, line 8). The professional category does not statutorily define any equivalent to a bachelor's degree. The labor certification does not state or allow for any alternate combination of education and experience or define any educational equivalency. USCIS may only read the terms of the labor certification as certified. USCIS may not ignore a term of the labor certification, nor may it impose additional requirements. See *Matter of Silver Dragon Chinese Restaurant*, 19 I&N Dec. 401, 406 (Comm. 1986). See also, *Mandany v. Smith*, 696 F.2d 1008, (D.C. Cir. 1983); *K.R.K. Irvine, Inc. v. Landon*, 699 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1983); *Stewart Infra-Red Commissary of Massachusetts, Inc. v. Coomey*, 661 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1981). 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(l)(3)(ii)(C) requires the submission of "an official college or university record showing the date the baccalaureate degree was awarded and the area of concentration of study." Such a requirement for a degree must also be applied to degrees higher than a baccalaureate. No such official record was submitted to show that the beneficiary held the required advanced degree, as required by the labor certification.

Ability of prospective employer to pay wage. Any petition filed by or for an employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be either in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements.

The petitioner must demonstrate the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, which is the date the ETA Form 9089, Application for Permanent Employment Certification, was accepted for processing by any office within the employment system of the DOL. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(d).

Here, the ETA Form 9089 was accepted on June 19, 2007. The proffered wage as stated on the ETA Form 9089 is \$66,206 per year.

The evidence in the record of proceeding shows that the petitioner is structured as a limited liability company and filed its tax returns on IRS Form 1065.¹¹ According to the tax returns in the record, the petitioner's fiscal year begins December 1 and runs through November 30. On the ETA Form 9089, signed by the beneficiary on August 1, 2007, the beneficiary did not claim to have worked for the petitioner.

The petitioner must establish that its job offer to the beneficiary is a realistic one. Because the filing of an ETA 9089 labor certification application establishes a priority date for any immigrant petition later based on the ETA 9089, the petitioner must establish that the job offer was realistic as of the priority date and that the offer remained realistic for each year thereafter, until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. The petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is an essential element in evaluating whether a job offer is realistic. *See Matter of Great Wall*, 16 I&N Dec. 142 (Acting Reg. Comm. 1977); *see also* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2). In evaluating whether a job offer is realistic, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) requires the petitioner to demonstrate financial resources sufficient to pay the beneficiary's proffered wages, although the

¹¹ A limited liability company (LLC) is an entity formed under state law by filing articles of organization. An LLC may be classified for federal income tax purposes as if it were a sole proprietorship, a partnership or a corporation. If the LLC has only one owner, it will automatically be treated as a sole proprietorship unless an election is made to be treated as a corporation. If the LLC has two or more owners, it will automatically be considered to be a partnership unless an election is made to be treated as a corporation. If the LLC does not elect its classification, a default classification of partnership (multi-member LLC) or disregarded entity (taxed as if it were a sole proprietorship) will apply. *See* 26 C.F.R. § 301.7701-3. The election referred to is made using IRS Form 8832, Entity Classification Election. In the instant case, the petitioner, made no such election, and the tax returns reflect that the petitioner has three partners, so is considered to be a partnership for federal tax purposes.

totality of the circumstances affecting the petitioning business will be considered if the evidence warrants such consideration. *See Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (Reg. Comm. 1967).

In determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage during a given period, USCIS will first examine whether the petitioner employed and paid the beneficiary during that period. If the petitioner establishes by documentary evidence that it employed the beneficiary at a salary equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the evidence will be considered *prima facie* proof of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner did not claim to have employed the beneficiary or paid the beneficiary any wages during the relevant time period.

If the petitioner does not establish that it employed and paid the beneficiary an amount at least equal to the proffered wage during that period, USCIS will next examine the net income figure reflected on the petitioner's federal income tax return, without consideration of depreciation or other expenses. *River Street Donuts, LLC v. Napolitano*, 558 F.3d 111 (1st Cir. 2009); *Taco Especial v. Napolitano*, 696 F. Supp. 2d 873, 881 (E.D. Mich. 2010). Reliance on federal income tax returns as a basis for determining a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is well established by judicial precedent. *Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava*, 632 F. Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (citing *Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman*, 736 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1984)); *see also Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh*, 719 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Texas 1989); *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), *aff'd*, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983). Reliance on the petitioner's gross receipts and wage expense is misplaced. Showing that the petitioner's gross receipts exceeded the proffered wage is insufficient. Similarly, showing that the petitioner paid wages in excess of the proffered wage is insufficient.

In *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. at 1084, the court held that the Immigration and Naturalization Service, now USCIS, had properly relied on the petitioner's net income figure, as stated on the petitioner's corporate income tax returns, rather than the petitioner's gross income. The court specifically rejected the argument that USCIS should have considered income before expenses were paid rather than net income. *See Taco Especial*, 696 F. Supp. at 881 (gross profits overstate an employer's ability to pay because it ignores other necessary expenses).

With respect to depreciation, the court in *River Street Donuts* noted:

The AAO recognized that a depreciation deduction is a systematic allocation of the cost of a tangible long-term asset and does not represent a specific cash expenditure during the year claimed. Furthermore, the AAO indicated that the allocation of the depreciation of a long-term asset could be spread out over the years or concentrated into a few depending on the petitioner's choice of accounting and depreciation methods. Nonetheless, the AAO explained that depreciation represents an actual cost of doing business, which could represent either the diminution in value of buildings and equipment or the accumulation of funds necessary to replace perishable equipment and buildings. Accordingly, the AAO stressed that even though amounts deducted for depreciation do not represent current use of cash, neither does it represent amounts available to pay wages.

We find that the AAO has a rational explanation for its policy of not adding depreciation back to net income. Namely, that the amount spent on a long term tangible asset is a "real" expense.

River Street Donuts, 558 F.3d at 116. "[USCIS] and judicial precedent support the use of tax returns and the *net income figures* in determining petitioner's ability to pay. Plaintiffs' argument that these figures should be revised by the court by adding back depreciation is without support." *Chi-Feng Chang*, 719 F.Supp. at 537 (emphasis added).

If the petitioner does not demonstrate sufficient net income to pay the proffered wage, as an alternate means of determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage, USCIS may review the petitioner's net current assets. Net current assets rather than the petitioner's total assets are considered in the determination of the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner's total assets include depreciable assets that the petitioner uses in its business, including real property that counsel asserts should be considered. Those depreciable assets will not be converted to cash during the ordinary course of business and will not, therefore, become funds available to pay the proffered wage. Further, the petitioner's total assets must be balanced by the petitioner's liabilities. Otherwise, they cannot properly be considered in the determination of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. Rather, USCIS will consider net current assets as an alternative method of demonstrating the ability to pay the proffered wage.

Net current assets are the difference between the petitioner's current assets and current liabilities.¹² A partnership's year-end current assets are shown on Schedule L, lines 1 through 6. Its year-end current liabilities are shown on lines 15 through 17. If the total of a corporation's end-of-year net current assets and the wages paid to the beneficiary (if any) are equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the petitioner is expected to be able to pay the proffered wage using those net current assets.

The record before the director closed on November 1, 2007 with the receipt by the director of the petitioner's original submissions. As of that date, the petitioner's 2005 federal income tax return, covering the period December 1, 2005 through November 30, 2006, would be the most recent return available. The petitioner submitted only its 2004 income tax return. That income tax return covers a period prior to the priority date, so can be considered only generally. The petitioner submitted no other regulatory proscribed evidence pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) concerning its ability to pay the proffered wage from the priority date of June 19, 2007 onward. As a result, we are unable to conclude that the petitioner has the ability to pay the proffered wage from the priority date onward.

¹² According to *Barron's Dictionary of Accounting Terms* 117 (3rd ed. 2000), "current assets" consist of items having (in most cases) a life of one year or less, such as cash, marketable securities, inventory and prepaid expenses. "Current liabilities" are obligations payable (in most cases) within one year, such accounts payable, short-term notes payable, and accrued expenses (such as taxes and salaries). *Id.* at 118.

USCIS may consider the overall magnitude of the petitioner's business activities in its determination of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. *See Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (BIA 1967). The petitioning entity in *Sonogawa* had been in business for over 11 years and routinely earned a gross annual income of about \$100,000. During the year in which the petition was filed in that case, the petitioner changed business locations and paid rent on both the old and new locations for five months. There were large moving costs and also a period of time when the petitioner was unable to do regular business. The Regional Commissioner determined that the petitioner's prospects for a resumption of successful business operations were well established. The petitioner was a fashion designer whose work had been featured in *Time* and *Look* magazines. Her clients included Miss Universe, movie actresses, and society matrons. The petitioner's clients had been included in the lists of the best-dressed California women. The petitioner lectured on fashion design at design and fashion shows throughout the United States and at colleges and universities in California. The Regional Commissioner's determination in *Sonogawa* was based in part on the petitioner's sound business reputation and outstanding reputation as a couturiere. As in *Sonogawa*, USCIS may, at its discretion, consider evidence relevant to the petitioner's financial ability that falls outside of a petitioner's net income and net current assets. USCIS may consider such factors as the number of years the petitioner has been doing business, the established historical growth of the petitioner's business, the overall number of employees, the occurrence of any uncharacteristic business expenditures or losses, the petitioner's reputation within its industry, whether the beneficiary is replacing a former employee or an outsourced service, or any other evidence that USCIS deems relevant to the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage.

In the instant case, the petitioner submitted no evidence as to its reputation or any evidence showing that one year was off or otherwise not representative of the petitioner's overall financial picture. Instead, the petitioner submitted only one tax return covering a period before the priority date of December 1, 2004 through November 30, 2005, demonstrating a net income of \$393,015 and net current assets of \$122,337. This information does not demonstrate the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage from the priority date onward as it covers a period 19 months before the priority date of June 19, 2007. Thus, assessing the totality of the circumstances in this individual case, it is concluded that the petitioner has not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage.

The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and alternative basis for denial. The burden of proof in these proceedings rests solely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The petitioner has not met that burden.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.