






U.S. Citizenship
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
DATE: **AUG 06 2012** OFFICE: TEXAS SERVICE CENTER

FILE: 

IN RE: Petitioner: 
Beneficiary:

PETITION: Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as a Skilled Worker or Professional Pursuant to Section 203(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:



INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the AAO inappropriately applied the law in reaching its decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen in accordance with the instructions on Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$630. The specific requirements for filing such a motion can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. **Do not file any motion directly with the AAO.** Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires any motion to be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,

Perry Rhew
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The preference visa petition was denied by the Director, Texas Service Center, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner is a supermarket that provides catering services. It seeks to employ the beneficiary permanently in the United States as a chef. As required by statute, the petition is accompanied by ETA Form 9089, Application for Permanent Employment Certification, approved by the United States Department of Labor (DOL). The director determined that the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage beginning on the priority date of the visa petition. The director denied the petition accordingly.

The record shows that the appeal is properly filed, timely and makes a specific allegation of error in law or fact. The procedural history in this case is documented by the record and incorporated into the decision. Further elaboration of the procedural history will be made only as necessary.

As set forth in the director's March 12, 2009 denial, at issue in this case is whether or not the petitioner has the ability to pay the proffered wage as of the priority date and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence.

Section 203(b)(3)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(i), provides for the granting of preference classification to qualified immigrants who are capable, at the time of petitioning for classification under this paragraph, of performing skilled labor (requiring at least two years training or experience), not of a temporary nature, for which qualified workers are not available in the United States.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states in pertinent part:

Ability of prospective employer to pay wage. Any petition filed by or for an employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be either in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements.

The petitioner must demonstrate the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, which is the date the ETA Form 9089, Application for Permanent Employment Certification, was accepted for processing by any office within the employment system of the DOL. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(d). The petitioner must also demonstrate that, on the priority date, the beneficiary had the qualifications stated on its ETA Form 9089, Application for Permanent Employment Certification, as certified by the DOL and submitted with the instant petition. *Matter of Wing's Tea House*, 16 I&N Dec. 158 (Acting Reg'l Comm'r 1977).

Here, the ETA Form 9089 was accepted on October 22, 2007. The proffered wage as stated on the ETA Form 9089 is \$18.31 per hour (\$38,084.80 per year). The ETA Form 9089 states that the position requires two years of experience as a chef, or alternatively, as a cook.

The AAO conducts appellate review on a *de novo* basis. *See Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004). The AAO considers all pertinent evidence in the record, including new evidence properly submitted upon appeal.¹

The evidence in the record of proceeding shows that the petitioner is structured as an S corporation. On the petition, the petitioner claimed to have been established on February 4, 1999 and to employ 22 workers. According to the tax returns in the record, the petitioner's fiscal year is based on a calendar year. On the ETA Form 9089, signed by the beneficiary on October 19, 2007, the beneficiary claimed to have worked for the petitioner since 1995.

Response to Request for Evidence and Notice of Intent to Dismiss

On April 24, 2012 the AAO issued a Request for Evidence and Notice of Intent to Dismiss (RFE/NOID) the instant appeal. The petitioner was advised that Form I-140, ETA Form 9089, and the 2007 Form 1120S, U.S. Income Tax Return for an S Corporation each bore a different employer identification number (EIN), and date of incorporation or establishment. The petitioner was requested to submit documentary evidence to establish that the petitioner is the same legal entity that is listed on ETA Form 9089. The petitioner was also asked to address discrepancies in the record regarding the petitioner's name and the name of the petitioner's owners.

In a response received on June 5, 2012, counsel submits a letter stating that the petitioner is no longer in business but that a new corporation, [REDACTED] is a successor-in-interest to the petitioner. However, counsel fails to address several items detailed in the AAO's notice. Thus, it remains that it has not been established that the entity named in the labor certification with [REDACTED] that commenced business in 1990, is the same entity as the one named on Form I-140 with [REDACTED], established on February 4, 1999. Furthermore, none of the submitted IRS Forms 1120S match either of the two EIN numbers noted above. Additionally, counsel failed to submit evidence to establish that the petitioner was an active corporate entity within [REDACTED] when the petition and appeal were filed.²

Additionally, it has not been established that [REDACTED] is a successor-in-interest to the entity that filed the labor certification, petition, and appeal in the instant

¹ The submission of additional evidence on appeal is allowed by the instructions to the Form I-290B, which are incorporated into the regulations by the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(1). The record in the instant case provides no reason to preclude consideration of any of the documents newly submitted on appeal. *See Matter of Soriano*, 19 I&N Dec. 764 (BIA 1988).

² The record contains a "filing receipt" from [REDACTED] established on November 23, 2004. However, according to the respective documents, the entity that filed ETA Form 9089 commenced business in 1990, and the petitioner was established on February 4, 1999.

matter. A labor certification is only valid for the particular job opportunity stated on the application form. 20 C.F.R. § 656.30(c). Because [REDACTED] is a different entity than the petitioner, labor certification employer, and appellant, it must establish that it is a successor-in-interest to that entity. See *Matter of Dial Auto Repair Shop, Inc.*, 19 I&N Dec. 481 (Comm'r 1986).

A valid successor relationship may be established for immigration purposes if it satisfies three conditions. First, the successor must fully describe and document the transaction transferring ownership of all, or a relevant part of, the predecessor. Second, the successor must demonstrate that the job opportunity is the same as originally offered on the labor certification. Third, the successor must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it is eligible for the immigrant visa in all respects.

The record contains a June 1, 2012 letter from [REDACTED] Certified Public Accountant, which states, "In May 2009, the supermarket portion of the business was sold which included rights to the name [REDACTED] and most of the catering portion was transferred to a new corporation called [REDACTED]. Counsel submitted the certificate of incorporation for [REDACTED] that indicates that the director is [REDACTED]. However, there is no evidence to indicate that [REDACTED] purchased all or part of the petitioner.

Thus, the evidence in the record does not satisfy all three conditions described above because it does not fully describe and document the transaction transferring ownership of the predecessor and it does not demonstrate that the claimed successor is eligible for the immigrant visa in all respects, including whether it and the predecessor possessed the ability to pay the proffered wage for the relevant periods. Please see below for further discussion. Accordingly, the appeal must be dismissed because it has not been established that [REDACTED] is a successor-in-interest to the petitioner, labor certification employer and appellant.

Evidence of the Ability to Pay the Proffered Wage

As noted above, it remains that the record does not establish that the petitioning entity is the same as the one that filed the labor certification. Furthermore, it has not been established that [REDACTED] is a valid successor-in-interest to the petitioner. However, for the sake of the record, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) will conduct an analysis of the petitioner's ability to pay as though those issues had been resolved.

The petitioner must establish that its job offer to the beneficiary is a realistic one. Because the filing of an ETA Form 9089 labor certification application establishes a priority date for any immigrant petition later based on the ETA Form 9089, the petitioner must establish that the job offer was realistic as of the priority date and that the offer remained realistic for each year thereafter, until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. The petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is an essential element in evaluating whether a job offer is realistic. See *Matter of Great Wall*, 16 I&N Dec. 142 (Acting Reg'l Comm'r 1977); see also 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2). In evaluating whether a job offer is realistic, USCIS

requires the petitioner to demonstrate financial resources sufficient to pay the beneficiary's proffered wages, although the totality of the circumstances affecting the petitioning business will be considered if the evidence warrants such consideration. See *Matter of Sonegawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (Reg'l Comm'r 1967).

In determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage during a given period, USCIS will first examine whether the petitioner employed and paid the beneficiary during that period. If the petitioner establishes by documentary evidence that it employed the beneficiary at a salary equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the evidence will be considered *prima facie* proof of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. In the instant case, the petitioner has not established that it paid the beneficiary the full proffered wage during any relevant timeframe including the period from the priority date on October 22, 2007 or subsequently. The record does not contain any IRS Forms W-2 issued to the beneficiary in 2007 or 2008. Form W-2 for 2009 indicates that [REDACTED] paid the beneficiary \$23,486.40. The record also contains Forms W-2 issued by [REDACTED] indicating that the beneficiary was paid \$27,400.80 in 2010 and \$33,924.80 in 2011. Thus, the petitioner must demonstrate that it can pay the entire proffered wage in 2007 and 2008 and the difference between wages actually paid to the beneficiary and the proffered wage in 2009, 2010, and 2011.

If the petitioner does not establish that it employed and paid the beneficiary an amount at least equal to the proffered wage during that period, USCIS will next examine the net income figure reflected on the petitioner's federal income tax return, without consideration of depreciation or other expenses. *River Street Donuts, LLC v. Napolitano*, 558 F.3d 111 (1st Cir. 2009); *Taco Especial v. Napolitano*, 696 F. Supp. 2d 873 (E.D. Mich. 2010), *aff'd*, No. 10-1517 (6th Cir. filed Nov. 10, 2011). Reliance on federal income tax returns as a basis for determining a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is well established by judicial precedent. *Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava*, 632 F. Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (citing *Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman*, 736 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1984)); see also *Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh*, 719 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Texas 1989); *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), *aff'd*, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983). Reliance on the petitioner's gross receipts and wage expense is misplaced. Showing that the petitioner's gross receipts exceeded the proffered wage is insufficient. Similarly, showing that the petitioner paid wages in excess of the proffered wage is insufficient.

In *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. at 1084, the court held that the Immigration and Naturalization Service, now USCIS, had properly relied on the petitioner's net income figure, as stated on the petitioner's corporate income tax returns, rather than the petitioner's gross income. The court specifically rejected the argument that USCIS should have considered income before expenses were paid rather than net income. See *Taco Especial v. Napolitano*, 696 F. Supp. 2d at 881 (gross profits overstate an employer's ability to pay because it ignores other necessary expenses).

With respect to depreciation, the court in *River Street Donuts* noted:

The AAO recognized that a depreciation deduction is a systematic allocation of

the cost of a tangible long-term asset and does not represent a specific cash expenditure during the year claimed. Furthermore, the AAO indicated that the allocation of the depreciation of a long-term asset could be spread out over the years or concentrated into a few depending on the petitioner's choice of accounting and depreciation methods. Nonetheless, the AAO explained that depreciation represents an actual cost of doing business, which could represent either the diminution in value of buildings and equipment or the accumulation of funds necessary to replace perishable equipment and buildings. Accordingly, the AAO stressed that even though amounts deducted for depreciation do not represent current use of cash, neither does it represent amounts available to pay wages.

We find that the AAO has a rational explanation for its policy of not adding depreciation back to net income. Namely, that the amount spent on a long term tangible asset is a "real" expense.

River Street Donuts at 118. “[USCIS] and judicial precedent support the use of tax returns and the *net income figures* in determining petitioner’s ability to pay. Plaintiffs’ argument that these figures should be revised by the court by adding back depreciation is without support.” *Chi-Feng Chang* at 537 (emphasis added).

The tax returns in the record demonstrate net income as shown in the table below.

Year	Taxpayer	Net Income ³
2007		\$946.00
2008		-\$14,133.00
2009	Not submitted.	---
2010		\$14,312.00
2011	Not submitted.	---

³ Where an S corporation’s income is exclusively from a trade or business, USCIS considers net income to be the figure for ordinary income, shown on line 21 of page one of the petitioner’s IRS Form 1120S. However, where an S corporation has income, credits, deductions or other adjustments from sources other than a trade or business, they are reported on Schedule K. If the Schedule K has relevant entries for additional income, credits, deductions or other adjustments, net income is found line 18 (2007, 2008, and 2010) of Schedule K. See Instructions for Form 1120S, at <http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i1120s.pdf> (accessed July 2, 2012) (indicating that Schedule K is a summary schedule of all shareholders’ shares of the corporation’s income, deductions, credits, etc.). Because the petitioner had additional deductions shown on its Schedule K for 2007, 2008, and 2010 the petitioner’s net income is found on Schedule K of its tax returns for those three years.

Therefore, for the years 2007 and 2008 the petitioner did not have sufficient net income to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner failed to submit the requested Forms 1120S for 2009, and 2011; thus, the petitioner has not established the ability to pay the difference between the proffered wage and what the beneficiary was paid in 2009 and 2011. In 2010, [REDACTED] did have sufficient net income to pay the \$10,684.00 difference between the proffered wage and what the beneficiary was paid.

As an alternate means of determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage, USCIS may review the petitioner's net current assets. Net current assets are the difference between the petitioner's current assets and current liabilities.⁴ A corporation's year-end current assets are shown on Schedule L, lines 1 through 6. Its year-end current liabilities are shown on lines 16 through 18. If the total of a corporation's end-of-year net current assets and the wages paid to the beneficiary (if any) are equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the petitioner is expected to be able to pay the proffered wage using those net current assets. The tax returns in the record demonstrate end-of-year net current assets as shown in the table below.

Year	Taxpayer	Current Assets	Current Liabilities	Net Current Assets (Current Assets - Current Liabilities)
2007	[REDACTED]	\$194,229.00	\$308,803.00	-\$114,574.00
2008	[REDACTED]	\$207,234.00	\$327,283.00	-\$120,049.00
2009	Not submitted.	---	---	---
2011	Not submitted.	---	---	---

Therefore, for the years 2007 and 2008, the petitioner did not have sufficient net current assets to pay the proffered wage. For 2009 and 2011 there is no evidence to establish that the petitioner had sufficient net current assets to pay the difference between the proffered wage and what the beneficiary was paid.

Therefore, from the date the ETA Form 9089 was accepted for processing by the DOL, the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage as of the priority date through an examination of wages paid to the beneficiary, or its net income or net current assets.

⁴According to *Barron's Dictionary of Accounting Terms* 117 (3rd ed. 2000), "current assets" consist of items having (in most cases) a life of one year or less, such as cash, marketable securities, inventory and prepaid expenses. "Current liabilities" are obligations payable (in most cases) within one year, such accounts payable, short-term notes payable, and accrued expenses (such as taxes and salaries). *Id.* at 118.

On appeal, counsel argues that, “The petitioner throughout the years in question (i.e., 2007-present), has had a substantial gross annual income, has substantial assets, uses legitimate accountant devices (i.e., depreciation⁵, inventory, etc.) to depress net income, and has always maintained a steady bank balance.” In support of his argument, counsel submits a sampling of the petitioner’s bank statements from between January 31, 2007 and January 21, 2009. However, counsel’s reliance on the balances in the petitioner’s bank account is misplaced. First, bank statements are not among the three types of evidence, enumerated in 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2), required to illustrate a petitioner’s ability to pay a proffered wage. While this regulation allows additional material “in appropriate cases,” the petitioner in this case has not demonstrated why the documentation specified at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) is inapplicable or otherwise paints an inaccurate financial picture of the petitioner. Second, bank statements show the amount in an account on a given date, and cannot show the sustainable ability to pay a proffered wage. Third, no evidence was submitted to demonstrate that the funds reported on the petitioner’s bank statements somehow reflect additional available funds that were not reflected on its tax return(s), such as the petitioner’s taxable income (income minus deductions) or the cash specified on Schedule L that was considered above in determining the petitioner’s net current assets.

Counsel’s assertions on appeal cannot be concluded to outweigh the evidence presented in the tax returns as submitted by the petitioner that demonstrates that the petitioner could not pay the proffered wage from the day the ETA Form 9089 was accepted for processing by the DOL.

It is also noted that in response to the director’s February 2, 2009 RFE, counsel argues that the compensation paid to the officers of the petitioner could be used to pay the proffered wage. Officer compensation was \$123,600 in 2007, \$143,100 in 2008, and \$0.00 in 2010. As noted above, the record does not contain the petitioner’s 2009 tax returns. However, the record is devoid of any evidence to establish that the petitioner’s officers were willing and able to forgo part of their compensation to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner failed to submit evidence to show that officer compensation payments were not fixed by contract or otherwise. Without such evidence, the AAO does not find counsel’s claim persuasive. The assertions of counsel do not constitute evidence. *Matter of Obaigbena*, 19 I&N Dec. 533, 534 (BIA 1988); *Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez*, 17 I&N Dec. 503, 506 (BIA 1980).

USCIS may consider the overall magnitude of the petitioner’s business activities in its determination of the petitioner’s ability to pay the proffered wage. See *Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (Reg’l Comm’r 1967). The petitioning entity in *Sonogawa* had been in business for over 11 years and routinely earned a gross annual income of about \$100,000. During the year in which the petition was filed in that case, the petitioner changed business locations and paid rent on both the old and new locations for five months. There were large moving costs and also a period of time when the petitioner was unable to do regular business. The Regional Commissioner determined that the petitioner’s prospects for a resumption of successful business operations were well established. The petitioner was a fashion designer whose work had been featured in *Time* and *Look* magazines. Her clients included Miss Universe, movie actresses, and society matrons. The petitioner’s clients had

⁵ Please see discussion above.

been included in the lists of the best-dressed California women. The petitioner lectured on fashion design at design and fashion shows throughout the United States and at colleges and universities in California. The Regional Commissioner's determination in *Sonegawa* was based in part on the petitioner's sound business reputation and outstanding reputation as a couturiere. As in *Sonegawa*, USCIS may, at its discretion, consider evidence relevant to the petitioner's financial ability that falls outside of a petitioner's net income and net current assets. USCIS may consider such factors as the number of years the petitioner has been doing business, the established historical growth of the petitioner's business, the overall number of employees, the occurrence of any uncharacteristic business expenditures or losses, the petitioner's reputation within its industry, whether the beneficiary is replacing a former employee or an outsourced service, or any other evidence that USCIS deems relevant to the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage.

In the instant case, the record is devoid of regulatory-prescribed evidence for 2009 as specifically requested. The petitioner did not establish the historical growth of its business, the occurrence of any uncharacteristic business expenditures or losses, or its reputation within its industry. Thus, assessing the totality of the circumstances in this individual case, it is concluded that the petitioner has not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage.

The evidence submitted does not establish that the petitioner had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date.

Evidence of the Actual Minimum Requirements and the Beneficiary's Qualifications

Beyond the decision of the director, the petitioner must demonstrate that the beneficiary possessed all of the requirements stated on the labor certification as of the October 22, 2007 priority date. *See Matter of Wing's Tea House*, 16 I&N Dec. 158 (Acting Reg'l Comm'r 1977).

In the above-referenced April 24, 2012 RFE/NOID from the AAO, it was noted that Part H. of the labor certification indicates that the proffered position requires a minimum of 24 months experience as a chef, or in the alternative, as a cook. In Part J., Item 21, the petitioner indicates that the beneficiary gained qualifying experience with the employer in the same or substantially comparable position to the job opportunity requested. It was observed that if the beneficiary only meets the 24 month experience requirement with experience gained with the petitioner, it would undermine the actual minimum requirements for the proffered position. The petitioner was requested to indicate whether the DOL had an opportunity to assess the substantial comparability of experience as either a chef or as a cook through an audit of the ETA Form 9089. In the June 5, 2012 response, the petitioner failed to address this issue.

In addition to the beneficiary's experience with the petitioner, the labor certification states that the beneficiary worked at [REDACTED] from 1989 to 1995. The beneficiary's claimed qualifying experience must be supported by letters from employers giving the name, address, and title of the employer, and a description of the beneficiary's experience. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(I)(3)(ii)(A). The record contains a May 30, 2012 affidavit from the beneficiary stating that

he worked at [REDACTED] from 1991 through 2000.⁶ Also submitted was a sampling of pay stubs from between December 21, 1990 and September 4, 1994, as well as a 1993 Form W-2 from [REDACTED] for \$13,657. The beneficiary's affidavit states that the business no longer exists. The beneficiary's affidavit is self-serving and does not provide independent, objective evidence of his prior work experience. See *Matter of Ho*, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591-592 (BIA 1988)(states that the petitioner must resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent, objective evidence). Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm'r 1998) (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg'l Comm'r 1972)).

The submitted payroll records indicate that the beneficiary did not always work at [REDACTED] full-time. There is no explanation as to the discrepancy in the dates of employment and location of the restaurant.⁷ The record does not contain evidence of the duties performed by the beneficiary. Taken as a whole, the evidence in the record does not establish that the beneficiary possessed the required experience set forth on the labor certification by the priority date. Therefore, the petitioner has also failed to establish that the beneficiary is qualified for the offered position.

The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and alternative basis for denial. In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, that burden has not been met.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.

⁶ The labor certification states that the beneficiary began working in [REDACTED] in 1995.

⁷ *Matter of Ho*, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591-592 (BIA 1988), states, "[i]t is incumbent upon the petitioner to resolve the inconsistencies by independent objective evidence. Attempts to explain or reconcile the conflicting accounts, absent competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth, in fact, lies, will not suffice."