(b)(6)

**U.S. Department of Homeland Security**
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Administrative Appeals Office (AAO)
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., MS 2090
Washington, DC 20529-2090

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services

DATE: JUL 0 9 2012 OFFICE: TEXAS SERVICE CENTER FILE:

IN RE: Petitioner:
Beneficiary:

PETITION: Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as a Skilled Worker or Professional Pursuant to Section 203(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:

INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the AAO inappropriately applied the law in reaching its decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen with the field office or service center that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of $630. The specific requirements for filing such a motion can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. **Do not file any motion directly with the AAO.** Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires any motion to be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,

Elizabeth McCormack

Perry Rhew
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The Director, Texas Service Center, denied the employment-based immigrant visa petition, which is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner is a carpet wholesaler. It seeks to employ the beneficiary permanently in the United States as a master repair person/weaver pursuant to section 203(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3).

As required by statute, the petition is accompanied by labor certification application approved by the United States Department of Labor (DOL). In the present case, the director determined that the petitioner had not established that the petition requires at least two years of training or experience and, therefore, that the beneficiary cannot be found qualified for classification as a skilled worker. The director denied the petition accordingly.

The record shows that the appeal is properly filed and makes a specific allegation of error in law or fact. The procedural history in this case is documented by the record and incorporated into the decision. Further elaboration of the procedural history will be made only as necessary.

The AAO conducts appellate review on a *de novo* basis. *See Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004). The AAO considers all pertinent evidence in the record, including new evidence properly submitted upon appeal.[1]

Here, the Form I-140 was filed on July 13, 2007. On Part 2.e. of the Form I-140, the petitioner indicated that it was filing the petition for a professional or a skilled worker.

On appeal, counsel asserts that the petitioner responded to the director's request for evidence dated December 1, 2007 requesting the classification sought be changed to EW3 preference. However, the request for evidence referenced by counsel was issued for file [redacted][2], and not the case at hand. [redacted] was subsequently approved on March 7, 2008. The director then denied the present I-140 on January 26, 2009, based upon the incorrect classification request on the I-140.

Section 203(b)(3)(A)(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(i), provides for the granting of preference classification to qualified immigrants who are capable, at the time of petitioning for classification under this paragraph, of performing skilled labor (requiring at least two years training or experience), not of a temporary nature, for which qualified workers are not available in the United States. Section 203(b)(3)(A)(iii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(iii), provides for the granting of preference classification to other qualified immigrants who are capable, at the time of petitioning

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[1] The submission of additional evidence on appeal is allowed by the instructions to the Form I-290B, which are incorporated into the regulations by the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(1). The record in the instant case provides no reason to preclude consideration of any of the documents newly submitted on appeal. *See Matter of Soriano*, 19 I&N Dec. 764 (BIA 1988).

[2] It is noted that [redacted] was filed by the same attorney, for the present petitioner and beneficiary.

for classification under this paragraph, of performing unskilled labor, not of a temporary or seasonal nature, for which qualified workers are not available in the United States.

In the present case, the labor certification indicates that the proffered position requires 6 months of experience in the proffered position. However, the petitioner requested the skilled worker classification on the Form I-140. There is no provision in statute or regulation that compels United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) to readjudicate a petition under a different visa classification in response to a petitioner's request to change it, once the decision has been rendered. A petitioner may not make material changes to a petition in an effort to make a deficient petition conform to USCIS requirements. *See Matter of Izummi*, 22 I&N Dec. 169, 176 (Assoc. Comm'r 1988).

The evidence submitted does not establish that the petition requires at least two years of training or experience such that the beneficiary may be found qualified for classification as a skilled worker.

An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. *See Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States*, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), *aff'd*, 345 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2003); *see also Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004) (noting that the AAO conducts appellate review on a *de novo* basis).

Beyond the decision of the director, the petitioner submitted the original labor certification from the United States Department of Labor (DOL), with the instant petition, and a request to substitute the beneficiary of the instant petition for the original beneficiary on the certification. The substitution request was timely and the previous beneficiary has not adjusted status using the labor certification contained in the present case.

The labor certification is evidence of an individual alien's admissibility under section 212(a)(5)(A)(i) of the Act, which provides:

> In general.-Any alien who seeks to enter the United States for the purpose of performing skilled or unskilled labor is inadmissible, unless the Secretary of Labor has determined and certified to the Secretary of State and the Attorney General that-
>
> > (I) there are not sufficient workers who are able, willing, qualified (or equally qualified in the case of an alien described in clause (ii)) and available at the time of application for a visa and admission to the United States and at the place where the alien is to perform such skilled or unskilled labor, and
> >
> > (II) the employment of such alien will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of workers in the United States similarly employed.

The regulation at 20 C.F.R. § 656.30(c)(2) in effect at that time stated the following: "A labor certification involving a specific job offer is valid only for the particular job opportunity and for the

area of intended employment stated on the Application for Permanent Employment Certification form."

USCIS may not approve a visa petition when the approved labor certification has already been used by another alien. *See Matter of Harry Bailen Builders, Inc.*, 19 I&N Dec. 412 (Comm. 1986).[3] The labor certification on which the present petition is based already served as the basis of admissibility for the beneficiary in Therefore, the labor certification cannot be used as a basis for a valid job offer in the present case.

Beyond the decision of the director, the petitioner has also failed to establish its ability to pay the proffered wage as of the priority date and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2).

In determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage, USCIS first examines whether the petitioner has paid the beneficiary the full proffered wage each year from the priority date. If the petitioner has not paid the beneficiary the full proffered wage each year, USCIS will next examine whether the petitioner had sufficient net income or net current assets to pay the difference between the wage paid, if any, and the proffered wage.[4] If the petitioner's net income or net current assets is not sufficient to demonstrate the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage, USCIS may also consider the overall magnitude of the petitioner's business activities. *See Matter of Sonegawa,* 12 I&N Dec. 612 (Reg'l Comm'r 1967).

In the instant case, the petitioner did not employ the beneficiary or pay the beneficiary the full proffered wage each year, and its net income was not equal or greater to the proffered wage for fiscal years 2000 through 2005.[5] Additionally, the petitioner's net current assets were not equal or greater to the proffered wage for fiscal year 2000 or 2001[6]. Further, the petitioner failed to establish that factors

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[3] While *Harry Bailen,* 19 I&N Dec. at 414, relies in part on language in 8 C.F.R. § 204.4(f) that no longer exists in the regulations, the decision also relies on DOL's regulations, which continue to hold that a labor certification is valid only for a specific job opportunity. 20 C.F.R. § 656.30(c)(2). Moreover, the reasoning in *Harry Bailen,* 19 I&N Dec. at 414 has been adopted in recent cases. *See Matter of Francisco Javier Villarreal-Zuniga,* 23 I&N Dec. 886, 889-90 (BIA 2006).

[4] *See River Street Donuts, LLC v. Napolitano*, 558 F.3d 111 (1st Cir. 2009); *Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava*, 632 F. Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); *Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman*, 736 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1984)); *Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh*, 719 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Texas 1989); *K.C.P. Food Co. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), *aff'd*, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983); and *Taco Especial v. Napolitano*, 696 F. Supp. 2d 873 (E.D. Mich. 2010), aff'd, No. 10-1517 (6th Cir. filed Nov. 10, 2011).

[5] The priority date in the instant case is April 30, 2001. The petitioner's fiscal year runs from October 1 through September 30. Therefore, the petitioner's tax return for October 1, 2000 to September 30, 2001 should have been submitted for a complete ability to pay analysis.

[6] The petitioner failed to submit Schedule L with its fiscal year 2001 tax return, so a net current asset calculation could not be completed for 2001.

similar to *Sonegawa* existed in the instant case, which would permit a conclusion that the petitioner had the ability to pay the proffered wage despite its shortfalls in net income and net current assets.

Accordingly, after considering the totality of the circumstances, the petitioner has also failed to establish its continuing ability to pay the proffered wage to the beneficiary since the priority date.

Beyond the decision of the director, the petitioner has also not established that the beneficiary is qualified for the offered position. The petitioner must establish that the beneficiary possessed all the education, training, and experience specified on the labor certification as of the priority date. 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(l), (12). *See Matter of Wing's Tea House,* 16 I&N Dec. 158, 159 (Acting Reg'l Comm'r 1977); *see also Matter of Katigbak,* 14 I&N Dec. 45, 49 (Reg'l Comm'r 1971). In evaluating the beneficiary's qualifications, USCIS must look to the job offer portion of the labor certification to determine the required qualifications for the position. USCIS may not ignore a term of the labor certification, nor may it impose additional requirements. *See Matter of Silver Dragon Chinese Restaurant,* 19 I&N Dec. 401, 406 (Comm'r 1986). *See also, Madany* v. *Smith,* 696 F.2d 1008 (D.C. Cir. 1983); *K.R.K. Irvine, Inc.* v. *Landon,* 699 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1983); *Stewart Infra-Red Commissary of Massachusetts, Inc.* v. *Coomey,* 661 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1981).

In the instant case, the labor certification states that the offered position requires six months of experience as a master repairperson/weaver. On the ETA Form 9089 submitted with the beneficiary claims to qualify for the offered position based on experience as a data input person for from 1998 to 2008.

The beneficiary's claimed qualifying experience must be supported by letters from employers giving the name, address, and title of the employer, and a description of the beneficiary's experience. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(l)(3)(ii)(A). The record contains a "To: Whom it My Concern" signed by President Director for Jakarta, Indonesia, a "carpet cleaning industry," which states the company employed the beneficiary as a senior instructor, "his background includes business development and training for one of or [sic] industry's franchises, along with close involvement in industry trade associations," from June 1990 to December 1992. However, the letter does not describe the duties performed by the beneficiary in detail, or state if the job was full-time. It appears this company cleaned carpets and was not a carpet wholesaler who repaired carpets.

Further, evidence in the file shows the beneficiary first entered the U.S. sometime between January 28, 1992 and February 6, 1992. Therefore, she could not have been employed until December 1992 with It is incumbent on the petitioner to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence, and attempts to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies, absent competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth, in fact, lies, will not suffice. *Matter of Ho,* 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591-592 (BIA 1988). Doubt cast on any aspect of the petitioner's proof may, of course, lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in support of the visa petition. *Id.* at 591.

Finally, the beneficiary did not list employment with [redacted] on the ETA Form 9089. In *Matter of Leung,* 16 I&N Dec. 2530 (BIA 1976), the Board's dicta notes that the beneficiary's experience, without such fact certified by DOL on the beneficiary's Form ETA 750B, lessens the credibility of the evidence and facts asserted.

The evidence in the record does not establish that the beneficiary possessed the required experience set forth on the labor certification by the priority date. Therefore, the petitioner has also failed to establish that the beneficiary is qualified for the offered position.

Beyond the decision of the director, according to the Virginia State Corporate Division, it appears that the petitioner's status was automatically terminated on November 30, 2011, for non-payment of fees. Any further filings for this petitioner must demonstrate the continued existence, operation, and good standing of the organization.

The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and alternative basis for denial. In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, that burden has not been met.

**ORDER**: The appeal is dismissed.