


U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Administrative Appeals Office (AAO)
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., MS 2090
Washington, DC 20529-2090



U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services


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
Date: JUN 11 2012

Office: NEBRASKA SERVICE CENTER

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


IN RE: Petitioner:
Beneficiary:



PETITION: Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as a Skilled Worker or Professional pursuant to Section 203(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:



INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the AAO inappropriately applied the law in reaching its decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen with the field office or service center that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$630. The specific requirements for filing such a motion can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. **Do not file any motion directly with the AAO.** Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires any motion to be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,


Perry Rhew

Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The preference visa petition was denied by the Director, Nebraska Service Center, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner is in the business of computer sales and repair. It seeks to employ the beneficiary permanently in the United States as a general marketing manager. As required by statute, the petition is accompanied by a Form ETA 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification, approved by the United States Department of Labor (DOL). The director determined that the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage beginning on the priority date of the visa petition. The director denied the petition accordingly.

The record shows that the appeal is properly filed, timely and makes a specific allegation of error in law or fact. The procedural history in this case is documented by the record and incorporated into the decision. Further elaboration of the procedural history will be made only as necessary.

As set forth in the director's January 20, 2009¹ denial, an issue in this case is whether or not the petitioner has the ability to pay the proffered wage as of the priority date and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence.

Section 203(b)(3)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(i), provides for the granting of preference classification to qualified immigrants who are capable, at the time of petitioning for classification under this paragraph, of performing skilled labor (requiring at least two years training or experience), not of a temporary nature, for which qualified workers are not available in the United States. Section 203(b)(3)(A)(ii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(ii), also provides for the granting of preference classification to qualified immigrants who hold baccalaureate degrees and are members of the professions.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states in pertinent part:

Ability of prospective employer to pay wage. Any petition filed by or for an employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be either in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements.

The petitioner must demonstrate the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, which is the date the Form ETA 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification, was accepted for processing by any office within the employment system of the DOL. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(d). The petitioner must also demonstrate that, on the priority date, the beneficiary had the

¹ The AAO notes that the date stamp on the director's decision shows the incorrect year. The date stamp lists the year as 2008, while it should be 2009.

qualifications stated on its Form ETA 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification, as certified by the DOL and submitted with the instant petition. *Matter of Wing's Tea House*, 16 I&N Dec. 158 (Acting Reg'l Comm'r 1977).

Here, the Form ETA 750 was accepted on January 20, 2004. The proffered wage as stated on the Form ETA 750 is \$4,330 per month (\$51,960 per year). The Form ETA 750 states that the position requires a bachelor's degree in Public Administration Marketing and two years of experience in the job offered as a general marketing manager.

The AAO conducts appellate review on a *de novo* basis. See *Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004). The AAO considers all pertinent evidence in the record, including new evidence properly submitted upon appeal.²

The evidence in the record of proceeding shows that the petitioner is structured as an S corporation. On the petition, the petitioner claimed to have been established in 1993³ and to currently employ seven workers. According to the tax returns in the record, the petitioner's fiscal year is based on a calendar year. On the Form ETA 750B, signed by the beneficiary on January 14, 2004, the beneficiary claimed to have worked for the petitioner beginning on July 2003 and continuing to the date the form was signed, on January 15, 2004.

The petitioner must establish that its job offer to the beneficiary is a realistic one. Because the filing of an ETA 750 labor certification application establishes a priority date for any immigrant petition later based on the ETA 750, the petitioner must establish that the job offer was realistic as of the priority date and that the offer remained realistic for each year thereafter, until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. The petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is an essential element in evaluating whether a job offer is realistic. See *Matter of Great Wall*, 16 I&N Dec. 142 (Acting Reg'l Comm'r 1977); see also 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2). In evaluating whether a job offer is realistic, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) requires the petitioner to demonstrate financial resources sufficient to pay the beneficiary's proffered wages, although the totality of the circumstances affecting the petitioning business will be considered if the evidence warrants such consideration. See *Matter of Sonegawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (Reg'l Comm'r 1967).

In determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage during a given period, USCIS will first examine whether the petitioner employed and paid the beneficiary during that period. If the

² The submission of additional evidence on appeal is allowed by the instructions to the Form I-290B, which are incorporated into the regulations by the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(1). The record in the instant case provides no reason to preclude consideration of any of the documents newly submitted on appeal. See *Matter of Soriano*, 19 I&N Dec. 764 (BIA 1988).

³ The petitioner's tax returns of record list the petitioner's date of incorporation as 1997. It is incumbent on the petitioner to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence, and attempts to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies, absent competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth, in fact, lies, will not suffice. *Matter of Ho*, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591-592 (BIA 1988).

(b)(6)

petitioner establishes by documentary evidence that it employed the beneficiary at a salary equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the evidence will be considered *prima facie* proof of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. In the instant case, on appeal, the petitioner submitted the beneficiary's Forms W-2 from 2004 through 2008. The beneficiary's Forms W-2 demonstrate that the beneficiary was compensated by the petitioner as shown in the table below.

- In 2004, the Form W-2 stated wages of \$16,868.39.
- In 2005, the Form W-2 stated wages of \$20,533.04.
- In 2006, the Form W-2 stated wages of \$9,687.16.
- In 2007, the Form W-2 stated wages of \$20,567.19.
- In 2008, the Form W-2 stated wages of \$25,758.32.

Therefore, the petitioner has not established that it employed and paid the beneficiary the full proffered wage as of the priority date.

If the petitioner does not establish that it employed and paid the beneficiary an amount at least equal to the proffered wage during that period, USCIS will next examine the net income figure reflected on the petitioner's federal income tax return, without consideration of depreciation or other expenses. *River Street Donuts, LLC v. Napolitano*, 558 F.3d 111 (1st Cir. 2009); *Taco Especial v. Napolitano*, 696 F. Supp. 2d 873 (E.D. Mich. 2010), *aff'd*, No. 10-1517 (6th Cir. filed Nov. 10, 2011). Reliance on federal income tax returns as a basis for determining a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is well established by judicial precedent. *Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava*, 632 F. Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (citing *Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman*, 736 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1984)); *see also Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh*, 719 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Texas 1989); *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), *aff'd*, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983). Reliance on the petitioner's gross receipts and wage expense is misplaced. Showing that the petitioner's gross receipts exceeded the proffered wage is insufficient. Similarly, showing that the petitioner paid wages in excess of the proffered wage is insufficient.

In *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. at 1084, the court held that the Immigration and Naturalization Service, now USCIS, had properly relied on the petitioner's net income figure, as stated on the petitioner's corporate income tax returns, rather than the petitioner's gross income. The court specifically rejected the argument that USCIS should have considered income before expenses were paid rather than net income. *See Taco Especial v. Napolitano*, 696 F. Supp. 2d at 881 (gross profits overstate an employer's ability to pay because it ignores other necessary expenses).

With respect to depreciation, the court in *River Street Donuts* noted:

The AAO recognized that a depreciation deduction is a systematic allocation of the cost of a tangible long-term asset and does not represent a specific cash expenditure during the year claimed. Furthermore, the AAO indicated that the allocation of the depreciation of a long-term asset could be spread out over the

years or concentrated into a few depending on the petitioner's choice of accounting and depreciation methods. Nonetheless, the AAO explained that depreciation represents an actual cost of doing business, which could represent either the diminution in value of buildings and equipment or the accumulation of funds necessary to replace perishable equipment and buildings. Accordingly, the AAO stressed that even though amounts deducted for depreciation do not represent current use of cash, neither does it represent amounts available to pay wages.

We find that the AAO has a rational explanation for its policy of not adding depreciation back to net income. Namely, that the amount spent on a long term tangible asset is a "real" expense.

River Street Donuts at 118. "[USCIS] and judicial precedent support the use of tax returns and the *net income figures* in determining petitioner's ability to pay. Plaintiffs' argument that these figures should be revised by the court by adding back depreciation is without support." *Chi-Feng Chang* at 537 (emphasis added).

The record before the director closed on December 24, 2008 with the receipt by the director of the petitioner's submissions in response to the director's request for evidence. As of that date, the petitioner's 2008 federal income tax return was not yet due. Therefore, the petitioner's income tax return for 2007 is the most recent return available. The petitioner's tax returns demonstrate its net income as shown in the table below.

- In 2004, the Form 1120S stated net income⁴ of -\$25,864.
- In 2005, the Form 1120S stated net income of \$653.
- In 2006, the Form 1120S stated net income of -\$16,430.
- In 2007, the Form 1120S stated net income of -\$1,513.

Therefore, for the years 2004 through 2007, the petitioner did not have sufficient net income to pay the difference between wages already paid to the beneficiary and the proffered wage.

⁴ Where an S corporation's income is exclusively from a trade or business, USCIS considers net income to be the figure for ordinary income, shown on line 21 of page one of the petitioner's IRS Form 1120S. However, where an S corporation has income, credits, deductions or other adjustments from sources other than a trade or business, they are reported on Schedule K. If the Schedule K has relevant entries for additional income, credits, deductions or other adjustments, net income is found on line 17e (2004-2005) and line 18 (2006-2011) of Schedule K. See Instructions for Form 1120S, at <http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i1120s.pdf> (accessed May 10, 2012) (indicating that Schedule K is a summary schedule of all shareholders' shares of the corporation's income, deductions, credits, etc.). Because the petitioner had additional income, credits, deductions, or other adjustments shown on its Schedule K for 2004 through 2007, the petitioner's net income is found on Schedule K of its tax returns.

(b)(6)

As an alternate means of determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage, USCIS may review the petitioner's net current assets. Net current assets are the difference between the petitioner's current assets and current liabilities.⁵ A corporation's year-end current assets are shown on Schedule L, lines 1 through 6. Its year-end current liabilities are shown on lines 16 through 18. If the total of a corporation's end-of-year net current assets and the wages paid to the beneficiary (if any) are equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the petitioner is expected to be able to pay the proffered wage using those net current assets. The petitioner's tax returns demonstrate its end-of-year net current assets as shown in the table below.

- In 2004, the Form 1120S stated net current assets of -\$85,799.
- In 2005, the Form 1120S stated net current assets of -\$60,227.
- In 2006, the Form 1120S stated net current assets of -\$85,133.
- In 2007, the Form 1120S stated net current assets of -\$88,682.

Therefore, for the years 2004 through 2007, the petitioner did not have sufficient net current assets to pay the difference between wages already paid to the beneficiary and the proffered wage.

Therefore, from the date the Form ETA 750 was accepted for processing by the DOL, the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage as of the priority date through an examination of wages paid to the beneficiary, or its net income or net current assets.

On appeal, counsel asserts that the petitioner's accountant improperly listed the petitioner's net current asset amounts for the years 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2008. Counsel states, "The reclassification of the debt does not affect the income reported on the returns nor does it require filing amended returns. It is simply a more proper classification of the long-term debt of the organization and evidence of the financial strength of the organization." The petitioner's accountant, [REDACTED] states in an undated letter, "It has come to my attention, as the tax return preparer for [REDACTED], that certain long-term liabilities (defined as liabilities that will be paid more than one year after the date of the tax return) have been reported as current liabilities. These misclassifications have no affect [sic] on the income reported or on the income taxes due for the periods indicated. The significance for immigration purposes was not understood until an inquiry was made by the immigration attorney."

The petitioner submitted a document listing the "reclassified" liabilities for consideration. The AAO views the petitioner's change of items on the petitioner's current and long term liabilities as questionable, specifically with regard to the significant increases in the petitioner's net current assets based on the restatement of current and long term liabilities. *See Matter of Ho*, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591

⁵According to *Barron's Dictionary of Accounting Terms* 117 (3rd ed. 2000), "current assets" consist of items having (in most cases) a life of one year or less, such as cash, marketable securities, inventory and prepaid expenses. "Current liabilities" are obligations payable (in most cases) within one year, such accounts payable, short-term notes payable, and accrued expenses (such as taxes and salaries). *Id.* at 118.

(BIA 1988) (stating that doubt cast on any aspect of the petitioner's proof may lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in support of the visa petition). A petitioner may not make material changes to a petition in an effort to make a deficient petition conform to USCIS requirements. See *Matter of Izummi*, 22 I&N Dec. 169, 176 (Assoc. Comm'r 1988). Further, no evidence was included to indicate that the amendments were submitted to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) or its receipt or acceptance by the IRS. USCIS requires IRS-certified copies of amended returns to establish that the amended returns were actually received and processed by the IRS. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm'r 1998) (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg'l Comm'r 1972)). Thus, the AAO will only examine the version of the petitioner's tax return that was initially submitted and not the reclassified amounts submitted by the accountant on appeal.

On appeal, counsel states that officer's compensation should be considered as additional evidence of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. The sole shareholder of a corporation has the authority to allocate expenses of the corporation for various legitimate business purposes, including for the purpose of reducing the corporation's taxable income. Compensation of officers is an expense category explicitly stated on the Form 1120S U.S. Corporation Income Tax Return. For this reason, the petitioner's figures for compensation of officers may be considered as additional financial resources of the petitioner, in addition to its figures for ordinary income. In the instant case, Schedule K-1 of the petitioner's 2004 through 2007 federal tax returns show that [REDACTED] holds 60% of the company's stock and [REDACTED] holds 40% of the company's stock. The petitioner's tax returns demonstrate its compensation of officers as shown in the table below.

- In 2004, line 7 of page one on the Form 1120S showed compensation of officers of \$32,994.
- In 2005, line 7 of page one on the Form 1120S showed compensation of officers of \$32,982.
- In 2006, line 7 of page one on the Form 1120S showed compensation of officers of \$40,152.
- In 2007, line 7 of page one on the Form 1120S showed compensation of officers of \$39,468.

These figures are supported by the Forms W-2 for [REDACTED] for the years 2004 through 2008, which were submitted by the petitioner. The Forms W-2 demonstrate officer compensation for [REDACTED] by the petitioner as shown in the table below.

- In 2004, the Forms W-2 stated compensation of \$17,394.11 and \$15,600, respectively.
- In 2005, the Forms W-2 stated compensation of \$17,382.29 and \$15,600, respectively.
- In 2006, the Forms W-2 stated compensation of \$24,551.66 and \$15,600, respectively.
- In 2007, the Forms W-2 stated compensation of \$23,867.64 and \$15,600, respectively.
- In 2007, the Forms W-2 stated compensation of \$26,249.36 and \$14,100, respectively.

A statement was submitted from [REDACTED], indicating he would be willing to pay the difference between the wages paid to the beneficiary and the proffered wage from the priority date until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. No statement was submitted from [REDACTED]. The petitioner failed to submit photocopies of [REDACTED] federal tax returns (Forms 1040) for the

years 2004 through 2008 and statements listing their monthly expenses for each of the relevant years. However, even if the entire amount of officer compensation were available, for the years 2004 and 2006, the petitioner did not have sufficient officer compensation to pay the difference between wages already paid to the beneficiary and the proffered wage.

Additionally, the amount of officer compensation paid to [REDACTED] does not vary from 2004 through 2007. The petitioner failed to submit evidence to show that officer compensation payments were not fixed by contract or otherwise during these years. Without such evidence, the AAO does not find counsel's claim persuasive. The assertions of counsel do not constitute evidence. *Matter of Obaigbena*, 19 I&N Dec. 533, 534 (BIA 1988); *Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez*, 17 I&N Dec. 503, 506 (BIA 1980).

Counsel also claims that USCIS should consider the personal assets of the owners when determining the ability to pay the proffered wage. Because a corporation is a separate and distinct legal entity from its owners and shareholders, the assets of its shareholders or of other enterprises or corporations cannot be considered in determining the petitioning corporation's ability to pay the proffered wage. See *Matter of Aphrodite Investments, Ltd.*, 17 I&N Dec. 530 (Comm'r 1980). In a similar case, the court in *Sitar v. Ashcroft*, 2003 WL 22203713 (D.Mass. Sept. 18, 2003) stated, "nothing in the governing regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 204.5, permits [USCIS] to consider the financial resources of individuals or entities who have no legal obligation to pay the wage."

On appeal, counsel also asserts that the beneficiary's ability to generate income should be considered. Counsel cites *Masonry Masters, Inc. v. Thornburgh*, 875 F.2d 898 (D.C. Cir. 1989), in support of this assertion. The AAO is not bound to follow the published decision of a United States district court in cases arising within the same district. See *Matter of K-S-*, 20 I&N Dec. 715 (BIA 1993). Although part of this decision mentions the ability of the beneficiary to generate income, the holding is based on other grounds and is primarily a criticism of USCIS for failure to specify a formula used in determining the proffered wage.⁶ Further, in this instance, no detail or documentation has been provided to explain how the beneficiary's employment as a general marketing manager will significantly increase profits for a computer sales and repair company. This hypothesis cannot be concluded to outweigh the evidence presented in the corporate tax returns.

In addition, counsel refers to various decisions issued by the AAO and BALCA concerning ability to pay. While 8 C.F.R. § 103.3(c) provides that precedent decisions of USCIS are binding on all its employees in the administration of the Act, unpublished decisions are not similarly binding. Precedent decisions must be designated and published in bound volumes or as interim decisions. 8 C.F.R. § 103.9(a).

Counsel's assertions on appeal cannot be concluded to outweigh the evidence presented in the tax returns as submitted by the petitioner that demonstrates that the petitioner could not pay the proffered wage from the day the Form ETA 750 was accepted for processing by the DOL.

⁶ Subsequent to that decision, USCIS implemented a formula that involves assessing wages actually paid to the alien beneficiary, and the petitioner's net income and net current assets.

(b)(6)

USCIS may consider the overall magnitude of the petitioner's business activities in its determination of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. See *Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (Reg'l Comm'r 1967). The petitioning entity in *Sonogawa* had been in business for over 11 years and routinely earned a gross annual income of about \$100,000. During the year in which the petition was filed in that case, the petitioner changed business locations and paid rent on both the old and new locations for five months. There were large moving costs and also a period of time when the petitioner was unable to do regular business. The Regional Commissioner determined that the petitioner's prospects for a resumption of successful business operations were well established. The petitioner was a fashion designer whose work had been featured in *Time* and *Look* magazines. Her clients included Miss Universe, movie actresses, and society matrons. The petitioner's clients had been included in the lists of the best-dressed California women. The petitioner lectured on fashion design at design and fashion shows throughout the United States and at colleges and universities in California. The Regional Commissioner's determination in *Sonogawa* was based in part on the petitioner's sound business reputation and outstanding reputation as a couturiere. As in *Sonogawa*, USCIS may, at its discretion, consider evidence relevant to the petitioner's financial ability that falls outside of a petitioner's net income and net current assets. USCIS may consider such factors as the number of years the petitioner has been doing business, the established historical growth of the petitioner's business, the overall number of employees, the occurrence of any uncharacteristic business expenditures or losses, the petitioner's reputation within its industry, whether the beneficiary is replacing a former employee or an outsourced service, or any other evidence that USCIS deems relevant to the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage.

In the instant case, the petition shows that the petitioner has been in business since 1993, although the tax returns reflect that the petitioner has been in business only since 1997. The tax returns for 2004 through 2007 failed to demonstrate the ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage through net income or net current assets.⁷ No evidence of the historical growth of the petitioner's business or of the petitioner's reputation within its industry was submitted. Counsel also failed to provide evidence of any factors that may have impacted the petitioner during the relevant years. Thus, assessing the totality of the circumstances in this individual case, it is concluded that the petitioner has not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage.

The evidence submitted does not establish that the petitioner had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date.

⁷ It is noted that the instant beneficiary is also the beneficiary of an H-1B nonimmigrant petition sponsored by the petitioner, but is not being paid the wage on the certified labor condition application. The petitioner submitted a letter dated April 9, 2009 stating, "He agreed to take lesser payment to insure [sic] that the business could get itself better established since we expanded operation in 2005."

Beyond the decision of the director,⁸ the petitioner has also not established that the beneficiary is qualified for the offered position. The petitioner must establish that the beneficiary possessed all the education, training, and experience specified on the labor certification as of the priority date. 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(1), (12). See *Matter of Wing's Tea House*, 16 I&N Dec. 158, 159 (Acting Reg'l Comm'r 1977); see also *Matter of Katigbak*, 14 I&N Dec. 45, 49 (Reg'l Comm'r 1971). In evaluating the beneficiary's qualifications, USCIS must look to the job offer portion of the labor certification to determine the required qualifications for the position. USCIS may not ignore a term of the labor certification, nor may it impose additional requirements. See *Matter of Silver Dragon Chinese Restaurant*, 19 I&N Dec. 401, 406 (Comm'r 1986). See also, *Madany v. Smith*, 696 F.2d 1008 (D.C. Cir. 1983); *K.R.K. Irvine, Inc. v. Landon*, 699 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1983); *Stewart Infra-Red Commissary of Massachusetts, Inc. v. Coomey*, 661 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1981).

In the instant case, the labor certification states that the offered position requires two years of experience in the job offered as a marketing manager. On the labor certification, the beneficiary claims to qualify for the offered position based on the following experience:

- As a Senior Manager with [REDACTED] from May 2002 to October 2002.
- As a Chief Marketing Officer with [REDACTED] from September 2001 to April 2002.

The beneficiary also listed experience in marketing⁹ with [REDACTED] the petitioner, from July 2003 to the date the form was signed, on January 15, 2004. No other experience is listed.

The beneficiary's claimed qualifying experience must be supported by letters from employers giving the name, address, and title of the employer, and a description of the beneficiary's experience. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(l)(3)(ii)(A). The record contains an employment certification dated April 23, 2003 from [REDACTED]. The certification does not include the beneficiary's job duties or the title of the author. The record also contains a career certification dated April 22, 2003 from [REDACTED]. The certification does not include the beneficiary's job duties or the address of the employer. Further, the experience with [REDACTED] is not listed on Form ETA 750. In *Matter of Leung*, 16 I&N Dec. 2530 (BIA 1976), the Board's dicta notes that the beneficiary's experience, without such fact certified by DOL on the beneficiary's Form ETA 750B, lessens the credibility of the evidence and facts asserted.

⁸ An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. See *Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States*, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), *aff'd*, 345 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2003); see also *Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004) (noting that the AAO conducts appellate review on a *de novo* basis).

⁹ The beneficiary failed to list his job title on the Form ETA 750B. Under "Duties Performed" the beneficiary wrote "Market/sell products & services, oversee advertising... develop the CO's marketing strategy, search the demand for products and services..."

(b)(6)

The evidence in the record does not establish that the beneficiary possessed the required experience set forth on the labor certification by the priority date. Therefore, the petitioner has also failed to establish that the beneficiary is qualified for the offered position.

The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and alternative basis for denial. In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, that burden has not been met.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.