


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
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Administrative Appeals Office (AAO)
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., MS 2090
Washington, DC 20529-2090





U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services




Date: **JUN 22 2012** Office: NEBRASKA SERVICE CENTER

FILE: 

IN RE: Petitioner: 
Beneficiary: 

PETITION: Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as a Skilled Worker or Professional pursuant to Section 203(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:



INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the AAO inappropriately applied the law in reaching its decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen in accordance with the instructions on Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$630. The specific requirements for filing such a motion can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. **Do not file any motion directly with the AAO.** Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires any motion to be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,


Perry Rhew

Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The preference visa petition was denied by the Director, Nebraska Service Center, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner is a business software development company. It seeks to employ the beneficiary permanently in the United States as a software engineer. As required by statute, the petition is accompanied by an ETA Form 9089, Application for Permanent Employment Certification, approved by the United States Department of Labor (DOL). The director determined that the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage beginning on the priority date of the visa petition. The director denied the petition accordingly.

The record shows that the appeal is properly filed and timely and makes a specific allegation of error in law or fact. The procedural history in this case is documented by the record and incorporated into the decision. Further elaboration of the procedural history will be made only as necessary.

As set forth in the director's April 24, 2009 denial, the single issue in this case is whether or not the petitioner has the ability to pay the proffered wage as of the priority date and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence.

Section 203(b)(3)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(i), provides for the granting of preference classification to qualified immigrants who are capable, at the time of petitioning for classification under this paragraph, of performing skilled labor (requiring at least two years training or experience), not of a temporary nature, for which qualified workers are not available in the United States.

The regulation 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states in pertinent part:

Ability of prospective employer to pay wage. Any petition filed by or for an employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be either in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements.

The petitioner must demonstrate the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, which is the date the ETA Form 9089, Application for Permanent Employment Certification, was accepted for processing by any office within the employment system of the DOL. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(d). The petitioner must also demonstrate that, on the priority date, the beneficiary had the qualifications stated on its ETA Form 9089, Application for Permanent Employment Certification, as certified by the DOL and submitted with the instant petition. *Matter of Wing's Tea House*, 16 I&N Dec. 158 (Acting Reg'l Comm'r 1977).

Here, the ETA Form 9089 was accepted on May 9, 2007. The proffered wage as stated on the ETA Form 9089 is \$57,000 per year. The ETA Form 9089 states that the position requires a Bachelor's degree in computer science.

The AAO conducts appellate review on a *de novo* basis. See *Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004). The AAO considers all pertinent evidence in the record, including new evidence properly submitted upon appeal.¹

The evidence in the record of proceeding shows that the petitioner is structured as a sole proprietorship, as the petitioner is listed on Schedule C of the sole proprietor's 2007 individual federal income tax returns.² On the I-140 immigrant petition, the petitioner claimed to have been established in 2002 and to currently employ two workers. On the ETA Form 9089, signed by the beneficiary in response to the director's Request for Evidence (RFE), the beneficiary claimed to have worked for the petitioner as a full-time software engineer from February 28, 2005 to May 10, 2007.

The petitioner must establish that its job offer to the beneficiary is a realistic one. Because the filing of an ETA 750 labor certification application establishes a priority date for any immigrant petition later based on the ETA 750, the petitioner must establish that the job offer was realistic as of the priority date and that the offer remained realistic for each year thereafter, until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. The petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is an essential element in evaluating whether a job offer is realistic. See *Matter of Great Wall*, 16 I&N Dec. 142 (Acting Reg'l Comm'r 1977); see also 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2). In evaluating whether a job offer is realistic, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) requires the petitioner to demonstrate financial resources sufficient to pay the beneficiary's proffered wages, although the totality of the circumstances affecting the petitioning business will be considered if the evidence warrants such consideration. See *Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (Reg'l Comm'r 1967).

In determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage during a given period, USCIS will first examine whether the petitioner employed and paid the beneficiary during that period. If the petitioner establishes by documentary evidence that it employed the beneficiary at a salary equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the evidence will be considered *prima facie* proof of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. In the instant case, the petitioner submitted copies of the beneficiary's 2007 and 2008 Forms W-2, showing that in 2007 and 2008 it paid the petitioner \$33,541.59 and \$36,666.64, respectively. Therefore, the petitioner must show its ability to pay the

¹ The submission of additional evidence on appeal is allowed by the instructions to the Form I-290B, which are incorporated into the regulations by the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(1). The record in the instant case provides no reason to preclude consideration of any of the documents newly submitted on appeal. See *Matter of Soriano*, 19 I&N Dec. 764 (BIA 1988).

² The entity listed on Schedule C of the Form 1040 is [REDACTED]. However, the Employer Identification Number (EIN) listed on Schedule C matches the EIN of the petitioner listed on Form I-140 and ETA Form 9089.

difference between what it paid to the beneficiary and the proffered wage, which is \$23,458.41 in 2007, and \$20,333.36 in 2008.

If the petitioner does not establish that it employed and paid the beneficiary an amount at least equal to the proffered wage during that period, USCIS will next examine the net income figure reflected on the petitioner's federal income tax return, without consideration of depreciation or other expenses. *River Street Donuts, LLC v. Napolitano*, 558 F.3d 111 (1st Cir. 2009); *Taco Especial v. Napolitano*, 696 F. Supp. 2d 873 (E.D. Mich. 2010), *aff'd*, No. 10-1517 (6th Cir. filed Nov. 10, 2011). Reliance on federal income tax returns as a basis for determining a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is well established by judicial precedent. *Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava*, 632 F. Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (citing *Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman*, 736 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1984)); *see also Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh*, 719 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Texas 1989); *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), *aff'd*, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983).

The petitioner is a sole proprietorship, a business in which one person operates the business in his or her personal capacity. Black's Law Dictionary 1398 (7th Ed. 1999). Unlike a corporation, a sole proprietorship does not exist as an entity apart from the individual owner. *See Matter of United Investment Group*, 19 I&N Dec. 248, 250 (Comm'r 1984). Therefore the sole proprietor's adjusted gross income, assets and personal liabilities are also considered as part of the petitioner's ability to pay. Sole proprietors report income and expenses from their businesses on their individual (Form 1040) federal tax return each year. The business-related income and expenses are reported on Schedule C and are carried forward to the first page of the tax return. Sole proprietors must show that they can cover their existing business expenses as well as pay the proffered wage out of their adjusted gross income or other available funds. In addition, sole proprietors must show that they can sustain themselves and their dependents. *See Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), *aff'd*, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983).

In *Ubeda*, 539 F. Supp. at 650, the court concluded that it was highly unlikely that a petitioner could support himself, his spouse and five dependents on a gross income of slightly more than \$20,000 where the beneficiary's proposed salary was \$6,000 or approximately thirty percent (30%) of the petitioner's gross income.

In the instant case, and according to the most updated information of record, the sole proprietor supported a family of two.³ The proprietor's 2007 federal tax return reflects that in 2007 the proprietor's adjusted gross income (Form 1040, line 37) was \$28,470. Although, the sole proprietor's AGI for 2007 is greater than the difference between what was paid to the beneficiary in 2007 (\$33,541.59) and the proffered wage of \$57,000, sole proprietors must show that they can cover their existing business expenses, pay the proffered wage out of their adjusted gross income or other available funds, and support themselves and their dependents. In the instant case, it is unlikely

³ The sole proprietor's 2007 Individual Income Tax Return (Form 1040) lists [REDACTED] daughter, as the sole proprietor's dependent.

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that the sole proprietor would be able to support himself and his daughter and also pay the beneficiary's proffered wage on \$5,011.59, which is what remains after the balance of the proffered wage (\$23,458.41) is subtracted from the AGI. USCIS may reject a fact stated in the petition if it does not believe that fact to be true. Section 204(b) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1154(b); *see also Anetekhai v. I.N.S.*, 876 F.2d 1218, 1220 (5th Cir. 1989); *Lu-Ann Bakery Shop, Inc. v. Nelson*, 705 F. Supp. 7, 10 (D.D.C. 1988); *Systronics Corp. v. INS*, 153 F. Supp. 2d 7, 15 (D.D.C. 2001). The petitioner failed to provide a statement of the sole proprietor's monthly household expenses from 2007 onward. Without considering the sole proprietor's monthly expenses for those years, it is impossible to evaluate the petitioner's ability to pay.

On appeal, counsel asserts [REDACTED] a company established in 2007, provides all capital funds for the petitioner's development projects. According to counsel, [REDACTED] is merging into [REDACTED] and this will function as one business entity. The petitioner also provided a statement dated May 18, 2009, signed by the petitioner's owner [REDACTED] states that he is the sole owner of [REDACTED] and 60% owner of [REDACTED] and that [REDACTED] has been providing all the funds for [REDACTED] project development. Although counsel provided a copy of [REDACTED] articles of organization filed on December 4, 2007, the record does not contain any evidence that [REDACTED] were, in fact, merged.⁴ Furthermore, a search on the ([REDACTED] Secretary of State Website revealed that [REDACTED] is currently cancelled. *See* [REDACTED] (accessed May 9, 2012).⁵

On appeal, counsel submitted monthly bank statements related to [REDACTED] bank account at [REDACTED] from May 2007 to April 2009. The funds located in the sole proprietorship's business checking account are likely shown on Schedule C of the

⁴ Corporations are classified as members of a controlled group if they are connected through certain stock ownership. All corporate members of a controlled group are treated as one single entity for tax purposes (i.e., only one set of graduated income tax brackets and respective tax rates applies to the group's total taxable income). Each member of the group can file its own tax return rather than the group filing one consolidated return. However, members of a controlled group often consolidate their financial statements and file a consolidated tax return. The controlled group of corporations is subject to limitations on tax benefits to ensure the benefits of the group do not amount to more than those to which one single corporation would be entitled. The petitioner did not submit any evidence of being a member of a controlled group.

⁵ If the petitioner is currently dissolved, this is material to whether the job offer, as outlined on the immigrant petition filed by this organization, is a *bona fide* job offer. Moreover, any such concealment of the true status of the organization by the petitioner seriously compromises the credibility of the remaining evidence in the record. *See Matter of Ho*, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 586 (BIA 1988)(stating that doubt cast on any aspect of the petitioner's proof may lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in support of the visa petition.) It is incumbent upon the petitioner to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence, and attempts to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies, absent competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth, in fact, lies, will not suffice. *See Id.*

sole proprietor's tax returns as gross receipts and expenses. The net profit (or loss) is carried forward to page number one of the sole proprietor's IRS Form 1040, and included in the calculation of the petitioner's AGI. The record of proceeding does not contain a copy of the petitioner's or the sole proprietor's 2008 tax return, which prevents the AAO from fully analyzing the petitioner's ability to pay for the year 2008, based on the business funds in the business bank account. Further, bank statements are not one of the regulatory-prescribed forms of evidence that can be submitted to establish the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2).

Counsel also submitted monthly bank statements related to another [REDACTED] bank account at [REDACTED] which he indicates to be [REDACTED]. As stated above, the petitioner has submitted no evidence that [REDACTED] has merged with the petitioner. Because a corporation is a separate and distinct legal entity from its owners and shareholders, the assets of its shareholders or of other enterprises or corporations cannot be considered in determining the petitioning corporation's ability to pay the proffered wage. *See Matter of Aphrodite Investments, Ltd.*, 17 I&N Dec. 530 (Comm'r 1980). In a similar case, the court in *Sitar v. Ashcroft*, 2003 WL 22203713 (D.Mass. Sept. 18, 2003) stated, "nothing in the governing regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 204.5, permits [USCIS] to consider the financial resources of individuals or entities who have no legal obligation to pay the wage."

USCIS may consider the overall magnitude of the petitioner's business activities in its determination of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. *See Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (Reg'l Comm'r 1967). The petitioning entity in *Sonogawa* had been in business for over 11 years and routinely earned a gross annual income of about \$100,000. During the year in which the petition was filed in that case, the petitioner changed business locations and paid rent on both the old and new locations for five months. There were large moving costs and also a period of time when the petitioner was unable to do regular business. The Regional Commissioner determined that the petitioner's prospects for a resumption of successful business operations were well established. The petitioner was a fashion designer whose work had been featured in *Time* and *Look* magazines. Her clients included Miss Universe, movie actresses, and society matrons. The petitioner's clients had been included in the lists of the best-dressed California women. The petitioner lectured on fashion design at design and fashion shows throughout the United States and at colleges and universities in California. The Regional Commissioner's determination in *Sonogawa* was based in part on the petitioner's sound business reputation and outstanding reputation as a couturiere. As in *Sonogawa*, USCIS may, at its discretion, consider evidence relevant to the petitioner's financial ability that falls outside of a petitioner's net income and net current assets. USCIS may consider such factors as the number of years the petitioner has been doing business, the established historical growth of the petitioner's business, the overall number of employees, the occurrence of any uncharacteristic business expenditures or losses, the petitioner's reputation within its industry, whether the beneficiary is replacing a former employee or an outsourced service, or any other evidence that USCIS deems relevant to the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage.

In the instant case, the petitioner has been in business since 2002. The record contains only a copy of the sole proprietor's 2007 Individual Tax Return (Form 1040). Although the petitioner filed the

appeal on May 22, 2009, it failed to submit a copy of the sole proprietor's Form 1040 accompanied by Schedule C for the year 2008, which prevents the AAO from fully analyzing its ability to pay based on the sole proprietor's adjusted gross income for that year. The petitioner also did not submit a statement of the sole proprietor's monthly expenses for all relevant years. Further, the petitioner has not established a historical growth since 2002. The alleged merger of the petitioner with [REDACTED] is not documented on the record. The funds in the sole proprietorship's business bank account appear to be included on the Schedule C to IRS Form 1040. The net profit (or loss) is carried forward to page one of the sole proprietor's IRS Form 1040 and included in the calculation of the petitioner's AGI, which is insufficient to establish the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. The evidence of record does not indicate the occurrence of any uncharacteristic business expenditures or losses, or does not establish the petitioner's reputation within its industry. Thus, assessing the totality of the circumstances in this individual case, it is concluded that the petitioner has not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage.

Beyond the decision of the director,⁶ [REDACTED] also failed to establish that it is a successor-in-interest to the entity that filed the labor certification, petition and appeal in the instant matter. A labor certification is only valid for the particular job opportunity stated on the application form. 20 C.F.R. § 656.30(c). If [REDACTED] is a different entity than the petitioner/labor certification employer and appellant, it must establish that it is a successor-in-interest to that entity. *See Matter of Dial Auto Repair Shop, Inc.*, 19 I&N Dec. 481 (Comm'r 1986).

A valid successor relationship may be established for immigration purposes if it satisfies three conditions. First, the successor must fully describe and document the transaction transferring ownership of all, or a relevant part of, the predecessor. Second, the successor must demonstrate that the job opportunity is the same as originally offered on the labor certification. Third, the successor must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it is eligible for the immigrant visa in all respects.

As stated above, there is no evidence in the record to satisfy all three conditions described above. The record does not reflect a transferring of ownership of the predecessor, that the job opportunity will be the same as originally offered, nor that the claimed successor is eligible for the immigrant visa in all respects, including whether it and the predecessor possessed the ability to pay the proffered wage for the relevant periods. Accordingly, the petition must also be denied because [REDACTED] has failed to establish that it is a successor-in-interest to the petitioner/labor certification employer and appellant.

The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and alternative basis for denial. In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the

⁶ An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. *See Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States*, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), *aff'd*, 345 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2003); *see also Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004) (noting that the AAO conducts appellate review on a *de novo* basis).

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benefit sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here that burden has not been met.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.