


(b)(6)

U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services  
Administrative Appeals Office (AAO)  
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., MS 2090  
Washington, DC 20529-2090



U.S. Citizenship  
and Immigration  
Services




**MAY 24 2012**

Date:

Office: NEBRASKA SERVICE CENTER


FILE:



IN RE:


Petitioner:

Beneficiary:



PETITION: Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as a Skilled Worker or Professional pursuant to Section 203(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:



**INSTRUCTIONS:**

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the AAO inappropriately applied the law in reaching its decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen with the field office or service center that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$630. The specific requirements for filing such a motion can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. **Do not file any motion directly with the AAO.** Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires any motion to be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,

  
Perry Rhew

Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The preference visa petition was denied by the Director, Nebraska Service Center, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner is a construction developer. It seeks to employ the beneficiary permanently in the United States as a construction carpenter. As required by statute, the petition is accompanied by a Form ETA 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification, approved by the United States Department of Labor (DOL). The director determined that the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage beginning on the priority date of the visa petition. The director denied the petition accordingly.

The record shows that the appeal is properly filed, timely and makes a specific allegation of error in law or fact. The procedural history in this case is documented by the record and incorporated into the decision. Further elaboration of the procedural history will be made only as necessary.

As set forth in the director's March 24, 2009 denial, the issue in this case is whether or not the petitioner has the ability to pay the proffered wage as of the priority date and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence.

Section 203(b)(3)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(i), provides for the granting of preference classification to qualified immigrants who are capable, at the time of petitioning for classification under this paragraph, of performing skilled labor (requiring at least two years training or experience), not of a temporary nature, for which qualified workers are not available in the United States.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states in pertinent part:

*Ability of prospective employer to pay wage.* Any petition filed by or for an employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be either in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements.

The petitioner must demonstrate the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, which is the date the Form ETA 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification, was accepted for processing by any office within the employment system of the DOL. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(d). The petitioner must also demonstrate that, on the priority date, the beneficiary had the qualifications stated on its Form ETA 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification, as certified by the DOL and submitted with the instant petition. *Matter of Wing's Tea House*, 16 I&N Dec. 158 (Acting Reg'l Comm'r 1977).

Here, the Form ETA 750 was accepted on April 30, 2001. The proffered wage as stated on the Form ETA 750 is \$17.56 per hour (\$36,524.80 per year based on forty hours per week). The Form ETA 750 states that the position requires three years of experience in the job offered position as a construction carpenter.

The AAO conducts appellate review on a *de novo* basis. *See Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004). The AAO considers all pertinent evidence in the record, including new evidence properly submitted upon appeal.<sup>1</sup>

The evidence in the record of proceeding shows that the petitioner is structured as an S corporation. On the petition, the petitioner claimed to have been established in 2001 and to currently employ two workers.<sup>2</sup> According to the tax returns in the record, the petitioner's fiscal year is based on a calendar year. On the Form ETA 750B, signed by the beneficiary on August 25, 2003, the beneficiary claimed to have worked for the petitioner as a construction carpenter since June 1998. This cannot be reconciled with the fact that on Form I-140, the petitioner claimed to have been established only in 2001. Doubt cast on any aspect of the petitioner's proof may, of course, lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in support of the visa petition. It is incumbent upon the petitioner to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence. Any attempt to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies will not suffice unless the petitioner submits competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. *Matter of Ho*, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591-92 (BIA 1988).

The petitioner must establish that its job offer to the beneficiary is a realistic one. Because the filing of an ETA 750 labor certification application establishes a priority date for any immigrant petition later based on the ETA 750, the petitioner must establish that the job offer was realistic as of the priority date and that the offer remained realistic for each year thereafter, until the beneficiary obtains lawful

---

<sup>1</sup> The submission of additional evidence on appeal is allowed by the instructions to the Form I-290B, which are incorporated into the regulations by the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(1). The record in the instant case provides no reason to preclude consideration of any of the documents newly submitted on appeal. *See Matter of Soriano*, 19 I&N Dec. 764 (BIA 1988).

<sup>2</sup> The record includes inconsistencies regarding the petitioner's date of formation, business address, and ownership. According to the information found in the California's Secretary of State Website, the petitioner was incorporated on March 15, 1991. *See* <http://kepler.sos.ca.gov/cbs.aspx> (accessed April 7, 2012). The petitioner's Forms 1120S of record list the petitioner's date of election as an S Corporation as June 15, 1991. Further, the petitioner's 2006 and 2007 Forms 1120S show on its Schedule K-1 that [REDACTED] is the petitioner's sole shareholder. In all other years, the Forms 1120S list two shareholders: [REDACTED]. In a letter dated March 4, 2009 and signed by [REDACTED] as President of the petitioner, [REDACTED] explained that he owns 50% of the business and that his wife, [REDACTED] owns the other 50%. No evidence of a change of the petitioner's ownership was submitted. It is incumbent upon the petitioner to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence. Any attempt to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies will not suffice unless the petitioner submits competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. *Matter of Ho*, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591-92 (BIA 1988).

permanent residence. The petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is an essential element in evaluating whether a job offer is realistic. See *Matter of Great Wall*, 16 I&N Dec. 142 (Acting Reg'l Comm'r 1977); see also 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2). In evaluating whether a job offer is realistic, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) requires the petitioner to demonstrate financial resources sufficient to pay the beneficiary's proffered wages, although the totality of the circumstances affecting the petitioning business will be considered if the evidence warrants such consideration. See *Matter of Sonegawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (Reg'l Comm'r 1967).

In determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage during a given period, USCIS will first examine whether the petitioner employed and paid the beneficiary during that period. If the petitioner establishes by documentary evidence that it employed the beneficiary at a salary equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the evidence will be considered *prima facie* proof of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. In the instant case, the petitioner did not submit any evidence that it employed and paid the beneficiary the full proffered wage during any relevant timeframe including the period from the priority date in 2001 onward.<sup>3</sup>

If the petitioner does not establish that it employed and paid the beneficiary an amount at least equal to the proffered wage during that period, USCIS will next examine the net income figure reflected on the petitioner's federal income tax return, without consideration of depreciation or other expenses. *River Street Donuts, LLC v. Napolitano*, 558 F.3d 111 (1<sup>st</sup> Cir. 2009); *Taco Especial v. Napolitano*, 696 F. Supp. 2d 873 (E.D. Mich. 2010), *aff'd*, No. 10-1517 (6th Cir. filed Nov. 10, 2011). Reliance on federal income tax returns as a basis for determining a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is well established by judicial precedent. *Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava*, 632 F. Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (citing *Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman*, 736 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1984)); see also *Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh*, 719 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Texas 1989); *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), *aff'd*, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983). Reliance on the petitioner's gross receipts and wage expense is misplaced. Showing that the petitioner's gross receipts exceeded the proffered wage is insufficient. Similarly, showing that the petitioner paid wages in excess of the proffered wage is insufficient.

In *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. at 1084, the court held that the Immigration and Naturalization Service, now USCIS, had properly relied on the petitioner's net income figure, as stated on the petitioner's corporate income tax returns, rather than the petitioner's gross income. The court specifically rejected the argument that USCIS should have considered income before expenses were paid rather than net income. See *Taco Especial v. Napolitano*, 696 F. Supp. 2d at 881 (gross profits overstate an employer's ability to pay because it ignores other necessary expenses).

With respect to depreciation, the court in *River Street Donuts* noted:

---

<sup>3</sup> Although the record reflects that the beneficiary was employed by the petitioner since 1998, the petitioner did not submit any Forms W-2 or 1099, pay stubs or other evidence of wages it paid to the beneficiary.

The AAO recognized that a depreciation deduction is a systematic allocation of the cost of a tangible long-term asset and does not represent a specific cash expenditure during the year claimed. Furthermore, the AAO indicated that the allocation of the depreciation of a long-term asset could be spread out over the years or concentrated into a few depending on the petitioner's choice of accounting and depreciation methods. Nonetheless, the AAO explained that depreciation represents an actual cost of doing business, which could represent either the diminution in value of buildings and equipment or the accumulation of funds necessary to replace perishable equipment and buildings. Accordingly, the AAO stressed that even though amounts deducted for depreciation do not represent current use of cash, neither does it represent amounts available to pay wages.

We find that the AAO has a rational explanation for its policy of not adding depreciation back to net income. Namely, that the amount spent on a long term tangible asset is a "real" expense.

*River Street Donuts* at 118. “[USCIS] and judicial precedent support the use of tax returns and the *net income figures* in determining petitioner’s ability to pay. Plaintiffs’ argument that these figures should be revised by the court by adding back depreciation is without support.” *Chi-Feng Chang* at 537 (emphasis added).

The record before the director closed on March 9, 2009, with the receipt by the director of the petitioner’s submissions in response to the director’s request for evidence (RFE). As of that date, the petitioner’s 2008 federal income tax return was not yet due. Therefore, the petitioner’s income tax return for 2007 is the most recent return available. The petitioner’s tax returns demonstrate its net income for 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007, as shown in the table below.

- In 2001, the Form 1120S stated net income<sup>4</sup> of \$(54,394).
- In 2002, the Form 1120S stated net income of \$40,179.
- In 2003, the Form 1120S stated net income of \$(34,061)

---

<sup>4</sup> Where an S corporation’s income is exclusively from a trade or business, USCIS considers net income to be the figure for ordinary income, shown on line 21 of page one of the petitioner’s IRS Form 1120S. However, where an S corporation has income, credits, deductions or other adjustments from sources other than a trade or business, they are reported on Schedule K. If the Schedule K has relevant entries for additional income, credits, deductions or other adjustments, net income is found on line 23 (1997-2003) line 17e (2004-2005) line 18 (2006-2011) of Schedule K. See Instructions for Form 1120S, at <http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i1120s.pdf> (accessed April 7, 2012) (indicating that Schedule K is a summary schedule of all shareholders’ shares of the corporation’s income, deductions, credits, etc.). Because the petitioner had additional income, credits, deductions, and other adjustments shown on its Schedule K for 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007, the petitioner’s net income is found on Schedule K of its tax returns.

- In 2004, the Form 1120S stated net income of \$(34,556)
- In 2005, the Form 1120S stated net income of \$8,689
- In 2006, the Form 1120S stated net income of \$(57,249)
- In 2006, the Form 1120S stated net income of \$(43,179)

Therefore, for the years 2001, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007, the petitioner did not have sufficient net income to pay the proffered wage.

As an alternate means of determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage, USCIS may review the petitioner's net current assets. Net current assets are the difference between the petitioner's current assets and current liabilities.<sup>5</sup> A corporation's year-end current assets are shown on Schedule L, lines 1 through 6. Its year-end current liabilities are shown on lines 16 through 18. If the total of a corporation's end-of-year net current assets and the wages paid to the beneficiary (if any) are equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the petitioner is expected to be able to pay the proffered wage using those net current assets. The petitioner's tax returns demonstrate its end-of-year net current assets for 2001, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007, as shown in the table below.

- In 2001, the Form 1120S stated net current assets of \$300.
- In 2003, the Form 1120S stated net current assets of \$0.
- In 2004, the Form 1120S stated net current assets of \$(2,863).
- In 2005, the Form 1120S stated net current assets of \$881.
- In 2006, the Form 1120S stated net current assets of \$0.
- In 2007, the Form 1120S stated net current assets of \$5,908.

Therefore, for the years 2001, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007, the petitioner did not have sufficient net current assets to pay the proffered wage.

Therefore, from the date the Form ETA 750 was accepted for processing by the DOL, the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage as of the priority date through an examination of wages paid to the beneficiary, or its net income or net current assets.

In response to the director's RFE the petitioner submitted copies of its balance sheets for 2001, 2002, and 2003, showing net worth of \$1,026,696; \$1,058,361; and \$1,214,971; respectively. For 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009, the petitioner submitted copies of balance sheets for "ARCE and Associates, Inc. d/b/a JRM Construction" showing net worth of \$1,268,071; \$1,424,661; \$1,679,355; \$1,718,795; \$1,836,640; and \$1,267,255, respectively. These figures were not reported on the

---

<sup>5</sup>According to *Barron's Dictionary of Accounting Terms* 117 (3<sup>rd</sup> ed. 2000), "current assets" consist of items having (in most cases) a life of one year or less, such as cash, marketable securities, inventory and prepaid expenses. "Current liabilities" are obligations payable (in most cases) within one year, such accounts payable, short-term notes payable, and accrued expenses (such as taxes and salaries). *Id.* at 118.

petitioner's federal tax returns. It is noted that the petitioner listed monies in bank accounts on the balance sheets; however the petitioner did not submit any bank statements or list this cash as an asset on its federal tax returns in Schedule L, Line 1. The petitioner also submitted [REDACTED] personal balance sheet for 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2009. The petitioner explained that [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] his spouse, are equal 50% partners of [REDACTED] a general partnership.

In the March 24, 2009 denial, the director emphasized that the petitioner's asset statements were not audited by an independent third party and therefore are not sufficient to establish the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. The director also pointed out that because a corporation is a distinct and separate legal entity from its shareholders, [REDACTED] personal assets cannot be considered to be assets of the company and cannot be utilized to show the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage.

On appeal, counsel asserts that the director did not consider the assets of the shareholder, notwithstanding that the entity is an S Corporation. Counsel states that audited asset statements will be provided and requests 120 days to file additional documents. On Part 2 of Form I-290B, counsel checked box B, indicating that a Brief or additional evidence will be submitted to the AAO within 30 days. Although counsel changed 30 days to 120 days on the form, no request for an extension of time to submit a brief was granted. As of this date, more than 35 months later, the AAO has received nothing further. The regulation requires that any brief shall be submitted directly to the AAO. 8 C.F.R. §§ 103.3(a)(2)(vii) and (viii).. The AAO will issue a decision based on the evidence of record.

Counsel's assertions on appeal cannot be concluded to outweigh the evidence presented in the tax returns as submitted by the petitioner that demonstrate that the petitioner could not pay the proffered wage from the day the Form ETA 750 was accepted for processing by the DOL.

Counsel's reliance on unaudited financial records is misplaced. The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) makes clear that where a petitioner relies on financial statements to demonstrate its ability to pay the proffered wage, those financial statements must be audited. As there is no accountant's report accompanying these statements, the AAO cannot conclude that they are audited statements. Unaudited financial statements are the representations of management. The unsupported representations of management are not reliable evidence and are insufficient to demonstrate the ability to pay the proffered wage. For this reason, the AAO cannot accept the petitioner's unaudited statements of record.

Furthermore, the balance sheets of record could not be considered in determining petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. Balance sheets are not among the three types of evidence, enumerated in 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2), required to illustrate a petitioner's ability to pay a proffered wage. While this regulation allows additional material "in appropriate cases," the petitioner in this case has not demonstrated why the documentation specified at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) is inapplicable or otherwise paints an inaccurate financial picture of the petitioner. Also, balance sheets do not reflect true assets and liabilities of the company, as it would be using the accrual basis of accounting.

In addition, as noted by the director in the denial, because a corporation is a separate and distinct legal entity from its owners and shareholders, the assets of its shareholders or of other enterprises or corporations cannot be considered in determining the petitioning corporation's ability to pay the proffered wage. Therefore, [REDACTED] personal assets cannot be considered in determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. *See Matter of Aphrodite Investments, Ltd.*, 17 I&N Dec. 530 (Comm'r 1980). In a similar case, the court in *Sitar v. Ashcroft*, 2003 WL 22203713 (D.Mass. Sept. 18, 2003) stated, "nothing in the governing regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 204.5, permits [USCIS] to consider the financial resources of individuals or entities who have no legal obligation to pay the wage."

USCIS may consider the overall magnitude of the petitioner's business activities in its determination of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. *See Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (Reg'l Comm'r 1967). The petitioning entity in *Sonogawa* had been in business for over 11 years and routinely earned a gross annual income of about \$100,000. During the year in which the petition was filed in that case, the petitioner changed business locations and paid rent on both the old and new locations for five months. There were large moving costs and also a period of time when the petitioner was unable to do regular business. The Regional Commissioner determined that the petitioner's prospects for a resumption of successful business operations were well established. The petitioner was a fashion designer whose work had been featured in *Time* and *Look* magazines. Her clients included Miss Universe, movie actresses, and society matrons. The petitioner's clients had been included in the lists of the best-dressed California women. The petitioner lectured on fashion design at design and fashion shows throughout the United States and at colleges and universities in California. The Regional Commissioner's determination in *Sonogawa* was based in part on the petitioner's sound business reputation and outstanding reputation as a couturiere. As in *Sonogawa*, USCIS may, at its discretion, consider evidence relevant to the petitioner's financial ability that falls outside of a petitioner's net income and net current assets. USCIS may consider such factors as the number of years the petitioner has been doing business, the established historical growth of the petitioner's business, the overall number of employees, the occurrence of any uncharacteristic business expenditures or losses, the petitioner's reputation within its industry, whether the beneficiary is replacing a former employee or an outsourced service, or any other evidence that USCIS deems relevant to the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage.

In the instant case, the petitioner's tax returns reflect that it had the ability to pay the proffered wage only in 2002. All other relevant years reflect low or negative net income. During all years, the petitioner reported low or negative net current assets. In his March 4, 2009 letter, [REDACTED] the petitioner's owner, claims to be a real estate investor and that he founded [REDACTED] in order to make real estate investments. [REDACTED] stated the petitioner has never been able to show a significant profit because it have never had a large amount of construction jobs, and the majority of the work is related to properties already in its portfolio. The letter goes on to explain that the monies required to operate the petitioner come directly from [REDACTED] own funds, as the petitioner itself does not produce enough income. It is noted that in 2001, 2002, 2005, and 2006, the petitioner did not have any expenses in Salaries and Wages and no expenses in Cost of Labor listed on its tax returns. The petitioner's tax returns reflect unstable gross receipts ranging from \$0 in 2001

to \$113,273 in 2007. While the petitioner's net income for 2002 was higher than any of the other years, the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage was not established for all relevant years. No evidence was provided to demonstrate any temporary or uncharacteristic disruption in the petitioner's business activities during the years that the petitioner has been in business. No evidence was submitted to establish a basis for expected continued growth. Although the petitioner claimed to be in business since 2001, no evidence was provided to establish an outstanding reputation in the industry comparable to the petitioner in *Sonegawa*. Thus, assessing the totality of the circumstances in this individual case, it is concluded that the petitioner has not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage.

The evidence submitted does not establish that the petitioner had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date.

Beyond the decision of the director,<sup>6</sup> the petitioner has also failed to establish that it will be the actual employer of the beneficiary. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(c); 20 C.F.R. § 656.3.

In determining whether the petitioner will be the beneficiary's actual employer, USCIS will assess the petitioner's control over the beneficiary in the offered position. See *Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Darden*, 503 U.S. 318 (1992); *Clackamas Gastroenterology Associates, P.C. v. Wells*, 538 U.S. 440 (2003) (hereinafter "*Clackamas*"); see also Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220(2) (1958). Such indicia of control include when, where, and how a worker performs the job; the continuity of the worker's relationship with the employer; the tax treatment of the worker; the provision of employee benefits; and whether the work performed by the worker is part of the employer's regular business. See *Clackamas*, 538 U.S. at 448-449; cf. New Compliance Manual, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, § 2-III(A)(1), (EEOC 2006) (adopting a materially identical test and indicating that said test was based on the *Darden* decision).

The evidence in the record does not establish that the petitioner, [REDACTED], will be the beneficiary's actual employer. The record reflects that the beneficiary performs general construction work and handyman repair work duties for the petitioner, as well as for [REDACTED]. The letter from the petitioner's owner states that the beneficiary worked on many properties owned by the petitioner, as well as other properties personally owned by [REDACTED]. The letter goes on to acknowledge that the petitioner has never been able to show a significant profit because it has never had a large amount of construction jobs. Public Records information reveals that several other businesses are located at address claimed by the petitioner [REDACTED] all with connections to the petitioner, including [REDACTED].

---

<sup>6</sup> An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. See *Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States*, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), *aff'd*, 345 F.3d 683 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2003); see also *Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004) (noting that the AAO conducts appellate review on a *de novo* basis).

Balance sheets submitted by the petitioner also suggest that the petitioner does business under another name, “

Due to the inconsistencies noted above, it is unclear that the petitioner will be the beneficiary’s actual employer. Doubt cast on any aspect of the petitioner’s proof may, of course, lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in support of the visa petition. It is incumbent upon the petitioner to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence. Any attempt to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies will not suffice unless the petitioner submits competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. *Matter of Ho*, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591-92 (BIA 1988).

Therefore, the petition must also be denied because the petitioner failed to establish that it will actually employ the beneficiary.

Also beyond the decision of the director, the petitioner has also not established that the beneficiary is qualified for the offered position. The petitioner must establish that the beneficiary possessed all the education, training, and experience specified on the labor certification as of the priority date. 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(1), (12). *See Matter of Wing’s Tea House*, 16 I&N Dec. 158, 159 (Acting Reg’l Comm’r 1977); *see also Matter of Katigbak*, 14 I&N Dec. 45, 49 (Reg’l Comm’r 1971). In evaluating the beneficiary’s qualifications, USCIS must look to the job offer portion of the labor certification to determine the required qualifications for the position. USCIS may not ignore a term of the labor certification, nor may it impose additional requirements. *See Matter of Silver Dragon Chinese Restaurant*, 19 I&N Dec. 401, 406 (Comm’r 1986). *See also, Madany v. Smith*, 696 F.2d 1008 (D.C. Cir. 1983); *K.R.K. Irvine, Inc. v. Landon*, 699 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1983); *Stewart Infra-Red Commissary of Massachusetts, Inc. v. Coomey*, 661 F.2d 1 (1<sup>st</sup> Cir. 1981).

In the instant case, the labor certification states that the offered position requires three years of experience in the job offered as a construction carpenter. On the labor certification, the beneficiary claims to qualify for the offered position based on experience as a full-time construction carpenter gained with the petitioner from June 1998 to present.<sup>7</sup> The beneficiary also represented in the labor certification that he worked for located at as a full-time construction carpenter from April 1995 to May 1998.

The beneficiary’s claimed qualifying experience must be supported by letters from employers giving the name, address, and title of the employer, and a description of the beneficiary’s experience. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(l)(3)(ii)(A).

---

<sup>7</sup> For the purpose of analyzing the beneficiary’s qualifying experience to the job offered, the AAO will consider the end date to be at least until August 25, 2003, which is the date that the beneficiary signed the labor certification.

In response to the director's RFE, counsel stated that the company "Blue Diamond" no longer exists and therefore, the beneficiary was unable to obtain an experience letter from this company. However, no evidence that the beneficiary attempted to contact this company was provided. Nor was any alternative evidence submitted, such as tax records, pay stubs, or affidavits from former supervisors. The assertions of counsel do not constitute evidence. *Matter of Obaigbena*, 19 I&N Dec. 533, 534 (BIA 1988); *Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez*, 17 I&N Dec. 503, 506 (BIA 1980). The petitioner did not provide any other evidence of the beneficiary's previous employment with Blue Diamond. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm'r 1998) (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg'l Comm'r 1972)).

The record contains a letter dated November 22, 2001, signed by [REDACTED] certified that the beneficiary worked full-time for him in general construction from August 1991 to November 1994. This letter does not comply with the requirements of the regulation as it omits the title of the writer. In addition, the beneficiary failed to represent this previous employment on the labor certification. In *Matter of Leung*, 16 I&N Dec. 2530 (BIA 1976), the Board's dicta notes that the beneficiary's experience, without such fact certified by DOL on the beneficiary's Form ETA 750B, lessens the credibility of the evidence and facts asserted.

The record also contains a letter dated March 6, 2009, signed by [REDACTED] in the capacity of [REDACTED] located at [REDACTED] stated that the beneficiary worked for [REDACTED] as a full-time construction carpenter from February 1998 to May 1998. Although this letter includes the name, address, and title of the writer, and a specific description of the duties performed by the beneficiary, the beneficiary failed to represent this previous employment on the labor certification. *Id.*

The evidence in the record does not establish that the beneficiary possessed the required experience set forth on the labor certification by the priority date. Therefore, the petitioner has also failed to establish that the beneficiary is qualified for the offered position.

The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and alternative basis for denial. In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, that burden has not been met.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed.