







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
(b)(6)



DATE: JUN 03 2013 OFFICE: NEBRASKA SERVICE CENTER FILE: 

IN RE: Petitioner: 
Beneficiary: 

PETITION: Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as a Skilled Worker or Professional Pursuant to Section 203(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:


INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the AAO inappropriately applied the law in reaching its decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen in accordance with the instructions on Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$630. The specific requirements for filing such a motion can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. **Do not file any motion directly with the AAO.** Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires any motion to be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,


Ron Rosenberg
Acting Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The preference visa petition was denied by the Director, Nebraska Service Center, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner is a Chinese restaurant. It seeks to employ the beneficiary permanently in the United States as a cook of Chinese food. As required by statute, the petition is accompanied by a Form ETA 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification, approved by the United States Department of Labor (DOL). The record shows that the appeal is properly filed, timely and makes a specific allegation of error in law or fact. The procedural history in this case is documented by the record and incorporated into the decision. Further elaboration of the procedural history will be made only as necessary.

As set forth in the director's November 4, 2009 denial, at issue in this case is whether or not the petitioner has the ability to pay the proffered wage as of the priority date and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence and whether or not the beneficiary possessed the minimum experience required by the terms of the labor certification application.

As a threshold issue, the petitioner must establish that it is a valid successor-in-interest to the labor certification petitioner. According to information in the record, the ETA Form 750 was submitted by [REDACTED]. The Form I-140 petition was originally submitted by [REDACTED] however, [REDACTED] subsequently filed an amendment in order to be recognized as the petitioning successor. A valid successor relationship may be established for immigration purposes if it satisfies three conditions. First, the successor must fully describe and document the transaction transferring ownership of all, or a relevant part of, the predecessor. Second, the successor must demonstrate that the job opportunity is the same as originally offered on the labor certification. Third, the successor must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it is eligible for the immigrant visa in all respects.

Evidence of transfer of ownership must show that the successor not only purchased assets from the predecessor, but also the essential rights and obligations of the predecessor necessary to carry on the business. To ensure that the job opportunity remains the same as originally certified, the successor must continue to operate the same type of business as the predecessor, in the same metropolitan statistical area and the essential business functions must remain substantially the same as before the ownership transfer. See *Matter of Dial Auto*, 19 I&N Dec. at 482.

In order to establish that [REDACTED] is a successor-in-interest to [REDACTED] the petitioner states that [REDACTED] "not only demonstrates substantial continuity with the original petitioner, we have acquired all assets, all liabilities, and assumed all rights, duties and obligations of the original employer and continue to operate the same type of business as the original employer." In support of this statement, the petitioner submitted the following documents:

- Texas Franchise Tax Certification of Account Status for [REDACTED] dated September 4, 2009 and valid from March 6, 2007 to May 15, 2009;
- Secretary of State of Texas Certificate of Formation Limited Liability Company for [REDACTED] filed March 6, 2007;

- Application for Employer Identification Number (unsigned and undated) listing [REDACTED] as the legal entity and [REDACTED] as the Trade Name of the business,
- 2007 Form 1065 tax returns for [REDACTED]
- Bill of Sale of [REDACTED] dated February 28, 2007, listing [REDACTED] President, [REDACTED] as the Seller and [REDACTED] President, [REDACTED] as the Buyer; and
- Agreement for Purchase and Sale of Stock, dated February 28, 2007, which lists [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] as members and managers of [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] as shareholders of [REDACTED].

The petitioner also emphasized that just as [REDACTED] was doing business as the [REDACTED], [REDACTED] is now also doing business as the [REDACTED] in the same location. The evidence submitted establishes that [REDACTED] is a valid petitioning successor to [REDACTED]. However, the petitioner must also establish that it is eligible for the immigrant visa in all respects, including having established its ability to pay the proffered wage from the priority date onwards. In the instant case, the petitioner must demonstrate that [REDACTED] had the ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage from the priority date to the date of sale and that it has the ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage from the date of sale onward.

Section 203(b)(3)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(i), provides for the granting of preference classification to qualified immigrants who are capable, at the time of petitioning for classification under this paragraph, of performing skilled labor (requiring at least two years training or experience), not of a temporary nature, for which qualified workers are not available in the United States.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states, in pertinent part:

Ability of prospective employer to pay wage. Any petition filed by or for an employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be either in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements.

The petitioner must demonstrate the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, which is the date the Form ETA 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification, was accepted for processing by any office within the employment system of the DOL. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(d). The petitioner must also demonstrate that, on the priority date, the beneficiary had the qualifications stated on its Form ETA 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification, as certified by the DOL and submitted with the instant petition. *Matter of Wing's Tea House*, 16 I&N Dec. 158 (Acting Reg'l Comm'r 1977).

Here, the Form ETA 750 was accepted on December 8, 2003. The proffered wage as stated on the Form ETA 750 is \$ 21,174 per year. The Form ETA 750 states that the position requires two (2) years of experience in the proffered position.

The AAO conducts appellate review on a *de novo* basis. *See Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004). The AAO considers all pertinent evidence in the record, including new evidence properly submitted upon appeal.¹

The record shows that [REDACTED] was structured as an S corporation. The record further indicates that the petitioner is structured as a limited liability company and filed its tax returns on IRS Form 1065.² On the petition, the petitioner claimed to have been established in 1999 and to currently employ eight workers.³ According to the tax returns in the record, the petitioner's fiscal year is based on a calendar year, however for its first filing in 2007 the petitioner's return covers March 6, 2007 to December 31, 2007. On the Form ETA 750B, signed by the beneficiary on October 28, 2006, the beneficiary did not claim to have worked for the petitioner.

The petitioner must establish that its job offer to the beneficiary is a realistic one. Because the filing of an ETA 750 labor certification application establishes a priority date for any immigrant petition later based on the ETA 750, the petitioner must establish that the job offer was realistic as of the priority date and that the offer remained realistic for each year thereafter, until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. The petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is an essential element in evaluating whether a job offer is realistic. *See Matter of Great Wall*, 16 I&N Dec. 142 (Acting Reg'l Comm'r 1977); *see also* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2). In evaluating whether a job offer is realistic, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) requires the petitioner to demonstrate financial resources sufficient to pay the beneficiary's proffered wages, although the totality of the circumstances affecting the petitioning business will be considered if the evidence warrants such consideration. *See Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (Reg'l Comm'r 1967).

¹ The submission of additional evidence on appeal is allowed by the instructions to the Form I-290B, which are incorporated into the regulations by the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(1). The record in the instant case provides no reason to preclude consideration of any of the documents newly submitted on appeal. *See Matter of Soriano*, 19 I&N Dec. 764 (BIA 1988).

² A limited liability company (LLC) is an entity formed under state law by filing articles of organization. An LLC may be classified for federal income tax purposes as if it were a sole proprietorship, a partnership or a corporation. If the LLC has only one owner, it will automatically be treated as a sole proprietorship unless an election is made to be treated as a corporation. If the LLC has two or more owners, it will automatically be considered to be a partnership unless an election is made to be treated as a corporation. If the LLC does not elect its classification, a default classification of partnership (multi-member LLC) or disregarded entity (taxed as if it were a sole proprietorship) will apply. *See* 26 C.F.R. § 301.7701-3. The election referred to is made using IRS Form 8832, Entity Classification Election. In the instant case, the petitioner, a multi-member LLC, is considered to be a partnership for federal tax purposes.

³ [REDACTED] was established in 2007. It appears that the petitioner reported the date the restaurant was established by the predecessor rather than the date the actual petitioning entity was established.

In order to establish eligibility for the immigrant visa in all respects, the petitioner must support its claim with all necessary evidence, including evidence of ability to pay. The petitioning successor must prove the predecessor's ability to pay the proffered wage as of the priority date and until the date of transfer of ownership to the successor. In addition, the petitioner must establish the successor's ability to pay the proffered wage in accordance from the date of transfer of ownership forward. 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2); *see also Matter of Dial Auto*, 19 I&N Dec. at 482.

In determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage during a given period, USCIS will first examine whether the petitioner employed and paid the beneficiary during that period. If the petitioner establishes by documentary evidence that it employed the beneficiary at a salary equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the evidence will be considered *prima facie* proof of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. In the instant case, the petitioner has not established that it, or its predecessor [REDACTED] paid the beneficiary for any year from the priority date onward.

If the petitioner does not establish that it employed and paid the beneficiary an amount at least equal to the proffered wage during that period, USCIS will next examine the net income figure reflected on the petitioner's federal income tax return, without consideration of depreciation or other expenses. *River Street Donuts, LLC v. Napolitano*, 558 F.3d 111 (1st Cir. 2009); *Taco Especial v. Napolitano*, 696 F. Supp. 2d 873 (E.D. Mich. 2010), *aff'd*, No. 10-1517 (6th Cir. filed Nov. 10, 2011). Reliance on federal income tax returns as a basis for determining a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is well established by judicial precedent. *Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava*, 632 F. Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (*citing Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman*, 736 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1984)); *see also Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh*, 719 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Texas 1989); *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), *aff'd*, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983). Reliance on the petitioner's wage expense is misplaced. Showing that the petitioner paid wages in excess of the proffered wage is insufficient.

With respect to depreciation, the court in *River Street Donuts* noted:

The AAO recognized that a depreciation deduction is a systematic allocation of the cost of a tangible long-term asset and does not represent a specific cash expenditure during the year claimed. Furthermore, the AAO indicated that the allocation of the depreciation of a long-term asset could be spread out over the years or concentrated into a few depending on the petitioner's choice of accounting and depreciation methods. Nonetheless, the AAO explained that depreciation represents an actual cost of doing business, which could represent either the diminution in value of buildings and equipment or the accumulation of funds necessary to replace perishable equipment and buildings. Accordingly, the AAO stressed that even though amounts deducted for depreciation do not represent current use of cash, neither does it represent amounts available to pay wages.

We find that the AAO has a rational explanation for its policy of not adding depreciation back to net income. Namely, that the amount spent on a long term tangible asset is a "real" expense.

River Street Donuts at 118. “[USCIS] and judicial precedent support the use of tax returns and the net income figures in determining petitioner’s ability to pay. Plaintiffs’ argument that these figures should be revised by the court by adding back depreciation is without support.” *Chi-Feng Chang* at 537 (emphasis added).

In *K.C.P. Food*, 623 F. Supp. at 1084, the court held that the Immigration and Naturalization Service, now USCIS, had properly relied on the petitioner's net income figure, as stated on the petitioner's corporate income tax returns, rather than the petitioner's gross income. The court specifically rejected the argument that the Service should have considered income before expenses were paid rather than net income. See *Taco Especial v. Napolitano*, 696 F. Supp. 2d at 881 (gross profits overstate an employer's ability to pay because it ignores other necessary expenses).

The record before the director closed on October 28, 2009 with the receipt by the director of the petitioner’s submissions in response to the director’s request for evidence. As of that date, the petitioner’s 2008 federal income tax return was the most recent return available. The table below details the net income for the petitioner and its predecessor, as reported on their tax returns:

<u>Year</u>	<u>Form 1120S stated net income⁴</u>
2003	\$8,556
2004	(\$4,832)
2005	(\$45,872)
2006	\$3,111
2007	Return not submitted

<u>Year</u>	<u>Form 1065 stated net income⁵</u>
2007	(\$18,771)
2008	\$8,541

Therefore, for the years 2003 through 2007, the petitioner did not establish that its predecessor had sufficient net income to pay the proffered wage. For 2007 and 2008, the petitioner also failed to establish that it had sufficient net income to pay the proffered wage.

⁴ Where an S corporation’s income is exclusively from a trade or business, USCIS considers net income to be the figure for ordinary income, shown on line 21 of page one of the petitioner’s IRS Form 1120S.

⁵ For an LLC taxed as a partnership, where a partnership’s income is exclusively from a trade or business, USCIS considers net income to be the figure shown on Line 22 of page one of the petitioner’s Form 1065, U.S. Partnership Income Tax Return.

If the net income the petitioner demonstrates it had available during that period, if any, added to the wages paid to the beneficiary during the period, if any, do not equal the amount of the proffered wage or more, USCIS will review the petitioner's net current assets. Net current assets are the difference between the petitioner's current assets and current liabilities.⁶ A partnership's year-end current assets are shown on Schedule L, lines 1(d) through 6(d) and include cash-on-hand, inventories, and receivables expected to be converted to cash within one year. Its year-end current liabilities are shown on lines 15(d) through 17(d). If the total of a partnership's end-of-year net current assets and the wages paid to the beneficiary (if any) are equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the petitioner is expected to be able to pay the proffered wage using those net current assets. The table below details the petitioner and predecessor's net current assets, as reported on their tax returns:

<u>Year</u>	<u>Form 1120S stated net current assets</u>
2003	\$32,779.00
2004	\$33,868.00
2005	\$9,380.00
2006	\$7,411.00
2007	Return not submitted

<u>Year</u>	<u>Form 1065 stated net current assets</u>
2007	\$16,378.00
2008	\$50,172.00

Therefore, for the years 2005, 2006 and 2007, the petitioner failed to establish that its predecessor had sufficient net current assets to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner also did not establish that it had sufficient net current assets to pay the proffered wage in 2007. Thus, from the date the Form ETA 750 was accepted for processing by the DOL, the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage as of the priority date through an examination of wages paid to the beneficiary, or its net income or net current assets.

On appeal, counsel asserts that the beneficiary will produce revenue for the business. Against the projection of future earnings, *Matter of Great Wall*, 16 I&N Dec. 142, 144-145 (Acting Reg'l Comm'r 1977), states:

⁶ According to *Barron's Dictionary of Accounting Terms* 117 (3rd ed. 2000), "current assets" consist of items having (in most cases) a life of one year or less, such as cash, marketable securities, inventory and prepaid expenses. "Current liabilities" are obligations payable (in most cases) within one year, such accounts payable, short-term notes payable, and accrued expenses (such as taxes and salaries). *Id.* at 118.

I do not feel, nor do I believe the Congress intended, that the petitioner, who admittedly could not pay the offered wage at the time the petition was filed, should subsequently become eligible to have the petition approved under a new set of facts hinged upon probability and projections, even beyond the information presented on appeal.

Therefore, future projections of revenue generated by the beneficiary will not be used to calculate the petitioner's ability to pay.

Counsel further contends that the personal assets of [redacted] shareholders and [redacted] members should be considered when calculating the petitioner's ability to pay. Because a corporation is a separate and distinct legal entity from its owners and shareholders, the assets of its shareholders or of other enterprises or corporations cannot be considered in determining the petitioning corporation's ability to pay the proffered wage. *See Matter of Aphrodite Investments, Ltd.*, 17 I&N Dec. 530 (Comm'r 1980). In a similar case, the court in *Sitar v. Ashcroft*, 2003 WL 22203713 (D.Mass. Sept. 18, 2003) stated, "nothing in the governing regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 204.5, permits [USCIS] to consider the financial resources of individuals or entities who have no legal obligation to pay the wage." Counsel additionally states that funds reflected in business checking account statements should be considered. First, bank statements are not among the three types of evidence, enumerated in 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2), required to illustrate a petitioner's ability to pay a proffered wage. While this regulation allows additional material "in appropriate cases," the petitioner in this case has not demonstrated why the documentation specified at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) is inapplicable or otherwise paints an inaccurate financial picture of the petitioner. Second, bank statements show the amount in an account on a given date, and cannot show the sustainable ability to pay a proffered wage. Third, no evidence was submitted to demonstrate that the funds reported on the petitioner's bank statements somehow reflect additional available funds that were not reflected on its tax return(s), such as the petitioner's taxable income (income minus deductions) or the cash specified on Schedule L that will be considered in determining the petitioner's net current assets.

On appeal, counsel also asserts that the beneficiary began working for the petitioner in 2008 and that in that year the petitioner paid the beneficiary a portion of proffered wage pro-rated for a June start date. Counsel contends that this is sufficient to establish that the petitioner has paid the beneficiary at the proffered wage rate in 2008 and that as such, according to the language in a memorandum dated May 4, 2004, from William R. Yates, Associate Director of Operations, USCIS, regarding the determination of ability to pay (Yates Memorandum), it has established its continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date. *See Interoffice Memo. from William R. Yates, Associate Director of Operations, USCIS, to Service Center Directors and other USCIS officials, Determination of Ability to Pay under 8 CFR 204.5(g)(2)*, at 2, (May 4, 2004). Counsel asserts that Mr. Yates makes a clear distinction between past and current salaries and since he used the conjunction "or" in the context of evidence that the petitioner "has paid or currently is paying the proffered wage," counsel urges USCIS to consider the wage rate paid in 2008 as satisfying that particular method of demonstrating a petitioning entity's ability to pay.

The Yates' Memorandum relied upon by counsel provides guidance to adjudicators to review a record of proceeding and make a positive determination of a petitioning entity's ability to pay if, in the context of the beneficiary's employment, "[t]he record contains credible verifiable evidence that the petitioner is not only is employing the beneficiary but also has paid or currently is paying the proffered wage." However, in the instant case, the petitioner has not provided any evidence that it paid the beneficiary in 2008. Counsel submits the beneficiary's personal tax returns that show that he earned \$16,576 in 2008; however federal tax filings do not indicate the source of the income and therefore are not considered evidence that the petitioner paid the beneficiary.

The AAO consistently adjudicates appeals in accordance with the Yates Memorandum. However, counsel's interpretation of the language in that memorandum is overly broad and does not comport with the plain language of the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) set forth in the memorandum as authority for the policy guidance therein. The regulation requires that a petitioning entity demonstrate its *continuing* ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date. If USCIS and the AAO were to interpret and apply the Yates Memorandum as counsel urges, then in this particular factual context, the clear language in the regulation would be usurped by an interoffice guidance memorandum without binding legal effect. The petitioner must demonstrate its continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, Demonstrating that the petitioner is paying the proffered wage in a specific year may suffice to show the petitioner's ability to pay for that year, but the petitioner must still demonstrate its ability to pay for the rest of the pertinent period of time.

USCIS may consider the overall magnitude of the petitioner's business activities in its determination of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. *See Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (Reg'l Comm'r 1967). The petitioning entity in *Sonogawa* had been in business for over 11 years and routinely earned a gross annual income of about \$100,000. During the year in which the petition was filed in that case, the petitioner changed business locations and paid rent on both the old and new locations for five months. There were large moving costs and also a period of time when the petitioner was unable to do regular business. The Regional Commissioner determined that the petitioner's prospects for a resumption of successful business operations were well established. The petitioner was a fashion designer whose work had been featured in *Time* and *Look* magazines. Her clients included Miss Universe, movie actresses, and society matrons. The petitioner's clients had been included in the lists of the best-dressed California women. The petitioner lectured on fashion design at design and fashion shows throughout the United States and at colleges and universities in California. The Regional Commissioner's determination in *Sonogawa* was based in part on the petitioner's sound business reputation and outstanding reputation as a couturiere. As in *Sonogawa*, USCIS may, at its discretion, consider evidence relevant to the petitioner's financial ability that falls outside of a petitioner's net income and net current assets. USCIS may consider such factors as the number of years the petitioner has been doing business, the established historical growth of the petitioner's business, the overall number of employees, the occurrence of any uncharacteristic business expenditures or losses, the petitioner's reputation within its industry, whether the beneficiary is replacing a former employee or an outsourced service, or any other evidence that USCIS deems relevant to the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage.

In the instant case, the petitioner's gross receipts show a distinct downward trend for the relevant years. The petitioner indicated on the Form I-140 petition that it employs eight people; however the salaries and wages paid were not substantial. While the petitioner has been in business over ten years, it does not appear to pay substantial compensation to its owner. Further, the petitioner did not submit evidence sufficient to demonstrate that the owner was willing and able to forego officer compensation in order to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage. In addition, there is no evidence in the record of the historical growth of the petitioner's business, of the occurrence of any uncharacteristic business expenditures or losses from which it has since recovered, or of the petitioner's reputation within its industry. Thus, assessing the totality of the circumstances in this individual case, it is concluded that the petitioner has not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage as of the priority date onward.

The beneficiary must also meet all of the requirements of the offered position set forth on the labor certification by the priority date of the petition. 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(1), (12). *See Matter of Wing's Tea House*, 16 I&N Dec. 158, 159 (Act. Reg. Comm. 1977); *see also Matter of Katigbak*, 14 I&N Dec. 45, 49 (Reg. Comm. 1971). In evaluating the labor certification to determine the required qualifications for the position, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) may not ignore a term of the labor certification, nor may it impose additional requirements. *See Madany v. Smith*, 696 F.2d 1008 (D.C. Cir. 1983); *K.R.K. Irvine, Inc. v. Landon*, 699 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1983); *Stewart Infra-Red Commissary of Massachusetts, Inc. v. Coomey*, 661 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1981).

Where the job requirements in a labor certification are not otherwise unambiguously prescribed, e.g., by regulation, USCIS must examine "the language of the labor certification job requirements" in order to determine what the petitioner must demonstrate about the beneficiary's qualifications. *Madany*, 696 F.2d at 1015. The only rational manner by which USCIS can be expected to interpret the meaning of terms used to describe the requirements of a job in a labor certification is to "examine the certified job offer *exactly* as it is completed by the prospective employer." *Rosedale Linden Park Company v. Smith*, 595 F. Supp. 829, 833 (D.D.C. 1984)(emphasis added). USCIS's interpretation of the job's requirements, as stated on the labor certification must involve "reading and applying *the plain language* of the [labor certification]." *Id.* at 834 (emphasis added). USCIS cannot and should not reasonably be expected to look beyond the plain language of the labor certification or otherwise attempt to divine the employer's intentions through some sort of reverse engineering of the labor certification.

In the instant case, the labor certification states that the offered position has the following minimum requirements:

EDUCATION

Grade School: [blank]

High School: [blank]

College: [blank]

College Degree Required: None.

Major Field of Study: [blank]

TRAINING: None Required.

EXPERIENCE: Two (2) years in the job offered.

OTHER SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS: None.

The labor certification also states that the beneficiary qualifies for the offered position based on experience as a cook of Chinese food with the [redacted] in Honduras from September 2000 to present (October 2006). No other experience is listed. The beneficiary signed the labor certification on October 28, 2006, under a declaration that the contents are true and correct under penalty of perjury.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(1)(3)(ii)(A) states:

Any requirements of training or experience for skilled workers, professionals, or other workers must be supported by letters from trainers or employers giving the name, address, and title of the trainer or employer, and a description of the training received or the experience of the alien.

The record contains an experience letter dated December 8, 2008 from [redacted] manager, [redacted] on letterhead stating that the beneficiary was employed as a Chinese chef for the restaurant since 1995. The letter implies that the beneficiary was still employed with [redacted] at the time the letter was written. This is inconsistent with the petitioner's claim that the beneficiary began working for it in the United States in June 2008. The beginning date of employment listed is also inconsistent with that reported on the ETA 750, wherein the beneficiary states that he began working as a chef with [redacted] in September 2000. It is incumbent on the petitioner to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence, and attempts to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies, absent competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth, in fact, lies, will not suffice. *Matter of Ho*, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591-592 (BIA 1988).

The record contains a second letter from [redacted] dated October 28, 2006 which states that the beneficiary has been employed as a chef since January 1995 to the date of the letter. The signatory's name is not clear. The dates of employment listed are inconsistent with those reported of the ETA 750, wherein the beneficiary states that he began working as a chef with [redacted] in September 2000. It is incumbent on the petitioner to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence. *Id.*

Furthermore, the director noted that the address of the restaurant noted on the experience letter was the same as the beneficiary's home address and that the name of the letter's author was the same name of the beneficiary's wife. The director issued request for evidence (RFE) on August 6, 2009 requesting for clarification about whether or not the beneficiary and his wife were actually the owners of [redacted]. The director noted that the petitioner's failure to disclose the source of the beneficiary's experience letter raises doubt as to the veracity of the information submitted and that this letter alone would not be sufficient to establish that the beneficiary had the required two

years of experience. The director also questioned the beneficiary's role at [REDACTED] as travel records and descriptions of his activities indicate a management role in the restaurant. The director asked for objective evidence to establish the beneficiary's employment such as payroll records. In response, the petitioner submitted two years of payroll records and pictures from [REDACTED]. However, the director found that this evidence was insufficient to establish that the beneficiary had the required two years of experience as a cook of Chinese food.

On appeal, the petitioner states that the beneficiary was both the owner and chef at the [REDACTED] and submits a letter from the employees of the restaurant to corroborate this assertion. The letter from the employees states that the beneficiary "opened [REDACTED] from January 1995 to May 2007" and that he was both the chef and owner. The letter from the employees is not independent objective evidence and the dates of the beneficiary's employment are again inconsistent with the dates reported on the ETA 750 and in the prior letters submitted.

Counsel further states that the beneficiary has additional work experience that should be considered and submits the following employment letters to support his assertions:

- A letter from [REDACTED] dated November 8, 2009 stating that the beneficiary was employed as a chief chef from February 1988 to March 1992. However, the letter does not describe the beneficiary's duties and is not signed by a representative of the employer and therefore the letter does not meet the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(l)(3)(ii)(A).
- A letter from [REDACTED] dated November 6, 2009 stating that the beneficiary worked as a chef from August 1, 1992 to August 31, 1994. . However, the letter does not describe the beneficiary's duties and therefore the letter does not meet the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(l)(3)(ii)(A).
- Vocational Qualification Certificate from the People's Republic of China issued on August 6, 1987 which certifies that the beneficiary as fourth level/medium skill level. The certificate does not address the beneficiary's prior employment and does not meet the regulations at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(l)(3)(ii)(A).

Moreover, none of the letters represent experience that was included on the Form ETA 750. In *Matter of Leung*, 16 I&N Dec. 2530 (BIA 1976), the Board's dicta notes that the beneficiary's experience, without such fact certified by DOL on the beneficiary's Form ETA 750B, lessens the credibility of the evidence and facts asserted.

The AAO affirms the director's decision that the petitioner failed to establish that the beneficiary met the minimum requirements of the offered position set forth on the labor certification as of the priority date. Therefore, the beneficiary does not qualify for classification as a professional or skilled worker under section 203(b)(3)(A) of the Act.

Beyond the decision of the director, it is not clear that a *bona fide* job offer exists in the instant case. Under 20 C.F.R. §§ 626.20(c)(8) and 656.3, the petitioner has the burden when asked to show that a

valid employment relationship exists, that a *bona fide* job opportunity is available to U.S. workers. See *Matter of Amger Corp.*, 87-INA-545 (BALCA 1987). A relationship invalidating a *bona fide* job offer may arise where the beneficiary is related to the petitioner by “blood” or it may “be financial, by marriage, or through friendship.” See *Matter of Sunmart 374*, 00-INA-93 (BALCA May 15, 2000).

The record contains a letter from [REDACTED] which lists the beneficiary as the primary joint account holder of a checking account and lists one of the petitioner’s owners, [REDACTED], as a secondary joint account holder. Sharing a joint bank account with the beneficiary indicates that the petitioner may have had a prior financial relationship with the beneficiary. No prior relationship between the beneficiary and petitioner was disclosed to DOL or USCIS. Had DOL know of the relationship, it would have scrutinized the recruitment for the proffered position more closely. Furthermore, the relationship raises doubt as to whether or not a *bona fide* job offer ever existed that was truly open to all qualified U.S. workers and as such the petition must also be denied.

The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and alternative basis for denial. In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, that burden has not been met.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.