





U.S. Citizenship  
and Immigration  
Services

(b)(6)




DATE: JUN 13 2013

OFFICE: NEBRASKA SERVICE CENTER FILE: 

IN RE:

Petitioner:

Beneficiary:



PETITION: Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as an Other Worker Pursuant to Section 203(b)(3)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(iii)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:


SELF-REPRESENTED

INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the AAO inappropriately applied the law in reaching its decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen in accordance with the instructions on Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$630. The specific requirements for filing such a motion can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. **Do not file any motion directly with the AAO.** Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires any motion to be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,



Ron Rosenberg  
Acting Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The preference visa petition was denied by the Director, Nebraska Service Center, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The matter will be dismissed.

The petitioner is a skilled nursing facility. It seeks to employ the beneficiary permanently in the United States as a nursing assistant. As required by statute, the petition is accompanied by ETA Form 9089, Application for Permanent Employment Certification (labor certification), approved by the United States Department of Labor (DOL). The director determined that the petitioner failed to submit the required initial evidence and therefore had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage beginning on the priority date of the visa petition and failed to establish that the beneficiary was qualified for the proffered position. The director denied the petition accordingly.

The record shows that the appeal is properly filed, timely and makes a specific allegation of error in law or fact. The procedural history in this case is documented by the record and incorporated into the decision. Further elaboration of the procedural history will be made only as necessary.

As set forth in the director's July 30, 2010 denial, the issues in this case are whether or not the petitioner has the ability to pay the proffered wage as of the priority date and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence and whether or not the beneficiary was qualified for the proffered position.

Section 203(b)(3)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(iii), provides for the granting of preference classification to other qualified immigrants who are capable, at the time of petitioning for classification under this paragraph, of performing unskilled labor, not of a temporary or seasonal nature, for which qualified workers are not available in the United States.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states in pertinent part:

*Ability of prospective employer to pay wage.* Any petition filed by or for an employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be either in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements.

The petitioner must demonstrate the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, which is the date the ETA Form 9089, Application for Permanent Employment Certification, was accepted for processing by any office within the employment system of the DOL. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(d). The petitioner must also demonstrate that, on the priority date, the beneficiary had the qualifications stated on its ETA Form 9089, Application for Permanent Employment

Certification, as certified by the DOL and submitted with the instant petition. *Matter of Wing's Tea House*, 16 I&N Dec. 158 (Acting Reg'l Comm'r 1977).

Here, the ETA Form 9089 was accepted on May 21, 2008. The proffered wage as stated on the ETA Form 9089 is \$8.86 per hour (\$18,428.80 annually). The ETA Form 9089 states that the position requires a high school diploma, 6 months of experience in the job offered and a certified nursing assistant certificate.

The AAO conducts appellate review on a *de novo* basis. *See Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004). The AAO considers all pertinent evidence in the record, including new evidence properly submitted upon appeal.<sup>1</sup>

The AAO notes that the petitioner's corporate name as listed on the labor certification and Form I-140 is [REDACTED]. The 2008 and 2009 tax returns in the record are for [REDACTED] which lists the same Federal Employer Identification Number (FEIN) as the labor certification and Form I-140 entity but a different address. According to the California Secretary of State, [REDACTED] filed for incorporation in 2006. The petitioner appears to be a d/b/a of [REDACTED]. However, the record does not include evidence that the d/b/a was filed with and approved by the State of California. The AAO will address the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage based on the tax returns submitted, but for this analysis to be accepted the petitioner must submit official evidence (i.e. the d/b/a was filed with and approved by the State of California) that the tax returns in the record are its tax returns. In any further filings, the petitioner should submit evidence to resolve this inconsistency.

The evidence in the record indicates that the petitioner is structured as an S corporation. On the petition, the petitioner states that it was established in April 2006 and it has 100 employees. On the ETA Form 9089, signed by the beneficiary on August 12, 2010, the beneficiary did not claim to have worked for the petitioner.

The petitioner must establish that its job offer to the beneficiary is a realistic one. Because the filing of an ETA Form 9089 labor certification application establishes a priority date for any immigrant petition later based on the ETA Form 9089, the petitioner must establish that the job offer was realistic as of the priority date and that the offer remained realistic for each year thereafter, until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. The petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is an essential element in evaluating whether a job offer is realistic. *See Matter of Great Wall*, 16 I&N Dec. 142 (Acting Reg'l Comm'r 1977); *see also* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2). In evaluating whether a job offer is realistic, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) requires the petitioner to demonstrate financial resources sufficient to pay the beneficiary's proffered wages, although the totality of the circumstances

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<sup>1</sup> The submission of additional evidence on appeal is allowed by the instructions to the Form I-290B, which are incorporated into the regulations by the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(1). The record in the instant case provides no reason to preclude consideration of any of the documents newly submitted on appeal. *See Matter of Soriano*, 19 I&N Dec. 764 (BIA 1988).

affecting the petitioning business will be considered if the evidence warrants such consideration. See *Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (Reg'l Comm'r 1967).

In determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage during a given period, USCIS will first examine whether the petitioner employed and paid the beneficiary during that period. If the petitioner establishes by documentary evidence that it employed the beneficiary at a salary equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the evidence will be considered *prima facie* proof of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. In the instant case, the petitioner has not submitted evidence of the wages, if any, that it paid the beneficiary from the priority date.

If the petitioner does not establish that it employed and paid the beneficiary an amount at least equal to the proffered wage during that period, USCIS will next examine the net income figure reflected on the petitioner's federal income tax return, without consideration of depreciation or other expenses. *River Street Donuts, LLC v. Napolitano*, 558 F.3d 111 (1<sup>st</sup> Cir. 2009); *Taco Especial v. Napolitano*, 696 F. Supp. 2d 873 (E.D. Mich. 2010), *aff'd*, No. 10-1517 (6th Cir. filed Nov. 10, 2011). Reliance on federal income tax returns as a basis for determining a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is well established by judicial precedent. *Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava*, 632 F. Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (citing *Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman*, 736 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1984)); see also *Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh*, 719 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Texas 1989); *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), *aff'd*, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983). Reliance on the petitioner's gross receipts and wage expense is misplaced. Showing that the petitioner's gross receipts exceeded the proffered wage is insufficient. Similarly, showing that the petitioner paid wages in excess of the proffered wage is insufficient.

In *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. at 1084, the court held that the Immigration and Naturalization Service, now USCIS, had properly relied on the petitioner's net income figure, as stated on the petitioner's corporate income tax returns, rather than the petitioner's gross income. The court specifically rejected the argument that USCIS should have considered income before expenses were paid rather than net income. See *Taco Especial v. Napolitano*, 696 F. Supp. 2d at 881 (gross profits overstate an employer's ability to pay because it ignores other necessary expenses).

With respect to depreciation, the court in *River Street Donuts* noted:

The AAO recognized that a depreciation deduction is a systematic allocation of the cost of a tangible long-term asset and does not represent a specific cash expenditure during the year claimed. Furthermore, the AAO indicated that the allocation of the depreciation of a long-term asset could be spread out over the years or concentrated into a few depending on the petitioner's choice of accounting and depreciation methods. Nonetheless, the AAO explained that depreciation represents an actual cost of doing business, which could represent either the diminution in value of buildings and equipment or the accumulation of funds necessary to replace perishable equipment and buildings. Accordingly, the AAO stressed that even though amounts deducted for depreciation do not

represent current use of cash, neither does it represent amounts available to pay wages.

We find that the AAO has a rational explanation for its policy of not adding depreciation back to net income. Namely, that the amount spent on a long term tangible asset is a “real” expense.

*River Street Donuts* at 118. “[USCIS] and judicial precedent support the use of tax returns and the *net income figures* in determining petitioner’s ability to pay. Plaintiffs’ argument that these figures should be revised by the court by adding back depreciation is without support.” *Chi-Feng Chang* at 537 (emphasis added).

The record before the director closed on January 20, 2009, when the director received the petitioner’s Form I-140. As of that date, the petitioner’s 2008 tax return would have been the most recent return available. However, as noted in the director’s decision the petitioner failed to submit any evidence of its ability to pay the proffered wage as required by 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2). The tax returns that the petitioner submitted on appeal demonstrate net income for 2008 and 2009, as shown below.

- In 2008, the Form 1120S stated net income of \$75,549<sup>2</sup>
- In 2009, the Form 1120S stated net income of \$(334,217).

Therefore, for the year 2008, the tax return submitted would reflect sufficient net income to pay the proffered wage if this was the only petition filed. However, according to USCIS records the petitioner has filed 50 I-140 petitions on behalf of other beneficiaries. Accordingly, the petitioner must establish that it has had the continuing ability to pay the combined proffered wages to each beneficiary from the priority date of the instant petition. *See Matter of Great Wall*, 16 I&N Dec. 142, 144-145 (Acting Reg’l Comm’r 1977). The evidence in the record does not document for all 50 petitions the priority date,<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Where an S corporation’s income is exclusively from a trade or business, USCIS considers net income to be the figure for ordinary income, shown on line 21 of page one of the petitioner’s IRS Form 1120S. However, where an S corporation has income, credits, deductions or other adjustments from sources other than a trade or business, they are reported on Schedule K. If the Schedule K has relevant entries for additional income, credits, deductions or other adjustments, net income is found on line 18 of Schedule K. *See* Instructions for Form 1120S, at <http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i1120s.pdf> (accessed May 28, 2013) (indicating that Schedule K is a summary schedule of all shareholders’ shares of the corporation’s income, deductions, credits, etc.). In 2008 the Schedule K for the tax return submitted included a deduction and other adjustments, therefore the net income is found on line 18 of Schedule K.

<sup>3</sup> The petitioner asserts that it only has 15 I-140 petitions pending, however, USCIS records demonstrate that the petitioner has filed at least 50 Form I-140 petitions. The petitioner must address this discrepancy in any further filings. It is incumbent upon the petitioner to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence. Any attempt to explain or reconcile

proffered wage or wages paid to each beneficiary, whether any of the other petitions have been withdrawn, revoked, or denied, or whether any of the other beneficiaries have obtained lawful permanent residence. This issue must be addressed before it can be determined that the petitioner is able to pay the proffered wage in any year. The petitioner's 2009 federal tax return states negative income and would not demonstrate the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage to this beneficiary or any other sponsored worker.

As an alternate means of determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage, USCIS may review the petitioner's net current assets. Net current assets are the difference between the petitioner's current assets and current liabilities.<sup>1</sup> A corporation's year-end current assets are shown on Schedule L, lines 1 through 6. Its year-end current liabilities are shown on lines 16 through 18. If the total of a corporation's end-of-year net current assets and the wages paid to the beneficiary (if any) are equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the petitioner is expected to be able to pay the proffered wage using those net current assets.

The tax return submitted demonstrates end-of-year net current assets for 2008 and 2009, as shown below.

- In 2008, the Form 1120S stated net current assets of \$251,687.
- In 2009, the Form 1120S stated net current assets of \$(6,364).

Based on the net current assets in 2008, the tax return submitted would reflect the ability to pay the proffered wage in that year if this was the only petition filed. As mentioned, the petitioner must establish that it has had the continuing ability to pay the combined proffered wages to each beneficiary from the priority date of the instant petition. See *Matter of Great Wall*, 16 I&N Dec. 142, 144-145 (Acting Reg'l Comm'r 1977). The evidence in the record does not document the priority date, proffered wage or wages paid to each beneficiary, whether any of the other petitions have been withdrawn, revoked, or denied, or whether any of the other beneficiaries have obtained lawful permanent residence. In 2009, the petitioner had negative net current assets and would not be able to establish the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage of this beneficiary or any other sponsored worker.

Therefore, from the date the ETA Form 9089 was accepted for processing by the DOL, the petitioner has not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage as of the priority date through an examination of wages paid to the beneficiary, or its net income or net current assets.

The AAO notes that the petitioner sent tax returns for two unrelated entities with separate tax identification numbers. Because a corporation is a separate and distinct legal entity from its owners and shareholders, the assets of its shareholders or of other enterprises or corporations cannot be

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such inconsistencies will not suffice unless the petitioner submits competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. *Matter of Ho*, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591-92 (BIA 1988).

considered in determining the petitioning corporation's ability to pay the proffered wage. *See Matter of Aphrodite Investments, Ltd.*, 17 I&N Dec. 530 (Comm'r 1980). In a similar case, the court in *Sitar v. Ashcroft*, 2003 WL 22203713 (D.Mass. Sept. 18, 2003) stated, "nothing in the governing regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 204.5, permits [USCIS] to consider the financial resources of individuals or entities who have no legal obligation to pay the wage."

USCIS may consider the overall magnitude of the petitioner's business activities in its determination of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. *See Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (Reg'l Comm'r 1967). The petitioning entity in *Sonogawa* had been in business for over 11 years and routinely earned a gross annual income of about \$100,000. During the year in which the petition was filed in that case, the petitioner changed business locations and paid rent on both the old and new locations for five months. There were large moving costs and also a period of time when the petitioner was unable to do regular business. The Regional Commissioner determined that the petitioner's prospects for a resumption of successful business operations were well established. The petitioner was a fashion designer whose work had been featured in *Time* and *Look* magazines. Her clients included Miss Universe, movie actresses, and society matrons. The petitioner's clients had been included in the lists of the best-dressed California women. The petitioner lectured on fashion design at design and fashion shows throughout the United States and at colleges and universities in California. The Regional Commissioner's determination in *Sonogawa* was based in part on the petitioner's sound business reputation and outstanding reputation as a couturiere. As in *Sonogawa*, USCIS may, at its discretion, consider evidence relevant to the petitioner's financial ability that falls outside of a petitioner's net income and net current assets. USCIS may consider such factors as the number of years the petitioner has been doing business, the established historical growth of the petitioner's business, the overall number of employees, the occurrence of any uncharacteristic business expenditures or losses, the petitioner's reputation within its industry, whether the beneficiary is replacing a former employee or an outsourced service, or any other evidence that USCIS deems relevant to the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage.

The petitioner states that [REDACTED] 2009 financial statements show an operational loss of \$334,217 and "Despite this loss the petitioner was able to pay primarily its payroll obligations." The petitioner also states this loss does not reflect the petitioner's inability to pay the proffered wages; [REDACTED] was acquired in 2006; at the time of acquisition, [REDACTED] incurred organizational and acquisition expenses which directly affected profitability; the loss is attributed to repair expenses necessary for the upkeep and maintenance of the facility; the repairs are required to be in compliance with the minimum criteria of the Department of Health Services; succeeding years will show minimal repair expenses; all salaries and wages were paid on time and all payroll taxes were paid and timely remitted; employees or staff have not been laid off to cut costs; and income tax returns for other facilities that [REDACTED] owns are being submitted as evidence of funding sources. The record does not include supporting evidence of the petitioner's claims related to repair expenses and that they are now minimal. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm'r 1998) (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg'l Comm'r 1972)).

The petitioner needs to fully address all of its sponsored workers in order for the AAO to determine whether it can meet its total wage burden and establish its ability to pay the beneficiary's proffered wage and the wages of its other sponsored workers. The evidence submitted fails to establish this. The wages of each sponsored employee, and any wages paid to those employees, is not clear. Also, the petitioner has not provided official evidence that it is a d/b/a of [REDACTED] and that the tax returns in the record are its tax returns. The record does not include evidence of any unusual events that temporarily disrupted the business. Considering these factors and the prior discussion of ability to pay the proffered wage, the AAO concludes that the petitioner has not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date.

The petitioner must establish that the beneficiary possessed all the education, training, and experience specified on the labor certification as of the priority date. 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(1), (12). *See Matter of Wing's Tea House*, 16 I&N Dec. 158, 159 (Acting Reg'l Comm'r 1977); *see also Matter of Katigbak*, 14 I&N Dec. 45, 49 (Reg'l Comm'r 1971). In evaluating the beneficiary's qualifications, USCIS must look to the job offer portion of the labor certification to determine the required qualifications for the position. USCIS may not ignore a term of the labor certification, nor may it impose additional requirements. *See Madany v. Smith*, 696 F.2d 1008 (D.C. Cir. 1983); *K.R.K. Irvine, Inc. v. Landon*, 699 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1983); *Stewart Infra-Red Commissary of Massachusetts, Inc. v. Coomey*, 661 F.2d 1 (1<sup>st</sup> Cir. 1981).

In evaluating the labor certification to determine the required qualifications for the position, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) may not ignore a term of the labor certification, nor may it impose additional requirements. *See Madany v. Smith*, 696 F.2d 1008 (D.C. Cir. 1983); *K.R.K. Irvine, Inc. v. Landon*, 699 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1983); *Stewart Infra-Red Commissary of Massachusetts, Inc. v. Coomey*, 661 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1981).

Where the job requirements in a labor certification are not otherwise unambiguously prescribed, e.g., by regulation, USCIS must examine "the language of the labor certification job requirements" in order to determine what the petitioner must demonstrate about the beneficiary's qualifications. *Madany*, 696 F.2d at 1015. The only rational manner by which USCIS can be expected to interpret the meaning of terms used to describe the requirements of a job in a labor certification is to "examine the certified job offer *exactly* as it is completed by the prospective employer." *Rosedale Linden Park Company v. Smith*, 595 F. Supp. 829, 833 (D.D.C. 1984)(emphasis added). USCIS's interpretation of the job's requirements, as stated on the labor certification must involve "reading and applying *the plain language* of the [labor certification]." *Id.* at 834 (emphasis added). USCIS cannot and should not reasonably be expected to look beyond the plain language of the labor certification or otherwise attempt to divine the employer's intentions through some sort of reverse engineering of the labor certification.

In the instant case, the labor certification states that the offered position has the following minimum requirements:

H.4. Education: High school diploma.

- H.5. Training: None required.
- H.6. Experience in the job offered: 6 months.
- H.7. Alternate field of study: None accepted.
- H.8. Alternate combination of education and experience: None accepted.
- H.9. Foreign educational equivalent: Not Accepted.
- H.10. Experience in an alternate occupation: None accepted.
- H.14. Specific skills or other requirements: Certified Nursing Assistant Certificate.

The labor certification also states that the beneficiary qualifies for the offered position based on experience as a caregiver with the [REDACTED] in Iligan City, Philippines from February 1, 2005 until May 20, 2008. The beneficiary signed the labor certification under a declaration that the contents are true and correct under penalty of perjury.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(l)(3)(ii)(A) states:

Any requirements of training or experience for skilled workers, professionals, or other workers must be supported by letters from trainers or employers giving the name, address, and title of the trainer or employer, and a description of the training received or the experience of the alien.

The record does not include evidence that the beneficiary has a high school diploma from the United States. The record includes a copy of the beneficiary's diploma from [REDACTED] Iligan City, Philippines. However, the petitioner stated on the ETA Form 9089 in H.9 that foreign educational equivalents are not accepted. Therefore, the petitioner has failed to establish that the beneficiary has the required education for the position offered.

The record includes a letter stating that the beneficiary completed the 6 month Caregiving National Certificate II training on April 16, 2010 in the Philippines; a 3 day training for health caregivers at the [REDACTED] in the Philippines; a Certificate of Participation in a Hydrotherapy program in the Philippines; a Certificate of Clinical Rotation at a [REDACTED] in the Philippines; a Certificate of Training for 40 hours of on the job training as a Health Caregiver in the Philippines; and a Certificate of Recognition for attending an Emergency Care and Resuscitation training in the Philippines. The ETA Form 9089 requires a Certified Nursing Assistant Certificate and the beneficiary has not provided evidence that he has this certificate. Nothing shows that the beneficiary has a certified nursing assistant certificate in the state of California. See California Department of Public Health, L & C Verification Page, <http://www.apps.cdph.ca.gov/cvl/ListPage.aspx> (accessed June 12, 2013). The AAO notes that foreign educational equivalents are not accepted.

The record contains an experience letter from [REDACTED] stating that the beneficiary was a caregiver for her son from June 2009 until August 28, 2009; and that his duties included assisting him in his personal hygiene and grooming, keeping him company, monitoring his blood sugar and giving him medications; accompanying him to doctor's visits; and being his sitter and advocate

when he was hospitalized. The letter does not provide the exact address of the employer's experience. The letter does not indicate whether the job was full-time. The AAO also notes that this employment occurred after the May 21, 2008 priority date and therefore cannot be considered.

The record contains an experience letter from [REDACTED] [REDACTED] on Office of the City Health Officer Iligan City letterhead stating that the beneficiary was a casual employee of the [REDACTED] and rendered services from March 10, 2005 until December 15, 2005 and February 16, 2006 until October 30, 2006. The letter does not provide the address of the employer, the beneficiary's job title and a description of the beneficiary's job duties. The letter does not indicate whether the job was full-time and the signatory's last name is not clear from the letter. The AAO also notes that the ETA Form 9089 states that the beneficiary's job title is caregiver and he was employed with the [REDACTED] from February 1, 2005 until May 20, 2008. It is incumbent upon the petitioner to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence. Any attempt to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies will not suffice unless the petitioner submits competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. *Matter of Ho*, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591-92 (BIA 1988).

The evidence in the record does not establish that the beneficiary possessed the required education and experience set forth on the labor certification by the priority date. Therefore, the petitioner has failed to establish that the beneficiary is qualified for the offered position.

The AAO affirms the director's decision that the petitioner failed to establish that the beneficiary met the minimum requirements of the offered position set forth on the labor certification as of the priority date and that it had the ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage as of the priority date. Therefore, the beneficiary does not qualify for classification as an other worker under section 203(b)(3)(A) of the Act.

The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and alternative basis for denial. In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, that burden has not been met.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed.