



U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services

(b)(6)

[Redacted]

DATE: **MAY 14 2013** OFFICE: NEBRASKA SERVICE CENTER

FILE: [Redacted]

IN RE: Petitioner: [Redacted]
Beneficiary: [Redacted]

PETITION: Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as a Skilled Worker or Professional Pursuant to Section 203(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:

[Redacted]

INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the AAO inappropriately applied the law in reaching its decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen in accordance with the instructions on Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$630. The specific requirements for filing such a motion can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. **Do not file any motion directly with the AAO.** Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires any motion to be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,

Ron Rosenberg
Acting Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The preference visa petition was denied by the Director, Nebraska Service Center, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner describes itself as a “Garden Art and Nursery” business. It seeks to employ the beneficiary permanently in the United States as a “Garden Art Specialist.” As required by statute, the petition is accompanied by a Form ETA 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification, approved by the United States Department of Labor (DOL). The director determined that the petitioner failed to submit all the initial required evidence and had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage beginning on the priority date of the visa petition, or that the beneficiary had the required experience to meet the terms of the certified labor certification. The director additionally found that the petitioner failed to establish that the petition required two years of experience to qualify as a skilled worker. The director denied the petition accordingly.

The record shows that the appeal is properly filed, timely and makes a specific allegation of error in law or fact. The procedural history in this case is documented by the record and incorporated into the decision. Further elaboration of the procedural history will be made only as necessary.

As set forth in the director’s January 8, 2010 denial,¹ the issues in this case are whether or not the petitioner has the ability to pay the proffered wage as of the priority date and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence, whether the beneficiary has the experience required for the proffered position as set forth on the Form ETA 750, and whether the labor certification supports filing for a skilled worker.

Section 203(b)(3)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(i), provides for the granting of preference classification to qualified immigrants who are capable, at the time of petitioning for classification under this paragraph, of performing skilled labor (requiring at least two years training or experience), not of a temporary nature, for which qualified workers are not available in the United States.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states in pertinent part:

Ability of prospective employer to pay wage. Any petition filed by or for an employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be either in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements.

¹ The decision is dated January 8, 2009, but as the petitioner filed the Form I-140 on October 14, 2009, the decision date appears to be in error, and should be January 8, 2010.

The petitioner must demonstrate the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, which is the date the Form ETA 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification, was accepted for processing by any office within the employment system of the DOL. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(d). The petitioner must also demonstrate that, on the priority date, the beneficiary had the qualifications stated on its Form ETA 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification, as certified by the DOL and submitted with the instant petition. *Matter of Wing's Tea House*, 16 I&N Dec. 158 (Acting Reg'l Comm'r 1977).

Here, the Form ETA 750 was accepted on May 11, 2001. The proffered wage as stated on the Form ETA 750 is \$13.61 per hour and \$20.01 for overtime. The Form ETA 750 states that the position requires 45 hours per week, thus, the beneficiary would earn \$13.61 per hour for 40 hours per week plus \$20.01 per hour for an additional five hours per week, or \$33,355.40 per year. The Form ETA 750 states that the position requires two years of experience in the proffered position or one year of experience in an unidentified related occupation. The beneficiary must also meet the following special requirements as set forth in section 15 of the labor certification:

[T]he employee must be able to color match, by eye, concrete statues, fountains and related garden art products requested by [redacted] and our customers.

...

The AAO conducts appellate review on a *de novo* basis. *See Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004). The AAO considers all pertinent evidence in the record, including new evidence properly submitted upon appeal.²

The evidence in the record of proceeding shows that the petitioner is structured as a C corporation. On the petition, the petitioner claimed to have been established in 1992, to have a gross annual income of \$559,000, and to currently employ four workers. According to the tax returns in the record, the petitioner's fiscal year operated from October 2001 to September 2002 in fiscal year 2001 and from October 2002 to the end of 2002 for fiscal year 2002 and then appeared to switch to a calendar year. On the Form ETA 750B, signed by the beneficiary on May 7, 2007, the beneficiary claimed to have worked for the petitioner since November 1996.

The petitioner must establish that its job offer to the beneficiary is a realistic one. Because the filing of an ETA 750 labor certification application establishes a priority date for any immigrant petition later based on the ETA 750, the petitioner must establish that the job offer was realistic as of the priority date and that the offer remained realistic for each year thereafter, until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. The petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is an essential element in evaluating whether a job offer is realistic. *See Matter of Great Wall*, 16 I&N Dec. 142 (Acting Reg'l Comm'r 1977); *see also* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2). In evaluating whether a job offer is realistic, United

² The submission of additional evidence on appeal is allowed by the instructions to the Form I-290B, which are incorporated into the regulations by the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(1). The record in the instant case provides no reason to preclude consideration of any of the documents newly submitted on appeal. *See Matter of Soriano*, 19 I&N Dec. 764 (BIA 1988).

States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) requires the petitioner to demonstrate financial resources sufficient to pay the beneficiary's proffered wages, although the totality of the circumstances affecting the petitioning business will be considered if the evidence warrants such consideration. *See Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (Reg'l Comm'r 1967).

In determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage during a given period, USCIS will first examine whether the petitioner employed and paid the beneficiary during that period. If the petitioner establishes by documentary evidence that it employed the beneficiary at a salary equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the evidence will be considered *prima facie* proof of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. In the instant case, the petitioner has not established that it employed and paid the beneficiary the full proffered wage, or any wages for that matter, from the priority date. The petitioner states on the Form ETA 750 (signed by the beneficiary on May 7, 2007 as noted above) that the beneficiary was employed by it from November 1996, yet submitted no documentation of any wages paid to the beneficiary.

If the petitioner does not establish that it employed and paid the beneficiary an amount at least equal to the proffered wage during that period, USCIS will next examine the net income figure reflected on the petitioner's federal income tax return, without consideration of depreciation or other expenses. *River Street Donuts, LLC v. Napolitano*, 558 F.3d 111 (1st Cir. 2009); *Taco Especial v. Napolitano*, 696 F. Supp. 2d 873 (E.D. Mich. 2010), *aff'd*, No. 10-1517 (6th Cir. filed Nov. 10, 2011). Reliance on federal income tax returns as a basis for determining a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is well established by judicial precedent. *Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava*, 632 F. Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (*citing Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman*, 736 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1984)); *see also Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh*, 719 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Texas 1989); *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), *aff'd*, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983). Reliance on the petitioner's gross sales and profits and wage expense is misplaced. Showing that the petitioner's gross sales and profits exceeded the proffered wage is insufficient. Similarly, showing that the petitioner paid wages in excess of the proffered wage is insufficient.

In *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. at 1084, the court held that the Immigration and Naturalization Service, now USCIS, had properly relied on the petitioner's net income figure, as stated on the petitioner's corporate income tax returns, rather than the petitioner's gross income. The court specifically rejected the argument that the Service should have considered income before expenses were paid rather than net income. *See Taco Especial v. Napolitano*, 696 F. Supp. 2d at 881 (gross profits overstate an employer's ability to pay because it ignores other necessary expenses).

With respect to depreciation, the court in *River Street Donuts* noted:

The AAO recognized that a depreciation deduction is a systematic allocation of the cost of a tangible long-term asset and does not represent a specific cash expenditure during the year claimed. Furthermore, the AAO indicated that the allocation of the depreciation of a long-term asset could be spread out over the years or concentrated into a few depending on the petitioner's choice of

accounting and depreciation methods. Nonetheless, the AAO explained that depreciation represents an actual cost of doing business, which could represent either the diminution in value of buildings and equipment or the accumulation of funds necessary to replace perishable equipment and buildings. Accordingly, the AAO stressed that even though amounts deducted for depreciation do not represent current use of cash, neither does it represent amounts available to pay wages.

We find that the AAO has a rational explanation for its policy of not adding depreciation back to net income. Namely, that the amount spent on a long term tangible asset is a "real" expense.

River Street Donuts at 118. "[USCIS] and judicial precedent support the use of tax returns and the *net income figures* in determining petitioner's ability to pay. Plaintiffs' argument that these figures should be revised by the court by adding back depreciation is without support." *Chi-Feng Chang* at 537 (emphasis added).

For a C corporation, USCIS considers net income to be the figure shown on Line 28 of the Form 1120, U.S. Corporation Income Tax Return. The record before the director closed on January 8, 2010 with the issuance of the director's decision denying the petition. As of that date, the petitioner's 2009 federal income tax return was not yet due. Therefore, the petitioner's income tax return for 2008 was the most recent return available. The petitioner, however, submitted for the first time on appeal its tax returns for years 2001 through 2008. Those tax returns demonstrate its net income for 2001 through 2008 as shown in the table below.

- In 2001, the Form 1120 for the time period October 1, 2001 to September 30, 2002 stated net income of (\$1,857).³
- In 2002, the Form 1120 for the time period October 1, 2002 to December 31, 2002 stated net income of (\$1,878).

Beginning with year 2003, the petitioner changed its filing status from a C Corporation to an S Corporation and began filing its tax returns on a Form 1120S. Where an S corporation's income is exclusively from a trade or business, USCIS considers net income to be the figure for ordinary income, shown on line 21 of page one of the petitioner's IRS Form 1120S. However, where an S corporation has income, credits, deductions or other adjustments from sources other than a trade or business, they are reported on Schedule K. If the Schedule K has relevant entries for additional income, credits, deductions or other adjustments, net income is found on line 23 (1997-2003), line 17e (2004-2005) and line 18 (2006-2011) of Schedule K. See Instructions for Form 1120S, at <http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i1120s.pdf> (accessed April 29, 2013) (indicating that Schedule K is a summary schedule of all shareholders' shares of the corporation's income, deductions, credits, etc.). Because the petitioner

³ As the priority date is May 11, 2001, in any further filings the petitioner would also need to submit its 2000 Form 1120 to cover the time period of the May 11, 2001 priority date until October 2001.

had additional income, credits, deductions and/or other adjustments shown on its Schedule K for years 2003 through 2008, the petitioner's net income is found on Schedule K of those tax returns.

- In 2003, the Form 1120 stated net income of (\$17,061).
- In 2004, the Form 1120 stated net income of \$4,512.
- In 2005, the Form 1120 stated net income of \$2,748.
- In 2006, the Form 1120 stated net income of \$18,066.
- In 2007, the Form 1120 stated net income of \$23,890.
- In 2008, the Form 1120 stated net income of (\$48,296).

Therefore, for the years 2001 through 2008, the petitioner's tax returns do not state sufficient net income to pay the proffered wage.

If the net income the petitioner demonstrates it had available during that period, if any, added to the wages paid to the beneficiary during the period, if any, do not equal the amount of the proffered wage or more, USCIS will review the petitioner's net current assets. Net current assets are the difference between the petitioner's current assets and current liabilities.⁴ A corporation's year-end current assets are shown on Schedule L, lines 1 through 6 and include cash-on-hand. Its year-end current liabilities are shown on lines 16 through 18.⁵ If the total of a corporation's end-of-year net current assets and the wages paid to the beneficiary (if any) are equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the petitioner is expected to be able to pay the proffered wage using those net current assets. The petitioner's tax returns demonstrate its end-of-year net current assets for 2001 through 2008 as shown in the table below.

- In 2001, the Form 1120 stated net current assets of \$25,192.
- In 2002 the petitioner's net current assets may not be determined as the petitioner did not complete Schedule L of its 2002 tax return.⁶
- In 2003, the Form 1120 stated net current assets of \$23,051.
- In 2004, the Form 1120 stated net current assets of \$19,472.
- In 2005, the Form 1120 stated net current assets of \$10,327.
- In 2006, the Form 1120 stated net current assets of \$9,327.
- In 2007, the Form 1120 stated net current assets of \$31,654.

⁴According to *Barron's Dictionary of Accounting Terms* 117 (3rd ed. 2000), "current assets" consist of items having (in most cases) a life of one year or less, such as cash, marketable securities, inventory and prepaid expenses. "Current liabilities" are obligations payable (in most cases) within one year, such accounts payable, short-term notes payable, and accrued expenses (such as taxes and salaries). *Id.* at 118.

⁵Net current assets are determined in this manner for both C Corporations and S Corporations.

⁶ For 2002, corporations with total receipts (line 1a plus lines 4 through 10 on page 1) **and** total assets at the end of the tax year less than \$250,000 are not required to complete Schedule L if the "Yes" box on Schedule K, question 13, is checked. See <http://www.irs.gov/instructions/i1120/> (accessed May 8, 2013).

- In 2008, the Form 1120 stated net current assets of \$6,580.

Therefore, for the years 2001 through 2008, the petitioner's tax returns do not state sufficient net current assets to pay the proffered wage.

Therefore, from the date the Form ETA 750 was accepted for processing by the DOL, the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage as of the priority date through an examination of wages paid to the beneficiary, or its net income or net current assets.

On appeal, counsel asserts that the petitioner has maintained the continuous ability to pay the proffered wage from the priority date onward and that the beneficiary had the experience required by the labor certification as of the priority date.

Counsel's assertions on appeal cannot be concluded to outweigh the evidence presented in the tax returns as submitted by the petitioner that demonstrates that the petitioner could not pay the proffered wage from the day the Form ETA 750 was accepted for processing by the DOL.

USCIS may consider the overall magnitude of the petitioner's business activities in its determination of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. *See Matter of Sonogawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (Reg'l Comm'r 1967). The petitioning entity in *Sonogawa* had been in business for over 11 years and routinely earned a gross annual income of about \$100,000. During the year in which the petition was filed in that case, the petitioner changed business locations and paid rent on both the old and new locations for five months. There were large moving costs and also a period of time when the petitioner was unable to do regular business. The Regional Commissioner determined that the petitioner's prospects for a resumption of successful business operations were well established. The petitioner was a fashion designer whose work had been featured in *Time* and *Look* magazines. Her clients included Miss Universe, movie actresses, and society matrons. The petitioner's clients had been included in the lists of the best-dressed California women. The petitioner lectured on fashion design at design and fashion shows throughout the United States and at colleges and universities in California. The Regional Commissioner's determination in *Sonogawa* was based in part on the petitioner's sound business reputation and outstanding reputation as a couturiere. As in *Sonogawa*, USCIS may, at its discretion, consider evidence relevant to the petitioner's financial ability that falls outside of a petitioner's net income and net current assets. USCIS may consider such factors as the number of years the petitioner has been doing business, the established historical growth of the petitioner's business, the overall number of employees, the occurrence of any uncharacteristic business expenditures or losses, the petitioner's reputation within its industry, whether the beneficiary is replacing a former employee or an outsourced service, or any other evidence that USCIS deems relevant to the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage.

In the instant case, the petitioner's tax returns do not establish the continuous ability to pay the proffered wage based upon its net income or net current assets during any relevant year. Although the petitioner indicates on the Form ETA 750 that it has employed the beneficiary since 1996, the petitioner did not present any proof of wages paid to the beneficiary. The petitioner's gross receipts

have fluctuated significantly and decreased from 2001 to 2008. The petitioner's tax returns show negative net income in 2001, 2002, 2003 and 2008. The record does not establish that the petitioner's reputation in the industry is such that it is more likely than not that it has maintained the continuous ability to pay the proffered wage from the priority date onward. Thus, assessing the totality of the circumstances in this individual case, it is concluded that the petitioner has not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage.

The evidence submitted does not establish that the petitioner had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date.

The petitioner has also not established that the beneficiary has two years of experience in the proffered position or one year of experience in an unidentified related occupation as required by the Form ETA 750, or the other required skills in box 15. An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. *See Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States*, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), *aff'd*, 345 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2003); *see also Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004) (noting that the AAO conducts appellate review on a *de novo* basis).

To determine whether a beneficiary is eligible for an employment based immigrant visa, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) must examine whether the alien's credentials meet the requirements set forth in the labor certification. In evaluating the beneficiary's qualifications, USCIS must look to the job offer portion of the labor certification to determine the required qualifications for the position. USCIS may not ignore a term of the labor certification, nor may it impose additional requirements. *See Matter of Silver Dragon Chinese Restaurant*, 19 I&N Dec. 401, 406 (Comm. 1986). *See also, Mandany v. Smith*, 696 F.2d 1008, (D.C. Cir. 1983); *K.R.K. Irvine, Inc. v. Landon*, 699 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1983); *Stewart Infra-Red Commissary of Massachusetts, Inc. v. Coomey*, 661 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1981). According to the plain terms of the labor certification, the applicant must have one year of experience in the job offered.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(l)(3) provides:

(ii) *Other documentation*—

(A) *General*. Any requirements of training or experience for skilled workers, professionals, or other workers must be supported by letters from trainers or employers giving the name, address, and title of the trainer or employer, and a description of the training received or the experience of the alien.

(B) *Skilled workers*. If the petition is for a skilled worker, the petition must be accompanied by evidence that the alien meets the educational, training or experience, and any other requirements of the individual labor certification, meets the requirements for Schedule A designation, or meets the requirements for the Labor Market Information Pilot Program occupation designation. The

minimum requirements for this classification are at least two years of training or experience.

Experience letters include the name, address, and title of the writer, and a specific description of the duties performed by the beneficiary. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(1) and (l)(3)(ii)(A). To establish that the beneficiary has the experience required by the labor certification the petitioner submitted the following documentation:

- A letter dated January 29, 2010 and signed by [REDACTED] which states that the beneficiary was employed by the author's business (" [REDACTED] " on the letterhead) from June of 1998 through October of 2001. The letter detailed the duties of the beneficiary. The letter does not state that the beneficiary was employed by that organization on a full-time basis during the employment dates listed.
- A letter dated January 29, 2010 and signed by [REDACTED] which states that the beneficiary "[collaborated] with us a few years ago doing paint work and remodeling pieces of art." The letterhead identifies the business name as Java. The letter is deficient and does not establish experience required by the labor certification in that the duties performed by the beneficiary are not specifically detailed, the letter does not state that the beneficiary was employed on a full-time basis and the letter does not list dates of employment. Additionally, without dates of employment, the AAO cannot determine whether this experience was obtained before the priority date.

The petitioner failed to list either employer providing the experience letters on the Form ETA 750 despite being instructed on the labor certification to name all employers within the past three years and any other jobs related to the occupation. This brings into question the legitimacy of the experience letters and those letters will not establish the required experience noted on the labor certification. *See Matter of Leung*, 16 I&N Dec. 2530 (BIA 1976), where the Board's dicta notes that the beneficiary's experience, without such fact certified by DOL on the beneficiary's Form ETA 750B lessens the credibility of the evidence and facts asserted. Therefore, the letters submitted fail to establish that the beneficiary has the experience required or the special skills for the position offered.

Section 203(b)(3)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(i), provides for the granting of preference classification to qualified immigrants who are capable, at the time of petitioning for classification under this paragraph, of performing skilled labor (requiring at least two years training or experience), not of a temporary nature, for which qualified workers are not available in the United States. Section 203(b)(3)(A)(iii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(iii), provides for the granting of preference classification to other qualified immigrants who are capable, at the time of petitioning for classification under this paragraph, of performing unskilled labor, not of a temporary or seasonal nature, for which qualified workers are not available in the United States.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(l) provides in pertinent part:

(4) Differentiating between skilled and other workers. The determination of whether a worker is a skilled or other worker will be based on the requirements of training and/or experience placed on the job by the prospective employer, as certified by the Department of Labor.

Here, the beneficiary may qualify for the offered position with either two years of experience in the proffered position, or only one year of experience in a related occupation (related occupation not identified). As the person may qualify for the position based on only one year of experience, the position's minimum requirements are less than required for a skilled worker. The evidence submitted does not establish that the minimum requirements of the petition requires at least two years of training or experience such that the beneficiary may be found qualified for classification as a skilled worker.

Accordingly, the petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and alternative basis for denial. In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, that burden has not been met.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.