


(b)(6)




U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services




Date: **OCT 22 2013**

Office: VERMONT SERVICE CENTER

FILE: 


IN RE:

Petitioner: 

PETITION:

Petition for U Nonimmigrant Classification as a Victim of a Qualifying Crime Pursuant to Section 101(a)(15)(U) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U).

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:




INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) in your case.

This is a non-precedent decision. The AAO does not announce new constructions of law nor establish agency policy through non-precedent decisions. If you believe the AAO incorrectly applied current law or policy to your case or if you seek to present new facts for consideration, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen, respectively. Any motion must be filed on a Notice of Appeal or Motion (Form I-290B) within 33 days of the date of this decision. **Please review the Form I-290B instructions at <http://www.uscis.gov/forms> for the latest information on fee, filing location, and other requirements. See also 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. Do not file a motion directly with the AAO.**

Thank you,


Ron Rosenberg
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office



DISCUSSION: The Director, Vermont Service Center (the director), denied the nonimmigrant visa petition and the matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner seeks nonimmigrant classification under section 101(a)(15)(U) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“the Act”), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U), as an alien victim of certain qualifying criminal activity.

The director denied the petition because the petitioner is not admissible to the United States and her request for an advanced waiver of inadmissibility (Form I-192) was denied. On appeal, counsel submits a brief and copies of previously submitted evidence.

Applicable Law

Section 101(a)(15)(U)(i) of the Act, provides for U nonimmigrant classification to alien victims of certain criminal activity who assist government officials in investigating or prosecuting such criminal activity. Section 212(d)(14) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(14), requires U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) to determine whether any grounds of inadmissibility exist when adjudicating a Form I-918 U petition, and provides USCIS with the authority to waive certain grounds of inadmissibility as a matter of discretion.

Section 212(a) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a), sets forth the grounds of inadmissibility to the United States, and states, in pertinent part:

(6) Illegal entrants and immigration violators.-

(A) Aliens present without permission or parole.-

(i) In general.-An alien present in the United States without being admitted or paroled, or who arrives in the United States at any time or place other than as designated by the Attorney General, is inadmissible.


(7) Documentation requirements.-

* * *

(B) Nonimmigrants.-

(i) In general.-Any nonimmigrant who-

(I) is not in possession of a passport valid for a minimum of six months from the date of the expiration of the initial period of the alien's admission or contemplated initial period of stay authorizing the alien to return to the country from which the alien came or to proceed to and enter some other country during such period, or



(II) is not in possession of a valid nonimmigrant visa or border crossing identification card at the time of application for admission, is inadmissible.

Section 212(a)(2) of the Act pertains to criminal and related grounds of inadmissibility and states, in pertinent part:

(A) Conviction of certain crimes.

(i) In general. Except as provided in clause (ii), any alien convicted of, or who admits having committed, or who admits committing acts which constitute the essential elements of. . .

(I) a crime involving moral turpitude (other than a purely political offense) or an attempt or conspiracy to commit such a crime . . .

* * *

is inadmissible.

All nonimmigrants must establish their admissibility to the United States or show that any grounds of inadmissibility have been waived. 8 C.F.R § 214.1(a)(3)(i). For aliens seeking U nonimmigrant status who are inadmissible to the United States, the regulations at 8 C.F.R §§ 212.17, 214.14(c)(2)(iv) require the filing of an Application for Advance Permission to Enter as a Nonimmigrant (Form I-192) in conjunction with a Form I-918 U petition in order to waive any ground of inadmissibility.

Facts and Procedural History

The petitioner is a native and citizen of Guatemala who claims to have last entered the United States in 1989 without being inspected, admitted or paroled by an immigration officer. The petitioner filed the instant Form I-918 U petition and the Form I-192 on July 8, 2011. On December 5, 2012, the director denied the Form I-918 petition and the Form I-192 application. In his decision on the Form I-918 petition, the director stated that the petitioner was not eligible for U nonimmigrant status because she was inadmissible and her request for a waiver of inadmissibility had been denied.

Counsel does not appear to dispute the director's determination that the petitioner is inadmissible to the United States. Instead, counsel asserts that USCIS made multiple errors in its decision to deny the Form I-192 and that some of the evidence submitted was ignored.

Analysis

The AAO conducts appellate review on a de novo basis. See *Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004). The regulations at 8 C.F.R §§ 212.17, 214.14(c)(2)(iv) require the filing of a Form I-192 application in order to waive any ground of inadmissibility. The regulation at 8 C.F.R.

§ 212.17(b)(3) states in pertinent part: “There is no appeal of a decision to deny a waiver.” As the AAO does not have jurisdiction to review whether the director properly denied the Form I-192 application, the AAO does not consider whether approval of the Form I-192 application should have been granted. The only issue before the AAO is whether the director was correct in finding the petitioner to be inadmissible and, therefore, requiring an approved Form I-192 pursuant to 8 C.F.R. §§ 212.17, 214.14(c)(2)(iv). We concur with the director’s determination that the applicant is inadmissible.

The director determined that the petitioner met all the statutory eligibility criteria for U nonimmigrant status, but found the petitioner inadmissible under section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), as an alien who has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT), section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Act, as an alien present without admission or parole, and section 212(a)(7)(B)(i), as an alien without a valid passport. The record shows that the petitioner is inadmissible to the United States under sections 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), (6)(A)(i), and (7)(B)(i) of the Act. The petitioner does not deny that she last entered the United States without being inspected, admitted or paroled by an immigration officer, or that she lacks a valid passport. Therefore, she is inadmissible under sections 212(a)(6)(A)(i) and (7)(B)(i) of the Act.

In addition, the petitioner’s criminal history shows she has been convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude. Under section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), an alien is inadmissible if he or she has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. The term “crime involving moral turpitude” is not defined in the Act or the regulations, but has been part of the immigration laws since 1891. *Jordan v. De George*, 341 U.S. 223, 229 (1951) (noting that the term first appeared in the Act of March 3, 1891, 26 Stat. 1084). The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) has explained that moral turpitude “refers generally to conduct which is inherently base, vile, or depraved, and contrary to the accepted rules of morality and the duties owed between persons or to society in general.” *Matter of Franklin*, 20 I&N Dec 867, 868 (BIA 1994), *aff’d*, 72 F.3d 571 (8th Cir. 1995). A crime involving moral turpitude must involve both reprehensible conduct and some degree of scienter, be it specific intent, deliberateness, willfulness or recklessness. *Matter of Silva-Trevino*, 24 I&N Dec. 687, 689 n.1, 706 (A.G. 2008).

On November 20, 1997, the petitioner was convicted of theft in the Superior Court of Los Angeles, California, in violation of section 484(a) of the California Penal Code (Cal. Penal Code). At the time of the applicant’s conviction for petty theft, Cal. Penal Code § 484(a) provided, in pertinent part:

Every person who shall feloniously steal, take, carry, lead, or drive away the personal property of another, or who shall fraudulently appropriate property which has been entrusted to him, or who shall knowingly and designedly, by any false or fraudulent representation or pretense, defraud any other person of money, labor or real or personal property, or who causes or procures others to report falsely of his wealth or mercantile character and by thus imposing upon any person, obtains credit and thereby fraudulently gets or obtains possession of money, or property or obtains the labor or service of another, is guilty of theft. . . .

The BIA and federal courts have long held that the crime of theft or larceny, whether grand or petty, generally involves moral turpitude. See *Matter of Scarpulla*, 15 I&N Dec. 139, 140 (BIA 1974) (stating, “It is well settled that theft or larceny, whether grand or petty, has always been held to involve moral turpitude . . .”); *Morasch v. INS*, 363 F.2d 30, 31 (9th Cir. 1966) (stating, “Obviously, either petty or grand larceny, i.e., stealing another’s property, qualifies [as a crime involving moral turpitude].”) However, a conviction for theft is considered to involve moral turpitude only when a permanent taking is intended. *Matter of Grazley*, 14 I&N Dec. 330 (BIA 1973). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that a conviction for theft (grand or petty) under the California Penal Code requires the specific intent to deprive the victim of his or her property permanently. *Castillo-Cruz v. Holder*, 581 F.3d 1154, 1160 (9th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). Thus, the petitioner is inadmissible under section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Act for having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.


On July 7, 2009, the petitioner was convicted of burglary in the second degree in the Superior Court of Los Angeles, California, in violation of section 459 of the Cal. Penal Code. At the time of the applicant’s conviction for second degree commercial burglary, Cal. Penal Code § 459 provided, in pertinent part:

Every person who enters any house, room, apartment, tenement, shop, warehouse, store, mill, barn, stable, outhouse or other building, tent, vessel, railroad car, locked or sealed cargo container, whether or not mounted on a vehicle, trailer coach, as defined in Section 635 of the Vehicle Code, any house car, as defined in Section 362 of the Vehicle Code, inhabited camper, as defined in Section 243 of the Vehicle Code, vehicle as defined by the Vehicle Code when the doors of such vehicle are locked, aircraft as defined by the Harbors and Navigation Code, mine or any underground portion thereof, with intent to commit grand or petit larceny or any felony is guilty of burglary. As used in this chapter, “inhabited” means currently being used for dwelling purposes, whether occupied or not.

The BIA has maintained that the determinative factor in assessing whether burglary involves moral turpitude is whether the crime intended to be committed at the time of entry or prior to the breaking out involves moral turpitude. *Matter of M-*, 2 I&N Dec. 721, 723 (BIA 1946). For example, the BIA has held that burglary with intent to commit theft is a crime involving moral turpitude. See *Matter of Frentescu*, 18 I&N Dec. 244 (BIA 1982). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has similarly held that burglary with the intent to commit theft is a crime involving moral turpitude. See *Cuevas-Gaspar v. Gonzales*, 430 F.3d 1013, 1020 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Because the underlying crime of theft or larceny is a crime of moral turpitude, unlawfully entering a residence with intent to commit theft or larceny therein is likewise a crime involving moral turpitude.”). The record of conviction shows that the petitioner was convicted for burglary in the second degree with the intent to commit larceny. Thus, the petitioner’s conviction for burglary is also a conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude.

The petitioner therefore cannot be granted U-1 nonimmigrant status because she is inadmissible under sections 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), (6)(A)(i), and (7)(B)(i) of the Act, her Form I-192 waiver

(b)(6)



NON-PRECEDENT DECISION

Page 6

application has been denied, and we have no jurisdiction to review the denial of a Form I-192 submitted in connection with a U petition. 8 C.F.R. § 212.17(b)(3).

Conclusion

In visa petition proceedings, it is the petitioner's burden to establish eligibility for the immigration benefit sought. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361; *Matter of Otiende*, 26 I&N Dec. 127, 128 (BIA 2013). Here, that burden has not been met.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.