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U.S. Citizenship
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FILE:

CDJ 2001 768 501

Office: MEXICO CITY (CIUDAD JUAREZ)

Date:

IN RE:

APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v)
of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(9)(B)(v)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

SELF-REPRESENTED

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. Please refer to 8 C.F.R. § 103.5 for the specific requirements. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$585. Any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen, as required by 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i).

Perry Rhew
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The waiver application was denied by the District Director, Mexico City, Mexico. The matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant, [REDACTED], is a native and citizen of Mexico. He was found to be inadmissible to the United States pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), for having been unlawfully present in the United States for more than one year and seeking admission within 10 years of his last departure from the United States. The applicant seeks a waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(9)(B)(v), in order to return to the United States to join his U.S. citizen spouse and three children.

The District Director concluded that the applicant had failed to establish that his bar to admission would impose extreme hardship on a qualifying relative, his United States citizen spouse, and denied the Application for Waiver of Ground of Excludability (Form I-601) accordingly.

On appeal, the applicant's spouse asserts that she and her children would like the applicant to return to the United States to be with them as a whole family. She states that her three children suffer without the applicant and ask questions about when he is coming home. She states that it is hard for her to provide for her children and take care of their daily needs without the applicant.

In support of the application, the record contains, but is not limited to, a letter from the applicant's spouse, letters from the applicant's children's teachers, letters from the applicant's employer, and copies of the applicant's earnings and deductions statements. The entire record was reviewed and considered in rendering a decision on the appeal.

Section 212(a)(9)(B) of the Act provides, in pertinent part:

(i) In general. - Any alien (other than an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence) who-

....

(II) has been unlawfully present in the United States for one year or more, and who again seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal from the United States, is inadmissible.

....

(v) Waiver. - The Attorney General [now the Secretary of Homeland Security (Secretary)] has sole discretion to waive clause (i) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse or son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the [Secretary] that the refusal of admission to such

immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such alien.

The record shows that the applicant entered the United States without inspection in August 1991. The applicant remained in the United States until departing in February 2006. The applicant accrued unlawful presence from April 1, 1997, the date of the enactment of unlawful presence provisions under the Act, until February 2006. The applicant does not dispute this on appeal. The applicant is attempting to seek admission into the United States within ten years of his February 2006 departure from the United States. The applicant is, therefore, inadmissible to the United States under section 212(a)(9)(B)(II) of the Act for having been unlawfully present in the United States for a period of more than one year and seeking admission to the United States within ten years of his last departure.

A section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) waiver of the bar to admission resulting from section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Act is dependent first upon a showing that the bar imposes an extreme hardship to the U.S. citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of the applicant. Hardship the alien himself experiences upon deportation is irrelevant to section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) waiver proceedings. Once extreme hardship is established, it is but one favorable factor to be considered in the determination of whether the Secretary should exercise discretion. *See Matter of Mendez*, 21 I&N Dec. 296 (BIA 1996).

The concept of extreme hardship to a qualifying relative “is not . . . fixed and inflexible,” and whether extreme hardship has been established is determined based on an examination of the facts of each individual case. *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. 560, 565 (BIA 1999). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) set forth a list of non-exclusive factors relevant to determining whether an applicant has established extreme hardship to a qualifying relative pursuant to section 212(i) of the Act. These factors include, with respect to the qualifying relative, the presence of family ties to United States citizens or lawful permanent residents in the United States, family ties outside the United States, country conditions where the qualifying relative would relocate and family ties in that country, the financial impact of departure, and significant health conditions, particularly where there is diminished availability of medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate. *Id.* at 566.

Relevant factors, though not extreme in themselves, must be considered in the aggregate in determining whether extreme hardship exists. In each case, the trier of fact must consider the entire range of factors concerning hardship in their totality and determine whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond those hardships ordinarily associated with deportation. *Matter of O-J-O-*, 21 I&N Dec. 381, 383 (BIA 1996) (citations omitted).

An analysis under *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez* is appropriate. The AAO notes that extreme hardship to a qualifying relative must be established in the event that he or she accompanies the applicant or in the event that he or she remains in the United States, as a qualifying relative is not required to reside outside of the United States based on the denial of the applicant’s waiver request.

The record contains a letter from the applicant's spouse, dated March 3, 2006, which was initially filed with the applicant's waiver application. The applicant's spouse asserts in her letter that it is emotionally hard for her to be separated from the applicant. She states that she is very afraid of the psychological problems the applicant's absence will cause to her 6-year-old son, [REDACTED] and 4-year-old daughter, [REDACTED]. She states that her children's teachers have noticed a change in their behavior. She states that her husband's absence will create a financial burden on the household. She states that she has no job and has always been a housewife and cared for her children. She states that she has no special skills and would not be able to find a job to afford daycare for three children, pay household expenses, and feed a family of four. She states that if her husband does not return, he will lose his job, which he has held for the last four years.

The AAO will consider financial hardship as a factor contributing to a finding of extreme hardship. However, the record in the present case fails to provide a clear picture of the applicant's spouse's financial situation. The notice of appeal was filed on April 17, 2007, over one year since the applicant's departure from the United States. The applicant's spouse failed to demonstrate, on appeal, how she is supporting herself and her three children without the applicant's presence in the United States. There is no documentation in the record of her expenses and other liabilities. Nor does the record indicate her source of financial support. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). While the applicant's spouse's unsupported assertions are relevant and have been considered, they are of little weight in the absence of supporting evidence. For these reasons, the AAO cannot conclude that the applicant's spouse is suffering from financial hardship due to the applicant's inadmissibility.

The AAO recognizes that the applicant's spouse and children are suffering emotionally as a result of their separation from the applicant. Their situation, however, is typical of individuals separated as a result of removal or inadmissibility and does not rise to the level of extreme hardship based on the record. While, in common parlance, the prospect of separation or involuntary relocation nearly always results in considerable hardship to individuals and families, in specifically limiting the availability of a waiver of inadmissibility to cases of "extreme hardship," Congress did not intend that a waiver be granted in every case where a qualifying relationship exists. The point made in this and prior decisions on this matter is that the current state of the law, viewed from a legislative, administrative, or judicial point of view, requires that the hardship be above and beyond the normal, expected hardship involved in such cases. U.S. court decisions have repeatedly held that the common results of removal are insufficient to prove extreme hardship. *See Hassan v. INS*, 927 F.2d 465, 468 (9th Cir. 1991), *Perez v. INS*, 96 F.3d 390 (9th Cir. 1996); *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. 627 (BIA 1996) (holding that emotional hardship caused by severing family and community ties is a common result of deportation and does not constitute extreme hardship); *Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. 810 (BIA 1968) (holding that separation of family members and financial difficulties alone do not establish extreme hardship); *Shoostary v. INS*, 39 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 1994) ("the extreme hardship requirement . . . was not enacted to insure that the family members of excludable aliens fulfill their dreams or continue in the lives which they currently enjoy. The uprooting of family, the separation from friends, and other normal processes of readjustment to one's home

country after having spent a number of years in the United States are not considered extreme, but represent the type of inconvenience and hardship experienced by the families of most aliens in the respondent's circumstances.”).

Furthermore, the applicant's spouse has only discussed the hardship she would suffer if she remains in the United States separated from the applicant. The applicant's spouse has not asserted, or submitted evidence to demonstrate, that she would suffer extreme hardship in Mexico if she relocated with her children there. Accordingly, the AAO cannot determine that the applicant's spouse would suffer extreme hardship if she relocated to Mexico.

In this case, the record does not contain sufficient evidence to show that the hardships faced by the applicant's spouse, considered in the aggregate, rise beyond the common results of removal or inadmissibility to the level of extreme hardship. The AAO therefore finds that the applicant has failed to establish eligibility for a waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act. Having found the applicant statutorily ineligible for relief, no purpose would be served in discussing whether he merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. *See* section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.