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U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U. S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Office of Administrative Appeals MS 2090
Washington, DC 20529-2090



**U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services**

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FILE: [REDACTED]
(CDJ 2004 747 840 relates)

Office: MEXICO CITY (CIUDAD JUAREZ)

DATE: **OCT 26 2009**

IN RE: Applicant: [REDACTED]

APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

SELF-REPRESENTED

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. Please refer to 8 C.F.R. § 103.5 for the specific requirements. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$585. Any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen, as required by 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i).

Perry Rhew
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The waiver application was denied by the District Director, Mexico City, Mexico, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The record establishes that the applicant, a native and citizen of Mexico, entered the United States without authorization in April 1998 and did not depart until March 2005. The applicant was thus found to be inadmissible to the United States pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), for having been unlawfully present in the United States for more than one year. The applicant does not contest the district director's finding of inadmissibility. Rather, he seeks a waiver of inadmissibility in order to reside in the United States with his U.S. citizen spouse and child, born in 2005.

The district director concluded that the applicant had failed to establish that extreme hardship would be imposed on a qualifying relative and denied the Application for Waiver of Ground of Excludability (Form I-601) accordingly. *Decision of the District Director*, dated October 24, 2006.

In support of the appeal, the applicant's spouse submitted a letter, dated November 13, 2006, and a copy of her U.S. citizen child's birth certificate. In addition, on April 11, 2007, the AAO received supplemental documentation in support of the appeal.¹

Section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Act provides, in pertinent part:

Aliens Unlawfully Present.-

(i) In general. - Any alien (other than an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence) who-

....

(II) has been unlawfully present in the United States for one year or more, and who again seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal from the United States, is inadmissible.

¹ 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(3) states:

(3) Translations. Any document containing foreign language submitted to the Service [now the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)] shall be accompanied by a full English language translation which the translator has certified as complete and accurate, and by the translator's certification that he or she is competent to translate from the foreign language into English.

The applicant submitted multiple documents on appeal that are not in English and/or are not translated into English. As the AAO cannot determine whether said documentation supports the applicant's claims for a waiver, these documents are not probative and will not be accorded any weight in this proceeding.

....

(v) Waiver. – The Attorney General [now the Secretary of Homeland Security (Secretary)] has sole discretion to waive clause (i) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse or son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General (Secretary) that the refusal of admission to such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such alien...

Section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act provides that a waiver under section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Act is applicable solely where the applicant establishes extreme hardship to his or her citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent. Unlike waivers under section 212(h) of the Act, section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) does not mention extreme hardship to a United States citizen or lawful permanent resident child. Nor is extreme hardship to the applicant himself a permissible consideration under the statute. In the present case, the applicant's U.S. citizen spouse is the only qualifying relative, and hardship to the applicant and/or their child cannot be considered, except as it may affect the applicant's spouse.

In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. 560, 565-66 (BIA 1999), the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) provided a list of factors it deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship to a qualifying relative. The factors include the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate.

Relevant factors, though not extreme in themselves, must be considered in the aggregate in determining whether extreme hardship exists. In each case, the trier of fact must consider the entire range of factors concerning hardship in their totality and determine whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond those hardships ordinarily associated with deportation. *Matter of O-J-O-*, 21 I&N Dec. 381, 383 (BIA 1996). (Citations omitted).

The applicant's U.S. citizen spouse contends that she will suffer emotional, physical and financial hardship if the applicant's waiver request is not granted. In a declaration she states that she is experiencing emotional hardship due to the supportive and loving relationship she has with her spouse. She further contends that she is suffering physically, as she has been diagnosed with a gastric ulcer condition and diabetes. Finally, the applicant's spouse contends that she is suffering financial hardship because she is maintaining two households, one in the United States and one in Mexico. *Letters from [REDACTED]* dated November 13, 2006 and April 3, 2007.

To support the physical and mental hardship noted by the applicant's spouse in her declaration, evidence of medications prescribed to the applicant's spouse in September 2006 and January 2007 have been provided. No documentation has been provided by the applicant's spouse's treating physician(s) outlining in detail the applicant's spouse's current medical and/or mental health situation, the severity of the situation, the relevance of the prescriptions to the applicant's spouse's health and the short and long-term treatment plan. The documentation referenced above thus fails to establish that the applicant's spouse's continued care and survival directly correlate to the applicant's physical presence in the United States. In addition, it has not been established that the applicant's spouse is unable to travel to Mexico to visit her spouse on a regular basis. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)).

Although the depth of concern and anxiety over the applicant's inadmissibility is neither doubted or minimized, the fact remains that Congress provided for a waiver of inadmissibility only under limited circumstances. In nearly every qualifying relationship, whether between husband and wife or parent and child, there is a deep level of affection and a certain amount of emotional and social interdependence. While, in common parlance, the prospect of separation or involuntary relocation nearly always results in considerable hardship to individuals and families, in specifically limiting the availability of a waiver of inadmissibility to cases of "extreme hardship," Congress did not intend that a waiver be granted in every case where a qualifying relationship exists. The current state of the law, viewed from a legislative, administrative, or judicial point of view, requires that the hardship be above and beyond the normal, expected hardship involved in such cases. U.S. court decisions have repeatedly held that the common results of removal are insufficient to prove extreme hardship. See *Hassan v. INS*, 927 F.2d 465, 468 (9th Cir. 1991), *Perez v. INS*, 96 F.3d 390 (9th Cir. 1996); *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. 627 (BIA 1996) (holding that emotional hardship caused by severing family and community ties is a common result of deportation and does not constitute extreme hardship); *Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. 810 (BIA 1968) (holding that separation of family members and financial difficulties alone do not establish extreme hardship). "[O]nly in cases of great actual or prospective injury . . . will the bar be removed." *Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. 245, 246 (BIA 1984).

As for the financial hardship referenced by the applicant's spouse, the AAO notes that courts considering the impact of financial detriment on a finding of extreme hardship have repeatedly held that, while it must be considered in the overall determination, "[e]conomic disadvantage alone does not constitute "extreme hardship." *Ramirez-Durazo v. INS*, 794 F.2d 491, 497 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that "lower standard of living in Mexico and the difficulties of readjustment to that culture and environment . . . simply are not sufficient.").

The record establishes that the applicant has been gainfully employed since August 2005. See *Letter from* [REDACTED] dated March 27, 2007. No documentation has been provided that outlines the applicant's spouse's current financial situation, including income, expenses, assets and liabilities, and her needs. In addition, the record fails to indicate what specific contributions the applicant made to the household prior to his departure from the United States, to establish that his physical absence is causing extreme financial hardship to his

spouse. Furthermore, it has not been established that the applicant is unable to obtain gainful employment abroad, thereby affording him the opportunity to assist his spouse with respect to their finances. While the applicant's spouse may need to make adjustments with respect to her financial situation and the maintenance of the household while the applicant resides abroad due to his inadmissibility, it has not been shown that such adjustments would cause the applicant's spouse extreme hardship.

The AAO recognizes that the applicant's spouse will endure hardship as a result of continued separation from the applicant. However, her situation, if she remains in the United States, is typical to individuals separated as a result of removal and does not rise to the level of extreme hardship based on the record. The AAO concludes that based on the evidence provided, it has not been established that the applicant's U.S. citizen spouse is suffering extreme emotional and/or financial hardship due to the applicant's inadmissibility.

Extreme hardship to a qualifying relative must also be established in the event that he or she accompanies the applicant abroad based on the denial of the applicant's waiver request. With respect to this criteria, the applicant's spouse asserts that she loves her country and has no desire to live elsewhere. *Supra* at 1. No documentation has been provided detailing the specific hardships the applicant's spouse would face were she to relocate abroad to reside with the applicant due to his inadmissibility. As noted above, assertions without supporting documentation do not suffice to establish extreme hardship. Thus, the applicant has failed to establish that his U.S. citizen spouse would suffer extreme hardship were she to relocate abroad to reside with the applicant due to his inadmissibility.

A review of the documentation in the record, when considered in its totality, reflects that the applicant has failed to establish that his U.S. citizen spouse would suffer extreme hardship if he were not permitted to reside in the United States, and moreover, the applicant has failed to establish that his U.S. citizen spouse would suffer extreme hardship were she to relocate abroad to reside with the applicant. The record demonstrates that the applicant's spouse faces no greater hardship than the unfortunate, but expected, disruptions, inconveniences, and difficulties arising whenever a spouse is removed from the United States or refused admission. Having found the applicant statutorily ineligible for relief, no purpose would be served in discussing whether the applicant merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. The waiver application is denied.