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
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U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Office of Administrative Appeals MS 2090
Washington, DC 20529-2090

**U.S. Citizenship
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


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
NOV 17 2010

IN RE:



APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under section 212(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:



INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied by us in reaching our decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. The specific requirements for filing such a request can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion. The fee for a Form I-290B is currently \$585, but will increase to \$630 on November 23, 2010. Any appeal or motion filed on or after November 23, 2010 must be filed with the \$630 fee. Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires that any motion be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,

Michael Shewary

f: Perry Rhew
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The waiver application was denied by the Officer in Charge (OIC), Vienna, Austria, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of Poland who was found to be inadmissible to the United States pursuant to section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), for having committed a crime involving moral turpitude. The applicant seeks a waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to section 212(h) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h). The OIC concluded that the applicant had failed to establish that his bar to admission would impose extreme hardship on a qualifying relative, and denied the Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility (Form I-601) accordingly. We note that the OIC indicated that the applicant's offense is within the definition of "crime of violence" under 18 U.S.C. § 16.

On appeal, counsel contends that U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) erred in finding the applicant inadmissible for having violated Article 283 of the Polish Penal Code. Counsel contends that USCIS does not allege that the applicant committed a crime involving moral turpitude or a crime of violence. He states that Article 283 of the Polish Penal Code as applied to the applicant's case does not carry a maximum sentence of five years imprisonment. Further, he asserts that the applicant's sentence was for 300 hours of community service, and that in the United States his sentence is the equivalent of a misdemeanor. Counsel avers that Poland's legal system does not distinguish between felony and misdemeanor offenses, and that a court's decision regulates the sentencing guidelines. Counsel indicates that the judge's letter and the judgment relating to the applicant state that "the offense is of a lesser degree." Counsel conveys that both the judgment and the judge's opinion indicate that the conduct of which the applicant was convicted would not result in any imprisonment in Polish Courts, and consequently, his offense would not be characterized as a misdemeanor under U.S. law. Counsel contends that the fact that the Polish Court did not apply the minimum sentence of three months imprisonment supports his opinion that the offense is a petty offense.

We will first address the finding of inadmissibility. Section 212(a)(2)(A) of the Act states, in pertinent parts:

- (i) [A]ny alien convicted of, or who admits having committed, or who admits committing acts which constitute the essential elements of—
 - (I) a crime involving moral turpitude (other than a purely political offense) or an attempt or conspiracy to commit such a crime . . . is inadmissible.
- (ii) Exception.—Clause (i)(I) shall not apply to an alien who committed only one crime if-

(I) the crime was committed when the alien was under 18 years of age, and the crime was committed (and the alien was released from any confinement to a prison or correctional institution imposed for the crime) more than 5 years before the date of the application for a visa or other documentation and the date of application for admission to the United States, or

(II) the maximum penalty possible for the crime of which the alien was convicted (or which the alien admits having committed or of which the acts that the alien admits having committed constituted the essential elements) did not exceed imprisonment for one year and, if the alien was convicted of such crime, the alien was not sentenced to a term of imprisonment in excess of 6 months (regardless of the extent to which the sentence was ultimately executed).

The Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) held in *Matter of Perez-Contreras*, 20 I&N Dec. 615, 617-18 (BIA 1992), that:

[M]oral turpitude is a nebulous concept, which refers generally to conduct that shocks the public conscience as being inherently base, vile, or depraved, contrary to the rules of morality and the duties owed between man and man, either one's fellow man or society in general....

In determining whether a crime involves moral turpitude, we consider whether the act is accompanied by a vicious motive or corrupt mind. Where knowing or intentional conduct is an element of an offense, we have found moral turpitude to be present. However, where the required mens rea may not be determined from the statute, moral turpitude does not inhere.

(Citations omitted.)

In *Matter of Silva-Trevino*, 24 I&N Dec. 687 (A.G. 2008), the Attorney General articulated a new methodology for determining whether a conviction is a crime involving moral turpitude where the language of the criminal statute in question encompasses conduct involving moral turpitude and conduct that does not. First, in evaluating whether an offense is one that categorically involves moral turpitude, an adjudicator reviews the criminal statute at issue to determine if there is a “realistic probability, not a theoretical possibility,” that the statute would be applied to reach conduct that does not involve moral turpitude. *Id.* at 698 (citing *Gonzalez v. Duenas-Alvarez*, 549 U.S. 183, 193 (2007)). A realistic probability exists where, at the time of the proceeding, an “actual (as opposed to hypothetical) case exists in which the relevant criminal statute was applied to conduct that did not involve moral turpitude. If the statute has not been so applied in any case (including the alien’s own case), the adjudicator can reasonably conclude that all convictions under the statute may categorically be treated as ones involving moral turpitude.” *Id.* at 697, 708 (citing *Duenas-Alvarez*, 549 U.S. at 193).

However, if a case exists in which the criminal statute in question was applied to conduct that does not involve moral turpitude, “the adjudicator cannot categorically treat all convictions under that statute as convictions for crimes that involve moral turpitude.” 24 I&N Dec. at 697 (citing *Duenas-Alvarez*, 549 U.S. at 185-88, 193). An adjudicator then engages in a second-stage inquiry in which the adjudicator reviews the “record of conviction” to determine if the conviction was based on conduct involving moral turpitude. *Id.* at 698-699, 703-704, 708. The record of conviction consists of documents such as the indictment, the judgment of conviction, jury instructions, a signed guilty plea, and the plea transcript. *Id.* at 698, 704, 708.

If review of the record of conviction is inconclusive, an adjudicator then considers any additional evidence deemed necessary or appropriate to resolve accurately the moral turpitude question. 24 I&N Dec. at 699-704, 708-709. However, this “does not mean that the parties would be free to present any and all evidence bearing on an alien’s conduct leading to the conviction. (citation omitted). The sole purpose of the inquiry is to ascertain the nature of the prior conviction; it is not an invitation to relitigate the conviction itself.” *Id.* at 703.

With regard to the applicant’s criminal convictions, his sentencing document reflects that on July 20, 2005, the applicant and two other people were charged with two counts. The first count is as follows:

[Committing] a robbery on [REDACTED] in the way that they threatened him with an immediate use of force conspicuously presenting their physical advantage, then stealing a mobile phone . . . which was in the hands of the harmed person . . . this being a minor offense,

i.e. an offense from art. 283 in connection with art[.] 280 § 1 of the Penalty Code

For the second count, the sentencing document states that on July 20, 2005, [REDACTED] acting jointly and in collusion with the applicant was charged with having:

Committed a robbery on [REDACTED] in the way that they threatened him with an immediate use of force conspicuously presenting their physical advantage, then stealing a mobile phone . . . this being a minor offense,

i.e. an offense from art. 283 in connection with art[.] 280 § 1 of the Penalty Code

The applicant was found guilty of the two charges, and was ordered to perform 10 months of community service.

The AAO notes that the applicant did not submit into the record a copy of Article 283 and section 1 of Article 280 of the Penal Code of Poland, which are the articles describing his crimes.

The applicant was convicted of two robbery offenses. In *Matter of F*, 2 I&N Dec. 517 (BIA 1946), wherein the respondent was caught taking a purse from the person of another in violation of section 379 of the Criminal Code of Canada, the Board analyzed whether the crime of robbery involves moral turpitude. *Id.* at 520-521. Section 379 of the Criminal Code of Canada provided “[e]very one is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to 14 years' imprisonment who steals any chattel, money, or valuable security from the person of another.” *Id.* at 520-521. The Board stated that since section 379 does not create a different theft offense, but simply indicates the punishment for when the theft is from the person of another, in order to determine whether violation of section 379 involves moral turpitude it was necessary to turn to the definition of the crime of “theft or stealing” under section 347 of the Criminal Code of Canada, and then determine whether the respondent intended a “permanent taking.” *Id.* at 521. The Board conveyed that for the crime of theft in Canada to involve moral turpitude “there must be an affirmative showing that the theft was committed with the intention of permanently depriving the owner of his property.” *Id.* at 520. The Board concluded that the circumstances surrounding the respondent’s theft revealed that the crime was committed with the intent to permanently deprive the rightful owner of her property. *Id.* at 521.

In the instant case, the applicant was charged and convicted of two robberies. His conduct entailed the taking of a cell phone from the person of another. In view of the circumstances surrounding his crimes, as described in the sentencing document, there appears to be no question but that his theft of the cell phones was committed with the intent of a permanent taking, which renders the applicant inadmissible under section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Act. Thus, we agree with the officer-in-charge’s finding that the applicant is inadmissible for having committed a crime involving moral turpitude. As such, counsel’s contentions that USCIS does not allege in its decision that the applicant committed a crime involving moral turpitude is unpersuasive. Furthermore, we note that the judge’s May 5, 2008 letter does not discuss that theft element of the applicant’s offenses.

Lastly, the petty offense exception under section 212(a)(2)(A) of the Act does not apply in the instant case because the applicant has two convictions for robbery, a crime involving moral turpitude, and the petty offense exception applies only where one crime involving moral turpitude has been committed.

The waiver for inadmissibility under section 212(a)(2)(B) of the Act is found under section 212(h) of the Act. That section provides, in pertinent part:

(h) The Attorney General [Secretary of Homeland Security] may, in his discretion, waive the application of subparagraph (A)(i)(I) . . . of subsection (a)(2) . . . if -

. . .

(B) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse, parent, son, or daughter of a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General [Secretary] that the alien's denial of admission would result in extreme hardship to the United States citizen or lawfully resident spouse, parent, son, or daughter of such alien . . .

A section 212(h) waiver of the bar to admission resulting from violation of section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Act is dependent first upon a showing that the bar imposes an extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse, parent, son, or daughter of the applicant. Hardship to the applicant is not a consideration under the statute and will be considered only to the extent that it results in hardship to a qualifying relative. The qualifying relatives here are the applicant's lawful permanent resident parents. If extreme hardship to the qualifying relative is established, the Secretary then assesses whether an exercise of discretion is warranted. *See Matter of Mendez-Moralez*, 21 I&N Dec. 296 (BIA 1996).

As a qualifying relative is not required to depart the United States as a consequence of an applicant's inadmissibility, two distinct factual scenarios are possible should a waiver application be denied: either the qualifying relative will join the applicant to reside abroad or the qualifying relative will remain in the United States. Ascertaining the actual course of action to be taken is difficult, and it is complicated by the fact that an applicant may easily assert a plan for the qualifying relative to relocate abroad or to remain in the United States depending on which scenario presents the greatest prospective hardship, even though no intention exists to carry out the alleged plan in reality. Cf. *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. 880, 885 (BIA 1994) (addressing separation of minor child from both parents applying for suspension of deportation). Thus, we interpret the statutory language of the various waiver provisions in section 212 of the Act to require an applicant to establish extreme hardship to his or her qualifying relative(s) under both possible scenarios. To endure the hardship of separation when extreme hardship could be avoided by joining the applicant abroad, or to endure the hardship of relocation when extreme hardship could be avoided by remaining in the United States, is a matter of choice and not the result of removal or inadmissibility. As the Board stated in *Matter of Ige*:

[W]e consider the critical issue . . . to be whether a child would suffer extreme hardship if he accompanied his parent abroad. If, as in this case, no hardship would ensue, then the fact that the child might face hardship if left in the United States would be the result of parental choice, not the parent's deportation.

Id. See also *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. 627, 632-33 (BIA 1996).

Extreme hardship is "not a definable term of fixed and inflexible content or meaning," but "necessarily depends upon the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case." *Matter of Hwang*, 10 I&N Dec. 448, 451 (BIA 1964). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. 560, 565-66 (BIA 1999), the Board provided a list of factors it deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship to a qualifying relative. The factors include the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate. *Id.* The Board added that

not all of the foregoing factors need be analyzed in any given case and emphasized that the list of factors was not exclusive. *Id.* at 566.

The Board has also held that the common or typical results of deportation, removal and inadmissibility do not constitute extreme hardship, and has listed certain individual hardship factors considered common rather than extreme. These factors include: economic disadvantage, loss of current employment, inability to maintain one's present standard of living, inability to pursue a chosen profession, separation from family members, severing community ties, cultural readjustment after living in the United States for many years, cultural adjustment of qualifying relatives who have never lived outside the United States, inferior economic and educational opportunities in the foreign country, or inferior medical facilities in the foreign country. *See generally Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. at 568; *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. at 631-32; *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 883; *Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. 245, 246-47 (Comm'r 1984); *Matter of Kim*, 15 I&N Dec. 88, 89-90 (BIA 1974); *Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. 810, 813 (BIA 1968).

However, though hardships may not be extreme when considered abstractly or individually, the Board has made it clear that “[r]elevant factors, though not extreme in themselves, must be considered in the aggregate in determining whether extreme hardship exists.” *Matter of O-J-O-*, 21 I&N Dec. 381, 383 (BIA 1996) (quoting *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 882). The adjudicator “must consider the entire range of factors concerning hardship in their totality and determine whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond those hardships ordinarily associated with deportation.” *Id.*

We observe that the actual hardship associated with an abstract hardship factor such as family separation, economic disadvantage, cultural readjustment, et cetera, differs in nature and severity depending on the unique circumstances of each case, as does the cumulative hardship a qualifying relative experiences as a result of aggregated individual hardships. *See, e.g., In re Bing Chih Kao and Mei Tsui Lin*, 23 I&N Dec. 45, 51 (BIA 2001) (distinguishing *Matter of Pilch* regarding hardship faced by qualifying relatives on the basis of variations in the length of residence in the United States and the ability to speak the language of the country to which they would relocate).

Further, family separation has been found to be a common result of inadmissibility or removal in some cases. *See Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. at 813. Nevertheless, family ties are to be considered in analyzing hardship. *See Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. at 565-66. The question of whether family separation is the ordinary result of inadmissibility or removal may depend on the type of familial relationship considered. For example, in *Matter of Shaughnessy*, the Board considered the scenario of parents being separated from their soon-to-be adult son, finding that this separation would not result in extreme hardship to the parents. *Id.* at 811-12; *see also U.S. v. Arrieta*, 224 F.3d 1076, 1082 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Mr. Arrieta was not a spouse, but a son and brother. It was evident from the record that the effect of the deportation order would be separation rather than relocation.”). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the Board considered the scenario of the respondent’s spouse accompanying him to Mexico, finding that she would not experience extreme

hardship from losing “physical proximity to her family” in the United States. 22 I&N Dec. at 566-67.

The decision in *Cervantes-Gonzalez* reflects the norm that spouses reside with one another and otherwise establish a life together, such that separating from one another is likely to result in substantial hardship. It is common for both spouses to relocate abroad if one of them is not allowed to stay in the United States, which typically results in separation from other family members living in the United States. Other decisions reflect the expectation that minor children will remain with their parents, upon whom they usually depend for financial and emotional support. See, e.g., *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 886 (“[I]t is generally preferable for children to be brought up by their parents.”). Therefore, the most important single hardship factor may be separation, particularly where spouses and minor children are concerned. *Salcido-Salcido*, 138 F.3d at 1293 (quoting *Contreras-Buenfil v. INS*, 712 F.2d 401, 403 (9th Cir. 1983)); *Cerrillo-Perez*, 809 F.2d at 1422.

Regardless of the type of familial relationship involved, the hardship resulting from family separation is based on the actual impact of separation on an applicant, and all hardships must be considered in determining whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond the consequences ordinarily associated with removal or inadmissibility. *Matter of O-J-O-*, 21 I&N Dec. at 383. Indeed, the specific facts of a case may dictate that even the separation of a spouse and children from an applicant does not constitute extreme hardship. In *Matter of Ngai*, for instance, the Board did not find extreme hardship because the claims of hardship conflicted with evidence in the record and because the applicant and his spouse had been voluntarily separated from one another for 28 years. 19 I&N Dec. at 247. Nevertheless, though we require an applicant to show that a qualifying relative would experience extreme hardship both in the event of relocation and in the event of separation, in analyzing the latter scenario, we give considerable, if not predominant, weight to the hardship of separation itself, particularly in cases involving the separation of spouses from one another and/or minor children from a parent. *Salcido-Salcido*, 138 F.3d at 1293.

In regard to hardship to the applicant’s parents as a consequence of remaining in the United States without him, the record conveys that the applicant stated that his parents are enduring financial and emotional difficulties maintaining two separate households (theirs in the United States and his and his brother’s in Poland). Further, the applicant asserts that his mother has depression due to separation and that she is currently undergoing treatment. The record indicates that the applicant and his brother live in his family’s home, which will be sold if they move to the United States. The applicant’s father states in his letter dated August 17, 2007 that he has waited a long time to have his family in the United States.

We note that there is no documentation in the record corroborating the financial hardship to the applicant’s parents or of the depression of his mother. While we recognize that the applicant’s parents will endure emotional hardship as a result of separation from their son, the record reflects that the applicant is now almost 23 years old and is, therefore, no longer a minor child. Even though family separation has been found to involve moral turpitude in certain situations, we find that the type of emotional hardship in the instant case, that of the separation of a parent from an adult son, is

distinguishable from the emotional hardship that often characterizes extreme hardship, which is the separation of parents from minor children who are more financially and emotionally dependent upon a parent. In consideration of the hardship factors combined, the financial and emotional hardship of the applicant's parents, and the lack of evidence demonstrating financial hardship and depression of the applicant's mother, we cannot find that when all of the hardship factors are combined they establish extreme hardship to the applicant's parents.

There is no claim made in the record of extreme hardship to the applicant's parents if they joined their son to live in Poland. The burden of proof in this proceeding lies with the applicant, and "while an analysis of a given application includes a review of all claims put forth in light of the facts and circumstances of a case, such analysis does not extend to discovery of undisclosed negative impacts." *Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. 245, 247 (Comm'r 1984).

Based upon the record before the AAO, the applicant in this case fails to establish extreme hardship to a qualifying family member for purposes of relief under section 212(h) of the Act. Having found the applicant statutorily ineligible for relief, no purpose would be served in discussing whether he merits a waiver as a matter of discretion. Nevertheless, as the applicant's robbery offenses appear to be violent or dangerous crimes, the applicant would likely have to meet the heightened standards of 8 C.F.R. § 212.7(d) to warrant a favorable exercise of discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(h) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. See Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.