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**U.S. Department of Homeland Security**  
U.S. Immigration and Citizenship Services  
*Office of Administrative Appeals MS 2050*  
Washington, DC 20529-2090



**U.S. Citizenship  
and Immigration  
Services**

*H<sub>2</sub>*

FILE:

Office: MEXICO CITY (CIUDAD JUAREZ) Date: OCT 12 2010

IN RE:

Applicant:

APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under section 212(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

[REDACTED]

INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

Thank you,

*Michael Shumway*

*for* Perry Rhew  
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The waiver application was denied by the District Director, Mexico City, Mexico, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be sustained.

The record reflects that the applicant is a native and citizen of the Bahamas. On December 27, 2006, the applicant's fiancée filed the Petition for Alien Fiancé(e) (Form I-129F) with U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) on his behalf, which was approved on March 26, 2007. In connection with the application for a K-1 nonimmigrant visa, the district director determined that the applicant was inadmissible to the United States under section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), for having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. The district director indicated that the applicant sought a waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to section 212(h) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h). The district director found that the applicant had failed to establish that his bar to admission would impose extreme hardship on a qualifying relative, and denied the Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility (Form I-601) accordingly.

On appeal, counsel makes the following assertions. The applicant is eligible for a section 212(h) waiver as the crime rendering him inadmissible occurred more than 15 years ago. Since his driving under the influence conviction on May 11, 1999, the applicant has not been arrested. The applicant attended counseling and has been rehabilitated. The applicant requires medical treatment, and because of high blood pressure he is currently supported by his fiancée. The petitioner, a 57-year-old certified nurse, has known the applicant since 1995, and she dated him in [REDACTED] after his divorce. The petitioner lives alone in the United States, and she cannot relocate to the Bahamas because she owns a home in [REDACTED] and is employed there as a nurse.

The AAO will first address the finding of inadmissibility. Section 212(a)(2) of the Act states, in pertinent parts:

(i) [A]ny alien convicted of, or who admits having committed, or who admits committing acts which constitute the essential elements of –

(I) a crime involving moral turpitude (other than a purely political offense) or an attempt or conspiracy to commit such a crime . . . is inadmissible.

The record reflects that on [REDACTED], the applicant was convicted of "conspiracy to commit fraud" and "attempted fraud by false pretenses" in violation of the law of the Bahamas. He was sentenced to pay a fine or serve 30 days hard labor.

The Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) held in *Matter of Perez-Contreras*, 20 I&N Dec. 615, 617-18 (BIA 1992), that:

[M]oral turpitude is a nebulous concept, which refers generally to conduct that shocks the public conscience as being inherently base, vile, or depraved, contrary to the rules of morality and the duties owed between man and man, either one's fellow man or society in general....

In determining whether a crime involves moral turpitude, we consider whether the act is accompanied by a vicious motive or corrupt mind. Where knowing or intentional conduct is an element of an offense, we have found moral turpitude to be present. However, where the required mens rea may not be determined from the statute, moral turpitude does not inhere.

(Citations omitted.)

In the recently decided *Matter of Silva-Trevino*, 24 I&N Dec. 687 (A.G. 2008), the Attorney General articulated a new methodology for determining whether a conviction is a crime involving moral turpitude where the language of the criminal statute in question encompasses conduct involving moral turpitude and conduct that does not. First, in evaluating whether an offense is one that categorically involves moral turpitude, an adjudicator reviews the criminal statute at issue to determine if there is a “realistic probability, not a theoretical possibility,” that the statute would be applied to reach conduct that does not involve moral turpitude. *Id.* at 698 (citing *Gonzalez v. Duenas-Alvarez*, 549 U.S. 183, 193 (2007)). A realistic probability exists where, at the time of the proceeding, an “actual (as opposed to hypothetical) case exists in which the relevant criminal statute was applied to conduct that did not involve moral turpitude. If the statute has not been so applied in any case (including the alien’s own case), the adjudicator can reasonably conclude that all convictions under the statute may categorically be treated as ones involving moral turpitude.” *Id.* at 697, 708 (citing *Duenas-Alvarez*, 549 U.S. at 193).

However, if a case exists in which the criminal statute in question was applied to conduct that does not involve moral turpitude, “the adjudicator cannot categorically treat all convictions under that statute as convictions for crimes that involve moral turpitude.” *Silva-Trevino*, 24 I&N Dec. at 697 (citing *Duenas-Alvarez*, 549 U.S. at 185-88, 193). An adjudicator then engages in a second-stage inquiry in which the adjudicator reviews the “record of conviction” to determine if the conviction was based on conduct involving moral turpitude. *Id.* at 698-699, 703-704, 708. The record of conviction consists of documents such as the indictment, the judgment of conviction, jury instructions, a signed guilty plea, and the plea transcript. *Id.* at 698, 704, 708.

If review of the record of conviction is inconclusive, an adjudicator then considers any additional evidence deemed necessary or appropriate to resolve accurately the moral turpitude question. *Id.* at [REDACTED]. However, this “does not mean that the parties would be free to present any and all evidence bearing on an alien’s conduct leading to the conviction. (citation omitted). The sole purpose of the inquiry is to ascertain the nature of the prior conviction; it is not an invitation to relitigate the conviction itself.” *Id.* at 703.

The record of conviction reflects the following:

[The applicant] conspired with [REDACTED] to defraud the [REDACTED] [REDACTED] of \$650.00 by falsely pretending that one [REDACTED] had purchased \$650.00 in Money Order for him. [REDACTED] who was a [REDACTED] employee, sent \$650.00 worth of money orders, by telegram, to [the applicant], at

[REDACTED] then went to the [REDACTED] and collected the money.

The applicant's crimes of "conspiracy to commit fraud" and "attempted fraud by false pretenses," involve moral turpitude in view of *Jordan v. DeGeorge*, 341 U.S. 223, 232 (1951), wherein the U.S. Supreme Court stated that "[t]he phrase 'crime involving moral turpitude' has without exception been construed to embrace fraudulent conduct." Thus, the director was correct in finding him inadmissible under section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Act.

The applicant was also convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol. Simple driving under the influence is not a crime involving moral turpitude. *See Matter of Lopez-Meza*, 22 I&N Dec. 1188 (BIA 1999).

The waiver for inadmissibility under section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Act is found under section 212(h) of the Act. That section provides, in pertinent part:

- (h) The Attorney General [Secretary of Homeland Security] may, in his discretion, waive the application of subparagraph (A)(i)(I) . . . of subsection (a)(2) . . . if -
  - (1) (A) in the case of any immigrant it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General [Secretary] that -
    - (i) . . . the activities for which the alien is inadmissible occurred more than 15 years before the date of the alien's application for a visa, admission, or adjustment of status,
    - (ii) the admission to the United States of such alien would not be contrary to the national welfare, safety, or security of the United States, and
    - (iii) the alien has been rehabilitated . . .

Section 212(h)(1)(A) of the Act provides that the Attorney General may, in his discretion, waive the application of subparagraph (A)(i)(I) of subsection (a)(2) if the activities for which the alien is inadmissible occurred more than 15 years before the date of the alien's application for a visa, admission, or adjustment of status. Since the convictions rendering the applicant inadmissible occurred in 1970, which is more than 15 years ago, they are waivable under section 212(h)(1)(A) of the Act.

Section 212(h)(1)(A)(ii) and (iii) of the Act requires that the applicant's admission to the United States not be contrary to the national welfare, safety, or security of the United States; and that the applicant establish his rehabilitation. Evidence in the record to establish the applicant's eligibility under section 212(h)(1)(A)(ii) and (iii) of the Act consists of letters and an affidavit. The applicant's fiancée conveys in her affidavit subscribed on September 18, 2007, that she lives alone and needs the applicant's companionship. His daughter states in her letter dated September 20, 2007, that she has a close relationship with her father, and that she will have less stress if he were in the United States and had a daily relationship with her and her children. We note that the applicant was convicted of

driving under the influence in March 1999. Nevertheless, in view of the record, which shows that the applicant has not committed any crimes since March 1999, and that he has had a positive influence in the lives of his family members and fiancée, the AAO finds that the applicant has provided sufficient evidence to demonstrate that his admission to the United States is not contrary to the national welfare, safety, or security of the United States, and that he has been rehabilitated, as required by section 212(h)(1)(A)(ii) and (iii) of the Act.

In *Matter of Mendez-Moralez*, 21 I&N Dec. 296, 301 (BIA 1996), the Board stated that once eligibility for a waiver is established, it is one of the favorable factors to be considered in determining whether the Secretary should exercise discretion in favor of the waiver. Furthermore, the Board stated that:

In evaluating whether section 212(h)(1)(B) relief is warranted in the exercise of discretion, the factors adverse to the alien include the nature and underlying circumstances of the exclusion ground at issue, the presence of additional significant violations of this country's immigration laws, the existence of a criminal record, and if so, its nature and seriousness, and the presence of other evidence indicative of the alien's bad character or undesirability as a permanent resident of this country. The favorable considerations include family ties in the United States, residence of long duration in this country (particularly where alien began residency at a young age), evidence of hardship to the alien and his family if he is excluded and deported, service in this country's Armed Forces, a history of stable employment, the existence of property or business ties, evidence of value or service in the community, evidence of genuine rehabilitation if a criminal record exists, and other evidence attesting to the alien's good character (e.g., affidavits from family, friends and responsible community representatives).

*Id.* at 301.

The AAO must then, "[B]alance the adverse factors evidencing an alien's undesirability as a permanent resident with the social and humane considerations presented on the alien's behalf to determine whether the grant of relief in the exercise of discretion appears to be in the best interests of the country." *Id.* at 300. (Citations omitted).

The adverse factors in the present case are the criminal convictions of "conspiracy to commit fraud," "attempted fraud by false pretenses," and driving under the influence of alcohol. The favorable factors in the present case are the positive influence the applicant has had on his fiancée and family members; and the passage of 40 years since the criminal conviction that rendered the applicant inadmissible to the United States. The AAO finds that the crimes committed by the applicant are serious in nature; nevertheless, when taken together, we find the favorable factors in the present case outweigh the adverse factors, such that a favorable exercise of discretion is warranted. Accordingly, the appeal will be sustained.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(h) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility rests with the applicant. See section 291 of the Act. Here, the

applicant has now met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be sustained and the waiver application will be approved.

**ORDER:** The appeal is sustained.