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U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service  
Office of Administrative Appeals MS 2090  
Washington, DC 20529-2090



U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services

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FILE:



Office: MEXICO CITY, MEXICO

Date: SEP 23 2010

IN RE:



APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under section 212(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) and section 212(a)(9)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:




INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

Thank you,

Perry Rhew  
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office



**DISCUSSION:** The waiver application was denied by the Acting District Director, Mexico City, Mexico. The matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be sustained.

The record reflects that the applicant is a native and citizen of Mexico who was found to be inadmissible to the United States under section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), for having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. The applicant was also found to be inadmissible to the United States pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), for having been unlawfully present in the United States for more than one year and seeking readmission within ten years of his last departure from the United States. The applicant is the spouse of a U.S. citizen and has three U.S. citizen children. He seeks a waiver of inadmissibility in order to reside in the United States.

In a decision dated March 10, 2008, the acting district director found that the applicant failed to establish extreme hardship to his qualifying relatives as a result of his inadmissibility and did not warrant the favorable exercise of the Secretary's discretion. The application was denied accordingly.

In a Notice of Appeal to the AAO dated March 10, 2008, counsel states that the acting district director's decision was arbitrary in that it was based on incorrect findings of fact and incorrect conclusions of law.

The record indicates that the applicant entered the United States without inspection in May 1989. The applicant remained in the United States until June 2006. Therefore, the applicant accrued unlawful presence from April 1, 1997, the date the unlawful presence provisions were enacted until June 2006. In applying for an immigrant visa, the applicant is seeking admission within ten years of his June 2006 departure from the United States. Therefore, the applicant is inadmissible to the United States under section 212(a)(9)(B)(II) of the Act for being unlawfully present in the United States for a period of more than one year.

Section 212(a)(9)(B) of the Act provides, in pertinent part:

(B) Aliens Unlawfully Present.-

(i) In general. - Any alien (other than an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence) who-

....

(II) has been unlawfully present in the United States for one year or more, and who again seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal from the United States, is inadmissible.

The record also indicates that on June 10, 1997 the applicant was charged with Battery, a misdemeanor, in violation of section 12-3 or Article 5 of Chapter 720 of the Illinois Compiled Statutes (ILCS), and Aggravated Battery, a Class 3 Felony, in violation of 720 ILCS 5 § 12-4(B)(1). On April 13, 1998 the applicant pled guilty to battery in violation of 720 ILCS 5 § 12-3 and was sentenced to 18 months probation and 80 hours of community service. The charge for aggravated battery was stricken from the record. The AAO notes that the maximum sentence for a misdemeanor in Illinois is one year imprisonment.

The applicant, who was born on June 16, 1968, was 28 years old at the time the crime was committed.

Section 212(a)(2)(A) of the Act states, in pertinent parts:

(i) [A]ny alien convicted of, or who admits having committed, or who admits committing acts which constitute the essential elements of –

(I) a crime involving moral turpitude (other than a purely political offense) or an attempt or conspiracy to commit such a crime . . . is inadmissible.

(ii) Exception.—Clause (i)(I) shall not apply to an alien who committed only one crime if-

(I) the crime was committed when the alien was under 18 years of age, and the crime was committed (and the alien was released from any confinement to a prison or correctional institution imposed for the crime) more than 5 years before the date of the application for a visa or other documentation and the date of application for admission to the United States, or

(II) the maximum penalty possible for the crime of which the alien was convicted (or which the alien admits having committed or of which the acts that the alien admits having committed constituted the essential elements) did not exceed imprisonment for one year and, if the alien was convicted of such crime, the alien was not sentenced to a term of imprisonment in excess of 6 months (regardless of the extent to which the sentence was ultimately executed).

The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) held in *Matter of Perez-Contreras*, 20 I&N Dec. 615, 617-18 (BIA 1992), that:

[M]oral turpitude is a nebulous concept, which refers generally to conduct that shocks the public conscience as being inherently base, vile, or depraved, contrary to the rules of morality and the duties owed between man and man, either one's fellow man or society in general....

In determining whether a crime involves moral turpitude, we consider whether the act is accompanied by a vicious motive or corrupt mind. Where knowing or intentional conduct is an element of an offense, we have found moral turpitude to be present. However, where the required mens rea may not be determined from the statute, moral turpitude does not inhere.

(Citations omitted.)

In the recently decided *Matter of Silva-Trevino*, 24 I&N Dec. 687 (A.G. 2008), the Attorney General articulated a new methodology for determining whether a conviction is a crime involving moral turpitude where the language of the criminal statute in question encompasses conduct involving moral turpitude and conduct that does not. First, in evaluating whether an offense is one that categorically involves moral turpitude, an adjudicator reviews the criminal statute at issue to determine if there is a “realistic probability, not a theoretical possibility,” that the statute would be applied to reach conduct that does not involve moral turpitude. *Id.* at 698 (citing *Gonzalez v. Duenas-Alvarez*, 549 U.S. 183, 193 (2007)). A realistic probability exists where, at the time of the proceeding, an “actual (as opposed to hypothetical) case exists in which the relevant criminal statute was applied to conduct that did not involve moral turpitude. If the statute has not been so applied in any case (including the alien’s own case), the adjudicator can reasonably conclude that all convictions under the statute may categorically be treated as ones involving moral turpitude.” *Id.* at 697, 708 (citing *Duenas-Alvarez*, 549 U.S. at 193).

However, if a case exists in which the criminal statute in question was applied to conduct that does not involve moral turpitude, “the adjudicator cannot categorically treat all convictions under that statute as convictions for crimes that involve moral turpitude.” 24 I&N Dec. at 697 (citing *Duenas-Alvarez*, 549 U.S. at 185-88, 193). An adjudicator then engages in a second-stage inquiry in which the adjudicator reviews the “record of conviction” to determine if the conviction was based on conduct involving moral turpitude. *Id.* at 698-699, 703-704, 708. The record of conviction consists of documents such as the indictment, the judgment of conviction, jury instructions, a signed guilty plea, and the plea transcript. *Id.* at 698, 704, 708.

If review of the record of conviction is inconclusive, an adjudicator then considers any additional evidence deemed necessary or appropriate to resolve accurately the moral turpitude question. 24 I&N Dec. at 699-704, 708-709. However, this “does not mean that the parties would be free to present any and all evidence bearing on an alien’s conduct leading to the conviction. (citation omitted). The sole purpose of the inquiry is to ascertain the nature of the prior conviction; it is not an invitation to relitigate the conviction itself.” *Id.* at 703.

Chapter 720 ILCS Act 5 § 12-3 states:

(a) A person commits battery if he intentionally or knowingly without legal justification and by any means, (1) causes bodily harm to an individual or (2) makes physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature with an individual.

(b) Sentence. Battery is a Class A misdemeanor.

The AAO notes that as a general rule, simple assault or battery is not deemed to involve moral turpitude for purposes of the immigration laws. *Matter of Fualaau*, 21 I&N Dec. 475, 477 (BIA 1996). However, this general rule does not apply where an assault or battery necessarily involved some aggravating dimension, such as the use of a deadly weapon, serious bodily harm... *See, e.g., Matter of Danesh*, 19 I&N Dec. 669 (BIA 1988).

The AAO finds that the applicant's conviction is for simple battery with no aggravating factors as the aggravating factors that may have been involved in the commission of battery under § 12-3 are serious bodily harm and/or assault with a deadly weapon. Serious or great bodily harm is an element of the offense of aggravated battery under 720 ILCS 5 § 12-4. 720 ILCS 5 § 12-4 states that, "A person who, in committing a battery, intentionally or knowingly causes great bodily harm, or permanent disability or disfigurement commits aggravated battery." Assault with a deadly weapon is an element of the offense of aggravated assault under 720 ILCS 5 § 12-2(a)(1). 720 ILCS 5 § 12-2(a)(1) states that, "A person commits an aggravated assault, when, in committing an assault, he...uses a deadly weapon."

The record indicates that the applicant was charged with aggravated battery and pled not guilty to the charge. The applicant's charge was then amended to battery under 720 ILCS Act 5 § 12-3 for which he pled guilty. The AAO acknowledges that the complaint in connection with the applicant's conviction states that he hit a person over the head with a shovel. However, as stated above, the AAO cannot relitigate the applicant's conviction. The applicant was convicted of simple battery. Thus, the AAO finds that the applicant has not been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.

However, as stated above, the applicant is inadmissible under section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Act for unlawful presence and will require a waiver under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act in order to reside in the United States with his spouse and three children.

Section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act provides for a waiver of section 212(a)(9)(B)(i) inadmissibility as follows:

The Attorney General [now Secretary of Homeland Security] has sole discretion to waive clause (i) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse or son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established . . . that the refusal of admission to such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such alien.

A waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act is dependent on a showing that the bar to admission imposes extreme hardship on a qualifying relative, which includes the U.S. citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of the applicant. Hardship to the applicant or his children can be considered only insofar as it results in hardship to a qualifying relative. The applicant's spouse is the only qualifying relative in this case. If extreme hardship to a qualifying relative is established, the applicant is statutorily eligible for a waiver, and USCIS then assesses whether a favorable exercise of discretion is warranted. *See Matter of Mendez-Morales*, 21 I&N Dec. 296, 301 (BIA 1996).

As a qualifying relative is not required to depart the United States as a consequence of an applicant's inadmissibility, two distinct factual scenarios exist should a waiver application be denied: either the qualifying relative will join the applicant to reside abroad or the qualifying relative will remain in the United States. Ascertaining the actual course of action that will be taken is complicated by the fact that an applicant may easily assert a plan for the qualifying relative to relocate abroad or to remain in the United States depending on which scenario presents the greatest prospective hardship, even though no intention exists to carry out the alleged plan in reality. *Cf. Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. 880, 885 (BIA 1994) (addressing separation of minor child from both parents applying for suspension of deportation). Thus, we interpret the statutory language of the various waiver provisions in section 212 of the Act to require an applicant to establish extreme hardship to his or her qualifying relative(s) under both possible scenarios. To endure the hardship of separation when extreme hardship could be avoided by joining the applicant abroad, or to endure the hardship of relocation when extreme hardship could be avoided by remaining in the United States, is a matter of choice and not the result of removal or inadmissibility. As the Board of Immigration Appeals stated in *Matter of Ige*:

[W]e consider the critical issue . . . to be whether a child would suffer extreme hardship if he accompanied his parent abroad. If, as in this case, no hardship would ensue, then the fact that the child might face hardship if left in the United States would be the result of parental choice, not the parent's deportation.

*Id.* *See also Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. 627, 632-33 (BIA 1996)

Extreme hardship is "not a definable term of fixed and inflexible content or meaning," but "necessarily depends upon the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case." *Matter of Hwang*, 10 I&N Dec. 448, 451 (BIA 1964). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the Board provided a list of factors it deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship to a qualifying relative. 22 I&N Dec. 560, 565 (BIA 1999). The factors include the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate.

*Id.* The Board added that not all of the foregoing factors need be analyzed in any given case and emphasized that the list of factors was not exclusive. *Id.* at 566.

The Board has also held that the common or typical results of deportation, removal and inadmissibility do not constitute extreme hardship, and has listed certain individual hardship factors considered common rather than extreme. These factors include: economic disadvantage, loss of current employment, inability to maintain one's present standard of living, inability to pursue a chosen profession, separation from family members, severing community ties, cultural readjustment after living in the United States for many years, cultural adjustment of qualifying relatives who have never lived outside the United States, inferior economic and educational opportunities in the foreign country, or inferior medical facilities in the foreign country. *See generally Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. at 568; *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. at 631-32; *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 883; *Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. 245, 246-47 (Comm'r 1984); *Matter of Kim*, 15 I&N Dec. 88, 89-90 (BIA 1974); *Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. 810, 813 (BIA 1968).

However, though hardships may not be extreme when considered abstractly or individually, the Board has made it clear that "[r]elevant factors, though not extreme in themselves, must be considered in the aggregate in determining whether extreme hardship exists." *Matter of O-J-O-*, 21 I&N Dec. 381, 383 (BIA 1996) (quoting *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 882). The adjudicator "must consider the entire range of factors concerning hardship in their totality and determine whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond those hardships ordinarily associated with deportation." *Id.*

We observe that the actual hardship associated with an abstract hardship factor such as family separation, economic disadvantage, cultural readjustment, et cetera, differs in nature and severity depending on the unique circumstances of each case, as does the cumulative hardship a qualifying relative experiences as a result of aggregated individual hardships. *See, e.g., In re Bing Chih Kao and Mei Tsui Lin*, 23 I&N Dec. 45, 51 (BIA 2001) (distinguishing *Matter of Pilch* regarding hardship faced by qualifying relatives on the basis of variations in the length of residence in the United States and the ability to speak the language of the country to which they would relocate).

Family separation, for instance, has been found to be a common result of inadmissibility or removal in some cases. *See Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. at 813. Nevertheless, family ties are to be considered in analyzing hardship. *See Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. at 565-66. The question of whether family separation is the ordinary result of inadmissibility or removal may depend on the nature of family relationship considered. For example, in *Matter of Shaughnessy*, the Board considered the scenario of parents being separated from their soon-to-be adult son, finding that this separation would not result in extreme hardship to the parents. *Id.* at 811-12; *see also U.S. v. Arrieta*, 224 F.3d 1076, 1082 (9th Cir. 2000) ("Mr. Arrieta was not a spouse, but a son and brother. It was evident from the record that the effect of the deportation order would be separation rather than relocation."). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the Board considered the scenario of the respondent's spouse accompanying him to Mexico, finding that she would not experience extreme

hardship from losing “physical proximity to her family” in the United States. 22 I&N Dec. at 566-67.

The decision in *Cervantes-Gonzalez* reflects the norm that spouses reside with one another and establish a life together such that separating from one another is likely to result in substantial hardship. It is common for both spouses to relocate abroad if one of them is not allowed to stay in the United States, which typically results in separation from other family members living in the United States. Other decisions reflect the expectation that minor children will remain with their parents, upon whom they usually depend for financial and emotional support. *See, e.g., Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 886 (“[I]t is generally preferable for children to be brought up by their parents.”). Therefore, the most important single hardship factor may be separation, particularly where spouses and minor children are concerned. *Salcido-Salcido*, 138 F.3d at 1293 (quoting *Contreras-Buenfil v. INS*, 712 F.2d 401, 403 (9th Cir. 1983)); *Cerrillo-Perez*, 809 F.2d at 1422.

Regardless of the type of family relationship involved, the hardship resulting from family separation is determined based on the actual impact of separation on an applicant, and all hardships must be considered in determining whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond the consequences ordinarily associated with removal or inadmissibility. *Matter of O-J-O*, 21 I&N Dec. at 383. Nevertheless, though we require an applicant to show that a qualifying relative would experience extreme hardship both in the event of relocation and in the event of separation, in analyzing the latter scenario, we give considerable, if not predominant, weight to the hardship of separation itself, particularly in cases involving the separation of spouses from one another and/or minor children from a parent. *Salcido-Salcido*, 138 F.3d at 1293.

The record of hardship includes: a brief from counsel, a statement from the applicant’s spouse, country conditions documentation for Mexico, a copy of the settlement statement showing that the applicant’s spouse sold their home in Illinois, a divorce decree, and proof of child support payments to the applicant’s U.S. citizen child from a previous marriage.

The AAO notes that the applicant’s spouse, in an undated statement, asserts that she will suffer hardship as a wife and mother if the applicant’s waiver is not approved, but that her daughter will suffer the greatest hardship and that her daughter is her main focus. The AAO notes that as the applicant was found not to be inadmissible for committing a crime involving moral turpitude, hardship to his child will only be considered insofar as it is shown that hardship to her is causing hardship to his spouse. The applicant’s spouse states that if the family relocated to Mexico she would be concerned about her daughter’s education and health and if they stayed in the United States and separated from the applicant she would be concerned about her daughter being raised with only one parent and without a father. The applicant’s spouse also states that the applicant has a son from a previous marriage who he would see during the summer and speak to once a week over the phone. She states that the applicant’s son would suffer extreme hardship in that he will not be able to see his father and he will lose the child support he receives from the applicant because of the poverty and unemployment in Mexico. Again, as stated above, hardship to the applicant’s children can only be

considered insofar as it is shown that hardship to the children is causing hardship to the applicant's spouse.

The applicant's spouse states further that the applicant's ability to sustain and support himself in Mexico concerns her. She states that her internet research showed that 40% of the Mexican population was unemployed and that the average income in Mexico is \$4.00 per day. She states that if they relocated to Mexico they would struggle to provide for themselves on a daily basis.

The applicant's spouse also states that since the applicant's departure in 2006 she had to sell their family home because the financial situation was so difficult. She states that she struggled to pay their monthly expenses. She states that she can not work because there is no one to care for their three year old daughter and she does not drive. She states that the applicant had savings in the bank, but the length of time he has been in Mexico was not expected so she had to sell their home and in March 2008 she moved to Michigan to live with her brother and his family. The applicant's spouse states that she feels lonely and depressed and is stressed living with her brother's family.

The AAO finds that the applicant's spouse will suffer extreme hardship as a result of relocating to Mexico. The record includes documentation regarding the problems of extreme poverty and unemployment in Mexico. In addition, the record includes documentation regarding the health risks of living or visiting Mexico. The AAO notes that the applicant's waiver application indicates that he is presenting living in Durango, Mexico. The U.S. Department of States has issued a travel warning, dated July 16, 2010 for U.S. citizens visiting or living in Mexico. The warning states that recent violent attacks and persistent security concerns have prompted the U.S. Embassy to urge U.S. citizens to defer unnecessary travel to Durango and several other locations and to advise U.S. citizens residing or traveling in those areas to exercise extreme caution. The warning also states that between 2006 and 2009, the number of narcotics-related murders in the state of Durango increased ten-fold and that the cities of Durango and Gomez Palacio have experienced sharp increases in violence. The travel warning goes further to state that in late 2009 and early 2010, four visiting U.S. citizens were murdered in Gomez Palacio, Durango and that these are among several murders in the state of Durango that have been cause for particular concern and that remain under investigation.

Given the level of violence in Durango, Mexico where the applicant is living, coupled with the health and employment concerns of relocating to Mexico with a small child, the AAO finds that the applicant's spouse will suffer extreme hardship as a result of relocating to Mexico to be with the applicant.

The AAO also finds that the applicant's spouse is suffering extreme hardship as a result of being separated from the applicant. The record indicates that on March 28, 2008 the applicant's spouse sold their home in Illinois. In addition, the applicant's spouse is not able to work, she and her daughter had to move in with family members, and she states that she is lonely and depressed.

The AAO finds that the emotional and financial suffering experienced by the applicant's spouse surpasses the hardship typically encountered in instances of separation because of her reliance on the applicant in supporting their family, the presence of a minor child, and that it would be extreme hardship to relocate to Mexico. The AAO has carefully considered the facts of this particular case and finds that the hardship suffered by the applicant's spouse rises to the level of extreme hardship. The AAO therefore concludes that the applicant has established that his spouse would suffer extreme hardship if his waiver of inadmissibility is denied.

The AAO additionally finds that the applicant merits a waiver of inadmissibility as a matter of discretion. In discretionary matters, the applicant bears the burden of proving eligibility in terms of equities in the United States which are not outweighed by adverse factors. *See Matter of T-S-Y*, 7 I&N Dec. 582 (BIA 1957).

In evaluating whether section 212(h)(1)(B) relief is warranted in the exercise of discretion, the factors adverse to the alien include the nature and underlying circumstances of the exclusion ground at issue, the presence of additional significant violations of this country's immigration laws, the existence of a criminal record, and if so, its nature and seriousness, and the presence of other evidence indicative of the alien's bad character or undesirability as a permanent resident of this country. The favorable considerations include family ties in the United States, residence of long duration in this country (particularly where alien began residency at a young age), evidence of hardship to the alien and his family if he is excluded and deported, service in this country's Armed Forces, a history of stable employment, the existence of property or business ties, evidence of value or service in the community, evidence of genuine rehabilitation if a criminal record exists, and other evidence attesting to the alien's good character (e.g., affidavits from family, friends and responsible community representatives).

*See Matter of Mendez-Morales*, 21 I&N Dec. 296, 301 (BIA 1996). The AAO must then, "[B]alance the adverse factors evidencing an alien's undesirability as a permanent resident with the social and humane considerations presented on the alien's behalf to determine whether the grant of relief in the exercise of discretion appears to be in the best interests of the country." *Id.* at 300. (Citations omitted).

The adverse factors in the present case are the applicant's immigration violation and his criminal record.

The favorable factors in the present case are the applicant's family ties to the United States; extreme hardship to his U.S. citizen spouse and hardship to his two children if he were to be denied a waiver of inadmissibility; the applicant's lack of a criminal record or offense since 1998; and, as indicated by his spouse, the applicant's attributes as a good father and employee.

The AAO finds that the immigration violations and crimes committed by the applicant are serious in nature and cannot be condoned. Nevertheless, the AAO finds that taken together, the *favorable* factors in the present case outweigh the adverse factors, such that a favorable exercise of discretion is warranted. Accordingly, the appeal will be sustained.

**ORDER:** The appeal is sustained.