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**U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services  
Administrative Appeals Office (AAO)  
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., MS 2090  
Washington, DC 20529-2090  
U.S. Citizenship  
and Immigration  
Services**

Date: **JUL 20 2012** Office: CHICAGO, IL

FILE: [REDACTED]

H2

IN RE: [REDACTED] Applicant: [REDACTED]

APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under Section 212(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

SELF-REPRESENTED

INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

Thank you,

  
Perry Rhew  
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The waiver application was denied by the Field Office Director, Chicago, Illinois, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed as the waiver application is unnecessary.

The applicant is a native and citizen of Mexico who was found to be inadmissible to the United States pursuant to section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), for having committed a crime involving moral turpitude. The applicant's spouse and four children are U.S. citizens. He seeks a waiver of inadmissibility in order to reside in the United States.

The field office director found that the applicant had failed to establish extreme hardship to a qualifying relative and denied the Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility (Form I-601) accordingly. *Field Office Director's Decision*, dated April 6, 2010.

On appeal, the applicant's spouse asserts that the applicant did not use a fraudulent identification card for any purpose and she details the hardship that she and her children would experience if the waiver application is denied. *I-290B Supplement*, received May 4, 2010.

The record includes, but is not limited to, the I-290B supplement, statements from the applicant and his spouse, and the applicant's criminal record. The entire record was reviewed and considered in arriving at a decision on the appeal.

Section 212(a)(2)(A) of the Act states, in pertinent parts:

- (i) [A]ny alien convicted of, or who admits having committed, or who admits committing acts which constitute the essential elements of –
  - (I) a crime involving moral turpitude (other than a purely political offense) or an attempt or conspiracy to commit such a crime . . . is inadmissible.

In *Matter of Silva-Trevino*, 24 I&N Dec. 687 (A.G. 2008), the Attorney General articulated a new methodology for determining whether a conviction is a crime involving moral turpitude where the language of the criminal statute in question encompasses conduct involving moral turpitude and conduct that does not. First, in evaluating whether an offense is one that categorically involves moral turpitude, an adjudicator reviews the criminal statute at issue to determine if there is a “realistic probability, not a theoretical possibility,” that the statute would be applied to reach conduct that does not involve moral turpitude. *Id.* at 698 (citing *Gonzalez v. Duenas-Alvarez*, 549 U.S. 183, 193 (2007)). A realistic probability exists where, at the time of the proceeding, an “actual (as opposed to hypothetical) case exists in which the relevant criminal statute was applied to conduct that did not involve moral turpitude. If the statute has not been so applied in any case (including the alien’s own case), the adjudicator can reasonably conclude that all convictions under the statute may categorically be treated as ones involving moral turpitude.” *Id.* at 697, 708 (citing *Duenas-Alvarez*, 549 U.S. at 193).

However, if a case exists in which the criminal statute in question was applied to conduct that does not involve moral turpitude, “the adjudicator cannot categorically treat all convictions under that statute as convictions for crimes that involve moral turpitude.” 24 I&N Dec. at 697 (citing *Duenas-Alvarez*, 549 U.S. at 185-88, 193). An adjudicator then engages in a second-stage inquiry in which the adjudicator reviews the “record of conviction” to determine if the conviction was based on conduct involving moral turpitude. *Id.* at 698-699, 703-704, 708. The record of conviction consists of documents such as the indictment, the judgment of conviction, jury instructions, a signed guilty plea, and the plea transcript. *Id.* at 698, 704, 708.

If review of the record of conviction is inconclusive, an adjudicator then considers any additional evidence deemed necessary or appropriate to resolve accurately the moral turpitude question. 24 I&N Dec. at 699-704, 708-709. However, this “does not mean that the parties would be free to present any and all evidence bearing on an alien’s conduct leading to the conviction. (citation omitted). The sole purpose of the inquiry is to ascertain the nature of the prior conviction; it is not an invitation to relitigate the conviction itself.” *Id.* at 703. Finally, in all such inquiries, the burden is on the alien to establish “clearly and beyond doubt” that he is “not inadmissible.” *Id.* at 709 (citing *Kirong v. Mukasey*, 529 F.3d 800 (8th Cir. 2008)).

The record reflects that the applicant was convicted of possession of a fraudulent identification card in violation of 15 ILCS 335/14B(b)(5) on August 25, 1998. The applicant was sentenced to 12 months of conditional discharge, monetary penalties and 75 hours of public service.

15 ILCS 335/14B(b)(5) provides:

(b) It is a violation of this Section for any person:

...

5. To knowingly possess any fraudulent identification card while in unauthorized possession of any document, instrument or device capable of defrauding another...

The AAO notes that “possession of an altered immigration document with the knowledge that it was altered, but without its use or proof of any intent to use it unlawfully, is not a crime involving moral turpitude.” *Matter of Serna*, 20 I&N Dec. 579, 586 (BIA 1992). Based on this case law, the AAO finds that the applicant’s conviction under 15 ILCS 335/14B(b)(5) for possessing a fraudulent identification card is not a crime that involves moral turpitude as the statute does not require its use or proof of any intent to use it unlawfully. The AAO notes that the applicant was only convicted under section (b)(5) of 15 ILCS 335/14B, which only addresses mere possession without intent to use. Other provisions of 15 ILCS 335/14B(b) address intent to engage in fraudulent conduct, but the applicant was not convicted under those sections. The AAO finds that there is not a realistic probability that 15 ILCS 335/14B(b)(5) applies to fraudulent conduct or other unlawful use. Therefore, he is not inadmissible under section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Act and the appeal will be dismissed as the waiver application is unnecessary.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed as the waiver application is unnecessary.