




U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services

(b)(6)

DATE: JUN 06 2013 OFFICE: ROME

FILE: 

IN RE: 

APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under section 212(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h); section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v); and Permission to Reapply for Admission into the United States after Deportation or Removal under section 212(a)(9)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(iii)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

SELF-REPRESENTED

INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

Thank you,


Ron Rosenberg
Acting Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The waiver application was denied by the District Director, Rome, Italy and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be sustained.

The applicant is a native and citizen of Portugal who was found to be inadmissible to the United States pursuant to section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), for having committed crimes involving moral turpitude. The applicant is also inadmissible to the United States pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), for having been unlawfully present in the United States for more than one year and seeking readmission within 10 years of his last departure, and pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(A)(ii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii). He seeks permission to reapply for admission into the United States under section 212(a)(9)(A)(iii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(iii), and waivers under sections 212(a)(9)(B)(v) and 212(h) of the Act in order to reside in the United States with his U.S. citizen spouse and child.

The District Director concluded that the applicant failed to demonstrate extreme hardship to a qualifying relative and denied the applicant's Form I-601 application accordingly. The District Director further denied the applicant's Form I-212 as a matter of discretion because approval would have served no purpose. *See Decision of the District Director*, dated May 24, 2012.

On appeal, the applicant asserts that his spouse is suffering financial, physical, and emotional hardship upon separation from the applicant and would suffer extreme hardship upon relocation based upon her ties to the United States and inability to acclimate to Portugal.

In support of the waiver application and appeal, the applicant submitted letters from his spouse, letters of support, financial documentation, psychological and medical documents concerning the applicant's spouse and child, identity documents, documents concerning the applicant's criminal record, and family photographs. The entire record was reviewed and considered in rendering a decision on the appeal.

Section 212(a)(2)(A) of the Act states, in pertinent parts:

(i) [A]ny alien convicted of, or who admits having committed, or who admits committing acts which constitute the essential elements of –

(I) a crime involving moral turpitude (other than a purely political offense) or an attempt or conspiracy to commit such a crime . . . is inadmissible.

(ii) Exception.—Clause (i)(I) shall not apply to an alien who committed only one crime if-

(I) the crime was committed when the alien was under 18 years of age, and the crime was committed (and the alien was released from any confinement to a prison or correctional institution imposed for the crime) more than 5 years

before the date of the application for a visa or other documentation and the date of application for admission to the United States, or

(II) the maximum penalty possible for the crime of which the alien was convicted (or which the alien admits having committed or of which the acts that the alien admits having committed constituted the essential elements) did not exceed imprisonment for one year and, if the alien was convicted of such crime, the alien was not sentenced to a term of imprisonment in excess of 6 months (regardless of the extent to which the sentence was ultimately executed).

The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) held in *Matter of Perez-Contreras*, 20 I&N Dec. 615, 617-18 (BIA 1992), that:

[M]oral turpitude is a nebulous concept, which refers generally to conduct that shocks the public conscience as being inherently base, vile, or depraved, contrary to the rules of morality and the duties owed between man and man, either one's fellow man or society in general....

In determining whether a crime involves moral turpitude, we consider whether the act is accompanied by a vicious motive or corrupt mind. Where knowing or intentional conduct is an element of an offense, we have found moral turpitude to be present. However, where the required mens rea may not be determined from the statute, moral turpitude does not inhere.

(Citations omitted.)

In *Matter of Silva-Trevino*, 24 I&N Dec. 687 (A.G. 2008), the Attorney General articulated a new methodology for determining whether a conviction is a crime involving moral turpitude where the language of the criminal statute in question encompasses conduct involving moral turpitude and conduct that does not. First, in evaluating whether an offense is one that categorically involves moral turpitude, an adjudicator reviews the criminal statute at issue to determine if there is a “realistic probability, not a theoretical possibility,” that the statute would be applied to reach conduct that does not involve moral turpitude. *Id.* at 698 (citing *Gonzalez v. Duenas-Alvarez*, 549 U.S. 183, 193 (2007)). A realistic probability exists where, at the time of the proceeding, an “actual (as opposed to hypothetical) case exists in which the relevant criminal statute was applied to conduct that did not involve moral turpitude. If the statute has not been so applied in any case (including the alien’s own case), the adjudicator can reasonably conclude that all convictions under the statute may categorically be treated as ones involving moral turpitude.” *Id.* at 697, 708 (citing *Duenas-Alvarez*, 549 U.S. at 193).

However, if a case exists in which the criminal statute in question was applied to conduct that does not involve moral turpitude, “the adjudicator cannot categorically treat all convictions under that

statute as convictions for crimes that involve moral turpitude.” 24 I&N Dec. at 697 (citing *Duenas-Alvarez*, 549 U.S. at 185-88, 193). An adjudicator then engages in a second-stage inquiry in which the adjudicator reviews the “record of conviction” to determine if the conviction was based on conduct involving moral turpitude. *Id.* at 698-699, 703-704, 708. The record of conviction consists of documents such as the indictment, the judgment of conviction, jury instructions, a signed guilty plea, and the plea transcript. *Id.* at 698, 704, 708.

If review of the record of conviction is inconclusive, an adjudicator then considers any additional evidence deemed necessary or appropriate to resolve accurately the moral turpitude question. 24 I&N Dec. at 699-704, 708-709. However, this “does not mean that the parties would be free to present any and all evidence bearing on an alien’s conduct leading to the conviction. (citation omitted). The sole purpose of the inquiry is to ascertain the nature of the prior conviction; it is not an invitation to relitigate the conviction itself.” *Id.* at 703.

The record indicates that the applicant was convicted for receiving stolen property in New Jersey pursuant to New Jersey Stat. Ann. § 2C:20-7 on two separate dates, January 3, 1996 and September 11, 2006. The applicant was sentenced to 10 days imprisonment for the first offense and three years of probation for his second conviction. The district director found the applicant to be inadmissible under section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Act for having been convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude. The applicant does not, on appeal, dispute his inadmissibility based upon these convictions.

A waiver is available for inadmissibility under section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Act. Section 212(h) of the Act provides, in pertinent part:

(h) The Attorney General [Secretary of Homeland Security] may, in his discretion, waive the application of subparagraph (A)(i)(I) . . . of subsection (a)(2) . . . if -

...

(B) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse, parent, son, or daughter of a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General [Secretary] that the alien's denial of admission would result in extreme hardship to the United States citizen or lawfully resident spouse, parent, son, or daughter of such alien . . .

Section 212(a)(9)(B) of the Act, in pertinent part, provides:

(B) ALIENS UNLAWFULLY PRESENT.-

(i) In general.- Any alien (other than an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence) who-

...

(II) has been unlawfully present in the United States for one year or more, and who again seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal from the United States, is inadmissible.

....

(v) Waiver.-The Attorney General has sole discretion to waive clause (i) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse or son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General that the refusal of admission to such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such alien. No court shall have jurisdiction to review a decision or action by the Attorney General regarding a waiver under this clause.

The applicant entered the United States with a visitor visa on April 1, 1989 with authorization to remain in the United States for six months. The applicant remained in the United States beyond that date. The applicant was placed into immigration proceedings and ordered removed by an immigration judge on September 14, 2007. The BIA, on August 14, 2008, dismissed the applicant's appeal. The applicant remained in the United States until he was removed on February 10, 2009. The applicant began to accrue unlawful presence in the United States from April 1, 1997, the effective date of the unlawful presence provisions, until his departure on February 10, 2009. Accordingly, the applicant accrued over one year of unlawful presence in the United States, and he is inadmissible under section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Act. The applicant does not contest his inadmissibility on appeal.

A section 212(h) waiver of the bar to admission resulting from section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Act is dependent first upon a showing that the bar imposes an extreme hardship to the U.S. citizen or lawfully resident spouse, parent, or child of the applicant. A waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act is dependent on a showing that the bar to admission imposes extreme hardship on the U.S. citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of the applicant. Hardship to the applicant or his daughter is not considered in section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) waiver proceedings unless it causes hardship to a qualifying relative, in this case the applicant's spouse and parent. Once extreme hardship is established, it is but one favorable factor to be considered in the determination of whether the Secretary should exercise discretion. *See Matter of Mendez*, 21 I&N Dec. 296 (BIA 1996). The applicant is also applying for a 212(a)(9)(B)(v) waiver of the bar to admission resulting from section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Act.

Extreme hardship is "not a definable term of fixed and inflexible content or meaning," but "necessarily depends upon the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case." *Matter of Hwang*, 10 I&N Dec. 448, 451 (BIA 1964). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the Board provided a list of factors it deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship to a qualifying relative. 22 I&N Dec. 560, 565 (BIA 1999). The factors include the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the

qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate. *Id.* The Board added that not all of the foregoing factors need be analyzed in any given case and emphasized that the list of factors was not exclusive. *Id.* at 566.

The Board has also held that the common or typical results of removal and inadmissibility do not constitute extreme hardship, and has listed certain individual hardship factors considered common rather than extreme. These factors include: economic disadvantage, loss of current employment, inability to maintain one's present standard of living, inability to pursue a chosen profession, separation from family members, severing community ties, cultural readjustment after living in the United States for many years, cultural adjustment of qualifying relatives who have never lived outside the United States, inferior economic and educational opportunities in the foreign country, or inferior medical facilities in the foreign country. *See generally Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. at 568; *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. 627, 632-33 (BIA 1996); *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. 880, 883 (BIA 1994); *Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. 245, 246-47 (Comm'r 1984); *Matter of Kim*, 15 I&N Dec. 88, 89-90 (BIA 1974); *Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. 810, 813 (BIA 1968).

However, though hardships may not be extreme when considered abstractly or individually, the Board has made it clear that "[r]elevant factors, though not extreme in themselves, must be considered in the aggregate in determining whether extreme hardship exists." *Matter of O-J-O-*, 21 I&N Dec. 381, 383 (BIA 1996) (quoting *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 882). The adjudicator "must consider the entire range of factors concerning hardship in their totality and determine whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond those hardships ordinarily associated with deportation." *Id.*

The actual hardship associated with an abstract hardship factor such as family separation, economic disadvantage, cultural readjustment, et cetera, differs in nature and severity depending on the unique circumstances of each case, as does the cumulative hardship a qualifying relative experiences as a result of aggregated individual hardships. *See, e.g., Matter of Bing Chih Kao and Mei Tsui Lin*, 23 I&N Dec. 45, 51 (BIA 2001) (distinguishing *Matter of Pilch* regarding hardship faced by qualifying relatives on the basis of variations in the length of residence in the United States and the ability to speak the language of the country to which they would relocate). For example, though family separation has been found to be a common result of inadmissibility or removal, separation from family living in the United States can also be the most important single hardship factor in considering hardship in the aggregate. *See Salcido-Salcido*, 138 F.3d at 1293 (quoting *Contreras-Buenfil v. INS*, 712 F.2d 401, 403 (9th Cir. 1983)); *but see Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. at 247 (separation of spouse and children from applicant not extreme hardship due to conflicting evidence in the record and because applicant and spouse had been voluntarily separated from one another for 28 years). Therefore, we consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether denial of admission would result in extreme hardship to a qualifying relative.

The record reflects that the applicant is a 36-year-old native and citizen of Portugal and the applicant's spouse is a 35-year-old native of Portugal and citizen of the United States. The applicant's daughter is a four-year-old native and citizen of the United States and the applicant's mother is a 55-year-old native of Portugal and citizen of the United States. The applicant is residing in Portugal and his spouse, mother, and child are currently residing in New Jersey.

The applicant's spouse asserts that she is currently experiencing emotional and physical hardship based on separation from the applicant. The record contains a letter from a counselor stating that the applicant's spouse has been attending counseling since October 29, 2010 and that she is suffering from anxiety and depression. The record also contains a psychological evaluation stating that the applicant's spouse is undergoing ongoing psychotherapy and suffering major depression and significant psychological distress, which results in severe anxiety and recurring nightmares.

The applicant's spouse asserts that she is an employee of [REDACTED] and the record indicates that she has remained with this employer since August 5, 1998. A letter was submitted on her behalf from her employer, dated March 5, 2007, characterizing the applicant's spouse as an exemplary employee and an indispensable asset to the company. However, a subsequent letter from her employer, dated June 18, 2012, states that the applicant's spouse has found it increasingly difficult to work and care for her child without the applicant. The letter states that the applicant's spouse is now consistently late to work, missing deadlines, and misplacing files. The applicant's spouse's employer contends that they may be forced to terminate her if this continues and would have already begun this process if she had not been an exemplary employee in the past.

The record also contains a medical letter concerning the applicant's spouse's physical condition, stating that the applicant's spouse suffered three minor strokes, between 2009 and 2010, and has been diagnosed with patent foramen ovale, a hole between the left and right atria of her heart. The applicant's spouse's physician states that, due to the applicant's spouse's condition, she has a higher rate of a certain type of stroke. The physician further states that the stress and emotional suffering the applicant's spouse is currently experiencing are deterring her recovery and present risk factors for a significant cardiac event. In the aggregate, there is sufficient evidence in the record to show that the applicant's spouse is suffering from a level of hardship due to separation from the applicant that is beyond the common results of inadmissibility or removal of a spouse.

The applicant's spouse asserts that she cannot relocate to reside with the applicant in Portugal because there is no employment available in Portugal so that her family would be unable to survive. The applicant's spouse further asserts that she would be unable to obtain a position in Portugal because she has troubles with the language and the economy is suffering in that country. The applicant's spouse contends that even the applicant has been unable to establish employment in Portugal since his departure from the United States so that she has been forced to send him money to survive. It is noted that the record does not contain supporting documentation of the applicant's spouse's money transfers to the applicant.

The applicant's spouse also asserts that if she relocated to Portugal, she would be leaving behind all her ties in the United States for a country in which she is not accustomed to the culture and has not mastered the language. It is noted that the applicant's spouse's psychological evaluation indicates that she is a native of Portugal, but that she moved to the United States with her family at the age of eight. The psychological evaluation further indicates that the applicant's spouse and her child are residing with the applicant's family members in the United States, including his parents and brother. The applicant's spouse asserts that she is also very close to her mother, whom she helps in caring for her brother. The record contains a letter from the applicant's spouse's mother stating that the applicant's spouse assists her in caring for her youngest son, who is shutting down because he fears that he is going to lose the applicant's spouse's presence in his life. It is noted that the applicant's spouse's brother is not a qualifying relative in the context of this application so that any hardship he may experience will be considered only insofar as it affects the applicant's spouse.

As noted, the record indicates that the applicant's spouse has a longstanding position with the same employer in the United States, since August 5, 1998 to the present. The applicant's spouse asserts that she relies upon the health benefits provided by her position to care for the medical conditions of herself and her daughter. As also noted, the record indicates that the applicant's spouse suffers from a heart condition, patent foramen ovale. The applicant's spouse's physician states that her condition requires ongoing and constant monitoring and medication. The applicant's spouse's physician also states that the applicant's spouse will eventually require surgery to correct this defect, followed by extensive care. A letter from the applicant's spouse's daughter's physician indicates that she has a family history of asthma and appears to have the phenotype of asthma, but the diagnosis is not completely clear. It is acknowledged that the applicant's spouse has a network of psychological and medical providers in the United States upon whom she relies for her ongoing emotional and physical conditions. Considered in the aggregate, the applicant has established that his spouse would face extreme hardship if his waiver request is denied.

Extreme hardship is a requirement for eligibility, but once established it is but one favorable discretionary factor to be considered. *Matter of Mendez-Moralez*, 21 I&N Dec. 296, 301 (BIA 1996). For waivers of inadmissibility, the burden is on the applicant to establish that a grant of a waiver of inadmissibility is warranted in the exercise of discretion. *Id.* at 299. The adverse factors evidencing an alien's undesirability as a permanent resident must be balanced with the social and humane considerations presented on her behalf to determine whether the grant of relief in the exercise of discretion appears to be in the best interests of this country. *Id.* at 300.

The AAO notes that *Matter of Marin*, 16 I & N Dec. 581 (BIA 1978), involving a section 212(c) waiver, is used in waiver cases as guidance for balancing favorable and unfavorable factors and this cross application of standards is supported by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). In *Matter of Mendez-Moralez*, the BIA, assessing the exercise of discretion under section 212(h) of the Act, stated:

We find this use of *Matter of Marin*, *supra*, as a general guide to be appropriate. For the most part, it is prudent to avoid cross application, as between different

types of relief, of particular principles or standards for the exercise of discretion. *Id.* However, our reference to *Matter of Marin, supra*, is only for the purpose of the approach taken in that case regarding the balancing of favorable and unfavorable factors within the context of the relief being sought under section 212(h)(1)(B) of the Act. *See, e.g., Palmer v. INS*, 4 F.3d 482 (7th Cir.1993) (balancing of discretionary factors under section 212(h)). We find this guidance to be helpful and applicable, given that both forms of relief address the question of whether aliens with criminal records should be admitted to the United States and allowed to reside in this country permanently.

Matter of Mendez-Morales at 300.

In *Matter of Mendez-Morales*, in evaluating whether section 212(h)(1)(B) relief is warranted in the exercise of discretion, the BIA stated that:

The factors adverse to the applicant include the nature and underlying circumstances of the exclusion ground at issue, the presence of additional significant violations of this country's immigration laws, the existence of a criminal record and, if so, its nature, recency and seriousness, and the presence of other evidence indicative of an alien's bad character or undesirability as a permanent resident of this country. . . . The favorable considerations include family ties in the United States, residence of long duration in this country (particularly where the alien began his residency at a young age), evidence of hardship to the alien and his family if he is excluded and deported, service in this country's Armed Forces, a history of stable employment, the existence of property or business ties, evidence of value and service to the community, evidence of genuine rehabilitation if a criminal record exists, and other evidence attesting to the alien's good character (e.g., affidavits from family, friends, and responsible community representatives). .

Id. at 301.

The BIA further states that upon review of the record as a whole, a balancing of the equities and adverse matters must be made to determine whether discretion should be favorably exercised. The equities that the applicant for section 212(h)(1)(B) relief must bring forward to establish that he merits a favorable exercise of administrative discretion will depend in each case on the nature and circumstances of the ground of exclusion sought to be waived and on the presence of any additional adverse matters, and as the negative factors grow more serious, it becomes incumbent upon the applicant to introduce additional offsetting favorable evidence. *Id.* at 301.

The favorable factors include the extreme hardship the applicant's spouse and children would experience whether they remained in the United States, separated from the applicant, or accompanied the applicant to Portugal; evidence of the applicant's employment and payment of taxes during his residence in the United States; and letters of support including a prospective letter

of employment. The unfavorable factors in this matter include the applicant's prior criminal convictions and unlawful presence accrued in the United States.

Although the applicant's violations of immigration and criminal law cannot be condoned, the positive factors in this case outweigh the negative factors. In these proceedings, the burden of establishing eligibility for the waiver rests entirely with the applicant. See section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. In this case, the applicant has met his burden and the appeal of the applicant's Form I-601 denial will be sustained, and the application will be approved.

The applicant also submitted an application for Permission to Reapply for Admission into the United States after Deportation or Removal under section 212(a)(9)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(iii).

In *Matter of Tin*, 14 I&N Dec. 371 (Reg. Comm. 1973), the Regional Commissioner listed the following factors to be considered in the adjudication of a Form I-212 Application for Permission to Reapply After Deportation:

The basis for deportation; recency of deportation; length of residence in the United States; applicant's moral character; his respect for law and order; evidence of reformation and rehabilitation; family responsibilities; any inadmissibility under other sections of law; hardship involved to himself and others; and the need for his services in the United States.

In *Tin*, the Regional Commissioner noted that the applicant had gained an equity (job experience) while being unlawfully present in the U.S. The Regional Commissioner then stated that the alien had obtained an advantage over aliens seeking visa issuance abroad or who abide by the terms of their admission while in this country, and he concluded that approval of an application for permission to reapply for admission would condone the alien's acts and could encourage others to enter the United States to work in the United States unlawfully. *Id.*

Matter of Lee, 17 I&N Dec. 275 (Comm. 1978) further held that a record of immigration violations, standing alone, did not conclusively support a finding of a lack of good moral character. *Matter of Lee* at 278. *Lee* additionally held that,

[T]he recency of deportation can only be considered when there is a finding of poor moral character based on moral turpitude in the conduct and attitude of a person which evinces a callous conscience [toward the violation of immigration laws] In all other instances when the cause of deportation has been removed and the person now appears eligible for issuance of a visa, the time factor should not be considered. *Id.*

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held in *Garcia-Lopes v. INS*, 923 F.2d 72 (7th Cir. 1991), that less weight is given to equities acquired after a deportation order has been entered. Further, the equity of a marriage and the weight given to any hardship to the spouse is diminished if the parties married after the commencement of deportation proceedings, with knowledge that the alien

might be deported. It is also noted that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in *Carnalla-Munoz v. INS*, 627 F.2d 1004 (9th Cir. 1980), held that an after-acquired equity, referred to as an after-acquired family tie in *Matter of Tijam*, 22 I&N Dec. 408 (BIA 1998), need not be accorded great weight by the district director in a discretionary determination. Moreover, in *Ghassan v. INS*, 972 F.2d 631, 634-35 (5th Cir. 1992), the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that giving diminished weight to hardship faced by a spouse who entered into a marriage with knowledge of the alien's possible deportation was proper. The AAO finds these legal decisions establish the general principle that "after-acquired equities" are accorded less weight for purposes of assessing favorable equities in the exercise of discretion.

The favorable factors include the applicant's U.S. citizen spouse, his U.S. citizen child, the evidence of hardship the applicant's spouse is suffering upon separation from the applicant, letters of support submitted on the applicant's behalf, and evidence that the applicant was gainfully employed and paying taxes in the United States.

The unfavorable factors for this applicant include the applicant's criminal convictions and accrual of unlawful presence in the United States.

The applicant's violations of criminal and immigration law cannot be condoned, but it is noted that the applicant resided in the United States for nearly 20 years, from his entry on April 1, 1989 until his removal on February 10, 2009. The applicant has a U.S. citizen child who has resided in the United States since her birth and a U.S. citizen spouse who has resided in the United States since the age of eight. Medical letters from the applicant's spouse's doctors indicate that she has been suffering from depression and anxiety since the departure of the applicant, resulting in poor work performance for a position that she has held since 1998. The record further indicates that the applicant's spouse suffers from a cardiac condition that can be aggravated by emotional stress.

Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361, provides that the burden of proof is upon the applicant to establish he is eligible for the benefit sought. After a careful review of the record, it is concluded that the applicant has established that a favorable exercise of the Secretary's discretion is warranted, and the appeal of the applicant's Form I-212 application will also be sustained.

ORDER: The appeal is sustained. The Form I-601 waiver application and Form I-212 application for permission to reapply for admission are approved.