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
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
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Washington, DC 20529-2090




U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
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FILE:



Office: TEGUCIGALPA, HONDURAS

Date:

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
IN RE:



APPLICATION:

Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v)
of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B).

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:



INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. Please refer to 8 C.F.R. § 103.5 for the specific requirements. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$585. Any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen, as required by 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i).

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "John F. Grissom".

John F. Grissom, Acting Chief
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The waiver application was denied by the Officer in Charge (OIC), Tegucigalpa, Honduras, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The record reflects that the applicant is a native and citizen of Honduras. The applicant was found to be inadmissible to the United States pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), for having been unlawfully present in the United States for more than one year after April 1, 1997. He seeks a waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v), in order to reside in the United States with his U.S. citizen spouse and stepdaughters.

The record reflects that the applicant entered the United States without inspection in August 1999 and remained in the United States unlawfully until returning to Honduras in August 2005. The applicant is the beneficiary of an approved Petition for Alien Relative (Form I-130) filed by his spouse and has filed an Application for Immigrant Visa (DS-230). The applicant filed an Application for Waiver of Grounds of Excludability (Form I-601) on or about September 1, 2005.

The OIC concluded that the applicant had failed to establish that the bar to his admission would impose extreme hardship on a qualifying relative and denied the waiver application accordingly. *Decision of OIC*, dated June 12, 2006.

On appeal, counsel asserts that some of the evidence submitted by the applicant in support of the waiver application was not considered because it was “discarded by the consular officer and never . . . supplied to the . . . [OIC].” *See Form I-290B*. Counsel contends that the applicant will submit new and additional evidence, which will include the originally submitted evidence along with evidence that the applicant’s wife has declared bankruptcy and that her house is in foreclosure, proof that the applicant’s spouse is experiencing hardship in the applicant’s absence. *Id.*

On the Form I-290B, counsel indicated that a brief and/or evidence would be submitted to the AAO within 30 days. On October 23, 2008, the AAO sent a notice by fax to counsel stating that no such documentation had been received, and requesting that a copy of any additional brief or evidence along with evidence of the date it was originally filed be submitted within five business days. To date, no response to this notice has been received. Therefore, the record is considered complete.

In support of the waiver application, the applicant has submitted letters from his spouse, stepdaughters and mother-in-law; a letter from [REDACTED], Human Resources Manager at G.E. [REDACTED] & Company, indicating that the applicant’s spouse’s employment at the company was terminated on October 31, 2005; and a statement of unemployment insurance benefits for the applicant’s spouse. The entire record has been reviewed in rendering a decision on appeal.

Section 212(a)(9)(B) of the Act provides, in pertinent part, that:

- (i) In general. - Any alien (other than an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence) who –

...
(II) Has been unlawfully present in the United States for one year or more, and who again seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal from the United States, is inadmissible.

....
(v) Waiver. – The Attorney General [now Secretary, Homeland Security, “Secretary”] has sole discretion to waive clause (i) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse or son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General [Secretary] that the refusal of admission to such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such alien.

The record reflects that the applicant entered the United States without inspection in August 1999 and remained in the United States unlawfully until returning to Honduras in August 2005. The applicant is now seeking admission to the United States. Therefore, the applicant was unlawfully present from August 1999 until August 2005, a period in excess of one year. The applicant has not disputed that he is inadmissible under section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Act.

A waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) is dependent upon a showing that the bar to admission imposes an extreme hardship on a qualifying relative, *i.e.*, the U.S. citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of the applicant. Hardship to the applicant or his stepchildren is not relevant under the statute and will be considered only insofar as it results in hardship to a qualifying relative. The applicant's U.S. citizen spouse is the only qualifying relative. If extreme hardship to a qualifying relative is established, the Secretary then assesses whether an exercise of discretion is warranted. Section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act; *see also Matter of Mendez-Morales*, 21 I&N Dec. 296 (BIA 1996).

The concept of extreme hardship to a qualifying relative “is not . . . fixed and inflexible,” and whether extreme hardship has been established is determined based on an examination of the facts of each individual case. *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. 560, 565 (BIA 1999). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the Board of Immigration Appeals set forth a list of non-exclusive factors relevant to determining whether an applicant has established extreme hardship to a qualifying relative pursuant to section 212(i) of the Act. These factors include, with respect to the qualifying relative, the presence of family ties to U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents in the United States, family ties outside the United States, country conditions where the qualifying relative would relocate and family ties in that country, the financial impact of departure, and significant health conditions, particularly where there is diminished availability of medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate. *Id.* at 566.

Relevant factors, though not extreme in themselves, must be considered in the aggregate in determining whether extreme hardship exists. In each case, the trier of

fact must consider the entire range of factors concerning hardship in their totality and determine whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond those hardships ordinarily associated with deportation.

Matter of O-J-O-, 21 I&N Dec. 381, 383 (BIA 1996) (citations omitted).

In addition, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in reversing the denial of suspension of deportation to the petitioner in *Salcido-Salcido v. INS*, 138 F.3d 1292, 1293 (9th Cir. 1998), held that, “the most important single hardship factor may be the separation of the alien from family living in the United States”, and that, “[w]hen the BIA fails to give considerable, if not predominant, weight to the hardship that will result from family separation, it has abused its discretion.” (Citations omitted), *see also Cerrillo-Perez v. INS*, 809 F.2d 1419, 1424 (9th Cir. 1987) (“We have stated in a series of cases that the hardship to the alien resulting from his separation from family members may, in itself, constitute extreme hardship.”) (citations omitted). Separation of family will be given appropriate weight in the assessment of hardship factors in the present case.

An analysis under *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez* is generally appropriate. The AAO notes that extreme hardship to a qualifying relative must be established in the event that he or she accompanies the applicant or in the event that he or she remains in the United States, as a qualifying relative is not required to reside outside of the United States based on the denial of the applicant’s waiver request.

In her letter received December 11, 2005, the applicant’s spouse states that without the applicant’s financial assistance, she has “fallen behind on her bills,” which is also partly the result of her employment being terminated. The applicant’s spouse asserts that even should she find a new job, her income is unlikely to cover her household expenses. In her letter dated August 18, 2005, the applicant spouse further indicates that in their two years of marriage, she and the applicant have developed a great love for one another, and that being apart causes her “great pain.”

The record, reviewed in its entirety and in light of the *Cervantes-Gonzalez* factors, cited above, does not support a finding that the applicant’s spouse faces extreme hardship if the applicant is not granted a waiver of inadmissibility.

The AAO acknowledges that the applicant’s spouse suffers emotionally in the applicant’s absence, but it has not been demonstrated that this emotional hardship, when combined with other hardship factors, rises to the level of extreme hardship. The applicant’s spouse has asserted that she is suffering financial hardship in the applicant’s absence, but there is no evidence showing the nature of the applicant’s prior or potential employment in the United States, what financial assistance he provided his spouse while he was residing with her in the United States, or that he is unable to provide financial support from outside the United States. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *See Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). Likewise, there is no evidence showing that the applicant’s spouse has filed for bankruptcy or that her house is in foreclosure as asserted by counsel on appeal. Without documentary evidence to support the claim, the assertions of counsel

will not satisfy the applicant's burden of proof. The unsupported assertions of counsel do not constitute evidence. *Matter of Obaigbena*, 19 I&N Dec. 533, 534 (BIA 1988); *Matter of Laureano*, 19 I&N Dec. 1 (BIA 1983); *Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez*, 17 I&N Dec. 503, 506 (BIA 1980).

The AAO concludes that the hardship described in this case is the common result of removal or inadmissibility, and does not rise to the level of extreme hardship based on the record. U.S. court decisions have repeatedly held that the common results of removal or inadmissibility are insufficient to prove extreme hardship. *See Hassan v. INS*, 927 F.2d 465, 468 (9th Cir. 1991). In addition, *Perez v. INS*, 96 F.3d 390 (9th Cir. 1996), held that the common results of deportation are insufficient to prove extreme hardship and defined extreme hardship as hardship that was unusual or beyond that which would normally be expected upon deportation.

The AAO also notes that the applicant has submitted no evidence demonstrating that his spouse will experience extreme hardship if she relocates to Honduras.

In this case, the record does not contain sufficient evidence to show that the hardships faced by the qualifying relative, considered in the aggregate, rise beyond the common results of removal or inadmissibility to the level of extreme hardship. The AAO therefore finds that the applicant has failed to establish extreme hardship to his U.S. citizen spouse as required under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act. Having found the applicant statutorily ineligible for relief, no purpose would be served in discussing whether he merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility rests with the applicant. *See* section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.