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FILE: [REDACTED] Office: CIUDAD JUAREZ, MEXICO Date: **DEC 18 2008**

IN RE: [REDACTED]

APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:

SELF-REPRESENTED

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. Please refer to 8 C.F.R. § 103.5 for the specific requirements. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$585. Any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen, as required by 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i).

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "John F. Grissom".

John F. Grissom, Acting Chief  
Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The waiver application was denied by the Officer-in-Charge, Ciudad Juarez, Mexico, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of Mexico who entered the United States without inspection in July 2001 and remained until February 2003, when she returned to Mexico. She was found to be inadmissible to the United States under section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), for having been unlawfully present in the United States for one year or more. The applicant is the spouse of a U.S. Citizen and the beneficiary of an approved Petition for Alien Relative. She seeks a waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v), in order to return to the United States and reside with her husband.

The officer-in-charge concluded that the applicant failed to establish that extreme hardship would be imposed on a qualifying relative and denied the application accordingly. *See Decision of the Officer-in-Charge* dated December 30, 2005.

On appeal, the applicant asserts that her husband's life has been abruptly changed due to being separated from the applicant, and they are concerned that their daughter, who resides in Mexico with the applicant, will lose educational opportunities if she remains there. The applicant further states that her husband is having difficulty maintaining employment because he is traveling frequently to Mexico to visit the applicant and their child. In support of the waiver application the applicant submitted a letter from her husband. The entire record was reviewed and considered in arriving at a decision on the appeal.

Section 212(a)(9)(B) of the Act provides, in pertinent part:

- (i) In general. - Any alien (other than an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence) who –
  - (II) Has been unlawfully present in the United States for one year or more, and who again seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal from the United States, is inadmissible.
- ....
- (v) Waiver. – The Attorney General [now Secretary, Homeland Security, "Secretary"] has sole discretion to waive clause (i) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse or son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General [Secretary] that the refusal of admission to such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such alien.

A waiver of the bar to admission resulting from violation of section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Act is dependent first upon a showing that the bar imposes an extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of the applicant. Hardship the alien herself experiences upon deportation is irrelevant to section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) waiver proceedings; the only relevant hardship in the present case is hardship suffered by the applicant's husband. Once extreme hardship is established, it is but one favorable factor to be considered in the determination of whether the Secretary should exercise discretion. *See Matter of Mendez*, 21 I&N Dec. 296 (BIA 1996).

In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. 560 (BIA 1999), the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) provided a list of factors it deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship. These factors included the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate.

U.S. court decisions have additionally held that the common results of deportation or exclusion are insufficient to prove extreme hardship. *See Hassan v. INS*, 927 F.2d 465, 468 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1991). For example, in *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. 627 (BIA 1996), the BIA held that emotional hardship caused by severing family and community ties is a common result of deportation and does not constitute extreme hardship. In addition, in *Perez v. INS*, 96 F.3d 390 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996), the court held that the common results of deportation are insufficient to prove extreme hardship and defined "extreme hardship" as hardship that was unusual or beyond that which would normally be expected upon deportation. In *Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. 810 (BIA 1968), the BIA held that separation of family members and financial difficulties alone do not establish extreme hardship. Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court held in *INS v. Jong Ha Wang*, 450 U.S. 139 (1981), that the mere showing of economic detriment to qualifying family members is insufficient to warrant a finding of extreme hardship.

In the present case, the record reflects that the applicant is a thirty-five year-old native and citizen of Mexico who resided in the United States from July 2001, when she entered the country without inspection, to February 2003, when she returned to Mexico. The applicant's husband is a thirty-two year-old native of Mexico and citizen of the United States whom the applicant married on December 13, 2000. The applicant currently resides in Tierra Blanca, Zacatecas, Mexico and her husband resides in Denver, Colorado.

The applicant asserts that her husband's life has been "abruptly changed" and his employment has been affected due to being separated from the applicant and their daughter. The applicant submitted a letter from her husband with the waiver application to support an assertion that he would suffer extreme hardship if the waiver application were denied. The letter is in Spanish, and cannot be considered because it is not translated. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(3), which states:

Translations. Any document containing foreign language submitted to the Service [now Citizenship and Immigration Services] shall be accompanied by a full English

language translation which the translator has certified as complete and accurate, and by the translator's certification that he or she is competent to translate from the foreign language into English.

Furthermore, even if considered, the letter does not establish that any hardship to the applicant's husband would rise to the level of extreme hardship. The letter states that the applicant is pregnant with their second child and the applicant's husband would like the applicant to be with him during her pregnancy. *See undated letter from [REDACTED]*. The letter further states that the applicant's husband misses the applicant and their daughter very much and he must support them in Mexico and pay rent and other expenses in the United States. *Id.*

The AAO notes that no documentation concerning the applicant's husband's income and employment or the family's expenses was submitted to support an assertion that the applicant's husband is suffering financial hardship as a result of separation from the applicant. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). Further, there is no indication that there are any unusual circumstances that would cause financial hardship beyond what would normally be expected as a result of denial of admission to the applicant. The cost of travel to Mexico and having to support two households therefore appears to be a common result of exclusion or deportation, and would not rise to the level of extreme hardship for the applicant's husband. *See INS v. Jong Ha Wang, supra* (holding that the mere showing of economic detriment to qualifying family members is insufficient to warrant a finding of extreme hardship).

The applicant's husband states that he is experiencing emotional hardship due to separation from the applicant, but there is no evidence provided concerning his mental health or the potential emotional or psychological effects of the separation. The evidence on the record does not establish that the emotional effects of separation from the applicant would be more serious than the type of hardship a family member would normally suffer when faced with the prospect of his spouse's removal or exclusion. Although the depth of his distress over being separated from his wife is not in question, a waiver of inadmissibility is only available where the resulting hardship would be unusual or beyond that which would normally be expected upon removal or exclusion. The prospect of separation or involuntary relocation nearly always results in considerable hardship to individuals and families. But in specifically limiting the availability of a waiver of inadmissibility to cases of "extreme hardship," Congress did not intend that a waiver be granted in every case where a qualifying relationship exists.

The emotional and financial hardship the applicant's husband is experiencing appears to be the type of hardship that a family member would normally suffer as a result of deportation or exclusion. U.S. court decisions have repeatedly held that the common results of deportation or exclusion are insufficient to prove extreme hardship. *See Perez v. INS*, 96 F.3d 390 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996) (defining "extreme hardship" as hardship that was unusual or beyond that which would normally be expected upon deportation); *Hassan v. INS*, 927 F.2d 465, 468 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1991); *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. 627 (BIA 1996) (holding that emotional hardship caused by severing family and community ties is a common result of deportation and does not constitute extreme hardship). No information or

evidence was submitted to support a claim that the applicant's husband would suffer extreme hardship if he relocated to Mexico with the applicant. Therefore, the AAO cannot make a determination of whether the applicant's husband would suffer extreme hardship if he moved to Mexico.

In this case, the record does not contain sufficient evidence to show that the hardships faced by the qualifying relative, considered in the aggregate, rise beyond the common results of removal or inadmissibility to the level of extreme hardship. The AAO therefore finds that the applicant has failed to establish extreme hardship to her U.S. Citizen spouse as required under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed.