



U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services

Identifying data deleted to
prevent clearly unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy
PUBLIC COPY

114



FILE: [Redacted] Office: CALIFORNIA SERVICE CENTER Date: MAR 28 2006

IN RE: Applicant: [Redacted]

APPLICATION: Application for Permission to Reapply for Admission into the United States after Deportation or Removal under section 212(a)(9)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(iii)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT: SELF-REPRESENTED

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

Robert P. Wiemann, Director
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The Application for Permission to Reapply for Admission into the United States after Deportation or Removal (Form I-212) was denied by the Director, California Service Center, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of Mexico who, on October 9, 1998, at the San Ysidro, California, Port of Entry, applied for admission into the United States. The applicant presented a Border Crossing Card (Form I-586) that did not belong to her. She was found inadmissible pursuant to section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(6)(C)(i) for having attempted to procure admission into the United States by fraud, and section 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(7)(A)(i)(I) for being an immigrant not in possession of a valid immigrant visa or other valid entry document. Consequently, she was expeditiously removed from the United States pursuant to section 235(b)(1) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1). The Director states that the applicant reentered the United States on an unknown date but prior to October 27, 1999, the date she married a Lawful Permanent Resident (LPR), without a lawful admission or parole and without permission to reapply for admission, in violation of section 276 the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1326. The applicant is inadmissible under section 212(a)(9)(A)(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(i) and seeks permission to reapply for admission into the United States under section 212(a)(9)(A)(iii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(iii) in order to remain in the United States and reside with her Lawful Permanent Resident (LPR) spouse and U.S. citizen children.

The Director determined that section 241(a)(5) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) applies in this matter and the applicant is not eligible for any relief or benefit from the Act and denied the Form I-212 accordingly. *See Director's Decision* dated November 18, 2004.

Section 241(a) of the Act states in pertinent part:

(5) Reinstatement of removal orders against aliens illegally reentering. If the Attorney General [now the Secretary of Homeland Security, "Secretary"] finds that an alien has reentered the United States illegally after having been removed or having departed voluntarily, under an order of removal, the prior order of removal is reinstated from its original date and is not subject to being reopened or reviewed, the alien is not eligible and may not apply for any relief under this Act, and the alien shall be removed under the prior order at any time after the reentry.

On appeal, the applicant states that she believes that the decision is in error because she reentered the United States on December 16, 1998, in possession of a B1/B2 visa. The applicant submits copies of her Mexican passport, her nonimmigrant visa and her Arrival-Departure Record (Form I-94).

The applicant provides documentation that shows that on December 15, 1998, she applied for and received a non-immigrant visa from the American Consulate in Tijuana, Mexico. On December 16, 1998, the applicant presented that visa and was admitted as a visitor for a period of six months, until June 15, 1999.

The AAO finds that since the applicant was inspected and admitted she is not subject to section 241(a)(5) of the Act. Although the applicant is not subject to section 241(a)(5) of the Act, she is clearly inadmissible under section 212(a)(9)(A) of the Act and, therefore, must receive permission to reapply for admission.

Section 212(a)(9)(A) of the Act states in pertinent part:

(A) Certain aliens previously removed.-

. . . .

(ii) Other aliens. - Any alien not described in clause (i) who-

(I) has been ordered removed under section 240 or any other provision of law, or

(II) departed the United States while an order of removal was outstanding, and seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal (or within 20 years of such date in the case of a second or subsequent removal or at any time in the case of an aliens convicted of an aggravated felony) is inadmissible.

(iii) Exception.- Clauses (i) and (ii) shall not apply to an alien seeking admission within a period if, prior to the date of the alien's reembarkation at a place outside the United States or attempt to be admitted from foreign contiguous territory, the Secretary has consented to the alien's reapplying for admission.

A review of the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) amendments to the Act and prior statutes and case law regarding permission to reapply for admission reflects that Congress has, (1) increased the bar to admissibility and the waiting period from 5 to 10 years in most instances and to 20 years in others, (2) has added a bar to admissibility for aliens who are unlawfully present in the United States, and (3) has imposed a permanent bar to admission for aliens who have been ordered removed and who subsequently enter or attempt to enter the United States without being lawfully admitted. It is concluded that Congress has placed a high priority on reducing and/or stopping aliens from overstaying their authorized period of stay and from being present in the United States without lawful admission or parole.

The AAO conducts the final administrative review and enters the ultimate decision for CIS on all immigration matters that fall within its jurisdiction. The AAO reviews each case de novo as to all questions of law, fact, discretion, or any other issue that may arise in an appeal that falls under its jurisdiction. Because the AAO engages in de novo review, the AAO may deny an application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law, without remand, even if the district or service center director does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. See *Helvering v. Gowran*, 302 U.S. 238, 245-246 (1937); see also, *Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States*, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), aff'd. 345 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2003).

In *Matter of Tin*, 14 I&N Dec. 371 (Reg. Comm. 1973), the Regional Commissioner listed the following factors to be considered in the adjudication of a Form I-212 Application for Permission to Reapply After Deportation:

The basis for deportation; recency of deportation; length of residence in the United States; applicant's moral character; his respect for law and order; evidence of reformation and

rehabilitation; family responsibilities; any inadmissibility under other sections of law; hardship involved to himself and others; and the need for his services in the United States.

In *Tin*, the Regional Commissioner noted that the applicant had gained an equity (job experience) while being unlawfully present in the U.S. The Regional Commissioner then stated that the alien had obtained an advantage over aliens seeking visa issuance abroad or who abide by the terms of their admission while in this country, and he concluded that approval of an application for permission to reapply for admission would condone the alien's acts and could encourage others to enter the United States to work unlawfully. *Id.*

Matter of Lee, 17 I&N Dec. 275 (Comm. 1978) further held that a record of immigration violations, standing alone, did not conclusively support a finding of a lack of good moral character. *Matter of Lee* at 278. *Lee* additionally held that,

[T]he recency of deportation can only be considered when there is a finding of poor moral character based on moral turpitude in the conduct and attitude of a person which evinces a callous conscience [toward the violation of immigration laws] In all other instances when the cause of deportation has been removed and the person now appears eligible for issuance of a visa, the time factor should not be considered. *Id.*

The court held in *Garcia-Lopes v. INS*, 923 F.2d 72 (7th Cir. 1991), that less weight is given to equities acquired after a deportation order has been entered. Further, the equity of a marriage and the weight given to any hardship to the spouse is diminished if the parties married after the commencement of deportation proceedings, with knowledge that the alien might be deported. It is also noted that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in *Carnalla-Nunoz v. INS*, 627 F.2d 1004 (9th Cir. 1980), held that an after-acquired equity, referred to as an after-acquired family tie in *Matter of Tijam*, 22 I&N Dec. 408 (BIA 1998) need not be accorded great weight by the district director in considering discretionary weight. Moreover, in *Ghassan v. INS*, 972 F.2d 631, 634-35 (5th Cir. 1992), the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that giving diminished weight to hardship faced by a spouse who entered into a marriage with knowledge of the alien's possible deportation was proper.

The applicant in the present matter married her LPR spouse on October 27, 1999, over a year after she was removed from the United States. She now seeks relief based on that after-acquired family tie.

The AAO finds that the favorable factors in this case are the applicant's family ties in the United States, her LPR spouse and U.S. citizen children, and the absence of any criminal record.

The AAO finds that the unfavorable factors in this case include the applicant's attempt to enter the United States by fraud, her failure to inform a Consular officer of her previous immigration violation in order to obtain a nonimmigrant visa, her overstay of her authorized period of stay after she was admitted with a nonimmigrant visa, and her lengthy presence in the United States without authorization. To reward a person for remaining in the United States in violation of law would seriously threaten the structure of all laws pertaining to immigration.

The applicant's actions in this matter cannot be condoned. Her equity, marriage to an LPR, gained after she was expeditiously removed, can be given only minimal weight. The applicant has not established by supporting evidence that the favorable factors outweigh the unfavorable ones.

Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361, provides that the burden of proof is upon the applicant to establish that the applicant is eligible for the benefit sought. After a careful review of the record, it is concluded that the applicant has failed to establish that a favorable exercise of the Secretary's discretion is warranted. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.