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
U.S. Citizenship  
and Immigration  
Services

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FILE:



Office: CALIFORNIA SERVICE CENTER

Date: APR 04 2007

IN RE:

Applicant:



APPLICATION:

Application for Permission to Reapply for Admission into the United States after Deportation or Removal under section 212(a)(9)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(iii)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:



INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

Robert P. Wiemann, Chief  
Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The Application for Permission to Reapply for Admission into the United States after Deportation or Removal (Form I-212) was denied by the Director, California Service Center and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of El Salvador who entered the United States without a lawful admission or parole on or about February 21, 1983. The Immigration and Naturalization Service (now Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS)) apprehended the applicant and on February 22, 1983, an Order to Show Cause (OSC) for a hearing before an immigration judge was served on him. On March 9, 1983, the applicant was released on a \$2,000 bond. On April 4, 1984, the applicant filed a Request for Asylum in the United States (Form I-589) with the office of the immigration judge. On November 3, 1987, an immigration judge denied the applicant's request for asylum and withholding of deportation and granted him voluntary departure until December 2, 1987, in lieu of deportation. The applicant filed an appeal with the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which was dismissed on January 2, 1990, and he was permitted to depart from the United States voluntarily within 30 days from the date of the BIA's order. The applicant failed to surrender for removal or depart from the United States within 30 days from the date of the BIA's order. The applicant's failure to depart the United States within 30 days from the date of the BIA's order changed the voluntary departure order to an order of deportation. On March 2, 1990, a Notice to Deportable Alien (Form I-166) was forwarded to the applicant requesting that he appear at the Los Angeles District Office in order to be removed from the United States. The applicant failed to appear as requested. The record reflects that on March 28, 1995 the applicant was convicted of the offense of assault with a deadly weapon or instrument, and on December 21, 1990, he was convicted of the offense of driving under the influence. The applicant is inadmissible pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(A)(ii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii). He seeks permission to reapply for admission into the United States under section 212(a)(9)(A)(iii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(A)(iii), in order to remain in the United States and reside with his U.S. citizen spouse and children.

The Director determined that the applicant was inadmissible under section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), for having been convicted of a Crime Involving Moral Turpitude (CIMT) and that he is not eligible for any exceptions or waivers under the Act based on the severity of the crime. Additionally, the Director determined that the unfavorable factors in the applicant's case outweighed the favorable factors. The Director then denied the Form I-212 accordingly. *See Director's Decision* dated November 1, 2004.

On appeal, counsel states that the District Director erred in denying the applicant's Form I-212 because he was convicted of a crime constituting the essential elements of a CIMT. Counsel further states that even if the applicant was convicted of a CIMT he falls under the petty crime exception under section 212(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II) of the Act.

On the Notice of Appeal to the AAO (Form I-290B) counsel states that he will be submitting a brief and/or evidence to the AAO within 30 days. On February 6, 2007, the AAO forwarded a fax to counsel informing him that this office had not received a brief or evidence related to this matter and unless counsel responded within five business days the appeal may be summarily dismissed. Counsel responded to the AAO's fax and stated that he did not file a brief or evidence to support the appeal. Therefore, the AAO will adjudicate the appeal based on the documentation contained in the record of proceeding.

Section 212(a)(9)(A) of the Act states in pertinent part:

(A) Certain aliens previously removed.-

(ii) Other aliens.- Any alien not described in clause (i) who-

(I) has been ordered removed under section 240 or any other provision of law, or

(II) departed the United States while an order of removal was outstanding, and seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal (or within 20 years of such date in the case of a second or subsequent removal or at any time in the case of an alien convicted of an aggravated felony) is inadmissible.

(iii) Exception.- Clauses (i) and (ii) shall not apply to an alien seeking admission within a period if, prior to the date of the alien's reembarkation at a place outside the United States or attempt to be admitted from foreign contiguous territory, the Attorney General [now Secretary, Homeland Security, "Secretary"] has consented to the alien's reapplying for admission.

A review of the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) amendments to the Act and prior statutes and case law regarding permission to reapply for admission, reflects that Congress has, (1) increased the bar to admissibility and the waiting period from 5 to 10 years in most instances and to 20 years for others, (2) has added a bar to admissibility for aliens who are unlawfully present in the United States, and (3) has imposed a permanent bar to admission for aliens who have been ordered removed and who subsequently enter or attempt to enter the United States without being lawfully admitted. It is concluded that Congress has placed a high priority on deterring aliens from overstaying their authorized period of stay and/or from being present in the United States without a lawful admission or parole.

The proceeding in the present case is for an application for permission to reapply for admission into the United States after deportation or removal and, therefore, the AAO will not discuss whether the applicant qualifies for the exception found in section 212(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II) of the Act. This proceeding is limited to the issue of whether or not the applicant meets the requirements necessary for the ground of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(A)(ii) of the Act to be waived.

In *Matter of Tin*, 14 I&N Dec. 371 (Reg. Comm. 1973), the Regional Commissioner listed the following factors to be considered in the adjudication of a Form I-212 Application for Permission to Reapply After Deportation:

The basis for deportation; recency of deportation; length of residence in the United States; applicant's moral character; his respect for law and order; evidence of reformation and rehabilitation; family responsibilities; any inadmissibility under other sections of law; hardship involved to himself and others; and the need for his services in the United States.

In *Tin*, the Regional Commissioner noted that the applicant had gained an equity (job experience) while being unlawfully present in the U.S. The Regional Commissioner then stated that the alien had obtained an advantage over aliens seeking visa issuance abroad or who abide by the terms of their admission while in this country, and he concluded that approval of an application for permission to reapply for admission would be a condonation of the alien's acts and could encourage others to enter without being admitted and work in the United States unlawfully. *Id.*

The court held in *Garcia-Lopes v. INS*, 923 F.2d 72 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1991), that less weight is given to equities acquired after a deportation order has been entered. Further, the equity of a marriage and the weight given to any hardship to the spouse is diminished if the parties married after the commencement of deportation proceedings, with knowledge that the alien might be deported. It is also noted that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in *Carnalla-Nunoz v. INS*, 627 F.2d 1004 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1980), held that an after-acquired equity, referred to as an after-acquired family tie in *Matter of Tijam*, 22 I&N Dec. 408 (BIA 1998) need not be accorded great weight by the district director in considering discretionary weight. Moreover, in *Ghassan v. INS*, 972 F.2d 631, 634-35 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1992), the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that giving diminished weight to hardship faced by a spouse who entered into a marriage with knowledge of the alien's possible deportation was proper.

The applicant in the present matter married his U.S. citizen spouse on October 30, 1993, over ten and one half years after he was placed in deportation proceedings and over three and one half years after the BIA dismissed his appeal. The applicant's spouse should reasonably have been aware, at the time of their marriage, of the applicant's immigration violations and the possibility of his being removed. He now seeks relief based on that after-acquired equity. Therefore, hardship to his spouse will be accorded appropriate weight.

The AAO finds that the favorable factors in this case are the applicant's family ties in the United States, his U.S. citizen spouse and children and general hardship to his family.

The AAO notes that a Petition for Alien Relative (Form I-130) filed on behalf of the applicant by his U.S. citizen spouse was denied on April 27, 2006.

The AAO finds that the unfavorable factors in this case include the applicant's initial illegal entry into the United States, his failure to depart the United States after he was granted voluntary departure and after his voluntary departure order became a final order of deportation, his criminal record, his periods of employment without authorization and his lengthy presence in the United States without a lawful admission or parole. The Commissioner stated in *Matter of Lee, supra*, that residence in the United States could be considered a positive factor only where that residence is pursuant to a legal admission or adjustment of status as a permanent resident. To reward a person for remaining in the United States in violation of law would seriously threaten the structure of all laws pertaining to immigration.

The applicant's actions in this matter cannot be condoned. His equity, marriage to a U.S. citizen, gained after he was placed in deportation proceedings and after the BIA dismissed his appeal, can be given only minimal weight. The applicant has not established by supporting evidence that the favorable factors outweigh the unfavorable factors.

Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361, provides that the burden of proof is upon the applicant to establish eligibility for the benefit sought. After a careful review of the record, it is concluded that the applicant has failed to establish that a favorable exercise of the Secretary's discretion is warranted. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed.