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
**U.S. Department of Homeland Security
20 Mass. Ave., N.W., Rm. 3000
Washington, DC 20529**



**U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services**

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FILE:



Office: BANGKOK, THAILAND

Date: MAY 03 2007

IN RE:

Applicant:



APPLICATION:

Application for Permission to Reapply for Admission into the United States after Deportation or Removal under Section 212(a)(9)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A).

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

SELF-REPRESENTED

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

Robert P. Wiemann

Robert P. Wiemann, Chief
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The Application for Permission to Reapply for Admission After Deportation or Removal (Form I-212) was denied by the Acting District Director, Bangkok, Thailand, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of Thailand who had lived in the United States for over 30 years (*statement from the applicant*) and was ordered removed on December 20, 2002 pursuant to Section 237(a)(1)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. The applicant departed the United States and returned to Thailand where she continues to reside. *Form G-325A, Biographic Information sheet, for the applicant.* The applicant is inadmissible under section 212(a)(9)(A)(ii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii). She now seeks permission to reapply for admission into the United States under section 212(a)(9)(A)(iii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(iii) in order to travel to the United States and reside with her U.S. citizen spouse, two U.S. citizen children, and one U.S. citizen grandchild.

The Acting District Director determined that the applicant is inadmissible pursuant to section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), for having committed a crime involving moral turpitude and under section 212(a)(9)(A) for having been removed from the United States. The Acting District Director determined that the unfavorable factors in the applicant's case outweighed the favorable factors. The Director denied the applicant's Form I-212 accordingly. *See Acting Director's Decision*, dated June 5, 2006.

On appeal, the applicant indicates that she is not a danger to the security of a state and has had no additional criminal offenses, she needs specialized medical treatment in the United States, and she has family in the United States. *Form I-290B and attached statement.*

Section 212(a)(9). Aliens previously removed.-

(A) Certain alien previously removed.-

(ii) Other aliens.- Any alien not described in clause (i) who-

(I) has been ordered removed under section 240 or any other provision of law, or

(II) departed the United States while an order of removal was outstanding, and seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal (or within 20 years of such date in the case of a second or subsequent removal or at any time in the case of an alien convicted of an aggravated felony) is inadmissible.

(iii) Exception.- Clauses (i) and (ii) shall not apply to an alien seeking admission within a period if, prior to the date of the aliens' reembarkation at a place outside the United States or attempt to be admitted from foreign continuous territory, the Attorney General [now, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security] has consented to the aliens' reapplying for admission.

In *Matter of Tin*, 14 I&N Dec. 371 (Reg. Comm. 1973), the Regional Commissioner listed the following factors to be considered in the adjudication of a Form I-212 Application for Permission to Reapply After Deportation:

The basis for deportation; recency of deportation; length of residence in the United States; applicant's moral character; his respect for law and order; evidence of reformation and rehabilitation; family responsibilities; any inadmissibility under other sections of law; hardship involved to himself and others; and the need for his services in the United States..

Where an applicant is seeking discretionary relief from removal or deportation and the courts are required to weigh favorable equities or factors against unfavorable factors, many have repeatedly upheld the general principle that less weight is given to equities acquired by an alien after an order of deportation or removal has been issued. The AAO notes that the applicant's Form I-212 involves a similar weighing of equities or favorable factors against unfavorable factors in order to determine whether to grant discretionary relief.

In *Garcia-Lopez v. INS*, 923 F.2d 72 (7th Cir. 1991), for example, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals (Seventh Circuit) reviewed a Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) denial of an alien's request for discretionary voluntary departure relief. The Seventh Circuit found that the Board's denial rested on discretionary grounds, and that the Board had weighed all of the favorable and unfavorable factors and stated the reasons for its denial of relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the general principle that less weight may be accorded to equities acquired after an order of deportation is issued, and the Seventh Circuit concluded that the Board had not abused or exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner.

In *Bothyo v. Moyer*, 772 F.2d 353, 357 (7th Cir. 1985), the Seventh Circuit reviewed a discretionary stay of deportation case that weighed and balanced favorable and unfavorable factors. The Seventh Circuit stated that an alien's marriage to a lawful permanent resident did not necessitate the granting of a stay of deportation because the marriage occurred after deportation proceedings had commenced and after an Order to Show Cause had been issued against the alien. The Seventh Circuit then affirmed the general principle that an "after-acquired equity" need not be accorded great weight by a district director in his or her consideration of discretionary weight.

In *Carnalla-Munoz v. INS*, 627 F.2d 1004, 1006 (9th Cir. 1980), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (Ninth Circuit) reviewed a discretionary suspension of deportation case. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the principle that post-deportation equities are entitled to less weight in determining hardship. In doing so, the Ninth Circuit referred to the 1980 decision, *Wang v. INS*, 622 F.2d 1341, 1346 (9th Cir. 1980) (overruled on unrelated grounds). In *Wang*, the alien sought discretionary relief and a finding of extreme hardship through a motion to reopen deportation proceedings. The Ninth Circuit held in *Wang*, that, "[e]quities arising when the alien knows he is in this country illegally, e.g. after a deportation order is issued, are entitled to less weight than equities arising when the alien is legally in this country."

In *Ghassan v. INS*, 972 F.2d 631, 634-35 (5th Cir. 1992), the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals (Fifth Circuit) reviewed a section 212(c), waiver of deportation, discretionary relief case that involved the balancing of favorable and unfavorable factors. The Fifth Circuit found no abuse of discretion in the Board's weighing of equitable factors against unfavorable factors in the alien's case, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed the principle that as an equity factor, it is not an abuse of discretion to accord diminished weight to hardship faced by a spouse who entered into a marriage with knowledge of the alien spouse's possible deportation.

The AAO finds that the above-cited precedent legal decisions establish the general principle that "after-acquired equities" are accorded less weight for purposes of assessing hardship to a spouse and for purposes of assessing favorable equities in the exercise of discretion.

The favorable factors in this matter include the applicant's family ties to U.S. citizens, her spouse, two children and one grandchild. The AAO notes that the applicant's marriage to her current spouse occurred on December 30, 2004, over two years after her removal and is an after-acquired equity. As an after-acquired equity this factor will be given less weight. The AAO notes that while the applicant has only one functioning kidney and suffers from neck pain due to an automobile accident (*Public Health Progress Notes, Department of Corrections, State of California*, dated September 10, 2001; *Letter from [REDACTED] D.C., Chiropractic Clinic, Apple Valley, California*, dated November 25, 1998), the record does not demonstrate that the applicant needs on-going treatment and whether, if needed, such treatment is unavailable in Thailand. The fact that the applicant left the United States and currently remains in Thailand is a favorable factor.

The AAO finds that the unfavorable factors in this case include the applicant's multiple criminal convictions occurring from 1996 to 2001, for which she received a prison sentence of several years beginning in 2001. *Legal Status Summary*, dated May 21, 2002. The AAO notes that the applicant was released from prison on November 25, 2002 and was under an order of parole for three years. *Id.*

While the AAO acknowledges the favorable factors in this case, it notes that the applicant's criminal convictions, including her time spent under parole, occurred within the last few years. The applicant's actions in this matter cannot be condoned. The applicant has not established by supporting evidence that the favorable factors outweigh the unfavorable ones.

Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361, provides that the burden of proof is upon the applicant to establish that she is eligible for the benefit sought. After a careful review of the record, it is concluded that the applicant has failed to establish that a favorable exercise of the Secretary's discretion is warranted. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.