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U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services  
Administrative Appeals Office (AAO)  
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., MS 2090  
Washington, DC 20529-2090



**U.S. Citizenship  
and Immigration  
Services**



H5

DATE: **APR 28 2011** Office: MILWAUKEE FILE:

IN RE: Applicant:

APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under sections 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v), and 212(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:



**INSTRUCTIONS:**

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied by us in reaching our decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. The specific requirements for filing such a request can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$630. Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires that any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,

Perry Rhew  
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The waiver application was denied by the Field Office Director, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The record establishes that the applicant, a native and citizen of India, was found inadmissible to the United States under section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), for having been unlawfully present in the United States for more than one year. The applicant was also found to be inadmissible under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), for having procured a nonimmigrant visa and entry to the United States by fraud or willful misrepresentation. The applicant seeks a waiver of inadmissibility in order to reside in the United States with her U.S. citizen spouse and children, born in 1999 and 2001.

The field office director concluded that the applicant had failed to establish that extreme hardship would be imposed on a qualifying relative and denied the Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility (Form I-601) accordingly. *Decision of the Field Office Director*, dated December 12, 2008.

In support of the appeal, counsel for the applicant submits a brief, dated January 8, 2009, and referenced exhibits. The entire record was reviewed and considered in rendering this decision.

Section 212(a)(9)(B) of the Act provides, in pertinent part:

Aliens Unlawfully Present.-

(i) In general. - Any alien (other than an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence) who-

....

(II) has been unlawfully present in the United States for one year or more, and who again seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal from the United States, is inadmissible.

....

(v) Waiver. - The Attorney General [now the Secretary of Homeland Security (Secretary)] has sole discretion to waive clause (i) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse or son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General (Secretary) that the refusal of admission to such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such alien...

Section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act provides, in pertinent part:

- (i) Any alien who, by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure (or has sought to procure or has procured) a visa, other documentation, or admission into the United States or other benefit provided under this Act is inadmissible.

....

- (iii) Waiver authorized. – For provision authorizing waiver of clause (i), see subsection (i).

Section 212(i) of the Act provides:

- (1) The Attorney General [now the Secretary of Homeland Security (Secretary)] may, in the discretion of the Attorney General [Secretary], waive the application of clause (i) of subsection (a)(6)(C) in the case of an alien who is the spouse, son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General [Secretary] that the refusal of admission to the United States of such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such an alien.

Regarding the field office director's finding of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Act, the record indicates that the applicant entered the United States in November 1996 with a valid visitor's visa with permission to remain for a six month period. She remained in the United States beyond the period of authorized stay and did not depart the United States until January 2002. The field office director correctly found the applicant to be inadmissible to the United States under section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Act for unlawful presence for more than one year. On appeal, the applicant does not contest this finding of inadmissibility.

Regarding the field office director's finding that the applicant is also inadmissible under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Act, for fraud or willful misrepresentation, the record establishes that the applicant fraudulently obtained an Indian entry stamp in her passport indicating that she had re-entered India two and a half months after her visit to the United States in 1996, when in fact, as detailed above, she did not depart the United States until January 2002. Moreover, when the applicant applied for a nonimmigrant visa in 2003 at the U.S. Consulate in Mumbai, India, she failed to disclose her previous overstay in the United States and the fact that she had two U.S. citizen children. The applicant was thus found inadmissible to the United States under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C), for having procured a nonimmigrant visa and re-entry into the United States by fraud or willful misrepresentation. On appeal, the applicant does not contest this finding of inadmissibility.

Waivers of inadmissibility under sections 212(a)(9)(B)(v) and 212(i) of the Act are dependent on a showing that the bar to admission imposes extreme hardship on a qualifying relative, which includes the U.S. citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of the applicant. Hardship to the applicant and/or her children can be considered only insofar as it results in hardship to a qualifying relative. The applicant's U.S. citizen spouse is the only qualifying relative in this case. If extreme hardship to a qualifying relative is established, the applicant is statutorily eligible for a waiver, and USCIS then assesses whether a favorable exercise of discretion is warranted. *See Matter of Mendez-Moralez*, 21 I&N Dec. 296, 301 (BIA 1996).

As a qualifying relative is not required to depart the United States as a consequence of an applicant's inadmissibility, two distinct factual scenarios exist should a waiver application be denied: either the qualifying relative will join the applicant to reside abroad or the qualifying relative will remain in the United States. Ascertaining the actual course of action that will be taken is complicated by the fact that an applicant may easily assert a plan for the qualifying relative to relocate abroad or to remain in the United States depending on which scenario presents the greatest prospective hardship, even though no intention exists to carry out the alleged plan in reality. *Cf. Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. 880, 885 (BIA 1994) (addressing separation of minor child from both parents applying for suspension of deportation). Thus, we interpret the statutory language of the various waiver provisions in section 212 of the Act to require an applicant to establish extreme hardship to his or her qualifying relative(s) under both possible scenarios. To endure the hardship of separation when extreme hardship could be avoided by joining the applicant abroad, or to endure the hardship of relocation when extreme hardship could be avoided by remaining in the United States, is a matter of choice and not the result of removal or inadmissibility. As the Board of Immigration Appeals stated in *Matter of Ige*:

[W]e consider the critical issue . . . to be whether a child would suffer extreme hardship if he accompanied his parent abroad. If, as in this case, no hardship would ensue, then the fact that the child might face hardship if left in the United States would be the result of parental choice, not the parent's deportation.

*Id.* See also *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. 627, 632-33 (BIA 1996).

Extreme hardship is "not a definable term of fixed and inflexible content or meaning," but "necessarily depends upon the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case." *Matter of Hwang*, 10 I&N Dec. 448, 451 (BIA 1964). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the Board provided a list of factors it deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship to a qualifying relative. 22 I&N Dec. 560, 565 (BIA 1999). The factors include the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate.

*Id.* The Board added that not all of the foregoing factors need be analyzed in any given case and emphasized that the list of factors was not exclusive. *Id.* at 566.

The Board has also held that the common or typical results of deportation, removal and inadmissibility do not constitute extreme hardship, and has listed certain individual hardship factors considered common rather than extreme. These factors include: economic disadvantage, loss of current employment, inability to maintain one's present standard of living, inability to pursue a chosen profession, separation from family members, severing community ties, cultural readjustment after living in the United States for many years, cultural adjustment of qualifying relatives who have never lived outside the United States, inferior economic and educational opportunities in the foreign country, or inferior medical facilities in the foreign country. *See generally Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. at 568; *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. at 631-32; *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 883; *Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. 245, 246-47 (Comm'r 1984); *Matter of Kim*, 15 I&N Dec. 88, 89-90 (BIA 1974); *Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. 810, 813 (BIA 1968).

However, though hardships may not be extreme when considered abstractly or individually, the Board has made it clear that "[r]elevant factors, though not extreme in themselves, must be considered in the aggregate in determining whether extreme hardship exists." *Matter of O-J-O-*, 21 I&N Dec. 381, 383 (BIA 1996) (quoting *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 882). The adjudicator "must consider the entire range of factors concerning hardship in their totality and determine whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond those hardships ordinarily associated with deportation." *Id.*

We observe that the actual hardship associated with an abstract hardship factor such as family separation, economic disadvantage, cultural readjustment, et cetera, differs in nature and severity depending on the unique circumstances of each case, as does the cumulative hardship a qualifying relative experiences as a result of aggregated individual hardships. *See, e.g., In re Bing Chih Kao and Mei Tsui Lin*, 23 I&N Dec. 45, 51 (BIA 2001) (distinguishing *Matter of Pilch* regarding hardship faced by qualifying relatives on the basis of variations in the length of residence in the United States and the ability to speak the language of the country to which they would relocate).

Family separation, for instance, has been found to be a common result of inadmissibility or removal in some cases. *See Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. at 813. Nevertheless, family ties are to be considered in analyzing hardship. *See Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. at 565-66. The question of whether family separation is the ordinary result of inadmissibility or removal may depend on the nature of family relationship considered. For example, in *Matter of Shaughnessy*, the Board considered the scenario of parents being separated from their soon-to-be adult son, finding that this separation would not result in extreme hardship to the parents. *Id.* at 811-12; *see also U.S. v. Arrieta*, 224 F.3d 1076, 1082 (9th Cir. 2000) ("Mr. Arrieta was not a spouse, but a son and brother. It was evident from the record that the effect of the deportation order would be separation rather than relocation."). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the Board considered the scenario of the respondent's spouse accompanying him to Mexico, finding that she would not experience extreme

hardship from losing “physical proximity to her family” in the United States. 22 I&N Dec. at 566-67.

The decision in *Cervantes-Gonzalez* reflects the norm that spouses reside with one another and establish a life together such that separating from one another is likely to result in substantial hardship. It is common for both spouses to relocate abroad if one of them is not allowed to stay in the United States, which typically results in separation from other family members living in the United States. Other decisions reflect the expectation that minor children will remain with their parents, upon whom they usually depend for financial and emotional support. *See, e.g., Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 886 (“[I]t is generally preferable for children to be brought up by their parents.”). Therefore, the most important single hardship factor may be separation, particularly where spouses and minor children are concerned. *Salcido-Salcido*, 138 F.3d at 1293 (quoting *Contreras-Buenfil v. INS*, 712 F.2d 401, 403 (9th Cir. 1983)); *Cerrillo-Perez*, 809 F.2d at 1422.

Regardless of the type of family relationship involved, the hardship resulting from family separation is determined based on the actual impact of separation on a qualifying relative, and all hardships must be considered in determining whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond the consequences ordinarily associated with removal or inadmissibility. *Matter of O-J-O-*, 21 I&N Dec. at 383. Nevertheless, though we require an applicant to show that a qualifying relative would experience extreme hardship both in the event of relocation and in the event of separation, in analyzing the latter scenario, we give considerable, if not predominant, weight to the hardship of separation itself, particularly in cases involving the separation of spouses from one another and/or minor children from a parent. *Salcido-Salcido*, 138 F.3d at 1293.

The applicant’s U.S. citizen spouse contends that he will suffer extreme hardship were he to remain in the United States while the applicant resides abroad due to her inadmissibility. In a declaration he explains that his wife is the homemaker of the family and were she to relocate abroad, he would suffer due to the extra burden of caring for his home and his children on his own. The applicant’s spouse also contends that his children are very close to their mother and were she to relocate abroad, they would experience extreme hardship. In addition, the applicant’s spouse asserts that he is running a business that requires him to be away from the home without a planned schedule, and were his wife to relocate abroad, he would not be able to fulfill his business obligations while caring for two children on his own. Finally, the applicant’s spouse explains that he is worried about his wife’s safety and well-being were she to return to India due to the problematic country conditions, including ethnic and religious tensions. *Affidavit of* [REDACTED] dated January 8, 2009.

To begin with respect to the emotional hardship referenced, counsel has submitted a letter from [REDACTED]. The letter outlines the hardships the applicant’s spouse and children will experience were the applicant to relocate abroad. The letter further recommends that the applicant’s spouse continue therapy to cope with stress every two weeks and that the children receive therapy to cope with separation from their mother. *Letter from* [REDACTED] dated January 2, 2009. The AAO notes that the letter provided by [REDACTED] is virtually identical to two previous letters submitted by counsel in April and October 2008. All three letters from [REDACTED] make similar

recommendations with respect to therapy for the applicant's spouse and children, yet no evidence has been provided establishing that the applicant's spouse is currently undergoing treatment. In fact, each letter from [REDACTED] references a treatment plan, yet counsel has not provided copies of such plans. As such, the evidence does not establish that the applicant's spouse will suffer extreme emotion hardship due to his wife's inadmissibility. Nor has it been established that the applicant's children would suffer extreme emotional hardship were they to remain in the United States with their father, thereby causing hardship to the applicant's spouse, the only qualifying relative in this case. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)).

In addition, no documentation has been provided establishing the applicant's spouse's current business obligations to establish that were his spouse to relocate abroad due to her inadmissibility, he would suffer extreme hardship as he would become primary caregiver and provider to his children. It has also not been established that the applicant's spouse is unable to travel to India, his home country, to visit the applicant on a regular basis, as he did when his wife returned to India in 2002 for an 18 month period. Finally, with respect to the problematic country conditions in India and the applicant's spouse's concerns for his wife's safety and well-being, the AAO notes that the U.S. Department of State has not issued any kind of travel warnings for India at this time. The four internet articles provided by counsel with respect to country conditions in India are general in nature and fail to establish that the applicant and/or her family would face any specific danger in India. It has thus not been established that the applicant's spouse would be unable to return to India regularly to visit his wife or that the applicant would be in danger in India.

The AAO recognizes that the applicant's spouse will endure hardship as a result of long-term separation from the applicant. However, his situation, if he remains in the United States, is typical to individuals separated as a result of removal and does not rise to the level of extreme hardship based on the record. Thus, the AAO concludes that it has not been established that the applicant's spouse will suffer extreme hardship were he to remain in the United States while the applicant resides abroad due to her inadmissibility.

Extreme hardship to a qualifying relative must also be established in the event that he or she accompanies the applicant abroad based on the denial of the applicant's waiver request. The applicant's spouse explains that he is a real estate investor and manager of numerous businesses and his personal presence is required on a day to day basis. Were he to relocate abroad, he contends that he would have to sell his businesses and suffer a significant loss in his investment. He further notes that his children are totally immersed in the American culture and thus, were they to relocate abroad to reside with the applicant, they would experience extreme hardship which in turn, would cause the applicant's spouse extreme hardship. He notes that they have not been to India since 2002. *Supra* at 3.

The record establishes that the applicant's children, natives and citizens of the United States, are integrated into the United States lifestyle and educational system. The Board of Immigration

Appeals (BIA) found that a fifteen-year-old child who lived her entire life in the United States, who was completely integrated into the American lifestyle, and who was not fluent in Chinese, would suffer extreme hardship if she relocated to Taiwan. *Matter of Kao and Lin*, 23 I&N Dec. 45 (BIA 2001). The AAO finds *Matter of Kao and Lin* to be persuasive in this case due to the similar fact pattern. To uproot the applicant's children at this stage of their education and social development and relocate them to India would constitute extreme hardship to them, and by extension, to the applicant's spouse, the only qualifying relative in this case. In addition, the record reflects that the applicant's U.S. citizen spouse would be relocating to a country with which he is no longer familiar. He would have to leave his home, his widowed mother and siblings, his community, and his long-term business operations. It has thus been established that the applicant's spouse would suffer extreme hardship were he to relocate abroad to reside with the applicant due to her inadmissibility.

A review of the documentation in the record, when considered in its totality, reflects that although the applicant has established that her U.S. citizen spouse would suffer extreme hardship were he to relocate abroad to reside with the applicant, the record fails to establish that the applicant's U.S. citizen spouse would suffer extreme hardship were he to remain in the United States while the applicant resides abroad. The record demonstrates that the applicant's spouse faces no greater hardship than the unfortunate, but expected, disruptions, inconveniences, and difficulties arising whenever a spouse is removed from the United States or refused admission. Having found the applicant statutorily ineligible for relief, no purpose would be served in discussing whether the applicant merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed. The waiver application is denied.