


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U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services  
Administrative Appeals Office (AAO)  
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., MS 2090  
Washington, DC 20529-2090  
**U.S. Citizenship  
and Immigration  
Services**



H5

Date: **MAY 20 2011** Office: VERMONT SERVICE CENTER FILE:

IN RE: Applicant:

APPLICATIONS: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under Section 212(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i), and Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under section 212(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

SELF-REPRESENTED

INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied by us in reaching our decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. The specific requirements for filing such a request can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$630. Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires that any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,

Perry Rhew  
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The waiver application was denied by the Acting Center Director, Vermont Service Center, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The record reflects that the applicant is a native and citizen of Canada who was found to be inadmissible to the United States pursuant to section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), for attempting to procure admission to the United States through fraud or the willful misrepresentation of a material fact; and section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), for having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. The record indicates that the applicant is the spouse of a United States citizen and the beneficiary of an approved Petition for Alien Relative (Form I-130). The applicant seeks a waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to section 212(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i); and section 212(h) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h), in order to reside in the United States with his spouse.

The Acting Center Director found that the applicant had failed to establish that extreme hardship would be imposed on a qualifying relative and denied the Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility (Form I-601) accordingly. *Decision of the Acting Center Director*, dated August 15, 2008.

On appeal, the applicant claims that his wife will suffer hardship if he is not allowed to join her in the United States. *Form I-290B*, filed September 15, 2008.

The record includes, but is not limited to, statements from the applicant and his wife, letters of support for the applicant, credit card statements, a criminal court judgment, and documents pertaining to the applicant's removal proceeding. The entire record was reviewed and considered in arriving at a decision on the appeal.

Section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act provides, in pertinent part, that:

- (i) In general.-Any alien who, by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure (or has sought to procure or has procured) a visa, other documentation, or admission into the United States or other benefit provided under this Act is inadmissible.
- (iii) Waiver authorized.-For provision authorizing waiver of clause (i), see subsection (i).

Section 212 of the Act provides, in pertinent part, that:

- (i) (1) The Attorney General [now the Secretary of Homeland Security, "Secretary"] may, in the discretion of the [Secretary], waive the application of clause (i) of subsection (a)(6)(C) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse, son, or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of

the [Secretary] that the refusal of admission to the United States of such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such an alien...

Section 212(a) of the Act provides, in pertinent part, that:

(A) Conviction of certain crimes.—

- (i) In general.—Except as provided in clause (ii), any alien convicted of, or who admits having committed, or who admits committing acts which constitute the essential elements of —
  - (I) a crime involving moral turpitude (other than a purely political offense) or an attempt or conspiracy to commit such a crime...

Section 212(h) of the Act provides, in pertinent part, that:

Waiver of subsection (a)(2)(A)(i)(I), (II), (B), (D), and (E).—The [Secretary] may, in [her] discretion, waive the application of subparagraphs (A)(i)(I)...of subsection (a)(2) if—

- (1) (A) in the case of any immigrant it is established to the satisfaction of the [Secretary] that—
  - (i)...the activities for which the alien is inadmissible occurred more than 15 years before the date of the alien's application for a visa, admission, or adjustment of status,
  - (ii)the admission to the United States of such alien would not be contrary to the national welfare, safety, or security of the United States, and
  - (iii)the alien has been rehabilitated; or
- (B) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse, parent, son, or daughter of a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence if it established to the satisfaction of the [Secretary] that the alien's denial of admission would result in extreme hardship to the United States citizen or lawfully resident spouse, parent, son, or daughter of such alien...

(2) the [Secretary], in [her] discretion, and pursuant to such terms, conditions and procedures as he may by regulations prescribe, has consented

to the alien's applying or reapplying for a visa, for admission to the United States, or adjustment of status.

In the present application, the record indicates that on September 2, 2002, in response to questioning by a border patrol officer, the applicant claimed to have never been to court, when in fact he has been in court for several immigration and criminal violations. On the same day, the applicant was expeditiously removed from the United States. Based on the applicant's misrepresentation, the AAO finds that the applicant is inadmissible under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Act.

Additionally, the record shows that on January 11, 1991, the applicant was convicted in Canada of theft over \$1,000.00, and sentenced to 30 months imprisonment. The applicant was found inadmissible pursuant to section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Act by the Acting Center Director. In a statement dated September 6, 2008, the applicant claims that the criminal charge against him was "trumped up;" however, he does not dispute that he was convicted of this charge. Because the applicant is also inadmissible under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Act, and demonstrating eligibility for a waiver under section 212(i) of the Act also satisfies the requirements for a waiver of criminal grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(h), the AAO will not review the determination of the applicant's inadmissibility under section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I).

A waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(i) of the Act is dependent on a showing that the bar to admission imposes extreme hardship on a qualifying relative, which includes the U.S. citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of the applicant. Hardship to the applicant can be considered only insofar as it results in hardship to a qualifying relative. The applicant's wife is the only qualifying relative in this case. If extreme hardship to a qualifying relative is established, the applicant is statutorily eligible for a waiver, and United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) then assesses whether a favorable exercise of discretion is warranted. See *Matter of Mendez-Morales*, 21 I&N Dec. 296, 301 (BIA 1996).

As a qualifying relative is not required to depart the United States as a consequence of an applicant's inadmissibility, two distinct factual scenarios exist should a waiver application be denied: either the qualifying relative will join the applicant to reside abroad or the qualifying relative will remain in the United States. Ascertaining the actual course of action that will be taken is complicated by the fact that an applicant may easily assert a plan for the qualifying relative to relocate abroad or to remain in the United States depending on which scenario presents the greatest prospective hardship, even though no intention exists to carry out the alleged plan in reality. Cf. *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. 880, 885 (BIA 1994) (addressing separation of minor child from both parents applying for suspension of deportation). Thus, we interpret the statutory language of the various waiver provisions in section 212 of the Act to require an applicant to establish extreme hardship to his or her qualifying relative(s) under both possible scenarios. To endure the hardship of separation when extreme hardship could be avoided by joining the applicant abroad, or to endure the hardship of relocation when extreme hardship could be avoided by remaining in the United States, is a matter of choice and not the result of removal or inadmissibility. As the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) stated in *Matter of Ige*:

[W]e consider the critical issue . . . to be whether a child would suffer extreme hardship if he accompanied his parent abroad. If, as in this case, no hardship would ensue, then the fact that the

child might face hardship if left in the United States would be the result of parental choice, not the parent's deportation.

*Id.* See also *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. 627, 632-33 (BIA 1996).

Extreme hardship is "not a definable term of fixed and inflexible content or meaning," but "necessarily depends upon the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case." *Matter of Hwang*, 10 I&N Dec. 448, 451 (BIA 1964). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the Board provided a list of factors it deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship to a qualifying relative. 22 I&N Dec. 560, 565 (BIA 1999). The factors include the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate. *Id.* The Board added that not all of the foregoing factors need be analyzed in any given case and emphasized that the list of factors was not exclusive. *Id.* at 566.

The Board has also held that the common or typical results of deportation, removal and inadmissibility do not constitute extreme hardship, and has listed certain individual hardship factors considered common rather than extreme. These factors include: economic disadvantage, loss of current employment, inability to maintain one's present standard of living, inability to pursue a chosen profession, separation from family members, severing community ties, cultural readjustment after living in the United States for many years, cultural adjustment of qualifying relatives who have never lived outside the United States, inferior economic and educational opportunities in the foreign country, or inferior medical facilities in the foreign country. See generally *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. at 568; *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. at 631-32; *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 883; *Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. 245, 246-47 (Comm'r 1984); *Matter of Kim*, 15 I&N Dec. 88, 89-90 (BIA 1974); *Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. 810, 813 (BIA 1968).

However, though hardships may not be extreme when considered abstractly or individually, the Board has made it clear that "[r]elevant factors, though not extreme in themselves, must be considered in the aggregate in determining whether extreme hardship exists." *Matter of O-J-O-*, 21 I&N Dec. 381, 383 (BIA 1996) (quoting *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 882). The adjudicator "must consider the entire range of factors concerning hardship in their totality and determine whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond those hardships ordinarily associated with deportation." *Id.*

We observe that the actual hardship associated with an abstract hardship factor such as family separation, economic disadvantage, cultural readjustment, et cetera, differs in nature and severity depending on the unique circumstances of each case, as does the cumulative hardship a qualifying relative experiences as a result of aggregated individual hardships. See, e.g., *In re Bing Chih Kao and Mei Tsui Lin*, 23 I&N Dec. 45, 51 (BIA 2001) (distinguishing *Matter of Pilch* regarding hardship faced by qualifying relatives on the basis of variations in the length of residence in the United States and the ability to speak the language of the country to which they would relocate).

Family separation, for instance, has been found to be a common result of inadmissibility or removal in some cases. See *Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. at 813. Nevertheless, family ties are to be considered in analyzing hardship. See *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. at 565-66. The question of whether family separation is the ordinary result of inadmissibility or removal may depend on the nature of family relationship considered. For example, in *Matter of Shaughnessy*, the Board considered the scenario of parents being separated from their soon-to-be adult son, finding that this separation would not result in extreme hardship to the parents. *Id.* at 811-12; see also *U.S. v. Arrieta*, 224 F.3d 1076, 1082 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Mr. Arrieta was not a spouse, but a son and brother. It was evident from the record that the effect of the deportation order would be separation rather than relocation.”). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the Board considered the scenario of the respondent’s spouse accompanying him to Mexico, finding that she would not experience extreme hardship from losing “physical proximity to her family” in the United States. 22 I&N Dec. at 566-67.

The decision in *Cervantes-Gonzalez* reflects the norm that spouses reside with one another and establish a life together such that separating from one another is likely to result in substantial hardship. It is common for both spouses to relocate abroad if one of them is not allowed to stay in the United States, which typically results in separation from other family members living in the United States. Other decisions reflect the expectation that minor children will remain with their parents, upon whom they usually depend for financial and emotional support. See, e.g., *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 886 (“[I]t is generally preferable for children to be brought up by their parents.”). Therefore, the most important single hardship factor may be separation, particularly where spouses and minor children are concerned. *Salcido-Salcido*, 138 F.3d at 1293 (quoting *Contreras-Buenfil v. INS*, 712 F.2d 401, 403 (9th Cir. 1983)); *Cerrillo-Perez*, 809 F.2d at 1422.

Regardless of the type of family relationship involved, the hardship resulting from family separation is determined based on the actual impact of separation on a qualifying relative, and all hardships must be considered in determining whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond the consequences ordinarily associated with removal or inadmissibility. *Matter of O-J-O-*, 21 I&N Dec. at 383. Nevertheless, though we require an applicant to show that a qualifying relative would experience extreme hardship both in the event of relocation and in the event of separation, in analyzing the latter scenario, we give considerable, if not predominant, weight to the hardship of separation itself, particularly in cases involving the separation of spouses from one another and/or minor children from a parent. *Salcido-Salcido*, 138 F.3d at 1293.

The first prong of the analysis addresses hardship to the applicant’s spouse if she relocates to Canada. In a statement dated January 29, 2008, the applicant states his wife “has no intention to move to Canada, as she has established a viable business that grosses 6000.00/week and employes [sic] four US citizens.” Additionally, in a statement dated January 5, 2007, the applicant states his wife’s elderly mother resides in Michigan and “having [him] present so she can visit Michigan more often would also greatly benefit [his wife].” The AAO notes the claims made regarding the difficulties the applicant’s wife would face in relocating to Canada.

The AAO acknowledges that the applicant's wife is a citizen of the United States and that she may experience some hardship in residing in Canada. The AAO notes that other than the statements by the applicant and his wife, no documentary evidence has been submitted establishing her business ownership or activities. Going on record without supporting documentation is not sufficient to meet the applicant's burden of proof in this proceeding. *See Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). Therefore, the AAO finds that the applicant has not established that his wife would face a loss of income or investment should she join the applicant in Canada. Additionally, the AAO notes that no country conditions materials or documentation has been submitted to establish that the applicant's wife would be unable to obtain employment in Canada that would allow her to use the skills she has acquired in the United States. In that the record does not include sufficient documentation of financial, medical, emotional or other types of hardship that the applicant's wife would experience if she joined the applicant in Canada, the AAO does not find the applicant to have established that his wife would suffer extreme hardship upon relocation.

In addition, the record does not establish extreme hardship to the applicant's wife if she remains in the United States. The applicant states that his wife is an "ideal life partner." He claims that before he met his wife, she was in two abusive marriages but she changed her life around. He states that if he cannot join his wife in the United States, it will "cause her mental collapse." In a statement dated December 17, 2007, the applicant claims he fears for his wife's "mental well being along with the well being of her business." In a statement dated December 29, 2006, the applicant's wife states she is suffering financial hardship by not having the applicant with her "to assist [her] with [her] business on a daily basis." She states that the applicant "can assist [her] greatly in running [her] business and finding [her] a building to buy." The applicant claims his wife has purchased a dog grooming business and she needs him "in Arizona to help her make her business expand and prosper." He claims that he and his wife spend \$25,000.00 per year "maintaining two households in addition to travel and communication costs." He states that he purchases calling cards for his wife to use to keep in contact with him, and she has "visited [him] many times in Canada." The applicant's wife claims that she visits the applicant in Canada three times a year, and through those three visits she loses \$5400.00 in income. The AAO notes that no evidence has been submitted establishing the applicant's wife's travel expenses and/or lost income when she travels to Canada. However, the AAO notes the financial and mental health concerns of the applicant's wife.

The AAO notes that the applicant submitted two credit card statements; however, these statements offer insufficient proof that the applicant's wife is unable to support herself in the applicant's absence. Additionally, as noted above, no documentary evidence has been submitted establishing the applicant's wife's business ownership. Further, even if the applicant's wife does own a business, no evidence has been submitted establishing that she needs the applicant to help run it. The AAO also notes that the record does not establish that the applicant is unable to obtain employment in Canada and, thereby, financially assist his wife from outside the United States. Additionally, the AAO finds that the applicant has not distinguished his wife's emotional hardship due to family separation from that which is commonly experienced when spouses reside apart as a result of inadmissibility. Based on the record before it, the AAO finds that the applicant has failed to establish that his wife would suffer extreme hardship if his waiver application is denied and she remains in the United States.

A review of the documentation in the record fails to establish the existence of extreme hardship to the applicant's wife caused by the applicant's inadmissibility to the United States. Having found the applicant statutorily ineligible for relief, no purpose would be served in discussing whether he merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(i) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. *See* section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed.