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U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Office of Administrative Appeals
20 Massachusetts Ave. N.W. MS 2090
Washington, D.C. 20529-2090
U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services



415

DATE: **APR 19 2012** OFFICE: SANTO DOMINGO, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC FILE: [REDACTED]

IN RE: Applicant: [REDACTED]

APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under section 212(i) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

SELF-REPRESENTED

INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied by us in reaching our decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. The specific requirements for filing such a request can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$630. Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires that any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,

Perry Rhew,
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The Field Office Director, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic denied the waiver application (Form I-601) and it is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of the Dominican Republic who was found to be inadmissible to the United States under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), for seeking to procure a visa, other documentation, or admission into the United States or other benefit provided under the Act by fraud or willful misrepresentation. The applicant seeks a waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to section 212(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i), in order to reside in the United States with his lawful permanent resident spouse.

The Field Office Director concluded that the applicant failed to establish that extreme hardship would be imposed on a qualifying relative and denied the Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility (Form I-601) accordingly. See *Decision of the Field Office Director*, dated December 16, 2009.

On appeal, the applicant's spouse states that she has been suffering a lot of headaches and insomnia as a result of thinking so much about her husband from whom she was never previously separated in 28 years. *Form I-290B*, Notice of Appeal or Motion, received January 19, 2010.

The record contains, but is not limited to: Form I-290B; Form I-601 and denial letter; medical records; hardship affidavit; family photos; and Form I-130. The entire record was reviewed in rendering a decision on appeal.

Section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act provides, in pertinent part, that:

- (i) Any alien who, by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure (or has sought to procure or has procured) a visa, other documentation, or admission into the United States or other benefit provided under this Act is inadmissible.

The record reflects that during an October 29, 1973 consular interview the applicant posed as the minor unmarried child of his aunt in order to procure an immigrant visa to the United States. The visa was refused and the applicant was found to be inadmissible under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Act. The record supports this finding, the applicant does not contest inadmissibility, and the AAO concurs that the applicant is inadmissible under section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act.

Section 212(i) of the Act provides, in pertinent part:

- (1) The Attorney General [now the Secretary of Homeland Security (Secretary)] may, in the discretion of the Attorney General [Secretary], waive the application of clause (i) of subsection (a)(6)(C) in the case of an alien who is the spouse, son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an

alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General [Secretary] that the refusal of admission to the United States of such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such an alien.

A waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(i) of the Act is dependent on a showing that the bar to admission imposes extreme hardship on a qualifying relative, which includes the U.S. citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of the applicant. Hardship to the applicant or applicant's children can be considered only insofar as it results in hardship to a qualifying relative. In the present case, the applicant's spouse is his only qualifying relative. If extreme hardship to a qualifying relative is established, the applicant is statutorily eligible for a waiver, and USCIS then assesses whether a favorable exercise of discretion is warranted. *See Matter of Mendez-Morales*, 21 I&N Dec. 296, 301 (BIA 1996).

Extreme hardship is "not a definable term of fixed and inflexible content or meaning," but "necessarily depends upon the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case." *Matter of Hwang*, 10 I&N Dec. 448, 451 (BIA 1964). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the Board provided a list of factors it deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship to a qualifying relative. 22 I&N Dec. 560, 565 (BIA 1999). The factors include the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate. *Id.* The Board added that not all of the foregoing factors need be analyzed in any given case and emphasized that the list of factors was not exclusive. *Id.* at 566.

The Board has also held that the common or typical results of removal and inadmissibility do not constitute extreme hardship, and has listed certain individual hardship factors considered common rather than extreme. These factors include: economic disadvantage, loss of current employment, inability to maintain one's present standard of living, inability to pursue a chosen profession, separation from family members, severing community ties, cultural readjustment after living in the United States for many years, cultural adjustment of qualifying relatives who have never lived outside the United States, inferior economic and educational opportunities in the foreign country, or inferior medical facilities in the foreign country. *See generally Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. at 568; *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. 627, 632-33 (BIA 1996); *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. 880, 883 (BIA 1994); *Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. 245, 246-47 (Comm'r 1984); *Matter of Kim*, 15 I&N Dec. 88, 89-90 (BIA 1974); *Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. 810, 813 (BIA 1968).

However, though hardships may not be extreme when considered abstractly or individually, the Board has made it clear that "[r]elevant factors, though not extreme in themselves, must be considered in the aggregate in determining whether extreme hardship exists." *Matter of O-J-O-*,

21 I&N Dec. 381, 383 (BIA 1996) (quoting *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 882). The adjudicator “must consider the entire range of factors concerning hardship in their totality and determine whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond those hardships ordinarily associated with deportation.” *Id.*

The actual hardship associated with an abstract hardship factor such as family separation, economic disadvantage, cultural readjustment, et cetera, differs in nature and severity depending on the unique circumstances of each case, as does the cumulative hardship a qualifying relative experiences as a result of aggregated individual hardships. See, e.g., *Matter of Bing Chih Kao and Mei Tsui Lin*, 23 I&N Dec. 45, 51 (BIA 2001) (distinguishing *Matter of Pilch* regarding hardship faced by qualifying relatives on the basis of variations in the length of residence in the United States and the ability to speak the language of the country to which they would relocate). For example, though family separation has been found to be a common result of inadmissibility or removal separation from family living in the United States can also be the most important single hardship factor in considering hardship in the aggregate. See *Salcido-Salcido*, 138 F.3d at 1293 (quoting *Contreras-Buenfil v. INS*, 712 F.2d 401, 403 (9th Cir. 1983)); but see *Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. at 247 (separation of spouse and children from applicant not extreme hardship due to conflicting evidence in the record and because applicant and spouse had been voluntarily separated from one another for 28 years). Therefore, we consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether denial of admission would result in extreme hardship to a qualifying relative.

The record reflects that the applicant’s spouse is a 50-year-old native of the Dominican Republic and lawful permanent resident of the United States who has been married to the applicant since September 1981. The applicant’s spouse states that she and her husband had never been separated in more than 28 years of marriage. But after waiting more than 13 years for her husband’s visa to become current and then traveling to the Dominican Republic for visa processing, she describes as devastating the denial of his application and her return to the United States alone. The applicant’s spouse states that being without her husband has been extremely sad and difficult. She states that she has been suffering a lot of headaches and insomnia as a result of thinking so much about him and has even sought medical treatment fearing that her condition would worsen into depression or a heart attack. [REDACTED] examined the applicant’s spouse and diagnosed her with headache, hypertension, and anxiety syndrome related to the applicant’s immigration problem. [REDACTED] states that she spent more than fifty percent of the examination providing psychotherapy to the applicant’s spouse.

The AAO has considered cumulatively all assertions of separation-related hardship to the applicant’s spouse including her lengthy marriage of more than 30 years to the applicant from whom she had never been apart prior to this present separation; the significant emotional and psychological difficulties she has encountered during separation, and the impact of these on her physical health.

The AAO finds that when considered in the aggregate, the difficulties described take the present case beyond those hardships ordinarily associated with removal or inadmissibility of a family

member, and the evidence in the record is sufficient to demonstrate that the challenges to the qualifying relative, when considered cumulatively, meet the extreme hardship standard.

The applicant's spouse does not address the possibility of relocating to the Dominican Republic to be with the applicant. She states that living is difficult in the Dominican Republic, but does so in the context of she and the applicant looking forward to both being U.S. residents. The AAO notes that the applicant's spouse has been a lawful permanent resident since July 13, 2009. The applicant's spouse requests that country conditions be considered, but does she not address the conditions to which she refers. Similarly, though she states that living is difficult in the Dominican Republic the applicant's spouse does not describe the difficulties or address concerns specifically related to her own relocation thereto.

As no relocation-related hardships to the applicant's spouse have been asserted, the AAO will not speculate in this regard. Accordingly, the AAO finds that the evidence is insufficient to demonstrate that the applicant's U.S. citizen spouse would suffer extreme hardship if she were to relocate to the Dominican Republic to be with the applicant.

Although the applicant has demonstrated that the qualifying relative would experience extreme hardship if separated from the applicant, we can find extreme hardship warranting a waiver of inadmissibility only where an applicant has demonstrated extreme hardship to a qualifying relative in the scenario of separation *and* the scenario of relocation. The AAO has long interpreted the waiver provisions of the Act to require a showing of extreme hardship in both possible scenarios, as a claim that a qualifying relative will remain in the United States and thereby suffer extreme hardship as a consequence of separation can easily be made for purposes of the waiver even where there is no intention to separate in reality. *See Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. 880, 886 (BIA 1994). Furthermore, to separate and suffer extreme hardship, where relocating abroad with the applicant would not result in extreme hardship, is a matter of choice and not the result of inadmissibility. *Id.*, *see also Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. 627, 632-33 (BIA 1996). As the applicant has not demonstrated extreme hardship from relocation, we cannot find that refusal of admission would result in extreme hardship to the qualifying relative in this case.

In these proceedings, the burden of establishing eligibility for the waiver rests entirely with the applicant. *See* section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. As the applicant has not established extreme hardship to a qualifying family member no purpose would be served in determining whether the applicant merits a waiver as a matter of discretion. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.