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U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Office of Administrative Appeals
20 Massachusetts Ave. NW MS 2090
Washington, DC 20529-2090
**U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services**



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
DATE: **APR 24 2012** OFFICE: PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA

File:

IN RE: Applicant:

APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under Section 212(i) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(i)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:



INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied by us in reaching our decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. The specific requirements for filing such a request can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$630. Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires that any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,

Perry Rhew
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The waiver application was denied by the Field Office Director, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of Ghana who was found to be inadmissible to the United States under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), for seeking to procure a visa, other documentation, or admission into the United States or other benefit provided under the Act by fraud or willful misrepresentation. The applicant seeks a waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to section 212(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i), in order to remain in the United States with her U.S. citizen spouse.

The Field Office Director concluded that the applicant failed to establish that extreme hardship would be imposed on a qualifying relative and denied the Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility (Form I-601) accordingly. See *Decision of the Field Office Director*, dated November 13, 2009.

On appeal counsel asserts that the applicant has met her burden of demonstrating that her U.S. citizen spouse will suffer extreme hardship if the waiver is not granted. See *Form I-290*, Notice of Appeal or Motion, received December 14, 2009.

The record contains, but is not limited to: Form I-290B and counsel's memorandum; various immigration applications and petitions; affidavits and letters; employment, financial, birth, divorce and marriage records; and country conditions documentation. The entire record was reviewed and considered in rendering this decision on the appeal.

Section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act provides, in pertinent part, that:

- (i) Any alien who, by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure (or has sought to procure or has procured) a visa, other documentation, or admission into the United States or other benefit provided under this Act is inadmissible.

The record reflects that the applicant entered the United States on May 27, 2003 with a valid B1/B2 visitor visa issued at the U.S. embassy in Accra, Ghana. The applicant testified during a USCIS interview on August 18, 2009 that despite having asserted an intention only to visit the U.S., she actually intended to permanently immigrate to the United States when she applied for her nonimmigrant visa and when she presented herself for inspection and admission into the United States. Based upon the foregoing, the applicant was found to be inadmissible under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Act, 8 USC § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i). The record supports this finding, the applicant does not contest inadmissibility, and the AAO concurs that the applicant is inadmissible under section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act.

Section 212(i) of the Act provides, in pertinent part:

- (1) The Attorney General [now the Secretary of Homeland Security (Secretary)] may, in the discretion of the Attorney General [Secretary], waive the application of clause (i) of subsection (a)(6)(C) in the case of an alien who is the spouse, son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General [Secretary] that the refusal of admission to the United States of such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such an alien.

A waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(i) of the Act is dependent on a showing that the bar to admission imposes extreme hardship on a qualifying relative, which includes the U.S. citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of the applicant. Hardship to the applicant or applicant's children can be considered only insofar as it results in hardship to a qualifying relative. In the present case, the applicant's spouse is her only qualifying relative. If extreme hardship to a qualifying relative is established, the applicant is statutorily eligible for a waiver, and USCIS then assesses whether a favorable exercise of discretion is warranted. See *Matter of Mendez-Morales*, 21 I&N Dec. 296, 301 (BIA 1996).

Extreme hardship is "not a definable term of fixed and inflexible content or meaning," but "necessarily depends upon the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case." *Matter of Hwang*, 10 I&N Dec. 448, 451 (BIA 1964). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the Board provided a list of factors it deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship to a qualifying relative. 22 I&N Dec. 560, 565 (BIA 1999). The factors include the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate. *Id.* The Board added that not all of the foregoing factors need be analyzed in any given case and emphasized that the list of factors was not exclusive. *Id.* at 566.

The Board has also held that the common or typical results of removal and inadmissibility do not constitute extreme hardship, and has listed certain individual hardship factors considered common rather than extreme. These factors include: economic disadvantage, loss of current employment, inability to maintain one's present standard of living, inability to pursue a chosen profession, separation from family members, severing community ties, cultural readjustment after living in the United States for many years, cultural adjustment of qualifying relatives who have never lived outside the United States, inferior economic and educational opportunities in the foreign country, or inferior medical facilities in the foreign country. See generally *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. at 568; *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. 627, 632-33 (BIA 1996); *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. 880, 883 (BIA 1994); *Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. 245, 246-47 (Comm'r 1984); *Matter of Kim*, 15 I&N Dec. 88, 89-90 (BIA 1974); *Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. 810, 813 (BIA 1968).

However, though hardships may not be extreme when considered abstractly or individually, the Board has made it clear that “[r]elevant factors, though not extreme in themselves, must be considered in the aggregate in determining whether extreme hardship exists.” *Matter of O-J-O-*, 21 I&N Dec. 381, 383 (BIA 1996) (quoting *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 882). The adjudicator “must consider the entire range of factors concerning hardship in their totality and determine whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond those hardships ordinarily associated with deportation.” *Id.*

The actual hardship associated with an abstract hardship factor such as family separation, economic disadvantage, cultural readjustment, et cetera, differs in nature and severity depending on the unique circumstances of each case, as does the cumulative hardship a qualifying relative experiences as a result of aggregated individual hardships. *See, e.g., Matter of Bing Chih Kao and Mei Tsui Lin*, 23 I&N Dec. 45, 51 (BIA 2001) (distinguishing *Matter of Pilch* regarding hardship faced by qualifying relatives on the basis of variations in the length of residence in the United States and the ability to speak the language of the country to which they would relocate). For example, though family separation has been found to be a common result of inadmissibility or removal separation from family living in the United States can also be the most important single hardship factor in considering hardship in the aggregate. *See Salcido-Salcido*, 138 F.3d at 1293 (quoting *Contreras-Buenfil v. INS*, 712 F.2d 401, 403 (9th Cir. 1983)); *but see Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. at 247 (separation of spouse and children from applicant not extreme hardship due to conflicting evidence in the record and because applicant and spouse had been voluntarily separated from one another for 28 years). Therefore, we consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether denial of admission would result in extreme hardship to a qualifying relative.

The record reflects that the applicant’s spouse is a 63-year-old native and citizen of the United States who has been married to the applicant since July 23, 2007. He states that he cannot imagine the pain and anguish he would feel if separated from the applicant and the thought of her not being with him is difficult to comprehend. The applicant’s spouse indicates that he was laid off from January to August 2009 and though he received unemployment compensation, he does not know what he would have done without his wife’s income. He contends that now that he has been called back by the company he and the applicant are better off financially, but they rely on both of their incomes to meet monthly expenses. The applicant’s spouse states that their combined monthly expenses total \$1,607. Two of the applicant’s spouse’s paycheck stubs from [REDACTED] were submitted showing an average net pay of \$600 every other week or \$1,300 monthly. The applicant’s spouse asserts that he does not have the financial resources to save money to fly back and forth to Ghana to visit the applicant. While the AAO recognizes that the applicant’s spouse will experience a reduction in overall income in the event of the applicant’s removal, the evidence does not establish that he would be unable to support himself in her absence. Similarly, while the AAO recognizes that the applicant’s spouse will experience some emotional hardship related to separation, the evidence is insufficient to establish hardship beyond that ordinarily associated with the removal or inadmissibility of a family member.

The AAO acknowledges that separation from the applicant may cause various difficulties for the applicant’s spouse. The difficulties described, however, do not take the present case beyond those

hardships ordinarily associated with removal or inadmissibility of a family member, and the evidence in the record is insufficient to demonstrate that the challenges to the qualifying relative, when considered cumulatively, meet the extreme hardship standard.

Addressing relocation, the applicant's spouse asserts that he is very close to his parents, five children and fourteen grandchildren, and he cannot imagine not being able to see them when he wants. He contends that the applicant is not from a rich family able to provide for them both were they to relocate to Ghana together and it would be difficult or impossible to find work sufficient to support them and allow him to travel to the U.S. to see his family. The applicant's spouse states that the economy in Ghana is very depressed with little opportunities for him or the applicant. He maintains that while a lot of people in Ghana speak English, there are also many native languages which he does not understand and would make it difficult for him to work and live there.

The AAO has considered cumulatively all assertions of relocation-related hardship to the applicant's spouse including adjustment at his age to a country in which he has never resided and has no ties beyond the applicant; unfamiliarity with the native languages in Ghana; separation from family in the U.S. including elderly parents, five children and fourteen grandchildren; loss of U.S. employment and economic concerns about Ghana. Considered in the aggregate, the AAO finds that the evidence is sufficient to demonstrate that the applicant's U.S. citizen spouse would suffer extreme hardship if he were to relocate to Ghana to be with the applicant.

Although the applicant has demonstrated that her qualifying relative spouse would experience extreme hardship if he relocated abroad to reside with the applicant, we can find extreme hardship warranting a waiver of inadmissibility only where an applicant has shown extreme hardship to a qualifying relative in the scenario of relocation *and* the scenario of separation. The AAO has long interpreted the waiver provisions of the Act to require a showing of extreme hardship in both possible scenarios, as a claim that a qualifying relative will relocate and thereby suffer extreme hardship can easily be made for purposes of the waiver even where there is no actual intention to relocate. *Cf. Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. 880, 886 (BIA 1994). Furthermore, to relocate and suffer extreme hardship, where remaining the United States and being separated from the applicant would not result in extreme hardship, is a matter of choice and not the result of inadmissibility. *Id.*, also *cf. Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. 627, 632-33 (BIA 1996). As the applicant has not demonstrated extreme hardship from separation, we cannot find that refusal of admission would result in extreme hardship to the qualifying relative in this case.

In these proceedings, the burden of establishing eligibility for the waiver rests entirely with the applicant. *See* section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. As the applicant has not established extreme hardship to a qualifying family member no purpose would be served in determining whether the applicant merits a waiver as a matter of discretion. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.