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**U.S. Department of Homeland Security**  
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services  
Administrative Appeals Office (AAO)  
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., MS 2090  
Washington, DC 20529-2090



**U.S. Citizenship  
and Immigration  
Services**

[REDACTED]

115

**APR 26 2012**

DATE:

Office: LOS ANGELES

FILE: [REDACTED]

IN RE: Applicant:

[REDACTED]

APPLICATION:

Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under section 212(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

[REDACTED]

INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied by us in reaching our decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. The specific requirements for filing such a request can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$630. Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires that any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Perry Rhew".

for

Perry Rhew

Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The waiver application was denied by the Field Office Director, Los Angeles, California, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The record establishes that the applicant is a native and citizen of the Philippines who admitted to having misrepresented her employment history with respect to the Alien Labor Certification, and subsequent immigrant visa application, filed on her behalf by [REDACTED] for the sole purpose of obtaining permanent resident status in the United States. The applicant was thus found to be inadmissible to the United States under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), for having attempted to procure permanent residence by fraud or willful misrepresentation. The applicant seeks a waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to section 212(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i), in order to reside in the United States with her U.S. citizen spouse

The field office director concluded that the applicant had failed to establish that extreme hardship would be imposed on a qualifying relative and denied the Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility (Form I-601) accordingly. *Decision of the Field Office Director*, dated December 2, 2008.

In support of the appeal, counsel for the applicant submits the following: a brief, dated January 26, 2009; a declaration from the applicant, dated January 26, 2009; information about country conditions in the Philippines; and a declaration from the applicant's spouse, dated January 26, 2009. The entire record was reviewed and considered in rendering this decision.

Section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act provides, in pertinent part:

- (i) Any alien who, by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure (or has sought to procure or has procured) a visa, other documentation, or admission into the United States or other benefit provided under this Act is inadmissible.

....

- (iii) Waiver authorized. – For provision authorizing waiver of clause (i), see subsection (i).

Section 212(i) of the Act provides:

- (1) The Attorney General [now the Secretary of Homeland Security (Secretary)] may, in the discretion of the Attorney General [Secretary], waive the application of clause (i) of subsection (a)(6)(C) in the case of an alien who is the spouse, son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General [Secretary] that the refusal of admission to the United States

of such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such an alien.

Regarding the field office director's finding that the applicant is inadmissible under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Act, for fraud or willful misrepresentation, counsel contends that the misrepresentations made were not willful because in a labor based petition, the underlying petition is completed, signed and filed by the prospective employer and thus, the applicant had no hand in the completion and submission of said petition. *See Brief in Support of Appeal*, dated January 26, 2009. In a statement provided by the applicant on appeal, she declares that she had nothing to do with the fraudulent employment certification and never had a hand in the preparation and filing of the labor certification and subsequent Form I-140, Immigrant Petition or Alien Worker. *See Declaration of Mary Jane B. Pitre*, dated January 26, 2009.

The principal elements of a misrepresentation that renders an alien inadmissible under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Act are willfulness and materiality. In visa petition proceedings, the burden is on the petitioner to establish eligibility for the benefit sought. *See Matter of Brantigan*, 11 I&N Dec. 493 (BIA 1966). The petitioner must prove by a preponderance of evidence that the beneficiary is fully qualified for the benefit sought. *Matter of Martinez*, 21 I&N Dec. 1035, 1036 (BIA 1997); *Matter of Patel*, 19 I&N Dec. 774 (BIA 1988); *Matter of Soo Hoo*, 11 I&N Dec. 151 (BIA 1965). The record establishes that on at least two separate occasions, the applicant declared that she had worked for [REDACTED]. Specifically, the Form ETA 750, Part B, executed by the applicant under penalty of perjury on June 30, 1994, outlined that she had worked from November 1991 until December 1993, with [REDACTED]. In addition, the Form G-325A, Biographical Information, executed by the applicant under penalty of perjury in May 1996, listed her employment with [REDACTED], from November 1991 through December 1993.

Moreover, on at least three occasions, the applicant admitted that she had misrepresented herself for the sole purpose of obtaining permanent residence. To begin, in June 1997, the applicant signed the Narrative Record of Sworn Statement and detailed that she never worked for [REDACTED] but had lied regarding this to get an immigration benefit. Moreover, in a letter executed by the applicant in July 1997, the applicant admitted that she had misrepresented her work history to meet the experience required on the alien labor certification. Finally, in a letter executed by the applicant in 2000, she noted that she misrepresented her work history because she wanted to obtain legal status in the United States and she knew that it was wrong to misrepresent her employment history. As such, despite counsel's and the applicant's assertions to the contrary, the applicant, on multiple occasions, signed documentation, under penalty of perjury, outlining an employment history that was not in fact true, in order to meet the qualifications of the Application for Alien Employment Certification filed by [REDACTED]. In addition, on multiple occasions the applicant admitted that her misrepresentation was for the sole purpose of obtaining permanent residence. The applicant had the duty and the responsibility to review all forms and statements prior to signing. As such, the AAO concurs with the field office director that the applicant is inadmissible under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Act.

A waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(i) of the Act is dependent on a showing that the bar to admission imposes extreme hardship on a qualifying relative, which includes the U.S. citizen or

lawfully resident spouse or parent of the applicant. The applicant's U.S. citizen spouse is the only qualifying relative in this case. Hardship to the applicant can be considered only insofar as it results in hardship to a qualifying relative. If extreme hardship to a qualifying relative is established, the applicant is statutorily eligible for a waiver, and USCIS then assesses whether a favorable exercise of discretion is warranted. *See Matter of Mendez-Morales*, 21 I&N Dec. 296, 301 (BIA 1996).

Extreme hardship is "not a definable term of fixed and inflexible content or meaning," but "necessarily depends upon the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case." *Matter of Hwang*, 10 I&N Dec. 448, 451 (BIA 1964). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the Board provided a list of factors it deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship to a qualifying relative. 22 I&N Dec. 560, 565 (BIA 1999). The factors include the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate. *Id.* The Board added that not all of the foregoing factors need be analyzed in any given case and emphasized that the list of factors was not exclusive. *Id.* at 566.

The Board has also held that the common or typical results of removal and inadmissibility do not constitute extreme hardship, and has listed certain individual hardship factors considered common rather than extreme. These factors include: economic disadvantage, loss of current employment, inability to maintain one's present standard of living, inability to pursue a chosen profession, separation from family members, severing community ties, cultural readjustment after living in the United States for many years, cultural adjustment of qualifying relatives who have never lived outside the United States, inferior economic and educational opportunities in the foreign country, or inferior medical facilities in the foreign country. *See generally Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. at 568; *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. 627, 632-33 (BIA 1996); *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. 880, 883 (BIA 1994); *Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. 245, 246-47 (Comm'r 1984); *Matter of Kim*, 15 I&N Dec. 88, 89-90 (BIA 1974); *Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. 810, 813 (BIA 1968). However, though hardships may not be extreme when considered abstractly or individually, the Board has made it clear that "[r]elevant factors, though not extreme in themselves, must be considered in the aggregate in determining whether extreme hardship exists." *Matter of O-J-O-*, 21 I&N Dec. 381, 383 (BIA 1996) (quoting *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 882). The adjudicator "must consider the entire range of factors concerning hardship in their totality and determine whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond those hardships ordinarily associated with deportation." *Id.*

The actual hardship associated with an abstract hardship factor such as family separation, economic disadvantage, cultural readjustment, et cetera, differs in nature and severity depending on the unique circumstances of each case, as does the cumulative hardship a qualifying relative experiences as a result of aggregated individual hardships. *See, e.g., Matter of Bing Chih Kao and Mei Tsui Lin*, 23 I&N Dec. 45, 51 (BIA 2001) (distinguishing *Matter of Pilch* regarding hardship faced by qualifying relatives on the basis of variations in the length of residence in the United States and the ability to speak the language of the country to which they would relocate). For example, though family

separation has been found to be a common result of inadmissibility or removal, separation from family living in the United States can also be the most important single hardship factor in considering hardship in the aggregate. *See Salcido-Salcido*, 138 F.3d at 1293 (quoting *Contreras-Buenfil v. INS*, 712 F.2d 401, 403 (9th Cir. 1983)); *but see Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. at 247 (separation of spouse and children from applicant not extreme hardship due to conflicting evidence in the record and because applicant and spouse had been voluntarily separated from one another for 28 years). Therefore, we consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether denial of admission would result in extreme hardship to a qualifying relative.

The applicant's U.S. citizen spouse asserts that he will suffer extreme hardship were he to remain in the United States while the applicant relocates abroad due to her inadmissibility. In a declaration he contends that were he to be separated from his wife on a long-term basis, he will suffer emotional and psychological pain and anxiety. In addition, the applicant's spouse asserts that he has numerous financial obligations and without his wife's continued financial contributions, he will experience financial hardship. Moreover, the applicant's spouse contends that visiting his wife in the Philippines will put him at risk due to terrorist and criminal activity. Finally, the applicant's spouse asserts that he will not be able to afford to cover the expenses of travel to the Philippines to visit his wife. *Declaration of Darryl Pitre*, dated January 26, 2009.

To begin, the record contains no supporting evidence concerning the emotional hardship the applicant's spouse states he will experience due to long-term separation from his wife. As for the financial hardship referenced, no documentation has been provided on appeal establishing the applicant and his spouse's current income and expenses and assets and liabilities and complete financial picture, to establish that without the applicant's specific financial contributions, the applicant's spouse will experience hardship. Nor has it been established that the applicant will be unable to obtain gainful employment in the Philippines, thus allowing her to assist her husband financially should the need arise. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)).

The AAO recognizes that the applicant's spouse will endure hardship as a result of long-term separation from the applicant. However, his situation, if he remains in the United States, is typical to individuals separated as a result of removal and does not rise to the level of extreme hardship based on the record. The AAO concludes that based on the evidence provided, it has not been established that the applicant's U.S. citizen spouse will experience extreme hardship were he to remain in the United States while the applicant relocates abroad due to her inadmissibility.

The applicant's spouse contends that he would experience hardship were he to relocate abroad. To begin, he explains that he was born in the United States and has no ties to the Philippines and unfamiliarity with the country, culture, language and customs would cause him hardship. In addition, the applicant's spouse notes that he has been gainfully employed for many years and were he to relocate abroad, he would suffer career disruption. Moreover, the applicant's spouse asserts that he will not be able to obtain gainful employment in the Philippines as he is a foreigner with no ties to the country. Further, the applicant's spouse details that he is emotionally and financially

attached to his four children, two with his previous live-in partner and two with his first wife, and long-term separation from them would cause him hardship. Finally, the applicant's spouse contends that he would be a target for kidnapping and he would not be able to receive affordable and effective health care coverage. *Supra* at 1-2.

The record establishes that the applicant's spouse was born in the United States and has no ties to the Philippines. Were he to relocate abroad, he would have to leave his home, his community, his four children and his long-term gainful employment, since 1991, with Professional Staffing. It has thus been established that the applicant's spouse would suffer extreme hardship were he to relocate abroad to reside with the applicant due to her inadmissibility.

We can find extreme hardship warranting a waiver of inadmissibility only where an applicant has demonstrated extreme hardship to a qualifying relative in the scenario of separation *and* the scenario of relocation. A claim that a qualifying relative will relocate and thereby suffer extreme hardship can easily be made for purposes of the waiver even where there is no actual intention to relocate. *Cf. Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. 880, 886 (BIA 1994). Furthermore, to relocate and suffer extreme hardship, where remaining in the United States and being separated from the applicant would not result in extreme hardship, is a matter of choice and not the result of inadmissibility. *Id.*, *also cf. Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. 627, 632-33 (BIA 1996). As the applicant has not demonstrated extreme hardship from separation, we cannot find that refusal of admission would result in extreme hardship to the qualifying relative in this case.

The record, reviewed in its entirety, does not support a finding that the applicant's spouse will face extreme hardship if the applicant is unable to remain in the United States. Rather, the record demonstrates that he will face no greater hardship than the unfortunate, but expected, disruptions, inconveniences, and difficulties arising whenever a spouse is removed from the United States or is refused admission. There is no documentation establishing that the applicant's spouse's hardships are any different from other families separated as a result of immigration violations. Although the AAO is not insensitive to the applicant's spouse's situation, the record does not establish that the hardships he would face rise to the level of "extreme" as contemplated by statute and case law. Having found the applicant statutorily ineligible for relief, no purpose would be served in discussing whether the applicant merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(i) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed. The waiver application is denied.