U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Office of Administrative Appeals MS 2090
20 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20529-2090

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services

(b)(6)

DATE: JAN 2 4 2013 Office: TUCSON, AZ FILE:

IN RE: Applicant:

APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility pursuant to Section 212(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i).

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

SELF-REPRESENTED

INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the AAO inappropriately applied the law in reaching its decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen with the field office or service center that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of $630. The specific requirements for filing such a request can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. **Do not file any motion directly with the AAO.** Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires any motion to be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,

Ron Rosenberg
Acting Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The waiver application was denied by the Field Office Director, Tucson, Arizona, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of Mexico who was found to be inadmissible to the United States under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), for having procured admission to the United States through fraud or misrepresentation. The applicant is the spouse of a U.S. citizen and is the beneficiary of an approved Petition for Alien Relative. The applicant seeks a waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to section 212(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i), in order to remain in the United States with her U.S. citizen spouse.

The Director concluded that the applicant's Form I-601 was improperly filed because she did not submit it within 30 days of receiving a Notice of Intent to Deny (NOID) her Form I-485, Application to Adjust Status, and the Form I-485 had therefore been denied.[1] *See Decision of Field Office Director*, dated March 6, 2012.

On appeal, the applicant asserts that she is not inadmissible because she did not misrepresent her purpose for entering the United States. She also states that she wants to remain in the United States with her husband and that her husband cannot leave his job to move to Mexico.

The record includes, but is not limited to: a statement from the qualifying spouse; medical records relating to the applicant; special education records relating to the qualifying spouse's son; and financial records. The entire record was reviewed and considered in rendering a decision on the appeal.

The applicant contests the finding of inadmissibility on appeal. Pursuant to section 291 of the Act, she bears the burden of demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that she is not inadmissible. *See also Matter of Arthur*, 16 I&N Dec. 558, 560 (BIA 1978). Where the evidence for and against admissibility "is of equal probative weight," the applicant cannot meet her burden of proof. *Matter of Rivero-Diaz*, 12 I&N Dec. 475, 476 (BIA 1967) (citing *Matter of M--*, 3 I&N Dec. 777, 781 (BIA 1949)).

Section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act provides, in pertinent part:

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[1] The Field Office Director bases the denial of the Form I-601 on the fact that no Form I-485 was pending when it was submitted and cites 8 C.F.R. § 212.7 and the form instructions, which state that the Form I-601 must be filed while the application for adjustment of status is pending. The AAO notes, that although the applicant's Form I-601 was originally rejected for lack of a signature despite being submitted within 30 days of the NOID, it was resubmitted on October 3, 2011, as noted in the decision of the Field Office Director. The Form I-485 was denied on October 13, 2011 and was therefore still pending when the applicant's Form I-601 was properly filed.

> (i) Any alien who, by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure (or has sought to procure or has procured) a visa, other documentation, or admission into the United States or other benefit provided under this Act is inadmissible.

In the present case, the record reflects that the applicant entered the United States on March 22, 2011 after telling immigration officers that she intended to go shopping in the United States. On March 24, 2011, the applicant married her qualifying spouse in the United States. She has remained in the country since that date.

The applicant claims that she did not misrepresent her purpose for entering the United States, but rather that she did go shopping for her wedding dress and shoes. However, the record reflects that the applicant and her qualifying spouse had applied for a marriage license on March 14, 2011, approximately one week prior to her entry into the United States. Additionally, her purchase of a wedding dress and her marriage two days later indicate that at the time she applied for entry into the United States, her intention was to get married. The applicant has therefore failed to meet her burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that she is not inadmissible. *Matter of Arthur*, 16 I&N Dec. 558, 560 (BIA 1978); *Matter of Rivero-Diaz*, 12 I&N Dec. 475, 476 (BIA 1967). As the applicant is inadmissible pursuant to section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Act, the AAO will now consider her application for a waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(i) of the Act.

Section 212(i) of the Act provides:

> (1) The [Secretary] may, in the discretion of the [Secretary], waive the application of clause (i) of subsection (a)(6)(C) in the case of an alien who is the spouse, son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the [Secretary] that the refusal of admission to the United States of such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such an alien.

Pursuant to section 212(i) of the Act, a waiver of the bar to admission is dependent first upon a showing that the bar imposes an extreme hardship on a qualifying family member. Hardship to the applicant herself can only be considered insofar as it causes extreme hardship to her qualifying spouse. Once extreme hardship is established, it is but one favorable factor to be considered in the determination of whether the Secretary should exercise discretion. *See Matter of Mendez*, 21 I&N Dec. 296 (BIA 1996).

Extreme hardship is "not a definable term of fixed and inflexible content or meaning," but "necessarily depends upon the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case." *Matter of Hwang*, 10 I&N Dec. 448, 451 (BIA 1964). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) provided a list of factors it deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship to a qualifying relative. 22 I&N Dec. 560, 565 (BIA 1999). The

factors include the presence of a lawful permanent resident or U.S. citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate. *Id.* The Board added that not all of the foregoing factors need be analyzed in any given case and emphasized that the list of factors was not exclusive. *Id.* at 566.

The Board has also held that the common or typical results of removal and inadmissibility do not constitute extreme hardship, and has listed certain individual hardship factors considered common rather than extreme. These factors include: economic disadvantage, loss of current employment, inability to maintain one's present standard of living, inability to pursue a chosen profession, separation from family members, severing community ties, cultural readjustment after living in the United States for many years, cultural adjustment of qualifying relatives who have never lived outside the United States, inferior economic and educational opportunities in the foreign country, or inferior medical facilities in the foreign country. *See generally Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. at 568; *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. 627, 632-33 (BIA 1996); *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. 880, 883 (BIA 1994); *Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. 245, 246-47 (Comm'r 1984); *Matter of Kim*, 15 I&N Dec. 88, 89-90 (BIA 1974); *Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. 810, 813 (BIA 1968).

However, though hardships may not be extreme when considered abstractly or individually, the Board has made it clear that "[r]elevant factors, though not extreme in themselves, must be considered in the aggregate in determining whether extreme hardship exists." *Matter of O-J-O-*, 21 I&N Dec. 381, 383 (BIA 1996) (quoting *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 882). The adjudicator "must consider the entire range of factors concerning hardship in their totality and determine whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond those hardships ordinarily associated with deportation." *Id.*

The actual hardship associated with an abstract hardship factor such as family separation, economic disadvantage, cultural readjustment, et cetera, differs in nature and severity depending on the unique circumstances of each case, as does the cumulative hardship a qualifying relative experiences as a result of aggregated individual hardships. *See, e.g.*, *Matter of Bing Chih Kao and Mei Tsui Lin*, 23 I&N Dec. 45, 51 (BIA 2001) (distinguishing *Matter of Pilch* regarding hardship faced by qualifying relatives on the basis of variations in the length of residence in the United States and the ability to speak the language of the country to which they would relocate). For example, though family separation has been found to be a common result of inadmissibility or removal, separation from family living in the United States can also be the most important single hardship factor in considering hardship in the aggregate. *See Salcido-Salcido v. INS*, 138 F.3d 1292, 1293 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting *Contreras-Buenfil v. INS*, 712 F.2d 401, 403 (9th Cir. 1983)); *but see Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. at 247 (separation of spouse and children from applicant not extreme hardship due to conflicting evidence in the record and because applicant

and spouse had been voluntarily separated from one another for 28 years). Therefore, we consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether denial of admission would result in extreme hardship to a qualifying relative.

The qualifying spouse states that he is away for work for about eight days at a time approximately every other week and that he needs the applicant's assistance in caring for his son while he is away. He indicates that his son receives special education services at school and cannot be alone. He also claims that he cannot move to Mexico because he would have to sell his home and leave his job in the United States. He fears that he would be unable to work in Mexico. The qualifying spouse also feels that it would be difficult for his son to move to Mexico because he does not speak Spanish.

The AAO finds that the applicant has failed to demonstrate that her qualifying spouse would suffer extreme hardship if separated from the applicant. Although the applicant submitted a letter indicating that the qualifying spouse's son was receiving special education services at school, there is no indication that he requires special care or supervision. The qualifying spouse's son is now 19 years old. Without evidence that the qualifying spouse cannot leave him alone, the AAO cannot make such a finding. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)).

The applicant has also failed to show that her qualifying spouse would experience extreme hardship if he were to relocate to Mexico. Although the qualifying spouse claims that he would be unable to work in Mexico because he is a U.S. citizen, there is no evidence to support that claim. The record also reflects that the qualifying spouse is originally from Mexico. Additionally, while the qualifying spouse states that he would have to sell his house and leave his job in the United States, the record does not establish that such difficulties reach the level of extreme hardship required for a waiver. *See Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. at 568.

As the applicant has not established extreme hardship to a qualifying family member, no purpose would be served in determining whether the applicant merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for an application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(i) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.