



U.S. Citizenship  
and Immigration  
Services

(b)(6)

DATE: JUN 28 2013 Office: ANAHEIM, CALIFORNIA

FILE: [REDACTED]

IN RE: Applicant: [REDACTED]

APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under Section 212(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i).

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

SELF-REPRESENTED

INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the AAO inappropriately applied the law in reaching its decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen in accordance with the instructions on Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$630. The specific requirements for filing such a motion can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. **Do not file any motion directly with the AAO.** Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires any motion to be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Ron Rosenberg", with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

Ron Rosenberg,  
Acting Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The waiver application was denied by the International Affairs Support Branch of behalf of the Field Office Director, Ciudad Juarez, Mexico, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and a citizen of Mexico who was found to be inadmissible to the United States pursuant to section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i). She is the wife of a Lawful Permanent Resident (LPR). The applicant is seeking a waiver under section 212(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i), in order to reside in the United States.

The Field Office Director concluded that the applicant had failed to establish that the bar to her admission would impose extreme hardship on a qualifying relative, her LPR spouse, and denied the Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility (Form I-601) on October 2, 2012.

On appeal, the applicant asserts that her spouse will suffer extreme hardship due to her inadmissibility, and submits several documents in support of the hardship assertions related to her spouse. *Form I-290B*, received November 1, 2012.

The record includes, but is not limited to, the following documentation: statements from the applicant and the applicant's spouse, as well as their children and grandchildren; data printouts from the applicant's spouse's employer demonstrating his earnings; copy of a tax return; and copies receipts of money transfers from the applicant's spouse to the applicant. The entire record was reviewed and all relevant evidence considered in rendering this decision.

Section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act states, in pertinent part:

- (i) In general. Any alien who, by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure (or has sought to procure or has procured) a visa, other documentation, or admission into the United States or other benefit provided under this chapter is inadmissible.

The record indicates that the applicant presented a passport with a false Temporary Residence Stamp in an attempt to enter the United States on June 3, 2001, and thus she attempted to enter the United States by materially misrepresenting her status as an immigrant. Therefore the applicant is inadmissible pursuant to section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Act. The applicant does not contest this finding on appeal.

Section 212(i) of the Act provides, in pertinent part:

- (1) The Attorney General may, in the discretion of the Attorney General, waive the application of clause (i) of subsection (a)(6)(C) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse, son, or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General that the refusal of admission to the United

States of such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such an alien or, in the case of a VAWA self-petitioner, the alien demonstrates extreme hardship to the alien or the alien's United States citizen, lawful permanent resident, or qualified alien parent or child.

A waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(i) of the Act is dependent on a showing that the bar to admission imposes extreme hardship on a qualifying relative, which includes the U.S. citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of the applicant. Hardship to an applicant or her children can be considered only insofar as it results in hardship to a qualifying relative. The applicant's spouse is the only qualifying relative in this case. If extreme hardship to a qualifying relative is established, the applicant is statutorily eligible for a waiver, and USCIS then assesses whether a favorable exercise of discretion is warranted. *See Matter of Mendez-Morales*, 21 I&N Dec. 296, 301 (BIA 1996).

Extreme hardship is "not a definable term of fixed and inflexible content or meaning," but "necessarily depends upon the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case." *Matter of Hwang*, 10 I&N Dec. 448, 451 (BIA 1964). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the Board provided a list of factors it deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship to a qualifying relative. 22 I&N Dec. 560, 565 (BIA 1999). The factors include the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate. *Id.* The Board added that not all of the foregoing factors need be analyzed in any given case and emphasized that the list of factors was not exclusive. *Id.* at 566.

The Board has also held that the common or typical results of removal and inadmissibility do not constitute extreme hardship, and has listed certain individual hardship factors considered common rather than extreme. These factors include: economic disadvantage, loss of current employment, inability to maintain one's present standard of living, inability to pursue a chosen profession, separation from family members, severing community ties, cultural readjustment after living in the United States for many years, cultural adjustment of qualifying relatives who have never lived outside the United States, inferior economic and educational opportunities in the foreign country, or inferior medical facilities in the foreign country. *See generally Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. at 568; *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. 627, 632-33 (BIA 1996); *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. 880, 883 (BIA 1994); *Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. 245, 246-47 (Comm'r 1984); *Matter of Kim*, 15 I&N Dec. 88, 89-90 (BIA 1974); *Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. 810, 813 (BIA 1968).

However, though hardships may not be extreme when considered abstractly or individually, the Board has made it clear that "[r]elevant factors, though not extreme in themselves, must be considered in the aggregate in determining whether extreme hardship exists." *Matter of O-J-O-*, 21 I&N Dec. 381, 383 (BIA 1996) (quoting *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 882). The adjudicator "must

consider the entire range of factors concerning hardship in their totality and determine whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond those hardships ordinarily associated with deportation.” *Id.*

The actual hardship associated with an abstract hardship factor such as family separation, economic disadvantage, cultural readjustment, et cetera, differs in nature and severity depending on the unique circumstances of each case, as does the cumulative hardship a qualifying relative experiences as a result of aggregated individual hardships. *See, e.g., Matter of Bing Chih Kao and Mei Tsui Lin*, 23 I&N Dec. 45, 51 (BIA 2001) (distinguishing *Matter of Pilch* regarding hardship faced by qualifying relatives on the basis of variations in the length of residence in the United States and the ability to speak the language of the country to which they would relocate). For example, though family separation has been found to be a common result of inadmissibility or removal, separation from family living in the United States can also be the most important single hardship factor in considering hardship in the aggregate. *See Salcido-Salcido*, 138 F.3d at 1293 (quoting *Contreras-Buenfil v. INS*, 712 F.2d 401, 403 (9th Cir. 1983)); *but see Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. at 247 (separation of spouse and children from applicant not extreme hardship due to conflicting evidence in the record and because applicant and spouse had been voluntarily separated from one another for 28 years). Therefore, we consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether denial of admission would result in extreme hardship to a qualifying relative.

The applicant asserts on appeal that she and her spouse need each other and she refers to statements from friends and family members. *Form I-290B*, received November 1, 2012. She asserts that he is experiencing hardship from having to support two households, one in the United States and one in Mexico. The applicant’s spouse states in an undated letter that he wishes for the applicant to reside in the United States, noting that due to work restraints he cannot afford to visit her as often as he likes.

An examination of the record reveals some documentation supporting the applicant’s assertions that the applicant’s spouse is funding two households, including money transfer receipts. However, there is insufficient documentation to establish what the financial obligations of her spouse are in the United States, or that he is unable to meet his financial obligations based on his current income. While the applicant’s spouse may be providing money to support the applicant, without the context of his overall financial situation, merely sending money to support an applicant does not demonstrate an uncommon financial impact of separation.

The record contains statements from family members expressing regret and anxiety over the inadmissibility of the applicant and attesting to the need for her presence in the United States in order for her to see her children and grandchildren and complete their family.

While the AAO sympathizes with the applicant’s spouse and children, emotional hardship due to separation is a common impact of inadmissibility. Without documentation which distinguishes the impact on the applicant’s spouse from that which is commonly experienced, the AAO does not find the emotional consequences in this case to rise above the common impact of separation.

The record as it is currently constituted does not contain sufficient documentation to establish that the impacts on the applicant's spouse, even when considered in the aggregate, rise above the common impacts to the degree of extreme hardship.

The applicant fails to articulate what impacts, if any, her spouse will experience due to relocation. As such, the record fails to establish that a qualifying relative will experience extreme hardship due to relocation.

The record, reviewed in its entirety and in light of the *Cervantes-Gonzalez* factors, cited above, does not support a finding that the applicant's husband faces extreme hardship if his wife is refused admission. U.S. court decisions have repeatedly held that the common results of removal or inadmissibility are insufficient to prove extreme hardship. See *Hassan v. INS*, 927 F.2d 465, 468 (9th Cir. 1991). In addition, *Perez v. INS*, 96 F.3d 390 (9th Cir. 1996), held that the common results of deportation are insufficient to prove extreme hardship and defined extreme hardship as hardship that was unusual or beyond that which would normally be expected upon deportation. Having found the applicant statutorily ineligible for relief, no purpose would be served in discussing whether she merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361, provides that the burden of proof is upon the applicant to establish that she is eligible for the benefit sought. See section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed.