



U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services


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Date: **NOV 21 2013** Office: CHICAGO



IN RE: Applicant:



APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under Section 212(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:



INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) in your case.

This is a non-precedent decision. The AAO does not announce new constructions of law nor establish agency policy through non-precedent decisions. If you believe the AAO incorrectly applied current law or policy to your case or if you seek to present new facts for consideration, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen, respectively. Any motion must be filed on a Notice of Appeal or Motion (Form I-290B) within 33 days of the date of this decision. **Please review the Form I-290B instructions at <http://www.uscis.gov/forms> for the latest information on fee, filing location, and other requirements. See also 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. Do not file a motion directly with the AAO.**

Thank you,

Ron Rosenberg
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The waiver application was denied by the Field Office Director, Chicago, and was subsequently appealed to the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO), which dismissed the appeal. The matter is now before the AAO on motion. The motion will be granted and the prior AAO decision will be affirmed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of Poland who was found to be inadmissible to the United States pursuant to section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), for procuring admission to the United States through fraud or misrepresentation. The applicant is the beneficiary of an approved Petition for Alien Relative (Form I-130) and seeks a waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to section 212(i) of the Act in order to reside in the United States with her U.S. citizen spouse.

The Field Office Director concluded that the applicant had failed to establish that extreme hardship would be imposed on a qualifying relative and denied the Form I-601, Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility, accordingly. *Decision of the Field Office Director*, dated March 20, 2012.

The AAO, reviewing the applicant's Form I-601 on appeal, concurred with the Field Office Director that extreme hardship to a qualifying relative had not been established and dismissed the appeal. *Decision of the AAO*, dated March 9, 2013.

On motion, counsel submits additional evidence of psychological hardship to the applicant's qualifying relative and additional financial documentation. According to 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(2), a motion to reopen must state new facts to be proved and be supported by affidavits or other documentary evidence. A motion that does not meet applicable requirements shall be dismissed. 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(4). As the applicant has submitted new documentary evidence to support her claim, the motion to reopen will be granted.

The record contains the following documentation: briefs by applicant's counsel, financial documentation, a psychological report for the applicant's spouse, Internet articles about the applicant's spouse's psychological conditions, statements by the applicant and the applicant's spouse, photographs, and letters of reference. The entire record was reviewed and considered in rendering a decision on the appeal.

Counsel also submits excerpts from other AAO decisions to support the assertion that the applicant's spouse would experience extreme hardship if separated from the applicant. The AAO notes that only AAO decisions that are published and designated as precedents in accordance with the requirements discussed in 8 C.F.R. § 103.3(c) are binding on U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services officers. The decisions submitted by counsel are unpublished and not designated as precedent decisions. The findings made in the other AAO decisions, therefore, have no binding precedential value for purposes of the applicant's case.

Section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act provides, in pertinent part:

- (i) Any alien who, by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure (or has sought to procure or has procured) a visa, other documentation, or admission into the United States or other benefit provided under this Act is inadmissible.

The record indicates that the applicant entered the United States on June 7, 2001 by misrepresenting herself to be a citizen of Austria, using an Austrian passport. The applicant does not contest the finding of inadmissibility.

Section 212(i) of the Act provides that:

The Attorney General [now the Secretary of Homeland Security (Secretary)] may, in the discretion of the [Secretary], waive the application of clause (i) of subsection (a)(6)(C) in the case of an alien who is the spouse, son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the [Secretary] that the refusal of admission to the United States of such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such an alien or, in the case of an alien granted classification under clause (iii) or (iv) of section 204 (a)(1)(A) or clause (ii) or (iii) of section 204(a)(1)(B), the alien demonstrates extreme hardship to the alien or the alien's United States citizen, lawful permanent resident, or qualified alien parent or child.

A waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(i) of the Act is dependent on a showing that the bar to admission imposes extreme hardship on a qualifying relative, which includes the U.S. citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of the applicant. Hardship to the applicant can be considered only insofar as it results in hardship to a qualifying relative. The applicant's U.S. citizen spouse is the only qualifying relative in this case. Under this provision of the law, children are not deemed to be "qualifying relatives." However, although children are not qualifying relatives under this statute, USCIS does consider that a child's hardship can be a factor in the determination whether a qualifying relative experiences extreme hardship. If extreme hardship to a qualifying relative is established, the applicant is statutorily eligible for a waiver, and USCIS then assesses whether a favorable exercise of discretion is warranted. *See Matter of Mendez-Morales*, 21 I&N Dec. 296, 301 (BIA 1996).

Extreme hardship is "not a definable term of fixed and inflexible content or meaning," but "necessarily depends upon the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case." *Matter of Hwang*, 10 I&N Dec. 448, 451 (BIA 1964). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the Board provided a list of factors it deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship to a qualifying relative. 22 I&N Dec. 560, 565 (BIA 1999). The factors include the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying

relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate. *Id.* The Board added that not all of the foregoing factors need be analyzed in any given case and emphasized that the list of factors was not exclusive. *Id.* at 566.

The Board has also held that the common or typical results of removal and inadmissibility do not constitute extreme hardship, and has listed certain individual hardship factors considered common rather than extreme. These factors include: economic disadvantage, loss of current employment, inability to maintain one's present standard of living, inability to pursue a chosen profession, separation from family members, severing community ties, cultural readjustment after living in the United States for many years, cultural adjustment of qualifying relatives who have never lived outside the United States, inferior economic and educational opportunities in the foreign country, or inferior medical facilities in the foreign country. See generally *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. at 568; *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. 627, 632-33 (BIA 1996); *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. 880, 883 (BIA 1994); *Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. 245, 246-47 (Comm'r 1984); *Matter of Kim*, 15 I&N Dec. 88, 89-90 (BIA 1974); *Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. 810, 813 (BIA 1968).

However, though hardships may not be extreme when considered abstractly or individually, the Board has made it clear that "[r]elevant factors, though not extreme in themselves, must be considered in the aggregate in determining whether extreme hardship exists." *Matter of O-J-O-*, 21 I&N Dec. 381, 383 (BIA 1996) (quoting *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 882). The adjudicator "must consider the entire range of factors concerning hardship in their totality and determine whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond those hardships ordinarily associated with deportation." *Id.*

The actual hardship associated with an abstract hardship factor such as family separation, economic disadvantage, cultural readjustment, et cetera, differs in nature and severity depending on the unique circumstances of each case, as does the cumulative hardship a qualifying relative experiences as a result of aggregated individual hardships. See, e.g., *Matter of Bing Chih Kao and Mei Tsui Lin*, 23 I&N Dec. 45, 51 (BIA 2001) (distinguishing *Matter of Pilch* regarding hardship faced by qualifying relatives on the basis of variations in the length of residence in the United States and the ability to speak the language of the country to which they would relocate). For example, though family separation has been found to be a common result of inadmissibility or removal, separation from family living in the United States can also be the most important single hardship factor in considering hardship in the aggregate. See *Salcido-Salcido v. INS*, 138 F.3d 1292, 1293 (9th Cir. 1993), (quoting *Contreras-Buenfil v. INS*, 712 F.2d 401, 403 (9th Cir. 1983)); but see *Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. at 247 (separation of spouse and children from applicant not extreme hardship due to conflicting evidence in the record and because applicant and spouse had been voluntarily separated from one another for 28 years). Therefore, we consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether denial of admission would result in extreme hardship to a qualifying relative.

Counsel contends that the applicant's spouse will suffer financially if the applicant's waiver is not approved. The AAO previously found that evidence in the record failed to establish that the qualifying spouse would not be able to meet his financial obligations without the applicant. A copy

of the applicant's 2010 federal income tax return indicates that the applicant's spouse worked as a subcontractor for [REDACTED] and that the family had an adjusted gross income of \$21,626. The evidence submitted on appeal showed the applicant did not contribute any income to her household, as she was a stay-at-home mother at the time. On motion, counsel notes that the applicant has since received an employment authorization document and then set up her own construction company; her spouse currently works as a subcontractor for the applicant's company. Counsel further states that the applicant serves as the office manager for her company, has acquired additional part-time employment at a janitorial services company, and also serves as a house-cleaner for private homes.

On motion, counsel submits a copy of the applicant's 2012 federal income tax return, which shows that the family had an adjusted gross income of \$29,928, and that the majority of the income was derived from the subcontractor business of the applicant's spouse. Even with the additional financial documentation submitted on motion, the applicant has not shown that her spouse would be unable to meet his financial obligations in her absence.

Counsel further asserts that the applicant's spouse will suffer mental and psychological hardship if the applicant's waiver is not approved. In its previous decision, the AAO noted that no evidence in the record addressed the psychological hardship to the applicant's spouse. On motion, counsel submits a psychological report for the applicant's spouse, dated March 28, 2013. The report concludes that the applicant's spouse is experiencing major depressive disorder and anxiety disorder with panic attacks. Although the AAO is sympathetic to the family's circumstances and recognizes that the input of any health professional is respected and valuable, the record does not show that the psychological hardship to the applicant's spouse, and the symptoms he has experienced, are atypical or unique compared to others separated from a spouse. See *Perez v. INS*, 96 F.3d 390 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that the common results of deportation are insufficient to prove extreme hardship and defining extreme hardship as hardship that was unusual or beyond that which would normally be expected upon deportation).

The record, reviewed in its entirety and in light of the *Cervantes-Gonzalez* factors, cited above, does not support a finding that the applicant's U.S. citizen spouse will face extreme hardship if the applicant is unable to reside in the United States. The AAO recognizes that the applicant's spouse is experiencing psychological difficulties and will endure emotional hardship as a result of separation from the applicant. However, in the absence of financial evidence to show that the applicant's spouse would be unable to support himself, his situation, if he remains in the United States, is typical to individuals separated as a result of removal and does not rise to the level of extreme hardship based on the record. The difficulties that the applicant's spouse would face as a result of his separation from the applicant, even when considered in the aggregate, do not rise to the level of extreme as contemplated by statute and case law.

Counsel further contends that the applicant's spouse will suffer hardship if he were to relocate to Poland to be with the applicant, because relocation would have serious financial, emotional, and mental impacts on the family. Counsel specifically asserts that while the applicant's spouse has extended family in Poland, the applicant's spouse supports his family there, and they depend on him

financially. Moreover, counsel states that the applicant's spouse would experience psychological hardship if he were to relocate to Poland to be with the applicant.

The applicant's spouse, however, was born in Poland, and he is familiar with the language and customs of Poland. Additionally, the record does not include evidence showing that the applicant's spouse's family financially depends on him, or that he would be unable to receive appropriate medical care or therapy if he were to relocate. The applicant submits no new evidence on motion to support these assertions. The unsupported assertions of counsel do not constitute evidence. *Matter of Obaigbena*, 19 I&N Dec. 533, 534 n.2 (BIA 1988); *Matter of Laureano*, 19 I&N Dec. 1, 3 n.2 (BIA 1983); *Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez*, 17 I&N Dec. 503,506 (BIA 1980). Considering the evidence in the aggregate, the applicant has not established that her spouse would suffer hardship beyond the common results of removal if he were to relocate to Poland to reside with her.

In this case, the record does not contain sufficient evidence to show that the hardships faced by the qualifying relative, considered in the aggregate, rise beyond the common results of removal or inadmissibility to the level of extreme hardship. The AAO therefore finds that the applicant has not established extreme hardship to her U.S. citizen spouse, as required under section 212(i) of the Act.

In application proceedings, it is the applicant's burden to establish eligibility for the immigration benefit sought. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, that burden has not been met.

ORDER: The motion to reopen is granted and the prior AAO decision is affirmed.