U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Office of Administrative Appeals MS 2090
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U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services

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[redacted]

FILE: [redacted] Office: MEXICO CITY (CIUDAD JUAREZ) Date: FEB 04 2010

IN RE: [redacted]

APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

SELF-REPRESENTED

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. Please refer to 8 C.F.R. § 103.5 for the specific requirements. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of $585. Any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider, as required by 8 C.F.R. 103.5(a)(1)(i).

Perry Rhew
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The waiver application was denied by the District Director, Mexico, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of Mexico who resided in the United States from November 1991, when he entered the country without inspection, to November 2005, when he returned to Mexico. He was found to be inadmissible to the United States under section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (The Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), for having been unlawfully present for a period of one year or more. The applicant is the spouse of a U.S. citizen and the beneficiary of an approved Petition for Alien Relative. He seeks a waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v), in order to return to the United States and reside with his wife and children.

The district director concluded that the applicant failed to establish that extreme hardship would be imposed on a qualifying relative and denied the application accordingly. *See Decision of the District Director* dated August 25, 2006.

On appeal, the applicant asserts that he should not be subject the section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Act because his departure from the United States was for the sole purpose of attending his interview at the U.S. Consulate and further states that "a law that breaks families apart is illogical and unjust." *Applicant's Statement in Support of Appeal.* The applicant further claims that his enforced departure would affect his wife's overall welfare because he had resided in the United States for over fifteen years and having to leave the country would create hardships for his wife and child and would amount to their "de facto deportation." *Applicant's Statement in Support of Appeal.* In support of the appeal the applicant submitted letters from himself and from his wife. The entire record was reviewed and considered in arriving at a decision on the appeal.

Section 212(a)(9)(B) of the Act provides, in pertinent part:

> (i) In general. - Any alien (other than an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence) who –
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> (II) Has been unlawfully present in the United States for one year or more, and who again seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal from the United States, is inadmissible.
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> . . . .
>
> (v) Waiver. – The Attorney General [now Secretary, Homeland Security, "Secretary"] has sole discretion to waive clause (i) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse or son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General [Secretary] that the refusal of admission to such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such alien.

Section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act provides that a waiver of the bar to admission is dependent first upon a showing that the bar imposes an extreme hardship on a qualifying family member. Once extreme hardship is established, it is but one favorable factor to be considered in the determination of whether the Secretary should exercise discretion. *See Matter of Mendez,* 21 I&N Dec. 296 (BIA 1996).

In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez,* 22 I&N Dec. 560 (BIA 1999), the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) provided a list of factors it deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship. These factors included the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate.

U.S. court decisions have additionally held that the common results of deportation or exclusion are insufficient to prove extreme hardship. *See Hassan v. INS,* 927 F.2d 465, 468 (9th Cir. 1991). For example, in *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. 627 (BIA 1996), the BIA held that emotional hardship caused by severing family and community ties is a common result of deportation and does not constitute extreme hardship. In addition, in *Perez v. INS,* 96 F.3d 390 (9th Cir. 1996), the court held that the common results of deportation are insufficient to prove extreme hardship and defined "extreme hardship" as hardship that was unusual or beyond that which would normally be expected upon deportation. In *Matter of Shaughnessy,* 12 I&N Dec. 810 (BIA 1968), the BIA held that separation of family members and financial difficulties alone do not establish extreme hardship. Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court held in *INS v. Jong Ha Wang,* 450 U.S. 139 (1981), that the mere showing of economic detriment to qualifying family members is insufficient to warrant a finding of extreme hardship.

In the present case, the record reflects that the applicant is a thirty-seven year-old native and citizen of Mexico who resided in the United States November 1991, when he entered the country without inspection, to November 2005, when he returned to Mexico. The applicant is inadmissible under section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Act for having been unlawfully present in the United States for a period of one year or more. The applicant's wife is a thirty year-old native and citizen of the United States. The applicant currently resides in Mexico and his wife and son reside in Riverside, California.

The applicant's wife asserts that she and her son have been suffering emotional and financial hardship since the applicant departed the United States. *See Letter from* [redacted] dated October 9, 2006. She further states that she misses the applicant and it has been difficult for her and her son to be without him, particularly when their son had tubes inserted in his ears and when her mother passed away and the applicant was not there to provide moral support. *See Letter from* [redacted] The applicant did not submit any additional evidence concerning their mental health or the potential psychological effects of the separation, and the evidence on the record is insufficient to establish that any emotional difficulties his wife is experiencing are more serious than the type of

hardship a family member would normally suffer when faced with the prospect of her spouse's exclusion or removal. Although the depth of her distress caused by separation from her husband is not in question, a waiver of inadmissibility is available only where the resulting hardship would be unusual or beyond that which would normally be expected upon deportation or exclusion. The prospect of separation or involuntary relocation nearly always results in considerable hardship to individuals and families. But in specifically limiting the availability of a waiver of inadmissibility to cases of "*extreme* hardship," Congress did not intend that a waiver be granted in every case where a qualifying relationship exists.

The applicant's wife states that she does not want to ask for government assistance, but she does not make enough money to pay all of their expenses, including rent, food, a car payment, and clothing and shoes for her and her son. *See Letter from* [redacted] No documentation of the family's expenses, the applicant's income in the United States, or his wife's income was submitted. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. *Matter of Soffici,* 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California,* 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). The record is insufficient to establish that the applicant's wife is suffering financial hardship as a result of the applicant's departure from the United States. Further, the record does not establish that there are any ongoing unusual circumstances that would cause financial hardship beyond what would normally be expected as a result of separation from the applicant. Any financial impact of resulting from the loss of the applicant's income therefore appears to be a common result of exclusion or deportation, and would not rise to the level of extreme hardship for the applicant's wife. *See INS v. Jong Ha Wang, supra* (holding that the mere showing of economic detriment to qualifying family members is insufficient to warrant a finding of extreme hardship).

The evidence on the record is insufficient to establish that any emotional or financial hardship the applicant's wife is experiencing is other than the type of hardship that a family member would normally suffer as a result of deportation or exclusion. U.S. court decisions have repeatedly held that the common results of deportation or exclusion are insufficient to prove extreme hardship. *See Perez v. INS,* 96 F.3d 390 (9th Cir. 1996) (defining "extreme hardship" as hardship that was unusual or beyond that which would normally be expected upon deportation); *Hassan v. INS,* 927 F.2d 465, 468 (9th Cir. 1991); *Matter of Pilch,* 21 I&N Dec. 627 (BIA 1996) (holding that emotional hardship caused by severing family and community ties is a common result of deportation and does not constitute extreme hardship). No claim was made that the applicant's wife would suffer extreme hardship if she relocated to Mexico with the applicant. Therefore, the AAO cannot make a determination of whether the applicant's wife would suffer extreme hardship if she moved to Mexico.

In this case, the record does not contain sufficient evidence to show that any hardships faced by the qualifying relative, considered in the aggregate, rise beyond the common results of removal or inadmissibility to the level of extreme hardship. The AAO therefore finds that the applicant has failed to establish extreme hardship to his U.S. citizen spouse as required under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.