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U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Office of Administrative Appeals MS 2090
Washington, DC 20529-2090

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services

H6

[redacted]

FILE: [redacted] Office: MEXICO CITY, MEXICO (CIUDAD JUAREZ) Date: SEP 30 2010

IN RE: Applicant: [redacted]

APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under Section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

SELF-REPRESENTED

INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied by us in reaching our decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. The specific requirements for filing such a request can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of $585. Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires that any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,

Tariq Syed
for
Perry Rhew
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

ACTION COMPLETED
APPROVED FOR FILING
Initials: JT Date: 6/22/11
FCO/Unit CDJ

DISCUSSION: The waiver application was denied by the District Director, Mexico City, Mexico, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The record reflects that the applicant is a native and citizen of Mexico who was found to be inadmissible to the United States pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), for having been unlawfully present in the United States for more than one year and seeking readmission within ten years of her last departure from the United States. The applicant is married to a United States citizen and the mother of two children. She is the beneficiary of an approved Petition for Alien Relative (Form I-130). The applicant seeks a waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v), in order to reside in the United States with her husband and children.

The District Director found that the applicant had failed to establish that extreme hardship would be imposed on a qualifying relative and denied the Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility (Form I-601) accordingly. *Decision of the District Director*, dated December 11, 2008.

On appeal, the applicant contends that United States Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS) "totally ignored the passionate declaration of [her] husband explaining why he would be so devastated if [she] cannot return to the United States." *Attachment to Form I-290B*, filed January 6, 2009.

The record includes, but is not limited to, statements from the applicant and her husband in English and Spanish[1], a letter from the applicant's daughter and sister in Spanish, letters of support for the applicant and her husband, a letter from [redacted] regarding the applicant's husband, school records for the applicant's daughter, and tax documents. The entire record was reviewed and considered, with the exception of the Spanish language documents, in arriving at a decision on the appeal.

Section 212(a)(9)(B) of the Act provides, in pertinent part:

> (B) Aliens Unlawfully Present.-
>
> (i) In general.-Any alien (other than an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence) who-
>
> . . . .
>
> (II) has been unlawfully present in the United States for one year or more, and who again seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal from the United States, is inadmissible.
>
> . . . .

[1] Pursuant to the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(3), an applicant who submits a document in a foreign language must provide a certified English-language translation of that document. As statements from the applicant's husband, daughter, and sister are in Spanish and are not accompanied by an English-language translation, the AAO will not consider them in this proceeding.

> (v) Waiver.-The Attorney General [now the Secretary of Homeland Security, "Secretary"] has sole discretion to waive clause (i) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse or son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the [Secretary] that the refusal of admission to such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such alien.

In the present case, the record indicates that the applicant initially entered the United States in 1995 without inspection. In 1996, she departed the United States. In May 2003, the applicant reentered the United States without inspection. On August 19, 2007, the applicant departed the United States.

The applicant accrued unlawful presence from May 2003, the date she entered the United States without inspection, until August 19, 2007, when she departed the United States. The applicant is seeking admission into the United States within ten years of her August 19, 2007 departure. The applicant is, therefore, inadmissible to the United States under section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Act for being unlawfully present in the United States for a period of more than one year.

A waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act is dependent on a showing that the bar to admission imposes extreme hardship on a qualifying relative, which includes the U.S. citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of the applicant. Hardship to the applicant or her children can be considered only insofar as it results in hardship to a qualifying relative. The applicant's husband is the only qualifying relative in this case. If extreme hardship to a qualifying relative is established, the applicant is statutorily eligible for a waiver, and USCIS then assesses whether a favorable exercise of discretion is warranted. *See Matter of Mendez-Moralez,* 21 I&N Dec. 296, 301 (BIA 1996).

As a qualifying relative is not required to depart the United States as a consequence of an applicant's inadmissibility, two distinct factual scenarios exist should a waiver application be denied: either the qualifying relative will join the applicant to reside abroad or the qualifying relative will remain in the United States. Ascertaining the actual course of action that will be taken is complicated by the fact that an applicant may easily assert a plan for the qualifying relative to relocate abroad or to remain in the United States depending on which scenario presents the greatest prospective hardship, even though no intention exists to carry out the alleged plan in reality. *Cf. Matter of Ige,* 20 I&N Dec. 880, 885 (BIA 1994) (addressing separation of minor child from both parents applying for suspension of deportation). Thus, we interpret the statutory language of the various waiver provisions in section 212 of the Act to require an applicant to establish extreme hardship to his or her qualifying relative(s) under both possible scenarios. To endure the hardship of separation when extreme hardship could be avoided by joining the applicant abroad, or to endure the hardship of relocation when extreme hardship could be avoided by remaining in the United States, is a matter of choice and not the result of removal or inadmissibility. As the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) stated in *Matter of Ige*:

> [W]e consider the critical issue . . . to be whether a child would suffer extreme hardship if he accompanied his parent abroad. If, as in this case, no hardship would ensue, then the fact that the

> child might face hardship if left in the United States would be the result of parental choice, not the parent's deportation.

Id. See also Matter of Pilch, 21 I&N Dec. 627, 632-33 (BIA 1996).

Extreme hardship is "not a definable term of fixed and inflexible content or meaning," but "necessarily depends upon the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case." *Matter of Hwang*, 10 I&N Dec. 448, 451 (BIA 1964). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez,* the Board provided a list of factors it deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship to a qualifying relative. 22 I&N Dec. 560, 565 (BIA 1999). The factors include the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate. *Id.* The Board added that not all of the foregoing factors need be analyzed in any given case and emphasized that the list of factors was not exclusive. *Id.* at 566.

The Board has also held that the common or typical results of deportation, removal and inadmissibility do not constitute extreme hardship, and has listed certain individual hardship factors considered common rather than extreme. These factors include: economic disadvantage, loss of current employment, inability to maintain one's present standard of living, inability to pursue a chosen profession, separation from family members, severing community ties, cultural readjustment after living in the United States for many years, cultural adjustment of qualifying relatives who have never lived outside the United States, inferior economic and educational opportunities in the foreign country, or inferior medical facilities in the foreign country. *See generally Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. at 568; *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. at 631-32; *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 883; *Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. 245, 246-47 (Comm'r 1984); *Matter of Kim*, 15 I&N Dec. 88, 89-90 (BIA 1974); *Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. 810, 813 (BIA 1968).

However, though hardships may not be extreme when considered abstractly or individually, the Board has made it clear that "[r]elevant factors, though not extreme in themselves, must be considered in the aggregate in determining whether extreme hardship exists." *Matter of O-J-O-*, 21 I&N Dec. 381, 383 (BIA 1996) (quoting *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 882). The adjudicator "must consider the entire range of factors concerning hardship in their totality and determine whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond those hardships ordinarily associated with deportation." *Id.*

We observe that the actual hardship associated with an abstract hardship factor such as family separation, economic disadvantage, cultural readjustment, et cetera, differs in nature and severity depending on the unique circumstances of each case, as does the cumulative hardship a qualifying relative experiences as a result of aggregated individual hardships. *See, e.g., In re Bing Chih Kao and Mei Tsui Lin*, 23 I&N Dec. 45, 51 (BIA 2001) (distinguishing *Matter of Pilch* regarding hardship faced by qualifying relatives on the basis of variations in the length of residence in the United States and the ability to speak the language of the country to which they would relocate).

Family separation, for instance, has been found to be a common result of inadmissibility or removal in some cases. *See Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. at 813. Nevertheless, family ties are to be considered in analyzing hardship. *See Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. at 565-66. The question of whether family separation is the ordinary result of inadmissibility or removal may depend on the nature of family relationship considered. For example, in *Matter of Shaughnessy*, the Board considered the scenario of parents being separated from their soon-to-be adult son, finding that this separation would not result in extreme hardship to the parents. *Id.* at 811-12; *see also U.S. v. Arrieta*, 224 F.3d 1076, 1082 (9th Cir. 2000) ("Mr. Arrieta was not a spouse, but a son and brother. It was evident from the record that the effect of the deportation order would be separation rather than relocation."). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the Board considered the scenario of the respondent's spouse accompanying him to Mexico, finding that she would not experience extreme hardship from losing "physical proximity to her family" in the United States. 22 I&N Dec. at 566-67.

The decision in *Cervantes-Gonzalez* reflects the norm that spouses reside with one another and establish a life together such that separating from one another is likely to result in substantial hardship. It is common for both spouses to relocate abroad if one of them is not allowed to stay in the United States, which typically results in separation from other family members living in the United States. Other decisions reflect the expectation that minor children will remain with their parents, upon whom they usually depend for financial and emotional support. *See, e.g., Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 886 ("[I]t is generally preferable for children to be brought up by their parents."). Therefore, the most important single hardship factor may be separation, particularly where spouses and minor children are concerned. *Salcido-Salcido*, 138 F.3d at 1293 (quoting *Contreras-Buenfil v. INS*, 712 F.2d 401, 403 (9th Cir. 1983)); *Cerrillo-Perez*, 809 F.2d at 1422.

Regardless of the type of family relationship involved, the hardship resulting from family separation is determined based on the actual impact of separation on an applicant, and all hardships must be considered in determining whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond the consequences ordinarily associated with removal or inadmissibility. *Matter of O-J-O-*, 21 I&N Dec. at 383. Nevertheless, though we require an applicant to show that a qualifying relative would experience extreme hardship both in the event of relocation and in the event of separation, in analyzing the latter scenario, we give considerable, if not predominant, weight to the hardship of separation itself, particularly in cases involving the separation of spouses from one another and/or minor children from a parent. *Salcido-Salcido*, 138 F.3d at 1293.

The first prong of the analysis addresses hardship to the applicant's spouse if he relocates to Mexico. The applicant's wife states "there is no way that [her husband] can go to Mexico with [them]." She claims that her husband "has a 14 year-old boy from another relationship, and leaving the United States would make him unable to support him." The AAO notes that the record establishes that the applicant and her husband claimed a son on their 2007 U.S. Individual Income Tax Return (Form 1040A). In addition, the AAO notes that the record is not clear as to the custody arrangement for the applicant's spouse's son and whether his mother would permit their son to visit or live with him in Mexico. The AAO notes that the record fails to contain documentary evidence, e.g., country conditions reports on Mexico, that establishes that the applicant's husband would be unable to obtain employment upon relocation and continue to support his son. Going on record without supporting documentation is not sufficient to meet the applicant's burden of proof in this proceeding. *See Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing *Matter of*

Treasure Craft of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). The AAO notes that the record fails to indicate that the applicant's husband has any medical condition, physical or mental, that would affect his ability to relocate.

The AAO notes that the applicant's husband is a native of Mexico, and it has not been established that he does not speak Spanish or that he has no family ties to Mexico. In fact, the AAO notes that the applicant's husband submitted a statement written in Spanish. In that the record does not include sufficient documentation of financial, medical, emotional or other types of hardship that the applicant's husband would experience if he joined the applicant in Mexico, the AAO does not find the applicant to have established that her husband would suffer extreme hardship upon relocation. The applicant has, however, established extreme hardship to her husband if he remains in the United States without her.

In a statement dated March 3, 2008, the applicant's husband states he loves the applicant and her children. The applicant states her husband "wants the children, whom...are his own by now, to have a mother with them so we can all be together again." She states her husband is raising her children, and "[h]e sees how they cry all the time at [them] being separated, and he feels the sadness that they feel." (emphasis deleted). In a letter dated January 22, 2008, [redacted] states the applicant's daughter, [redacted] was getting good grades at the beginning of the year and now she is failing 3 out of 6 classes and close to failing in Science. It is [her] understanding that [redacted]s currently away from the home and this may play a part in why [redacted] is failing, she may have trouble focusing and may be preoccupied with what is going on at home." The applicant states her daughter is going through an "emotional crisis" by not having her around. In a declaration dated January 4, 2009, the applicant's sister states she is worried about her niece "because she has been behaving differently since [the applicant] left." The AAO notes the concerns of the applicant, her sister, and [redacted]

In a statement dated September 10, 2007, the applicant's husband states he is worried that the applicant's children's biological father "will one day send [him] a letter for court, wanting to take the girls away." He claims that he has no appetite, he feels stressed and alone. The applicant's husband states that after his first marriage ended, he became depressed and he does not want to feel like that again. In a letter dated September 13, 2007, [redacted] states that the applicant's husband is being seen by her for anxiety, and "[h]e has been suffering anxiety and panic attacks since [the applicant] went to Mexico.... Because he is now in charge of his family in every way needed, he is anxious and unable to sleep." [redacted] states the applicant's husband is receiving medications and counseling.

The applicant's husband states he "need[s] to work even harder to make ends meet." In a letter dated January 2, 2009, [redacted] states the applicant's husband is a dedicated worker, but he "is having childcare issues because of [the applicant's] paperwork.... It is difficult taking care of children and working with one parent available." The applicant's sister states she is helping the applicant "with the care of her children...but it is very difficult to continue caring for their children because [she] [has] four children of [her] own and also work." The AAO notes that the applicant has submitted no evidence to establish that she is unable to obtain employment in Mexico and, thereby, reduce the financial burden on her husband.

Considering the applicant's spouse's anxiety and panic attacks, employment issues, stress of raising his stepdaughters and supporting his son, and the normal effects of separation, the AAO finds the record to establish that the applicant's husband would face extreme hardship if he remained in the United States in her absence.

However, in that the record does not also establish that the applicant's husband would suffer extreme hardship if he relocated to Mexico, the applicant has failed to establish extreme hardship to her husband under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act. Having found the applicant statutorily ineligible for relief, no purpose would be served in discussing whether she merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

The AAO notes that the applicant may also be inadmissible to the United States pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) of the Act for having been unlawfully present in the United States for an aggregate period of more than one year and reentering the United States without being admitted. The record establishes that the applicant's daughters were born on March 23, 1996 and August 31, 2002 in the United States; however, the applicant claims that she was only in the United States from 1995 until 1996, and again from May 2003 until August 19, 2007. The AAO notes that the record is unclear regarding when the applicant resided in and returned to the United States after her initial entry in 1995.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. *See* section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.