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U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Administrative Appeals Office (AAO)
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., MS 2090
Washington, DC 20529-2090

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services

H6

[redacted]

FILE: [redacted] Office: MEXICO CITY, MEXICO (CIUDAD JUAREZ) Date: FEB 25 2011

IN RE: Applicant: [redacted]

APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under Section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

[redacted]

INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied by us in reaching our decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. The specific requirements for filing such a request can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of $630. Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires that any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,

Perry Rhew
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The waiver application was denied by the Acting District Director, Mexico City, Mexico, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The record reflects that the applicant is a native and citizen of Mexico who was found to be inadmissible to the United States pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), for having been unlawfully present in the United States for more than one year and seeking readmission within ten years of his last departure from the United States. The applicant is married to a United States citizen and the beneficiary of an approved Petition for Alien Relative (Form I-130). The applicant seeks a waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v), in order to reside in the United States with his United States citizen spouse.

The Acting District Director found that the applicant had failed to establish that extreme hardship would be imposed on a qualifying relative and denied the Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility (Form I-601) accordingly. *Decision of the Acting District Director*, dated April 23, 2008.

On appeal, the applicant, through counsel, claims that the decision by United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) "incorrectly found that the [applicant] was guilty of misrepresentation" and since "the denial of the waiver was based on this incorrect information, the entire decision cannot be upheld." *Form I-290B*, filed May 22, 2008. The AAO notes that the Acting District Director's decision clearly stated that the applicant is inadmissible to the United States for unlawful presence and not for misrepresentation. Additionally, counsel claims that "the decision cites to cases that are strictly applicable to I-212 cases." *Id.* The AAO notes that the Acting District Director cites to application for permission to reapply cases for the insight they provide concerning the definition of extreme hardship.

The record includes, but is not limited to, counsel's appeal brief, statements from the applicant's wife, medical documentation for the applicant's wife, household bills, a mortgage document, and an investment document. The entire record was reviewed and considered in arriving at a decision on the appeal.

Section 212(a)(9)(B) of the Act provides, in pertinent part:

> (B) Aliens Unlawfully Present.-
>
> (i) In general.-Any alien (other than an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence) who-
>
> . . . .
>
> (II) has been unlawfully present in the United States for one year or more, and who again seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal from the United States, is inadmissible.
>
> . . . .

> (v) Waiver.-The Attorney General [now the Secretary of Homeland Security, "Secretary"] has sole discretion to waive clause (i) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse or son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the [Secretary] that the refusal of admission to such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such alien.

In the present case, the record indicates that the applicant entered the United States in September 2001 without inspection. In July 2007, the applicant departed the United States.

The applicant accrued unlawful presence from September 2001, the date he entered the United States without inspection, until July 2007, when he departed the United States. The applicant is seeking admission into the United States within ten years of his July 2007 departure. The applicant is, therefore, inadmissible to the United States under section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Act for being unlawfully present in the United States for a period of more than one year.

A waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act is dependent on a showing that the bar to admission imposes extreme hardship on a qualifying relative, which includes the U.S. citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of the applicant. Hardship to the applicant can be considered only insofar as it results in hardship to a qualifying relative. The applicant's wife is the only qualifying relative in this case. If extreme hardship to a qualifying relative is established, the applicant is statutorily eligible for a waiver, and USCIS then assesses whether a favorable exercise of discretion is warranted. *See Matter of Mendez-Moralez,* 21 I&N Dec. 296, 301 (BIA 1996).

As a qualifying relative is not required to depart the United States as a consequence of an applicant's inadmissibility, two distinct factual scenarios exist should a waiver application be denied: either the qualifying relative will join the applicant to reside abroad or the qualifying relative will remain in the United States. Ascertaining the actual course of action that will be taken is complicated by the fact that an applicant may easily assert a plan for the qualifying relative to relocate abroad or to remain in the United States depending on which scenario presents the greatest prospective hardship, even though no intention exists to carry out the alleged plan in reality. *Cf. Matter of Ige,* 20 I&N Dec. 880, 885 (BIA 1994) (addressing separation of minor child from both parents applying for suspension of deportation). Thus, we interpret the statutory language of the various waiver provisions in section 212 of the Act to require an applicant to establish extreme hardship to his or her qualifying relative(s) under both possible scenarios. To endure the hardship of separation when extreme hardship could be avoided by joining the applicant abroad, or to endure the hardship of relocation when extreme hardship could be avoided by remaining in the United States, is a matter of choice and not the result of removal or inadmissibility. As the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) stated in *Matter of Ige*:

> [W]e consider the critical issue . . . to be whether a child would suffer extreme hardship if he accompanied his parent abroad. If, as in this case, no hardship would ensue, then the fact that the

child might face hardship if left in the United States would be the result of parental choice, not the parent's deportation.

Id. See also Matter of Pilch, 21 I&N Dec. 627, 632-33 (BIA 1996).

Extreme hardship is "not a definable term of fixed and inflexible content or meaning," but "necessarily depends upon the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case." *Matter of Hwang*, 10 I&N Dec. 448, 451 (BIA 1964). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez,* the Board provided a list of factors it deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship to a qualifying relative. 22 I&N Dec. 560, 565 (BIA 1999). The factors include the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate. *Id.* The Board added that not all of the foregoing factors need be analyzed in any given case and emphasized that the list of factors was not exclusive. *Id.* at 566.

The Board has also held that the common or typical results of deportation, removal and inadmissibility do not constitute extreme hardship, and has listed certain individual hardship factors considered common rather than extreme. These factors include: economic disadvantage, loss of current employment, inability to maintain one's present standard of living, inability to pursue a chosen profession, separation from family members, severing community ties, cultural readjustment after living in the United States for many years, cultural adjustment of qualifying relatives who have never lived outside the United States, inferior economic and educational opportunities in the foreign country, or inferior medical facilities in the foreign country. *See generally Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. at 568; *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. at 631-32; *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 883; *Matter of Ngai*, 19 I&N Dec. 245, 246-47 (Comm'r 1984); *Matter of Kim*, 15 I&N Dec. 88, 89-90 (BIA 1974); *Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. 810, 813 (BIA 1968).

However, though hardships may not be extreme when considered abstractly or individually, the Board has made it clear that "[r]elevant factors, though not extreme in themselves, must be considered in the aggregate in determining whether extreme hardship exists." *Matter of O-J-O-*, 21 I&N Dec. 381, 383 (BIA 1996) (quoting *Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 882). The adjudicator "must consider the entire range of factors concerning hardship in their totality and determine whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond those hardships ordinarily associated with deportation." *Id.*

We observe that the actual hardship associated with an abstract hardship factor such as family separation, economic disadvantage, cultural readjustment, et cetera, differs in nature and severity depending on the unique circumstances of each case, as does the cumulative hardship a qualifying relative experiences as a result of aggregated individual hardships. *See, e.g., In re Bing Chih Kao and Mei Tsui Lin*, 23 I&N Dec. 45, 51 (BIA 2001) (distinguishing *Matter of Pilch* regarding hardship faced

by qualifying relatives on the basis of variations in the length of residence in the United States and the ability to speak the language of the country to which they would relocate).

Family separation, for instance, has been found to be a common result of inadmissibility or removal in some cases. *See Matter of Shaughnessy*, 12 I&N Dec. at 813. Nevertheless, family ties are to be considered in analyzing hardship. *See Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez,* 22 I&N Dec. at 565-66. The question of whether family separation is the ordinary result of inadmissibility or removal may depend on the nature of family relationship considered. For example, in *Matter of Shaughnessy*, the Board considered the scenario of parents being separated from their soon-to-be adult son, finding that this separation would not result in extreme hardship to the parents. *Id.* at 811-12; *see also U.S. v. Arrieta*, 224 F.3d 1076, 1082 (9th Cir. 2000) ("Mr. Arrieta was not a spouse, but a son and brother. It was evident from the record that the effect of the deportation order would be separation rather than relocation."). In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the Board considered the scenario of the respondent's spouse accompanying him to Mexico, finding that she would not experience extreme hardship from losing "physical proximity to her family" in the United States. 22 I&N Dec. at 566-67.

The decision in *Cervantes-Gonzalez* reflects the norm that spouses reside with one another and establish a life together such that separating from one another is likely to result in substantial hardship. It is common for both spouses to relocate abroad if one of them is not allowed to stay in the United States, which typically results in separation from other family members living in the United States. Other decisions reflect the expectation that minor children will remain with their parents, upon whom they usually depend for financial and emotional support. *See, e.g., Matter of Ige*, 20 I&N Dec. at 886 ("[I]t is generally preferable for children to be brought up by their parents."). Therefore, the most important single hardship factor may be separation, particularly where spouses and minor children are concerned. *Salcido-Salcido*, 138 F.3d at 1293 (quoting *Contreras-Buenfil v. INS,* 712 F.2d 401, 403 (9th Cir. 1983)); *Cerrillo-Perez*, 809 F.2d at 1422.

Regardless of the type of family relationship involved, the hardship resulting from family separation is determined based on the actual impact of separation on an applicant, and all hardships must be considered in determining whether the combination of hardships takes the case beyond the consequences ordinarily associated with removal or inadmissibility. *Matter of O-J-O-*, 21 I&N Dec. at 383. Nevertheless, though we require an applicant to show that a qualifying relative would experience extreme hardship both in the event of relocation and in the event of separation, in analyzing the latter scenario, we give considerable, if not predominant, weight to the hardship of separation itself, particularly in cases involving the separation of spouses from one another and/or minor children from a parent. *Salcido-Salcido*, 138 F.3d at 1293.

The first prong of the analysis addresses hardship to the applicant's spouse if she relocates to Mexico. In an undated statement, the applicant's wife states if she joined the applicant in Mexico, she "would be separated from [her] family in the United States, susceptible to hereditary medical problems, and unable to provide [their] future children the type of life [they] want for them." In counsel's appeal brief dated June 20, 2008, counsel states the applicant's wife has a high risk of colon cancer. The applicant's wife claims that her mother "has struggled with colon cancer disease for nearly 13 years." The AAO notes

that no medical documentation has been submitted establishing that the applicant's mother-in-law has been diagnosed with colon cancer. In a patient report dated December 18, 2006, the applicant's wife had a colonoscopy which indicates that the applicant's wife has a normal colon and appendix, and she should have a repeat colonoscopy in 3 years. The applicant's wife states she "would not be able to afford health insurance that would cover the hereditary family history and procedures that need to be followed to prevent colon cancer disease if [she] were forced to move to Mexico with [the applicant]." The AAO notes that other than the statements from the applicant's wife and counsel, there is no medical documentation in the record establishing that the applicant's wife has a high risk of colon cancer. Additionally, there is no documentation in the record establishing that the applicant's wife cannot receive colonoscopies in Mexico. The applicant's wife states that in 2004, she was "treated for infertility problems" and in 2005, she "was diagnosed with endometrial polyps." In a letter dated April 20, 2004, [redacted] states he met with the applicant and his wife "concerning [their] wish to have a child." The record establishes that on June 22, 2005, the applicant's wife had a dilatation and curettage for a diagnostic hysteroscopy and hysteroscopic polypectomy. The AAO notes the medical concerns of the applicant's wife.

The applicant's wife states she is extremely close to her family, her mother "is a single mom that needs [her] support, she "would miss [her] terribly," and she "could never afford the trips to see [her] mom as often as [she] would like." Additionally, she claims that "it is imperative that [she] [is] able to live in the U.S in order to insure [sic] her [mother's] ability to remain healthy." The applicant's wife states she does "not want [their] future children to be raised in Mexico." In a statement dated August 29, 2007, the applicant's wife states that "health and educational benefits are far greater here in the United States than in Mexico." The applicant's wife states in the United States, she "has an excellent health insurance plan," she participates "in the 401K retirement plan," and her current position would not be available in Mexico. The applicant's wife states she and the applicant own a home in the United States, and "[t]here is no way [they] would be able to afford to support [themselves] in Mexico and maintain [their] mortgage payments." In a statement dated July 11, 2007, the applicant's wife states "[m]oving to Mexico would mean having to resort to living conditions other than [to] what [they] have become accustomed, because of [the applicant's] low wages in Mexico." The AAO notes the claims regarding the difficulties the applicant's wife would face in relocating to Mexico.

The AAO acknowledges that the applicant's wife has resided in the United States for many years; however, she is a native of Mexico and it has not been established that she does not speak Spanish or have any family ties to Mexico. Additionally, the AAO notes the record fails to contain documentary evidence, e.g., country conditions reports on Mexico, that demonstrate that the applicant's wife would be unable to obtain employment upon relocation that would allow her to use the skills she has acquired in the United States. Going on record without supporting documentation is not sufficient to meet the applicant's burden of proof in this proceeding. *See Matter of Soffici*, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing *Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). Based on the record before it, the AAO finds that the applicant has failed to establish that his wife would suffer extreme hardship if she relocated to Mexico.

In addition, the record does not establish extreme hardship to the applicant's wife if she remains in the United States. The applicant's wife states if the applicant has to remain in Mexico, "it would cause severe emotional and financial trauma in [her] life." She states she cannot pay all the household expenses alone. The applicant's wife states the only way she can afford her mortgage and car payment is by "having family members living with [her]." She claims that the applicant is working on a ranch in Mexico, and makes "about $1000 Mexican pesos per week working six days for about 12 hours per day." Additionally, the applicant's wife states it would be hard to start a family because of the distance. The AAO notes the applicant's wife's concerns.

The AAO finds the record to include some documentation of the applicant's and his wife's expenses; however, this material offers insufficient proof that the applicant's wife is unable to support herself in the applicant's absence. Additionally, no documentary evidence has been submitted establishing that the applicant's employment in Mexico cannot help reduce the financial burden on his wife. Based on the record before it, the AAO finds that the applicant has failed to establish that his wife would suffer extreme hardship if his waiver application is denied and she remains in the United States.

A review of the documentation in the record fails to establish the existence of extreme hardship to the applicant's spouse caused by the applicant's inadmissibility to the United States. Having found the applicant statutorily ineligible for relief, no purpose would be served in discussing whether he merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. *See* section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.