


identifying data deleted to  
prevent clearly unwarranted  
invasion of personal privacy

U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services  
Administrative Appeals Office (AAO)  
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., MS 2090  
Washington, DC 20529-2090  
**U.S. Citizenship  
and Immigration  
Services**



**PUBLIC COPY**



H6

Date: **MAY 03 2012** Office: ACCRA

FILE 

IN RE:

Applicant: 

APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under Sections 212(a)(9)(B)(v) and 212(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(9)(B)(v), 1182(h)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

SELF-REPRESENTED

INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

Thank you,

for

Perry Rhew

Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The waiver application was denied by the Field Office Director, Accra, Ghana, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be sustained.

The applicant is a native and citizen of Nigeria who was found to be inadmissible to the United States pursuant to sections 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), for having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), for having been unlawfully present for more than one year and seeking readmission within 10 years of his last departure, and section 212(a)(9)(C)(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(C)(i), for entering the United States without being admitted after a prior removal. He seeks a waiver of inadmissibility in order to reside in the United States with his U.S. citizen wife and son.

The field office director denied the Form I-601 application for a waiver, finding that the applicant was statutorily barred from seeking readmission to the United States for 10 years from the date of his last departure on April 17, 2002. *Decision of the Field Office Director*, dated August 21, 2009.

On appeal, the applicant asserts that he has remained outside the United States for a lengthy period, she complied with the terms of his criminal sentence, and his conviction occurred many years ago in 1987. *Statement from the Applicant on Form I-290B*, dated September 10, 2009.

The record contains, but is not limited to: statements from the applicant and his wife; letters from a physician regarding the applicant's wife's mental health; letters from the applicant's pastor and friend; and documentation in connection with the applicant's criminal convictions. The entire record was reviewed and considered in rendering this decision.

Section 212(a)(2)(A) of the Act states, in pertinent parts:

(i) [A]ny alien convicted of, or who admits having committed, or who admits committing acts which constitute the essential elements of –

(I) a crime involving moral turpitude (other than a purely political offense) or an attempt or conspiracy to commit such a crime . . . is inadmissible.

(ii) Exception.—Clause (i)(I) shall not apply to an alien who committed only one crime if-

(I) the crime was committed when the alien was under 18 years of age, and the crime was committed (and the alien was released from any confinement to a prison or correctional institution imposed for the crime) more than 5 years before the date of the application for a visa or other documentation and the date of application for admission to the United States, or

(II) the maximum penalty possible for the crime of which the alien was convicted (or which the alien admits having committed or of which the acts that the alien admits having committed constituted the essential elements) did not exceed imprisonment for one year and, if the alien was convicted of such crime, the alien was not sentenced to a term of imprisonment in excess of 6 months (regardless of the extent to which the sentence was ultimately executed).

The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) held in *Matter of Perez-Contreras*, 20 I&N Dec. 615, 617-18 (BIA 1992), that:

[M]oral turpitude is a nebulous concept, which refers generally to conduct that shocks the public conscience as being inherently base, vile, or depraved, contrary to the rules of morality and the duties owed between man and man, either one's fellow man or society in general....

In determining whether a crime involves moral turpitude, we consider whether the act is accompanied by a vicious motive or corrupt mind. Where knowing or intentional conduct is an element of an offense, we have found moral turpitude to be present. However, where the required mens rea may not be determined from the statute, moral turpitude does not inhere.

(Citations omitted.)

In *Matter of Silva-Trevino*, 24 I&N Dec. 687 (A.G. 2008), the Attorney General articulated a new methodology for determining whether a conviction is a crime involving moral turpitude where the language of the criminal statute in question encompasses conduct involving moral turpitude and conduct that does not. First, in evaluating whether an offense is one that categorically involves moral turpitude, an adjudicator reviews the criminal statute at issue to determine if there is a “realistic probability, not a theoretical possibility,” that the statute would be applied to reach conduct that does not involve moral turpitude. *Id.* at 698 (citing *Gonzalez v. Duenas-Alvarez*, 549 U.S. 183, 193 (2007)). A realistic probability exists where, at the time of the proceeding, an “actual (as opposed to hypothetical) case exists in which the relevant criminal statute was applied to conduct that did not involve moral turpitude. If the statute has not been so applied in any case (including the alien’s own case), the adjudicator can reasonably conclude that all convictions under the statute may categorically be treated as ones involving moral turpitude.” *Id.* at 697, 708 (citing *Duenas-Alvarez*, 549 U.S. at 193).

However, if a case exists in which the criminal statute in question was applied to conduct that does not involve moral turpitude, “the adjudicator cannot categorically treat all convictions under that statute as convictions for crimes that involve moral turpitude.” 24 I&N Dec. at 697 (citing *Duenas-Alvarez*, 549 U.S. at 185-88, 193). An adjudicator then engages in a second-stage inquiry in which the adjudicator reviews the “record of conviction” to determine if the conviction was based on conduct involving moral turpitude. *Id.* at 698-699, 703-704, 708. The record of conviction consists

of documents such as the indictment, the judgment of conviction, jury instructions, a signed guilty plea, and the plea transcript. *Id.* at 698, 704, 708.

If review of the record of conviction is inconclusive, an adjudicator then considers any additional evidence deemed necessary or appropriate to resolve accurately the moral turpitude question. 24 I&N Dec. at 699-704, 708-709. However, this “does not mean that the parties would be free to present any and all evidence bearing on an alien’s conduct leading to the conviction. (citation omitted). The sole purpose of the inquiry is to ascertain the nature of the prior conviction; it is not an invitation to relitigate the conviction itself.” *Id.* at 703.

The record shows that the applicant was convicted of possession of a counterfeit Federal Reserve note with intent to defraud under 18 U.S.C. § 472 for his conduct on or about July 24, 1987. He was convicted of an offense of fraud for passing a counterfeit Federal Reserve note for his conduct on or about December 29, 1986. Based on these convictions, the field office director determined that he is inadmissible pursuant to section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Act for having been convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude. The applicant does not contest his inadmissibility under this provision on appeal.

Section 212(a)(9) of the Act provides, in pertinent part:

(B) Aliens Unlawfully Present.-

(i) In general. - Any alien (other than an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence) who-

(I) was unlawfully present in the United States for a period of more than 180 days but less than 1 year, voluntarily departed the United States . . . prior to the commencement of proceedings under section 235(b)(1) or section 240, and again seeks admission within 3 years of the date of such alien’s departure or removal, . . . is inadmissible.

(II) has been unlawfully present in the United States for one year or more, and who again seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien’s departure or removal from the United States, is inadmissible.

....

(v) Waiver. – The Attorney General [now the Secretary of Homeland Security (Secretary)] has sole discretion to waive clause (i) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse or son or daughter of a United States citizen or

of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General [Secretary] that the refusal of admission to such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such alien.

Section 212(a)(9) of the Act states in pertinent part:

....  
(C) Aliens unlawfully present after previous immigration violations.-

(i) In general.-Any alien who-

(I) has been unlawfully present in the United States for an aggregate period of more than 1 year, or

(II) has been ordered removed under section 235(b)(1), section 240, or any other provision of law, and who enters or attempts to reenter the United States without being admitted is inadmissible.

(ii) Exception.- Clause (i) shall not apply to an alien seeking admission more than 10 years after the date of the alien's last departure from the United States if, prior to the alien's reembarkation at a place outside the United States or attempt to be readmitted from a foreign contiguous territory, the Secretary has consented to the alien's reapplying for admission.

The record shows that, based on the applicant's convictions noted above, he was removed from the United States on or about May 3, 1989. He reentered without inspection in approximately June 1996. He was again removed on April 17, 2002. Based on these facts, the field office director determined that the applicant is inadmissible under section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Act for having been unlawfully present for more than one year and seeking readmission within 10 years of his last departure, and section 212(a)(9)(C)(i) of the Act for entering the United States without being admitted after his prior removal.

Upon review, it is noted that section 212(a)(9)(C)(i) of the Act did not take effect until April 1, 1997. As the applicant's entry without inspection after his removal occurred before that date in June 1996, he is not subject to this bar to admission.

However, the applicant accrued over one year of unlawful presence, from the date the unlawful presence provisions took effect on April 1, 1997 until his removal on April 17, 2002. The field office director correctly observed that the applicant was inadmissible under section 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) of the Act for a 10 year period, until April 17, 2012. As this date has passed, and the applicant has remained outside the United States for the entire 10 year period, he is no longer inadmissible under this provision.

As noted above, the applicant remains inadmissible under section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Act for having been convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude. He requires a waiver under section 212(h) of the Act.

Section 212(h) of the Act provides, in pertinent part, that:

The Attorney General may, in his discretion, waive the application of subparagraphs (A)(i)(I), (B), (D), and (E) of subsection (a)(2) and subparagraph (A)(i)(II) of such subsection insofar as it relates to a single offense of simple possession of 30 grams or less of marijuana . . . .

(1) (A) in the case of any immigrant it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General [Secretary] that –

- (i) . . . the activities for which the alien is inadmissible occurred more than 15 years before the date of the alien's application for a visa, admission, or adjustment of status,
- (ii) the admission to the United States of such alien would not be contrary to the national welfare, safety, or security of the United States, and
- (iii) the alien has been rehabilitated; or

(B) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse, parent, son, or daughter of a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General [Secretary] that the alien's denial of admission would result in extreme hardship to the United States citizen or lawfully resident spouse, parent, son, or daughter of such alien . . . ; and

(2) the Attorney General [Secretary], in his discretion, and pursuant to such terms, conditions and procedures as he may by regulations prescribe, has consented to the alien's applying or reapplying for a visa, for admission to the United States, or adjustment of status.

The applicant's most recent conviction, for possession of a counterfeit Federal Reserve note, resulted from his conduct on or about July 24, 1987. As his culpable conduct took place over 15 years ago, he meets the requirement of section 212(h)(1)(A)(i) of the Act.

The record does not reflect that admitting the applicant would be contrary to the national welfare, safety, or security of the United States. Section 212(h)(1)(A)(ii) of the Act. The record does not show that the applicant has engaged in violent or dangerous behavior. The record does not show that the applicant has engaged in criminal activity since his last conviction in 1987, in 25 years. The

record does not show that the applicant has been a public charge in the United States. Accordingly, the applicant has shown that he meets the requirement of section 212(h)(1)(A)(ii) of the Act.

The applicant has shown that he has been rehabilitated. As discussed above, there is no evidence that he has engaged in criminal activity since his second conviction for his conduct in 1987, in over 25 years. The applicant's reentry without inspection after removal in 1996 exhibited a disregard for the laws of the United States. However, this act occurred over 15 years ago. The applicant was removed over 10 years ago, and the record does not indicate that he has attempted to reenter without a lawful status. The applicant has expressed remorse for his criminal acts. He provided that, prior to his removal in 2002, he was a manager with a restaurant and a supervisor at a wholesale store, showing a propensity to work to support himself and his family. The record does not reflect that the applicant is likely to engage in further criminal activity. Accordingly, the applicant has shown that he meets the requirement of section 212(h)(1)(A)(iii) of the Act. Based on the foregoing, the applicant has shown that he is eligible for consideration for a waiver under section 212(h)(1)(A) of the Act.

In determining whether the applicant warrants a favorable exercise of discretion under section 212(h) of the Act, the Secretary must weigh positive and negative factors in the present case.

The negative factors in this case consist of the following:

The applicant has been convicted of two crimes relating to fraud and possession of a counterfeit Federal Reserve note that call into question his moral character. The applicant entered the United States without inspection after being removed, and he has spent a lengthy period in the United States without a legal immigration status.

The positive factors in this case include:

The applicant's U.S. citizen wife suffers from depression and mental health challenges, for which she has been seen by multiple psychiatrists and a psychotherapist. She has been hospitalized for depression. She has endured 10 years of separation from the applicant, and she will benefit from reuniting with him in the United States. The applicant's wife asserted that she has faced financial difficulty without the applicant, and his return will relieve her burden. The record shows that the applicant made a contribution to his community while in the United States through service to his religious organization. As discussed above, the record does not show that the applicant has engaged in criminal conduct in over 25 years, and his convictions were limited to a brief period.

While the applicant's criminal activity and violation of U.S. immigration law cannot be condoned, the positive factors in this case outweigh the negative factors.

In proceedings for an application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(h) of the Act, the burden of establishing that the application merits approval remains entirely with the applicant. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. In this case, the applicant has met his burden that he merits approval of his application.

**ORDER:** The appeal is sustained.