


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U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services

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FILE: [REDACTED] MSC-05-239-14208

Office: LOS ANGELES

Date: JUL 31 2008

IN RE: Applicant: [REDACTED]


APPLICATION: Application for Status as a Temporary Resident pursuant to Section 245A of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

SELF-REPRESENTED

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. The file has been returned to the office that originally decided your case. If your appeal was sustained, or if your case was remanded for further action, you will be contacted. If your appeal was dismissed, you no longer have a case pending before this office, and you are not entitled to file a motion to reopen or reconsider your case.


Robert P. Wiemann, Chief
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The application for temporary resident status pursuant to the terms of the settlement agreements reached in *Catholic Social Services, Inc., et al., v. Ridge, et al.*, CIV. NO. S-86-1343-LKK (E.D. Cal) January 23, 2004, and *Felicity Mary Newman, et al., v. United States Immigration and Citizenship Services, et al.*, CIV. NO. 87-4757-WDK (C.D. Cal) February 17, 2004 (CSS/Newman Settlement Agreements), was denied by the District Director, Los Angeles. The decision is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant submitted a Form I-687, Application for Status as a Temporary Resident under Section 245A of the Immigration and Nationality Act (Act), and a Form I-687 Supplement, CSS/Newman Class Membership Worksheet. The director determined that the applicant had not established by a preponderance of the evidence that he had continuously resided in the United States in an unlawful status for the duration of the requisite period. The director denied the application, finding that the applicant had not met his burden of proof and was, therefore, not eligible to adjust to temporary resident status pursuant to the terms of the CSS/Newman Settlement Agreements.

On appeal, the applicant asserts that he is eligible for the benefit sought and attempts to clarify his previously submitted testimony and evidence.

An applicant for temporary resident status must establish entry into the United States before January 1, 1982, and continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since such date and through the date the application is filed. Section 245A(a)(2) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(2). The applicant must also establish that he or she has been continuously physically present in the United States since November 6, 1986. Section 245A(a)(3) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(3). The regulations clarify that the applicant must have been physically present in the United States from November 6, 1986 until the date of filing the application. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(b)(1).

For purposes of establishing residence and physical presence under the CSS/Newman Settlement Agreements, the term “until the date of filing” in 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(b)(1) means until the date the applicant attempted to file a completed Form I-687 application and fee or was caused not to timely file during the original legalization application period of May 5, 1987 to May 4, 1988. CSS Settlement Agreement paragraph 11 at page 6; Newman Settlement Agreement paragraph 11 at page 10.

The applicant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she has resided in the United States for the requisite period, is admissible to the United States under the provisions of section 245A of the Act, and is otherwise eligible for adjustment of status. The inference to be drawn from the documentation provided shall depend on the extent of the documentation, its credibility and amenability to verification. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(5).

Although the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3) provides an illustrative list of contemporaneous documents that an applicant may submit in support of his or her claim of

continuous residence in the United States in an unlawful status since prior to January 1, 1982, the submission of any other relevant document is permitted pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(3)(vi)(L).

The “preponderance of the evidence” standard requires that the evidence demonstrate that the applicant's claim is “probably true,” where the determination of “truth” is made based on the factual circumstances of each individual case. *Matter of E-M*, 20 I&N Dec. 77, 79-80 (Comm. 1989). In evaluating the evidence, *Matter of E-M* also stated that “[t]ruth is to be determined not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality.” *Id.* at 80. Thus, in adjudicating the application pursuant to the preponderance of the evidence standard, the director must examine each piece of evidence for relevance, probative value, and credibility, both individually and within the context of the totality of the evidence, to determine whether the fact to be proven is probably true.

Even if the director has some doubt as to the truth, if the petitioner submits relevant, probative, and credible evidence that leads the director to believe that the claim is “probably true” or “more likely than not,” the applicant or petitioner has satisfied the standard of proof. *See U.S. v. Cardozo-Fonseca*, 480 U.S. 421, 431 (1987) (defining “more likely than not” as a greater than 50 percent probability of something occurring). If the director can articulate a material doubt, it is appropriate for the director to either request additional evidence or, if that doubt leads the director to believe that the claim is probably not true, deny the application or petition.

At issue in this proceeding is whether the applicant has submitted sufficient credible evidence to meet his burden of establishing continuous unlawful residence in the United States during the requisite period. Here, the applicant has failed to meet this burden.

The record shows that the applicant submitted a Form I-687 application and Supplement to Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) on May 27, 2005. At part #30 of the Form I-687 application where applicants were asked to list all residences in the United States since first entry, the applicant indicated that he lived at [REDACTED] California from September 1980 until April 1997.

In support of his application, the applicant submitted the following documentation that relates to the relevant period:

- Affidavit from [REDACTED] dated April 30, 2005. The affiant stated that he has personally known the applicant since he came to the United States in 1980 and that the applicant and his parents lived with [REDACTED] at his home at [REDACTED] in San Diego from 1980 until 1996. His statement is accompanied by his California driver’s license which indicates the Nute Way address and his social security card. The district director noted that the affiant asserted in his initial affidavit that the applicant had worked for him in his flower shop but that this was not credible since the applicant was only four years old in 1980. The affiant, on appeal, submitted an additional explanation

that it was actually the applicant's mother who was employed by the affiant's business, not the applicant himself. Given this discrepancy, the affidavit will be given little weight.

- The second affidavit submitted was from [REDACTED] who indicated that he is a United States citizen residing in Los Angeles, California. The affiant stated that he has known the applicant since 1981 when he met the applicant and his parents at his Catholic book store. The affiant does not indicate the frequency of contact that he has had with the applicant since their initial meeting, nor does he specifically state that he has personal knowledge that the applicant has resided in the United States continuously since 1981. This affidavit will be given nominal weight.

Based upon a review of the affidavits described above, the director denied the application for temporary residence on September 5, 2006. In denying the application, the director found that the applicant failed to establish that he has resided continuously in the United States for the duration of the requisite period. Citing the affidavits submitted, the director noted that the affidavits lack credibility and are not able to be verified. Thus, the director determined that the applicant had failed to meet his burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence.

On appeal, the applicant asserts that he is eligible for the benefit sought. He submits a written letter in support of his appeal in which he explains that the director erred in concluding that the affidavit submitted from [REDACTED] is not credible. The applicant explains that the inconsistencies noted by the director including the fact that the affiant indicated that [REDACTED] worked at his shop are easily resolved. He also submits a second affidavit from Mr. [REDACTED] that corroborates his claims on appeal.

As stated above, the "preponderance of the evidence" standard requires that the evidence demonstrate that the applicant's claim is "probably true," where the determination of "truth" is made based on the factual circumstances of each individual case. *Matter of E-M-*, 20 I&N Dec. 77, 79-80 (Comm. 1989). In evaluating the evidence, *Matter of E-M-* also stated that "[t]ruth is to be determined not by the quantity of evidence alone but by its quality." *Id.* Thus, in adjudicating the application pursuant to the preponderance of the evidence standard, the director must examine each piece of evidence for relevance, probative value, and credibility, both individually and within the context of the totality of the evidence, to determine whether the fact to be proven is probably true. In the instant case, the applicant has only submitted one affidavit to establish his residency in the United States since he was a small child.

Additionally, the AAO has completed a de novo review¹ of the record of proceedings and notes that on January 22, 2001 the applicant was ordered removed from the United States under 8

¹ An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. See *Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States*, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043

U.S.C. 1225(b)(1); and section 212(a) (6)(C)(ii) and 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(II) of the INA. Pursuant to section 245A(b)(2)(A) of the Act, the applicant's deportation rendered him inadmissible as an immigrant and consequently ineligible for temporary resident status under section 245A(4)(A) of the Act.

The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and alternative basis for denial. The burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The petitioner has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. This decision constitutes a final notice of ineligibility.